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December 1944: Eisenhower, Bradley, and the Calculated Risk in the Ardennes

JOHN NELSON RICKARD

Abstract
The purpose of this article is to investigate the claim made by both Eisenhower and Bradley that they had taken a calculated risk in weakly holding the Ardennes sector of the Allied line in December 1944. Specifically, the degree of "calculation" is subjected to critical analysis. The scope of the investigation covers the decision-making process of Eisenhower and Bradley prior to the German counteroffensive on 16 December. Their calculation of the risks involved is tested against the estimate of the situation, the key planning tool used by commanders to logically consider all aspects of a military problem. The objectives of the article are to assess how they conceptualized the risk in the Ardennes and to ascertain whether or not they actually had a plan for dealing with a large-scale German attack there. The results of the investigation prove that Eisenhower's chosen line of action, to leave the Ardennes weakly defended, did not promise success regardless of what the enemy did. Moreover, it proves that Bradley's estimate of the situation was faulty and that he did not have an army group-level plan to deal with the possibility of a major German effort against his weakly held front in the Ardennes.

Keywords
Ardennes; Battle of the Bulge; Bradley, Lieutenant General Omar N.; calculated risk; counteroffensive; Eifel; Eisenhower, General Dwight D.; essential elements of information; estimate of the situation; intelligence; Meuse River; Sixth Panzer Army; Ultra

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Introduction

On 16 December 1944 Adolf Hitler launched a massive counteroffensive to regain the strategic initiative in the West. Three German armies totaling some twenty-eight divisions struck Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges' First United States Army. Heaviest hit were the 99th Infantry Division of Major General Leonard T. Gerow's V Corps and the three and a half divi-

sions of Major General Troy H. Middleton's badly overstretched VIII Corps deployed across the Ardennes. In eight days the Fifth Panzer Army spearhead penetrated sixty miles and stood within five miles of the Meuse River crossing at Dinant. It took six weeks of grim combat in terrible winter conditions and the commitment of 600,000 mostly American troops to win the "Battle of the Bulge" and push the Germans back to the West Wall. The cost of victory was heavy – more than 80,000 American casualties alone.[1]

In explaining this serious setback only five months before the war's end, the Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and commander of the U.S. Twelfth Army Group, Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, claimed that they had taken a "calculated risk" that the Germans would initiate no offensive action in the Ardennes. They further claimed to have made contingency plans if risk became reality. Risk is certainly inherent in any military operation, but the surprise, scale, breadth, depth, and duration of the German counteroffensive was clearly not anticipated by Eisenhower and Bradley. This article seeks to investigate how they thought through the military problem of defending the Ardennes sector with minimal force and their response in the event that their assessment of German intentions was wrong.

Analytical Framework

To properly assess the calculated risk, the fundamentals of the estimate of the situation – a planning tool used by commanders at all levels to logically "work" a military problem and reach a decision – will be used. The 1941 edition of FM 100-5 *Field Service Regulations: Operations* declared that the commander's estimate of the situation was "based on the mission, the means available to him and to the enemy, the conditions in his area of operations including terrain and weather and the probable effects of various lines of action on future operations." On the basis of these factors, the commander then had to consider

> the lines of action open to him which, if successful, will accomplish the mission and the lines of action of which the enemy is physically capable … He analyzes the opposing lines of action, one against the other, to arrive at conclusions as to the probability of success for each of his own lines of action. On the basis of this analysis he then considers the relative advantages and disadvantages of his own lines of ac-

1. The author would like to thank Dr. Roger Cirillo for his invaluable assistance in preparing this article.

There are wide discrepancies in totaling the casualties. The official history gives total American casualties as 75,482 with 8,407 killed, 47,170 wounded, and 20,905 missing, but this was a quick compilation prepared for Eisenhower during the battle. Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1989), p. 396. George Forty suggest the figure of 81,834 in *The Reich's Last Gamble: Hitler's Ardennes Offensive, 1944* (London: Cassell, 2000), p. 10.

tion, and selects that line of action *which most promises success regardless of what the enemy may do* [emphasis added].[2]

An enemy's capabilities equated to his possible lines of action, but did not always dictate his mission or *most likely* line of action.

Documentary Limitations

The historian investigating this subject is at an immediate disadvantage because Eisenhower did not prepare a written estimate of the situation. American commanders generally preferred to do a mental estimate.[3] American doctrine recommended this when time was short and decisions had to be made quickly. However, when time permitted, as it did before the Ardennes counteroffensive, a written estimate was preferred because it permitted a greater degree of analysis. Moreover, it ensured that due consideration was given to all the factors bearing on any given situation.[4] A commander's written estimate was built on the specialized estimates of the principal staff officers. The Assistant Chief-of-Staff G-3 (Operations) at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), Major General Harold R. Bull, oversaw current operations and developed future ones through the Planning Staff. He would provide an estimate of the friendly situation while the Assistant Chief-of-Staff G-2 (Intelligence), Major General Kenneth W.D. Strong, provided an analysis of the enemy situation in an *Intelligence Estimate*. Neither Bull nor Strong, however, prepared any written estimates in this instance. According to doctrine, staff estimates were presented orally or in conference, and Eisenhower preferred this method. Strong only felt compelled to commit an estimate to paper when it was "essential that something should appear on the record."[5]

The estimate of the situation was primarily driven by intelligence that had

2. FM 100-5 was updated in June 1944. The section on the estimate was actually shorter than that found in the previous edition, but there was little change in the essentials. War Department, FM 100-5, *Field Service Regulations: Operations*, 22 May 1941, p. 25; War Department, FM 100-5, *Field Service Regulations: Operations*, 15 June 1944, pp. 35-36, United States Army Heritage and Education Center (USAHEC), Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

3. Roger Cirillo to author, 2 February 2008. In British practice, full estimates were produced only when needed, but the American system required systematic reports. The American army produced a daily *Periodic Report* and the consequent requirement to fill in all the blanks invariably meant, according to one Ultra representative, that "people tend to read them that way." Interview with Adolph G. Rosengarten, Jr., 22 December 1947, Forrest C. Pogue Interviews, USAHEC.

4. War Department, FM 101-5, *Staff Officers' Field Manual: The Staff and Combat Orders*, 19 August 1940, p. 128, USAHEC. Lucien K. Truscott, Jr. believed that the British staff procedures were very good. "I was always impressed with the care taken to insure that a final paper represented accurately the considered views of the committee, [and] the careful selection of words to express exact shades of meaning." *Command Missions: A Personal Story* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990), p. 32.

5. Ibid., p. 37; Major General Sir Kenneth Strong, *Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969), p. 118.

been collected and evaluated, but it is important to understand that Eisenhower was not authorized to task intelligence assets on his own. He and Strong were consumers, not producers, of intelligence. Strong received high-level intelligence directly from two main sources: the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department in Washington and high-grade signals intelligence known as Ultra directly from the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (JIC) of the British Chiefs of Staff (COS) in London. The JIC received processed Ultra decrypts from the Government Code and Cypher School (CG&CS) at Bletchley Park. In fact, the British provided Eisenhower the bulk of his intelligence needs.[6] Even when Strong established a mirror organization, the JIC (SHAEF), in July 1944 to be the sole producer of intelligence appreciations for the Planning Staff, he still had to rely on the British to furnish Ultra and the lower levels of command to provide traditional types of battlefield intelligence.[7]

Eisenhower relied on Strong and his G-2 section, comprising almost 600 officers and men, to provide him with timely and accurate intelligence upon which to base his decisions. The most important intelligence product utilized by Strong was the SHAEF *Intelligence Digest*. These documents were numbered sequentially and were issued daily according to the G-2 List "E," a very limited distribution. Strong declared that the army groups "and other recipients" destroyed them on purpose as soon as they had made use of them and the two copies kept for the record at SHAEF and in London were apparently destroyed after the war by accident.[8] However, copies are in the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas as well as the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. Strong also declared that these *Digests* were classified as Top Secret, but the Abilene documents are classified Secret.[9] The *Digests* contained the most critical and timely intelligence presumably based on Ultra, because Part Four of each document is titled "Information from War Department and War Office," while Part Five is "Movement" based on "Information from Secret Sources."

The *Digests* were supplemented by the SHAEF *Weekly Intelligence Summary*, a Secret document issued on a wider distribution by Strong to keep

6. Stephen E. Ambrose, "Eisenhower and the Intelligence Community in World War II," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (January 1981), p. 154.
7. F.H. Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations*, III, Part 2 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1988), p. 751. Strong's equivalent in the War Department was Major General Clayton L. Bissell. Other British agencies that fed intelligence to the JIC included Air Intelligence (a department of the Air Ministry) and Military Intelligence (MI) 14. Strong also communicated directly with the Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office and exchanged views on Ultra signals with his intelligence counterparts in London by way of the RUBY series through the Special Communications Unit (SCU)/Special Liaison Unit (SLU) link.
8. Strong, *Intelligence at the Top*, pp. 238-39. A search for the Digests was conducted in WO 106 and WO 160, but none were found.
9. Roger Cirillo has indicated that the *Digests* in the National Archives are classified Top Secret, but have the same format and content as the Abilene documents.

those individuals and organizations not directly concerned with operations in touch with events. However, he claimed that the summaries had "little or no operational significance" because highly classified information was excluded and they were already out of date by the time they were distributed.[10] A critical difference between the *Intelligence Summary* and the *Intelligence Estimate* was that the former lacked the analysis of lines of action and did not have a statement of relative probability of the enemy adopting a certain line of action when it could be justified.

Eisenhower's Estimate of the Situation

Eisenhower's ability to maximize the estimate process was degraded by his limited sense of front line conditions. He visited his forward commanders as much as he could, but SHAEF was located well back at Versailles near Paris and his political responsibilities imposed on his day-to-day command responsibilities. Revealingly, on 13 October he told Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery that no single commander could "stay so close to the day to day movement of divisions and corps that he can keep a 'battle grip' upon the overall situation and direct it intelligently." He added that his function was "adjusting the larger boundaries" to facilitate the tasks of the army groups. In fact, he demonstrated some difficulty adjusting to such a wide span of control and his directives lacked precision and a clear thought process.[11]

Historians have covered Eisenhower's strategy after Normandy in great detail and only a bare outline is required here. On 19 August he ordered the armies across the Seine River on a broad front in pursuit of the Germans. He did so in part because he calculated that a broad front advance north and south of the Ardennes was the best way to stretch the Germans and keep them from concentrating. However, he could not ignore American public opinion that wanted to see American forces on center stage and removed from British command. Montgomery strenuously resisted the dispersal of Allied strength and persistently advocated a concentrated thrust north of the Ardennes toward the Ruhr, Germany's most important industrial region. Thus was born the "Broad Front" versus "Single Thrust" controversy that persisted throughout the Fall. Eisenhower's solution, as expressed in his 28 October Directive to his army group commanders, was to provide Montgomery support from Bradley's army group. However, Bradley was also ordered to direct Patton's Third Army south of the Ardennes towards Ger-

10. Strong, *Intelligence at the Top*, p. 239. The American official historian, Forrest C. Pogue, does not cite a single *Digest* source in the footnotes of his history of Eisenhower's command because of the security protocols still in place to protect Ultra. Indeed, he was not even aware of Ultra. Pogue's account is based entirely on the Summaries of SHAEF, Twelfth Army Group, and the Periodic Reports of the armies, and the detailed study of available intelligence records prepared by Royce L. Thompson.

11. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., ed., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years*, Vol. IV (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 2222-23; Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell, *Coalitions, Politicians and Generals: Some Aspects of Command in Two World Wars* (London: Brassey's, 1993), pp. 239, 291.

many's second most important industrial region, the Saar.[12]

Eisenhower's ambitious intention to defeat the Germans west of the Rhine and cross that river by the end of 1944 proved unrealistic as a direct result of his failure to concentrate his combat power and the near collapse of logistical support. In early September American forces were already at Aachen on the German border, 200 miles beyond Paris. OVERLORD planners had anticipated being there only on D + 330 or May 1945.[13] On the eve of the Ardennes counteroffensive the Allied armies were deployed from the North Sea coast to Switzerland, some 500 miles, a frontage described by the American official historians as "excessively broad."[14] Nevertheless, Eisenhower decided to keep up limited attacks towards the Rhine until logistical preparations allowed for a final, all out offensive in January 1945. As he candidly admitted in his 1948 memoir, *Crusade in Europe*, he was employing every means to "continue the offensive to the *extreme limit* [emphasis added] of our ability." The result of Bradley's broad front, dual thrust advance within his own army group, however, was a subsistence level economy of force in the Ardennes that was never corrected during the Fall. It was this obvious and persistent area of weakness that continued to fix Hitler's attention. Eisenhower admitted after the war that his line was "badly stretched," but accepted full responsibility arguing that "risks had to be taken somewhere."[15]

On the eve of the German counteroffensive, Eisenhower had seventy Allied divisions, including forty-five American, deployed from north to south in the following army groups:

British 21st Army Group[16] (Montgomery): 15 divisions
- First Canadian Army
- Second British Army

U.S. 12th Army Group (Bradley): 30 Divisions
- Ninth U.S. Army
- First U.S. Army
- Third U.S. Army

U.S. Sixth Army Group (Devers): 18 Divisions
- Seventh U.S. Army
- First French Army

* In U.K.: Headquarters – First Allied Airborne Army

Note: Theater reserve, two divisions; unassigned, five divisions

12. Chandler, *Eisenhower*, Vol. IV, pp. 2258-59.
13. Roland G. Ruppenthal, *Logistical Support of the Armies*, Vol. II, *September 1944 – May 1945* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1987), p. 6.
14. Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1968), p. 813.
15. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1948), pp. 337, 340; Chandler, *Eisenhower*, Vol. IV, p. 2417.
16. Eisenhower actually referred to them as the North, Central, and Southern Groups of Armies to avoid nationalistic connotations.

His theater reserve, XVIII Airborne Corps, consisted of the American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions – two lightly armed divisions resting and refitting near Reims after suffering heavy losses in Operation MARKET GARDEN and subsequent fighting under Montgomery's command. Three American divisions, the 11th Armored, 17th Airborne, and 66th Infantry Divisions, and the British 6th Airborne Division were in England and the American 94th Infantry Division was in Brittany covering German forts that refused to surrender. This aggregate Allied force was powerful, but the triple aggravating factors of the broad front advance, a serious shortage of ammunition and a dwindling pool of infantrymen imposed considerable physical limitations. Still, Eisenhower correctly calculated that the means at his disposal exceeded the means at the disposal of the enemy.

In *Weekly Intelligence Summary* No. 38 for 10 December Strong identified seventy-one nominal divisions (including fifteen panzer/panzer grenadier) in the West, but calculated their actual strength as only thirty-seven divisions. Fifth Panzer Army's front was believed to extend from Muchen-Gladbach to just south of Aachen. Seventh Army, with headquarters at Münstereifel due east of Monschau, was believed to be covering the sector from just south of Aachen to Trier. Both armies, old adversaries from Normandy, were considered virtually combat ineffective and not capable of sustained offensive action. Ultra provided consistent intelligence on the large-scale German troop movements into and out of the forested Eifel region opposite the Ardennes.[17] Strong's map of early December showed five *volksgrenadier* divisions opposite VIII Corps. Hitler had hurriedly raised these types of divisions in September. Eisenhower mistakenly called them *Volkssturm* (Home Guard) and as a result did not believe these "hastily trained" formations could act offensively.[18]

The only sizable German force close to the Ardennes that gave Eisenhower any pause was the Sixth Panzer Army, established by Hitler in mid-September to rehabilitate SS panzer divisions withdrawn from the line. Eisenhower claimed that SHAEF lost track of it in early December, but in *Weekly Intelligence Summary* No. 36 of 26 November Strong indicated that its formations were deployed west of the Rhine with a possible center of gravity southwest of Cologne possibly behind Seventh Army.[19] Its order of battle was thought to be known, consisting of I and II SS Panzer Corps with 1st, 2nd, 9th, and 12th SS Panzer Divisions. Strong calculated that as many as nine panzer and five infantry divisions were known to be at the front, but were all missing including such veteran formations as the Panzer Lehr,

17. Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, pp. 423, 434.
18. He mistakenly referred to them as *Volkssturm* in a 10 January 1945 message to Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall. Chandler, *Eisenhower*, Vol. IV, p. 2417.
19. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, p. 341; SHAEF *Weekly Intelligence Summary* No. 36, 26 November 1944, SHAEF Selected Records, 1943-1945, Accession 69-14, Box 10, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL), Abilene, Kansas. *Weekly Intelligence Summary* No. 38 shows two SS panzer divisions north and two south of Cologne.

116th Panzer, 2nd Panzer, 10th SS Panzer, 3rd *Fallschirmjäger*, and 3rd Panzer Grenadier Divisions.[20]

The German panzer formations withdrawn from the front represented a considerable striking force, but Eisenhower correctly appreciated the critical state of German fuel supplies. The discovery of German measures to conserve fuel may have been incorrectly interpreted as the result of scarcity, rather than the intent to stockpile for an offensive, but Strong had accurately calculated that the operational radius of a sizable German mechanized force was only 120-150 miles based on known fuel stocks.[21] He had also declared in *Weekly Intelligence Summary* No. 34 of 12 November that although Sixth Panzer Army was formidable, it could not stage a "true counter-offensive" because it lacked the size and reserves of fuel.[22]

Table 1: SHAEF Appreciation of German Strength in the West, December 1944

	Pz/PG Nominal	= Pz/PG (Actual)	Infantry Nominal	= Infantry (Actual)
Army Group H				
Fifteenth Army	–	–	5	2 ⅔
First Parachute Army	–	–	5	2 ⅔
Army Group B				
Fifth Panzer Army	5	2	7	2 ⅔
Sixth SS Panzer Army	4	3	–	–
Seventh Army	–	–	10	5 ⅓
Army Group G				
First Army	5	2	8	4
Nineteenth Army	–	–	8	2 ⅓
TOTAL in line or immediate reserve	**14**	**7**	**43**	**19 ⅔**
Trans and Unlocated	1	½	7	4 ⅓
Defense Works and L of C	–	–	5	2
Fortresses	–	–	1	2
TOTAL	**15**	**7 ½**	**56**	**28**

Source: SHAEF *Weekly Intelligence Summary* No. 38, 10 December 1944.

The hard facts about German fuel limitations probably made Eisenhower's willingness to risk economy of force in the Ardennes easier, and even more so when factored with an appreciation of the Ardennes terrain. FM 100-5 declared that terrain "often exercises a decisive influence" on a commander's

20. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, p. 341; Strong, *Intelligence at the Top*, p. 211.
21. Ralph Bennett, *Ultra in the West: The Normandy Campaign of 1944-45* (London: Hutchinson, 1979), p. 172; Strong, *Intelligence at the Top*, p. 212.
22. SHAEF *Weekly Intelligence Summary* No. 34, 12 November 1944, DDEL. Strong did not address the probability of the Germans capturing American fuel in the *Summaries*. He later said that they probably had enough fuel for immediate operations, but would have needed to capture American dumps to go farther. *Intelligence at the Top*, p. 212.

decision and "Proper evaluation and utilization of the terrain reduces the disadvantage of incomplete information of the enemy."[23] An orthodox analysis based on the staff manual in use at the time would have led any commander to conclude that the Ardennes, although permitting administrative, mechanized road movement, was poor for the full deployment of mechanized forces to conduct combat operations. Circumstances were different than in May 1940 when the Germans executed a route march through the region in good weather before coming to grips with the French Army. In December 1944 the weather was abysmal and American forces were in place.

Strong did not prepare any topographical analysis of the Ardennes prior to the attack, but his appreciation of the ground was evident in *Weekly Intelligence Summary* No. 40 of 24 December. The general orientation of the terrain was Northeast to Southwest and three large areas of marshland, the Hohes Venn in the north, the Laroche-Vielsalm area in the center, and the St. Hubert Forest in the south posed considerable impediments to conducting combat operations. The area behind V and VIII Corps had steep, tortuous valleys along the Amblève, Ourthe, Sûre, Wiltz, and Clerf rivers and their numerous tributaries. The few good roads ran north-south, not east-west. Strong observed that the ground was "very difficult for military operations." He noted that it presented considerable difficulty for the Germans attacking, but was quick to add that it also posed great difficulty for American forces in trying to "break up" the German attack.[24] This later deduction was important and should have been included in the commander's estimate of the situation. Eisenhower's sense of the defensive value of the terrain was bolstered by the deteriorating Fall weather.

Eisenhower's deductions about the enemy's intent flowed from an appreciation of the enemy's physical means and their relationship to the terrain. Strong declared in his 10 December *Summary* No. 38 that the Germans faced two major problems, the defense of the Saar and the Ruhr. Under enemy capabilities he declared:

> There can be no option for the enemy but to fight hard for the SAAR without, however, prejudicing his position further [*sic*] NORTH. In the COLOGNE – DUSSELDORF sector, Sixth SS Panzer Army has been cleverly husbanded and remains uncommitted. And until this army is committed, we cannot really feel satisfied … we cannot expect anything else but continued reinforcement: hard and bloody fighting; every sort of defense … It will be a bitter and hard struggle to reach the RHINE.[25]

Strong's assessment convinced Eisenhower and the Supreme Commander extrapolated that the enemy's *most likely* intent, or line of action, would be to launch a *tactical* counterattack with Sixth Panzer Army (not a *strategic*

23. FM 100-5, p. 26; FM 101-5, Appendix II, Terrain Appreciation.
24. SHAEF *Weekly Intelligence Summary* No. 40, 24 December 1944, DDEL.
25. SHAEF *Weekly Intelligence Summary* No. 38, 10 December 1944, DDEL.

counteroffensive) once Ninth and First Armies crossed the Roer River.[26] The possible lines of action for such a counterattack included Northwest and North staged from the Eifel area. There was considerable evidence at hand to reinforce Strong's logic. Ninth and First Armies had been hit hard by several heavy counterattacks as they probed toward the Roer and between 16 November and 16 December they suffered 31,000 combined casualties.

Strong did not identify a counteroffensive as a possible line of action in his *Summary* No. 38, but he claimed in a post-war interview with Forrest C. Pogue that he had informed Eisenhower and Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, SHAEF Chief of Staff, in early December that the reforming panzer divisions could be used to "stage a relieving attack through the Ardennes," most likely when six days of bad weather grounded Allied air power.[27] Eisenhower made no mention of any anxiety about possible German activity in the Ardennes in his 3 December report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCOS), but he did question Bradley at Maastricht four days later about Hodges' vulnerability in the area.[28] Bradley must have made a compelling case because Eisenhower ordered no alterations in the existing deployments. He, like all American commanders, was wary of telling his subordinates "how" to carry out their missions.[29] Strong's post-war statement to Pogue is supported by his 13 December exchange of ideas with London where he declared that "some relieving attack" was possible in the Ardennes if the numerous *volksgrenadier* divisions identified there did not soon begin to move off to active fronts. The next day Strong distributed a Top Secret *Intelligence Digest* indicating one possible German line of action was a "re-

26. Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, p. 364; Harry C. Butcher, *My Three Years with Eisenhower* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1946), p. 714. This was the appreciation of the G-2 Division in the War Department as well. They fixated on the ability of the Germans to withdraw their armored divisions into local reserve in order to commit them to sharp and brief encounters against American penetrations. Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, 4 December 1944, p. 11, USAHEC. A PW on 6 December indicated that the SS divisions in reserve, supported by the *Luftwaffe*, would execute such a counterattack when the Americans crossed the Roer. SHAEF *Digest* #189, 12 December 1944, SHAEF Selected Records, Box 6, DDEL.

27. Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, p. 365.

28. Chandler, *Eisenhower*, Vol. IV, pp. 2328-32; Stephen E. Ambrose, *The Supreme Commander* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970), p. 552. While traveling through the area on his way to meet Montgomery at Maastricht on 7 December, Eisenhower observed that the relative weakness of American forces there might invite a "nasty little Kasserine." Even Marshall had questioned the weakness in the area during a trip to the front on 11 October. Charles B. MacDonald, *A Time for Trumpets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge* (New York: William Morrow, 1985), p. 73; Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory* (New York: The Viking Press, 1973), p. 484.

29. Immediately before MARKET-GARDEN he apparently sent Bedell Smith to Brussells to warn Montgomery of the potential threat of German armor to the airborne landings. Montgomery brushed aside the warning and Eisenhower told Smith that he could not tell Montgomery how to dispose of his divisions. Harold C. Deutsch, "Commanding Generals and the Uses of Intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. III, No. 3 (1988), p. 246.

lieving attack" in the Ardennes.[30]

Eisenhower had no choice but to later admit that Strong had definitely highlighted the possibility of an attack through the Ardennes. Bedell Smith claimed that Eisenhower clearly understood that the German High Command "might attempt a desperate gamble," but such phraseology implies an all-out counteroffensive.[31] Strong indicated a "relieving attack," a term with a far different meaning in the military lexicon than a counteroffensive. A relieving attack sought to take pressure off a portion of one's own front by attacking the enemy elsewhere. A spoiling attack sought to preempt an enemy attack at the point of execution. The key is that both a relieving and a spoiling attack were limited in scale, duration, and depth of penetration and were characterized by a rational mission and a limited objective.

Based on what he understood at the time, Eisenhower was satisfied that he knew the enemy's *most likely* intent, but FM 100-5 clearly recommended caution. In considering the enemy's possible lines of action, it declared that the commander "must guard against the unwarranted belief that he has discovered the enemy's intentions, and against ignoring other lines of action open to the enemy."[32] Even when the evidence supported the belief that the enemy was committed to a definite line of action, the commander had to bear in mind that the enemy could change his plans at any time.

Colonel Edwin E. Schwien, an instructor at the Command and General Staff College before the war, elaborated on the problematic nature of "predictive" intelligence in *Combat Intelligence: Its Acquisition and Transmission*:

> So long as the intention of the enemy commander is only an intention and has not yet been translated into action, how can we discover it if he does not actually tell us? Going a step further, even when this intention is indicated to us by some invisible or exterior manifestation how can we say we have determined "the most probable enemy action?"[33]

Certainly, Eisenhower would have been best served by a definitive statement from Strong saying that Sixth Panzer Army would attack at Location X at time Y like the forewarning he received of the Mortain counterattack in

30. However, Strong also stated that the W/T silence ordered for all SS formations did not necessarily indicate an imminent counteroffensive. RUBY/SH 173, 13 December 1944 in Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, p. 436; Strong, *Intelligence at the Top*, p. 212. SHAEF *Digest* #191 of 14 December makes no such observation.

31. Walter Bedell Smith, *Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions: Europe 1944-1945* (New York: Longman's, Green & Company, 1956), p. 91. In 1947 Bedell Smith declared that "we thought it would come in the Ardennes or near Strasbourg." Pogue interview with Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, 8 May 1947, Pogue Interviews, USAHEC.

32. FM 100-5, p. 26.

33. Colonel Edwin E. Schwien, *Combat Intelligence: Its Acquisition and Transmission* (Washington, DC: The Infantry Journal Press, 1936), p. 20.

Normandy.[34] However, such precision was unlikely. According to Colonel Oscar W. Koch, Patton's G-2, the role of senior intelligence officers was to indicate "what the enemy *could* do and let the commander gamble on which of those alternatives the enemy would choose." In other words, capabilities took priority over probabilities in a G-2's Intelligence Estimate. "Gamble" is perhaps a poor choice of words, for it implies that American commanders did not at least consider the important aspects of a military problem.[35] The fact of the matter is that Eisenhower did not have to be one hundred percent accurate – that is increasingly the burden borne by modern commanders. The estimate of the situation, properly utilized, allowed for contingency planning in case he was wrong. As Colonel Schwien observed, the inability to predict perfectly enemy intentions "necessitates the formulation of a number of variants or alternate plans which can be adopted to meet any possible [enemy] reaction."[36]

Although Eisenhower was inclined to accept the likelihood of some type of limited attack in the Ardennes, he claimed that he had no options except passing over to the defense to "make our lines absolutely secure from attack while we awaited reinforcements."[37] This all or nothing argument misrepresents the way his divisions were employed at the time. Clearly, the lack of a larger theater reserve was a problem. On 12 December he was in London to explain his strategy to Churchill and the British COS. Eisenhower talked of establishing a General Reserve, but when the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Alan F. Brooke, pressed him on where he would, or could, locate it, General Sir Frank Simpson recalled that Eisenhower was "clearly not sure about that."[38] However, it is apparent that a greater reserve could have been

34. Bennett, *Ultra in the West*, p. 119; Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, pp. 238, 246. Some authors suggest that Ultra gave no explicit forewarning. See Mark J. Reardon, *Victory at Mortain: Stopping Hitler's Panzer Counteroffensive* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), p. 93.

35. Oscar W. Koch, *G-2: Intelligence for Patton* (Philadelphia: Whitmore Publishing, 1971), p. 109. However, the template for a G-2's *Intelligence Estimate* listed capabilities followed immediately by a discussion paragraph. For example, Middleton's G-2, Colonel Andrew Reeves, concluded in the discussion paragraph of his *Estimate* No. 13 of 29 December 1944 that "it is very probable" that the Germans would react defensively to an VIII Corps advance. Reeves' discussion paragraph, however, was only a few lines long, and hardly bore the mark of detailed analysis. In this sense, he was really leaving it up to Middleton to choose between the listed capabilities. RG 407, Entry 427, 208-7.2 1 Dec 44 to 208-7.2 Jan 45, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (NARA II). Post-war analysis of American intelligence revealed dissatisfaction with the role of the G-2. See Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert A. Lovett, "Report of Committee Appointed by the Secretary of War to Study War Department Intelligence Activities," Memorandum for Secretary of War, Washington, D.C., 5 December 1945, USAHEC.

36. Schwien, *Combat Intelligence*, p. 23.

37. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, p. 340.

38. Simpson quoted in Nigel Hamilton, *Monty: The Field Marshal, 1944-1976* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986), pp. 172-73. Simpson was the Director of Military Operations at the War Office.

accumulated. Bradley could not fully deploy all his combat power assembled on the left flank of his army group because of the realities of the ground. Indeed, on 13 December Eisenhower told Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall that Bradley's advance was held up because of the flooded conditions of the Roer River, rather than any lack of strength. Only ten of the seventeen divisions available could be deployed at one time.[39] The deduction from this admission is that Eisenhower did not have to suspend all offensive operations to reinforce the Ardennes. A few divisions stacked up in the Aachen corridor could have been repositioned to reinforce VIII Corps without significantly eroding the depth and power of the main effort on Hodges' left flank.

It should be kept in mind that Eisenhower's apparent lack of options may have been intimately tied to the security of Ultra. Before D-Day, Marshall had given Eisenhower explicit direction to protect the source of Ultra at all costs. The GC&CS drafted the following: "When operational action is taken on the basis of Ultra intelligence, the utmost care must be taken, by means of proper cover, to insure that the action does not reveal or in any way suggest that this source of intelligence is at our disposal."[40] This aspect of Eisenhower's calculated risk has not received much attention, but even a cursory analysis suggests that he would have been pushing the security protocol to the limit had he in early December suddenly ordered combat-ready divisions into the Ardennes equal to the assessed threat. The move would have certainly caused great suspicion in Hitler's mind about the secrecy of the operation, particularly after the front had been quiet for so long. Despite the danger, it is not unreasonable to assume that some form of cover could have been devised to augment VIII Corps' defenses. The use of deception by the Allies at the operational level in the Fall, however, lacked the imagination and sophistication characteristic of NEPTUNE.[41] This was unfortunate because it coincided with the decline in the effectiveness of Ultra due to the stringent security measures Hitler instituted for the counteroffensive.

Summary of Eisenhower's Deductions

Several of Eisenhower's deductions made sense at the time. He correctly deduced that the German Army would be vulnerable if it left the relative protection of the West Wall to retake ground. The belief that any westward penetration would be contained on the flanks was also valid; Field Marshal Walter Model, commander of Army Group B, had made the same argument to Hitler. What Eisenhower did not consider, however, were the implications of a wide penetration (the actual straight line distance between Monschau and Echternach was fifty miles) and what that meant for American counteraction

39. Eisenhower repeated this reasoning to Marshall on 10 January 1945. Chandler, *Eisenhower*, Vol. IV, pp. 2341, 2417, 2445.
40. Marshall to Eisenhower, 15 March 1944, SRH-026, RG 457, Box 14, NARA II; F.W. Winterbotham, *The Ultra Secret* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974), pp. 88-89.
41. Anthony Cave Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 796.

from the flanks. It is also difficult to argue with his assessment that no Allied strategic objective was threatened in the Ardennes. He correctly appreciated that Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, Commander-in-Chief West, assessed German capabilities in similar fashion, and would conduct a cautious defense. Most importantly, Eisenhower concluded that the sheer scale of effort required for a counteroffensive in the Ardennes was beyond German resources after the massive losses in Normandy and on the Eastern Front in 1944.

Eisenhower's assessment of enemy intentions was further conditioned by German deception operations for the counteroffensive. The codename for the operation, *WACHT AM RHEIN* (Watch on the Rhine), did not appear in the Ultra signals because Hitler forbid its use over the telephone or Wireless Telegraphy (W/T). However, *ABWEHRSCHLACHT IM WESTEN* (Defensive Battle in the West) was a codename purposely disseminated through German radio traffic to reinforce the defensive nature of the fighting around Aachen and the intention to employ Sixth Panzer Army in a counterattack role west of the Rhine.[42] Tracking the various armies was also problematic because each had a cover name and the Germans made it a complex game of hide and seek. Sixth Panzer Army was "Rest and Refit Staff 16," Fifth Panzer Army was "*Jagerkommando zbV*," and Fifteenth Army was "*Gruppe von Manteuffel*."[43] The Germans deserve considerable credit for executing a comprehensive deception plan that reinforced Eisenhower's belief that the German Army was virtually crippled.

Eisenhower's real "calculation" did not occur until the Verdun conference on 19 December where definitive plans to deal with the penetration were hammered out with Bradley and Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers, commander of the U.S. Sixth Army Group. Indeed, the mere fact that the Verdun meeting had to be held at all proves there was no real planning completed prior to the German attack. Though Eisenhower made some sound deductions, the problem with his mental estimate is this: he had a gut feeling that something could happen in the Ardennes, allowed the weakness in the Ardennes to persist throughout the Fall and thus invited something to happen, and never forced Bradley to produce an army group contingency plan (built on Hodges' own plan) for rapid deployment of a mix of formations from the flanks in case something did happen.

Bradley's Estimate of the Situation

Bradley's "calculated risk" requires a different level of analysis because he was closer to the threat and thought in terms of armies, corps, and divisions

42. Bennett, *Ultra in the West*, p. 175; Danny S. Parker, *Battle of the Bulge: Hitler's Ardennes Offensive, 1944-1945* (Philadelphia: Combined Books, 1991), p. 39.

43. Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, p. 432. SHAEF does not seem to have been fooled by the German link of "Gruppe von Manteuffel" with Fifteenth Army. G-2 observed that "For some unknown reason Fifth Pz Army now seems to be using this title." SHAEF *Digest* #188, 11 December 1944.

rather than the entire front and therefore should have had a better feel for the enemy than Eisenhower. By December, Bradley had thirty divisions in the following groupings from north to south:

Ninth Army (Simpson) – 6 Divisions
- XIX Corps
- XIII Corps

First Army (Hodges) – 14 Divisions
- VII Corps (6 divisions)
- V Corps (4 ½ divisions)
- VIII Corps (3 ½ divisions) Covering Ardennes

Third Army (Patton) – 10 Divisions
- XX Corps
- XII Corps
- III Corps

However, his front was 230 miles long and he had no army group reserve although he claimed in his 1951 memoir, *A Soldier's Story*, that he had identified certain divisions in different armies as reserves which could only be used with his consent.[44] His point of greatest weakness was VIII Corps consisting of 68,822 troops on a front far longer than that recommended by American doctrine.[45] Bradley, like Eisenhower, was gravely concerned about the ammunition and infantrymen shortage, but he still believed that he maintained overmatch against the German forces opposite him.

Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, Twelfth Army Group's Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, shaped Bradley's understanding of German capabilities. Neither Sibert nor the Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Brigadier General A. Franklin Kibler, prepared written staff estimates to build the commander's estimate because Bradley, like Eisenhower, did a mental one. Sibert's last *Weekly Intelligence Summary* before the attack, No. 18 issued on 12 December, stated that:

> attrition is steadily sapping the strength of German forces on the Western Front and … the crust of defense is thinner, more brittle and more vulnerable than it appears on our G-2 maps … The enemy's primary capabilities continue to relate to the employment of the Sixth SS Panzer Army … All of the enemy's major capabilities … depend on the balance between the rate of attrition imposed by the Allied offensives and the rate of [German] infantry reinforcements. The balance at present is in favor of the Allies.[46]

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44. Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1951), p. 464.
45. Hugh M. Cole, *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1989), p. 56.
46. Twelfth Army Group *Weekly Intelligence Summary* No. 18, 9 December 1944, Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Pogue, *The Supreme*

This document was in fact tainted. Sibert signed it, but Major Ralph Ingersoll, a former journalist before the war and a terrain specialist in Twelfth Army Group's Plans Section, wrote sections of it at Sibert's request to impart a measure of success to Bradley's November offensives that was not actually perceivable on the ground. In effect, Ingersoll, an intense Anglophobe, had put journalistic "spin" on it to "sell" Bradley's accomplishments during the Fall.[47] However, it simply reflected Bradley's preconceived notions about the diminished capabilities of his opponent after several months of attrition warfare.

In his 12 December *Weekly Intelligence Summary* Sibert assessed total German ground strength in the West facing all three Allied army groups as 289,500 men, 685 tanks and assault guns, and 225 artillery battalions.[48] He estimated three to four actual divisions (27,000 men with ninety tanks) opposite Lieutenant General William H. Simpson's Ninth Army and eight actual divisions (79,000 men with sixty-five tanks) opposite Hodges' First Army. Sibert highlighted "considerable movement" west and southwest of Prüm (about ten miles east of the Our River) on 7 December indicating a "possible regrouping" opposite Middleton.[49] Ultra decrypts revealing such movement were corroborated by aerial reconnaissance conducted by the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Group of IX Tactical Air Command. Although the weather was bad in the Ardennes and Eifel in the six weeks prior to the counteroffensive, Bradley did receive important intelligence from this source. The official air force historian declared that the reconnaissance missions consistently reported "a noticeable shift" in the enemy's activity in the Eifel.[50]

One problem in assessing Bradley's calculated risk is determining the scale of German attack he thought was possible at the time. In *A Soldier's Story* he claimed that he was thinking in terms of no more than six *volks-*

Command, p. 369, footnote 29.

47. Gerald Astor, *A Blood-Dimmed Tide: The Battle of the Bulge by the Men Who Fought It* (New York: Donald I. Fine, 1992), pp. 75-76. Ingersoll also worked on deception and served as a liaison officer.

48. Twelfth Army Group *Weekly Intelligence Summary* No. 18. 289,000 seems a very small total number. It is derived from adding up the total estimated personnel in the divisions and does not include non-divisional, corps, and army troops. When it is considered that the Germans were going into "deficit" by perhaps as much as five divisions a month in the face of the Allied offensives, the number cited by Strong does not seem that unreasonable. Moreover, it seems to fit with Niklas Zetterling's calculations that no more than 380,000 German troops were in Normandy by the time of COBRA in late July. *Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness* (Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz, 2000), p. 32. However, more work clearly needs to be done on force ratios on the Western Front in the fall of 1944.

49. Twelfth Army Group *Weekly Intelligence Summary* No. 18.

50. 242 of 361 missions flown by 67th Group were successful despite ten totally non-operational days between 17 November and 16 December. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, Vol. III, *Europe: Argument to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 673-81.

grenadier divisions and one panzer division, but this was based on what Sibert could physically identify across the Our River.[51] Sibert's 12 December Order of Battle map listed only six *volksgrenadier* divisions opposite VIII Corps' three and a half divisions between Losheim and Trier, while Middleton's G-2, Colonel Andrew Reeves, estimated four infantry divisions and 24,000 men opposite the corps. Bradley admitted that he had greatly underestimated the enemy's offensive capabilities and it was only when a wider view was taken that a larger potential threat appeared. Between Trier and Monschau, an area corresponding closely to the frontage of the actual attack on 16 December, Sibert's map showed twelve divisions including two SS panzer divisions.[52] Bradley should probably have asked himself what he would do if VIII Corps was hit by twelve divisions, not seven. Moreover, he never factored in the Sixth Panzer Army, estimated to have an aggregate strength of 32,000 men with 320 tanks and located behind the Roer.[53] Bradley clearly exhibited a degree of tunnel vision and failed to estimate the wider danger by thinking outside the box.[54]

Bradley's faith in his ability to hold up to seven German divisions was bolstered by the obvious defensive value of the terrain. Sibert, however, later observed that the element of surprise on 16 December was heightened "by the enemy's disregard of terrain in selecting the points of attack and threw his armored force into sectors considered ill-adapted for … tanks." He had identified the same tendency on another portion of the front a month earlier. In Twelfth Army Group *Periodic Report* #165 of 17 November he assessed the spoiling attack executed in late October by the 9th Panzer and 15th Panzer Grenadier Divisions against the British Second Army along the Noorder and Van Duerne Canals between Venlo and Eindhoven. It penetrated five miles through the Peel Marshes in two days. Sibert concluded that selecting the swamps west of the Meuse as a spot to employ two mechanized divisions "alerts us to the fact that the enemy cannot be trusted always to attack according to the 'book.'"[55] This was a sound deduction. Bradley was right about

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51. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, p. 459.
52. Strong's map showed only five: the 18th, 26th, 36th, 326th, and 352nd *Volksgrenadier* Divisions. Sibert's map showed the 18th, 26th, 212th, 277th, 326th, and 352nd *Volksgrenadier* Divisions.
53. Bradley's postwar declaration that his "plan" could have contained the "full weight" of Sixth Panzer Army now seems preposterous. *A General's Life* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), p. 354. This second memoir, which was written with the assistance of Clay Blair, is a very dubious source and should be used with great care.
54. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, p. 459. Patton, although fully absorbed with his own fight in Lorraine, sensed as early as 24 November that "the First Army is making a terrible mistake in leaving the VIII Corps static, as it is highly probable that the Germans are building up east of them." What Patton did not indicate was whether or not this build up was defensive or offensive in nature. Martin Blumenson, ed., *The Patton Papers*, Vol. II, *1940-1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), p. 582.
55. Twelfth Army Group *Weekly Intelligence Summary* No. 19, 17 December 1944, CARL, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Twelfth Army Group G-2 *Periodic Report* #165, Annex 2 and 3, 17 November 1944, RG 407, Entry 427, 99/12-2.1 Dec 44 to Jan 45 to

the Ardennes terrain, but significant gaps would invariably be created as VIII Corps formations attempted to execute a delay. As they withdrew, commanders would seek out the best tactical positions available. Good defensive ground only retains its value if troops can exploit it from behind obstacles, natural or manmade, which are covered by fire, backed up by mobile reserves proportional to the frontage held, and screened by defensive counter-reconnaissance. FM 100-5 declared that "reliance for protection against mechanized attack cannot be placed on terrain alone."[56] That was why it was so critical to build a proper estimate which included road standards, spatial considerations, corridor analysis, and march table analysis. The product of this staff work was a clearer understanding in the commander's mind of the strengths and weaknesses of any physical position or plan.

Sibert made another sound deduction from the Peel Marshes counterattack, but unfortunately Bradley does not seem to have absorbed it. In *Periodic Report* #165 Sibert observed that the Germans were capable of massing large forces "in an assembly area close to our lines without any of our sources being aware of it."[57] Here was an excellent deduction that should have played a key role in Bradley's estimate of the situation, but he was looking for an obvious concentration of German forces to trigger a new decision in the Ardennes. The Germans collected their assault formations in dispersed assembly areas well out of contact prior to an offensive.[58] Dispersed assembly areas allowed the Germans to maintain operational flexibility to meet contingencies and then surge forward out of staging areas to attack their chosen *schwerpunkt* (the center of gravity) – in this case VIII Corps – in distinct waves. Hitler had decreed that no assault divisions would be positioned closer than six miles from the Our River. This prevented them being identified by foot patrols from VIII Corps. American doctrine classified reconnaissance as "close" and "distant," but VIII Corps did not have the capability of conducting long-range or distant reconnaissance. A better appreciation of German doctrine may have helped Bradley penetrate the deception or at least spurred him to ask more questions.

Like Eisenhower, Bradley clearly believed the enemy's most likely line of action was to remain on the defensive and commit Sixth Panzer Army to a "knockdown battle" at the Roer. Bradley observed that the indicators of Rundstedt's "apparent intent" to counterattack at the Roer were "conspicuous," particularly when Sibert was telling him that the Germans were building additional trenches along the Roer River line.[59] Bradley conceded that although the buildup that he could physically account for opposite Middleton

99/12-2.1 Mar 45, NARA II.

56. FM 100-5, June 1944, p. 62.

57. Twelfth Army Group G-2 *Periodic Report* #165.

58. Milan Vego, "Clausewitz's Schwerpunkt: Mistranslated from German – Misunderstood in English," *Military Review*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (January-February 2007), p. 103.

59. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, pp. 441, 447-48; SHAEF *Weekly Intelligence Summary* No. 38.

was much heavier than Rundstedt required for security there, "we were too much addicted to the anticipation of counterattack on the Roer to credit the enemy with more fanciful or ambitious intentions." Here was an open admission that Bradley had abandoned the entire estimate process in mid-cycle. FM 100-5 declared that it was continuous "and changed conditions may, at any time, call for a new decision. Too stubborn an adherence to a previous decision may result in costly delay, loss of opportunity for decisive action, or outright failure."[60]

Bradley was not simply addicted to the possibility of a counterattack at the Roer. He also seemed obsessed with Patton's operations in the Saar to justify the American broad front strategy. Bradley's headquarters, EAGLE TAC, was in Luxembourg City, much closer to Third Army's secondary thrust than to the army group's supposed main effort north of the Ardennes. With such defensive concerns north of the Ardennes and offensive ambitions south of the Ardennes, Bradley was not psychologically well disposed to listen to warnings about Middleton's front. Montgomery had voiced his concern about Hodges' weakness in the Ardennes to Eisenhower on 2 December. Bradley wrote to Montgomery the next day that the idea of moving some of Patton's divisions north into the Ardennes "was given careful consideration," but had been rejected.[61]

Another imprecise warning made its way up to Bradley's level on 10 December when Colonel Benjamin A. "Monk" Dickson, Hodges' G-2, issued First Army's *Intelligence Estimate* No. 37. Dickson declared that the enemy was capable of a "concentrated counterattack with air, armor, infantry, and secret weapons at a selected point at a time of his own choosing" and the perceivable build up "consistently points to his staking all on the *counteroffensive* [emphasis added]." Dickson, however, did not specifically pinpoint the Ardennes.[62] Sibert actually wrote the opposite two days later in *Weekly Intelligence Summary* No. 18. Personal and professional animosity was palpable between the two and Sibert frequently questioned Dickson's identification of German formations.[63] Bradley considered Dickson a pes-

60. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, p. 459; FM 100-5, p. 26.

61. Bradley to Montgomery, 3 December 1944, Bradley Papers, USAHEC.

62. First Army G-2 *Estimate* No. 37, 10 December 1944, Oscar Koch Papers, USAHEC. Dickson served as the G-2 of U.S. II Corps in Tunisia and had predicted a main effort counterattack on Gafsa from the direction of Gabes. Rommel did in fact attack Gafsa with elements of the *Afrika Korps*, but the initial main effort was launched by Fifth Panzer Army sixty miles north at Sidi-Bou-Zid. Dickson also accurately predicted the attack by 10th Panzer Division at El Guettar. George F. Howe, *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1957), pp. 401, 553.

63. Sibert complained that Dickson identified divisions that were actually on the Eastern Front. One was the 5th SS Viking Division. Dickson's claim was only one of four possible capabilities including defending the Roer River line, defending the Erft River line, and falling back to the Rhine and complete collapse or surrender. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, p. 464.

simist and an alarmist and perceived no anxiety from Hodges when he visited First Army on 11 December. Moreover, as David Hogan, Jr. has pointed out, there seems to be no substantiation for the idea that Hodges had asked Bradley for two extra divisions to reinforce the Ardennes.[64] Moreover, the degree to which Bradley dismissed intelligence on the enemy is demonstrated by the fact that right before the German attack he permitted Hodges to transfer a combat command from the 9th Armored Division to V Corps to support the attack towards the Roer.[65]

While neither Dickson nor Sibert zeroed in on the Ardennes in the days immediately preceding the attack, evidence suggested that Strong did. On 14 December Bedell Smith, on direction from Eisenhower, sent him to warn Bradley about possible German intentions against VIII Corps. Bradley claimed that he did not ignore any significant warnings, but a personal visit from Eisenhower's G-2 was not something to be taken lightly. Strong spent three quarters of an hour making his case, but Bradley was not convinced, presumably because Strong told him nothing new.[66] Strong no doubt briefed him on Ultra contained in the SHAEF *Intelligence Digest* issued that day, but Bradley might have had the same information because Ultra was disseminated to the SHAEF, army group, and army levels simultaneously. Indeed, Sibert disagreed with Strong's interpretation of the available evidence. Other than indicating that eight trains of *volksgrenadiers* were moving to the west bank of the Rhine, SHAEF *Digest* #191 of 14 December had little to say. The next day, however, #192 offered the following comment:

> The most interesting feature is the lack of activity on the line COLOGNE – GREVENBROICH. This area was very active during the latter part of Nov and early Dec. By 10 Dec activity had decreased; the present inactivity is exceptional. It may be assumed that the arrival of 6 SS Pz Army and its equipment, and subsequent regrouping in the COLOGNE sector is now completed.[67]

Bradley was looking for absolute certainty. He reflected that "nothing but an unequivocal indication of impending attack in the Ardennes could have induced me to quit the winter offensive."[68] The estimate of the situation, however, told him that was unlikely. An important component of a commander's estimate of the situation was his Essential Elements of Information

64. David W. Hogan, Jr., *A Command Post at War: First Army Headquarters in Europe, 1943-1945* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2000), p. 208.
65. VIII Corps AAR, December 1944, RG 407, Entry 427, 208-0.3, NARA II.
66. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, pp. 447, 462; Major General Kenneth W.D. Strong interview on 12 December 1946, Pogue Interviews; Strong, *Intelligence at the Top*, p. 211. MacDonald suggested that Bradley requested a newly arrived armored division to reinforce the Ardennes after Ingersoll had convinced Sibert that the Germans were hiding divisions. *A Time for Trumpets*, pp. 69, 72; Interview with Colonel B.A. Dickson, 6 February 1952, Pogue Interviews.
67. SHAEF *Digest* #192, 15 December 1944.
68. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, p. 461.

(EEI). Bradley would have identified these to drive Twelfth Army Group's overall intelligence plan at the German border and so influenced the intelligence function down the chain of command to the patrols sent out by VIII Corps. His EEI are not known, but it seems that he was not really interested in this aspect of the overall process because he admitted that "we probably should have sifted them [indicators of German intentions] for evidence of deception." The evidence suggests that he never focused any dedicated intelligence collection efforts in the Eifel where the Germans would have to assemble to pose a threat to VIII Corps.[69] This was a serious oversight on his part because there was a sound link between EEI and the estimate of the situation in that a commander needed to know "whether, when, and in what strength he [the enemy] can be reinforced."[70]

Bradley agreed with Eisenhower that the only way to protect VIII Corps was by passing completely over to the defense, but other options existed. One option was the use of deception. Such a passive measure would have ensured the security of Ultra. In fact, Twelfth Army Group was trying to make VIII Corps appear more robust with an offensive intent in order to distract German attention away from operations farther north. On 15 November Army Group directed the 23rd Special Troops deception unit to prepare a deception plan to pin down German troops opposite VIII Corps. The intent of Operation KOBLENZ was to simulate offensive preparations to capture the Moselle corridor and Koblenz. 23rd Special Troops simulated the 75th Infantry Division near Clervaux in 4th Infantry Division's area.[71] In some accounts, this little-known operation is generically referred to as RUBBER DUCK. Paragraphs alluding to it were stricken from VIII Corps' After Action Report for December.[72] Ultimately, the deception failed to protect VIII Corps in any way by making it look stronger than it was because the Germans did not fully buy it.

Another option for Bradley was to redeploy some divisions. Simpson's front was eighteen miles long with seven divisions. Hodges' front was 115 miles. Of that, Middleton's VIII Corps covered eighty-eight miles. That left

69. Harold R. Winton, *Corps Commanders of the Bulge: Six American Generals and Victory in the Ardennes* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007), p. 83. On 16 December First Army was the only army without an active OSS unit. Neither Hodges nor Bradley had any faith in them. Bradley interview with Forrest C. Pogue, 6 November 1946, Pogue Interviews; Anthony Cave Brown, *The Secret War Report of the OSS* (New York: Berkley Medallion Books, 1976), p. 516.

70. FM 100-5, p. 42.

71. Jonathan Gawne, *Ghosts of the ETO: American Tactical Deception Units in the European Theater, 1944-1945* (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2002), pp. 165-68.

72. Captain Charles E. Curran, Jr., "Operations of the VIII [Corps] in the German Counteroffensive, 16-26 December 1944, A Personal Experience of a Corps Liaison Assistant G-3," n.d., John Toland Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Curran's observation is seconded by Robert E. Merriam, *The Battle of the Ardennes* (London: Souvenir Press, 1958), pp. 74-75 and John Toland, *Battle: The Story of the Bulge* (New York: Random House, 1959), p. 19. See also Cole, *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, p. 73.

VII and V Corps with ten and a half divisions on a combined frontage of twenty-seven miles. Bradley could have redeployed some combat power, but he did not want to because he "could not conscientiously withhold in reserve divisions better used on the offense."[73] Here was a fundamental difference between Eisenhower and Bradley on the one hand and Montgomery on the other concerning the concept of "concentration" of force at the operational level. Montgomery focused operations on a narrow front in depth, a practice which automatically created reserves, while Eisenhower and Bradley considered concentration the product of using every ounce of one's combat power at the same time. Bradley missed the point that a good reserve facilitated the offense and the defense. In effect, it created balance.

It should not be concluded that Bradley never thought about the problem of defending the Ardennes. He and Eisenhower visited Middleton at VIII Corps headquarters in Bastogne on 8 November and discussed the situation, but the record has produced conflicting perspectives and revealed important command issues. According to Bradley, Middleton declared that VIII Corps could "fall back and fight a delaying action to the Meuse" and "slow them down until you hit them on the flanks." Bradley apparently gave Middleton this additional alternate task and reflected that they had selected specific defensive positions to hold.[74] What is lost in this is the role played by the First Army commander, Hodges. Army Group commanders did not give orders directly to corps commanders. Bradley should have given Hodges basic planning guidance highlighting his wish for particular defensive precautions in the Ardennes and for the ability to quickly draw on formations north of VIII Corps. Hodges would then have discussed it with Middleton and the product of their discussions would have been a written alternate plan passed up for Bradley's approval. This did not happen.

Middleton's comments on the draft of the official history in 1956 give a different picture of his interaction with Bradley. He declared that he was concerned about VIII Corps' long front and only a few days before the blow struck

> I had repeated my concern to General Bradley. Whenever the subject was raised I had the feeling that my superiors felt that I was unnecessarily concerned about something which could not happen. Furthermore, the use of that wide front to rehabilitate troops and to train troops was a direct invitation for the enemy to do as he did.[75]

Middleton's post-war reflection was colored to a certain extent by the observation of Major General Raymond S. McLain, commander of XIX Corps,

73. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, pp. 461, 464.
74. Ibid., pp. 454-55. MacDonald points out that Middleton never told his division commanders that they were going to fight a delaying action back to the Meuse in the event of a German attack. *A Time for Trumpets*, p. 74.
75. Troy H. Middleton to Major General John H. Stokes, Jr., 22 October 1956, RG 407, Entry 427, NARA II; Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, p. 371.

who visited Middleton at Bastogne three days before the Germans attacked. "Middleton told me he was concerned about an apparent German buildup in the [Schnee] Eifel and had discussed this with Bradley," McLain declared, "But since the latter's headquarters in Luxembourg were as close to the front as Bastogne, Middleton didn't see why he should worry, if Bradley wasn't worried."[76]

The lack of an integrated, multi-level approach to defending the Ardennes is further revealed by the problems with VIII Corps' basic defensive arrangements. Major General Alan W. Jones' 106th Infantry Division was placed in a tactically unsound position on the Schnee Eifel. Middleton had asked Hodges for permission to withdraw from this exposed salient, but was denied. The weak 14th Cavalry Group was assigned to guard the most logical and lethal corridor of enemy attack in the Losheim Gap, but Middleton did position nine battalions of corps artillery behind Jones. Hodges did not address the serious issue of the inter-corps boundary between V and VIII Corps that bisected the Losheim Gap and invited disaster. German doctrine specifically called for identifying and exploiting such seams. Moreover, First Army had established two fuel dumps holding three million gallons of gasoline at Malmèdy which was to the rear of the 106th Infantry Division in a Northwesterly direction.[77] Bradley declared that he had told Middleton not to establish any fuel dumps behind VIII Corps's front line, but he never passed this on to Hodges and in fact, corps did not control dumps. Such an order, had it been actually issued, seems excessive unless Bradley was indeed expecting an attack of sufficient magnitude (more than seven divisions) to quickly overrun Middleton.

As the battle actually unfolded, Middleton tried to execute his basic mission of defending in place and then to make some sort of fighting withdrawal. He tried to deny the enemy full use of the road net by blocking in front of communications centers like St. Vith, Houffalize, Bastogne, and Luxembourg City, but with the exception of St. Vith, these towns were approximately twenty miles from the Our River. All were in VIII Corps' rear area. His basic plan was to hold on SkyLine Drive (a long ridge paralleling the Our River on the west) with some secondary positions between there and the Clerf River.[78] However, VIII Corps simply did not possess the capability on

76. McLain quoted in Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, ed., "They Had Charisma: Marshall, Bradley, Patton, Eisenhower," *Army*, Vol. 21, No. 5 (May 1971), p. 29; Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, ed., "One of the Greatest: A Study in Leadership," *Military Review*, Vol. XLIX, No. 12 (December 1969), p. 23. Middleton's anxiety about the front was not in evidence when he briefed his new division commander, Alan Jones. See Ernest R. Dupuy, *St. Vith: Lion in the Way – The 106th Infantry Division in World War II* (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1949).

77. Hogan, *A Command Post at War*, p. 205; MacDonald, *A Time for Trumpets*, p. 74.

78. VIII Corps Sitreps and AAR, December 1944, RG 407, Entry 427, 208-0.3, NARA II. Middleton's biographer, Frank J. Price, stated that VIII Corps "organized defenses to absorb a heavy punch without letting the enemy all the way through. They prepared withdrawal and counterattack plans." *Troy H. Middleton* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Uni-

16 December to fight some type of mobile delay with three and a half divisions, one new and two battered, sixty miles (or even half that) back to the Meuse along a sixty mile front and hope to maintain cohesion.

When the blow struck on 16 December Eisenhower told Bradley he had better send Middleton some help and identified two armored divisions, the 7th and the 10th, for the immediate task. Both divisions were uncommitted at the time. 7th Armored Division was in XIII Corps reserve near Heerlen in Holland and belonged to Simpson's Ninth Army. It had been withdrawn for recuperation after fighting in the Peel Marshes, but was available to the corps commander, Major General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., to exploit a crossing of the Roer near Linnich.[79] The 10th Armored Division was out of the line in XX Corps, part of Third Army. The division was going through intensive combined arms training in night attacks on fortified positions in preparation for supporting the infantry divisions of XX Corps through the heavy fortifications of the West Wall.[80] Taking the 7th Armored Division from Simpson's Ninth Army posed no problem, but Bradley clearly hesitated in taking the 10th Armored from Patton. This angered Eisenhower and strongly suggests that there was no contingency planning with Third Army to employ the division elsewhere. It was certainly news to Patton. Eisenhower's deputy, Sir Arthur Tedder, reflected that Bradley declared on 8 December that if anything happened in the Ardennes he simply planned on drawing upon undesignated formations in Third Army.[81] Indeed, it is curious that it was a division from Ninth Army, not First Army, that was called upon to aid Middleton. Before the division could move, it first had to get road clearances which had clearly not been worked out before hand.

Bradley's post-war claims that he had "calculated" a response to a German penetration in the Ardennes fell apart in the face of his inability to quickly give Eisenhower a definitive operational plan to deal with the situation.[82]

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versity Press, 1974), pp. 213, 218.

79. Research and Evaluation Division, Armored School, "The Defense of St. Vith, Belgium 17-23 December 1944: An Historical Example of Armor in the Defense," John Toland Papers, Box 38, LC. Charles B. MacDonald, *The Siegfried Line Campaign* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1990), p. 566.

80. Patton, "Notes on Bastogne Operation," 16 January 1945, RG 407, Entry 427, 103-0.5, NARA II; CCA/10th Armored Division AAR, December 1944, RG 407, Entry 427, 610-CCA-0.3, NARA II. 10th Armored Division was withdrawn from the line on 6 December. Bradley had tied strings to divisions before. During the Lorraine Campaign he had restricted Patton's use of the 83rd Infantry Division. John Nelson Rickard, *Patton at Bay: The Lorraine Campaign, 1944* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2004), p. 269.

81. Lord Tedder, *With Prejudice: The War Memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder* (London: Cassell, 1966), p. 625.

82. Jerry D. Morelock, *Generals of the Ardennes: American Leadership during the Battle of the Bulge* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994), pp. 120-21. Trevor N. Dupuy suggested that Bradley acted quickly and his "prompt decision" to move the two armored divisions "was perhaps the most important command action of the entire campaign." *Hitler's Last Gamble: The Battle of the Bulge, December 1944 – January 1945* (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), p. 138.

Bradley later claimed that he had already identified these specific divisions as part of his "plan" to react to a penetration in the Ardennes, but in fact, no such identification had been made and undermines the very premise of his calculated risk.[83] If Bradley had truly done a proper estimate, Eisenhower should not have had to look for divisions. He need only have told him that Plan "X" was ready to go. A "plan" had several constituent parts including the decision, supplementary decisions, and the fleshed-out tactical, intelligence, and administrative details of the operation to be conducted. The employment of each subordinate formation was also prescribed.[84] Well before the attack Bradley should have given Eisenhower a map overlay with, as a bare minimum, boundaries, withdrawal and reinforcement routes, and a troop list. Basic control measures were critical for adjacent corps artillery as well because it could not fire into what was known as a "contingent zone" without orders from a higher artillery headquarters.[85] In the defense, pre-registration of targets was an important aspect of any artillery commander's own estimate of the situation. The absence of such minimal, yet essential planning elements proves that Bradley never went beyond the mental stage of his own estimate.

There is a simple test that the historian can use to disprove the *ex post facto* explanations of both Eisenhower and Bradley of a calculated risk. Eisenhower recalled that Bradley traced out on a map the line he estimated the German spearheads could possibly reach, and his estimates "later proved to be remarkably accurate, with a maximum error of five miles at any one point."[86] In fact, Fifth Panzer Army's spearhead, 2nd Panzer Division, managed to get to within five miles of the Meuse at Celles. Applying Eisenhower's template, Bradley would have traced a line five miles short of Celles somewhere near Ciergnon. Any arc drawn through this latter town would still place the maximum German penetration almost thirty miles west of Middleton's Command Post at Bastogne. Surely, if Bradley was only thinking in terms of a limited spoiling attack with at the most seven divisions, then the boundary he apparently traced on the map for Eisenhower should have been far more constricted in depth and certainly in width looking more like a pencil than an arrowhead. It would have definitely left the impression of wide open German flanks. Any commander faced with a possible fifty mile penetration of his line (as apparently drawn by Bradley) would have asked for more troops. The logic simply does not add up.

Conclusion

It is clear that Eisenhower's chosen line of action – to leave the Ardennes

83. Bradley specifically claimed that these two divisions could not be committed "without my prior approval." *A General's Life*, p. 354.
84. FM 101-5, p. 38.
85. War Department, FM 6-20, *Field Artillery Tactical Employment*, 5 February 1944, p. 11, USAHEC.
86. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, p. 338.

weakly defended – did not promise success regardless of what the enemy did as prescribed by American doctrine. The unanticipated German counteroffensive pushed back his timetable by six weeks. The big offensives to clear the west bank of the Rhine and cross it in the north, BLOCKBUSTER, VERITABLE, GRENADE, PLUNDER, and VARSITY were suppose to have gone off in early January 1945, not February and March. On 10 January the CCOS requested that Eisenhower report on the progress of operations carried out under his 28 October directive and the impact of the German counteroffensive. More revealing, they also asked for a "detailed appreciation" of his future operations. The implication is that they were looking for a better thought process and in fact his appreciation of 20 January was much more formal and precise than some of his previous ones.[87]

Eisenhower's mental estimate of the situation in the Ardennes was flawed in a manner strikingly similar to his appreciation of enemy capabilities and intentions while commanding Allied forces in Tunisia. He decided to conduct a winter campaign to reach Tunis and support Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson's British First Army. "The gamble was great," Eisenhower reflected, and "We abandoned caution" to push every available fighting man forward to Anderson. His point of weakness, as in the Ardennes, was, ironically, an overstretched American corps supported by a third of an armored division in reserve (the remainder was on line). The setbacks suffered by the II U.S. Corps at Sidi-Bou-Zid and Kasserine Pass were the result of the "long-shot gamble to capture Tunis quickly." This gamble looked even worse when juxtaposed beside his equally frank admission that II Corps was his "most dangerous area" and he failed to "comprehend clearly" enemy capabilities.[88] Eisenhower clearly went through the estimate process in his head in Tunisia, but he made some questionable deductions about time and space, the use of economy of force, and when to commit reserves. He repeated some of these mistakes at the German border in the Fall of 1944. Practicing economy of force in the Ardennes was not a bad thing; doing so for three and a half months, however, pushed the limits of the principle. Yet he reacted well on 16 December. In quickly forcing Bradley to commit the 7th and 10th Armored divisions, Eisenhower demonstrated that he knew he had pushed the limits.

As for Bradley, his chosen line of action also did not promise success regardless what the Germans did. In fact, he wanted the Germans to attack him. "I'd welcome a counterattack," he declared in *A Soldier's Story*, "We could kill many more Germans with a good deal less effort if they would

87. Chandler, *Eisenhower*, Vol. IV, p. 2449.

88. He fired his G-2, Brigadier Eric E. Mockler-Ferryman, because he had "blindly persisted" in the wrong conviction. Mockler-Ferryman, however, naturally exploited Ultra as much as he could, but the Germans made decisions so quickly that they sometimes invalidated the tactical information revealed by Ultra. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, pp. 121, 147. For a different interpretation of Mockler-Ferryman's relief, see Ambrose, "Eisenhower and the Intelligence Community in World War II," p. 165.

only climb out of their holes and come after us for a change." This perspective, however, was based on seven divisions, not twenty-eight. Bradley's calculation was off by a factor of four, captured in his comment to his Chief of Staff, Major General Leven C. Allen on 17 December: "just where in the hell has this sonuvabitch gotten all his strength."[89] Eisenhower strongly implied in a cable to Marshall on 21 December that First Army's predicament was "undoubtedly a failure … to evaluate correctly the power that the enemy could thrust through the Ardennes," but tried to shield Bradley from implicit criticism.[90]

The fact is that the German counteroffensive penetrated Bradley's line to a depth of sixty miles and almost reached the Meuse River in a mere eight days.[91] It is quite apparent that the Germans could have easily enveloped VIII Corps and destroyed it outright in a limited operation and retired safely behind the West Wall. There is simply no evidence to warrant Ingersoll's post-war claim that Bradley had "reasoned it out patiently" and calculated that the odds were "against the enemy's attacking there."[92] Bradley may have been handicapped by the need to protect the source of Ultra, but it is hard to escape the conclusion that he did not judge the risks in the Ardennes properly and exposed the VIII Corps to significant danger.[93] Every commander is responsible for his own security and Bradley certainly felt secure in the U.S. Army's overall mechanized mobility. "In accepting the risk of enemy penetration into the Ardennes," he reflected, "we had counted heavily on the speed with which we could fling this mechanized strength against his flanks."[94] There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of his claim and in certain ways it made sense. In the end, however, the essence of Bradley's "plan" to mitigate risk in the Ardennes was captured in his offhand comment to Strong in early December: "let them come."

One question that begs answering is what would the impact have been had Eisenhower and Bradley contemplated the enemy's *most dangerous* line of action – a term in use in 1944, but not generally used – as part of their

89. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, pp. 441-42, 466.
90. Chandler, *Eisenhower*, Vol. IV, p. 2368. Bradley did not accept responsibility for the attack at the time, but accepted responsibility for the calculated risk after the war. Hamilton, *Monty: The Field Marshal*, p. 249; Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, p. 462.
91. Conversely, the American army achieved a penetration of only twenty-two miles in ninety-six days of campaigning once they crossed the German border on 11 September. MacDonald, *The Siegfried Line Campaign*, p. 616.
92. Lieutenant Colonel Adolph A. Rosengarten, Jr., First Army's Ultra representative, argued that what Bradley meant by the calculated risk "was that the risk of a *successful* [emphasis added] German attack was minimal." Adolph A. Rosengarten, Jr., "The Bulge: A Glimpse of Combat Intelligence," *Military Review*, Vol. XLI, No. 6 (June 1961), p. 32; Ralph Ingersoll, *Top Secret* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1946), p. 246.
93. Russell F. Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaigns of France and Germany, 1944-1945* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), p. 463.
94. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, p. 455.

mental estimate of the situation.[95] The evidence suggests that they both were more sensitive to the possible flooding of the Roer River dams than to a thrust through the Ardennes. Eisenhower told Marshall on 3 December that the possibility of flooding was "a definite threat." On the balance, it is probably reasonable to say that Eisenhower felt more worried about the Colmar Pocket, a bulge extending into Allied lines in Devers' Sixth Army Group, than he was about Bradley's thinness in the Ardennes.[96]

In the end, Eisenhower and Bradley paid too little attention to the fact that "the enemy gets a vote too." Colonel Schwien's observation – "we attribute an almost unbelievable immobility and stupidity to our adversary" – may have been written in 1936, but it aptly described the mental disposition of Eisenhower and Bradley in December 1944. Marshall even told Pogue after the war that in his opinion neither Eisenhower nor Bradley seemed interested in German actions throughout October and November.[97] Indeed, they were so full of confidence in the ultimate outcome that nothing the enemy did probably would have registered as acutely dangerous to the Allied steamroller. FM 100-5 declared that a commander "must" take calculated risks, but Eisenhower and Bradley did not properly utilize the estimate of the situation to warrant the risk they took in the Ardennes.

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95. The enemy's most dangerous line of action, although important, should not overly influence a commander's own line of action. For a good discussion, see Colonel Hollis L. Muller, *Technique of Modern Arms* (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing, 1940).
96. Chandler, *Eisenhower*, Vol. IV, p. 2329; Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, p. 369. The Colmar Pocket was created in November when Devers moved the bulk of Seventh Army north to assist Patton. He confidently left the French First Army to deal with the German Nineteenth Army around Colmar, and this created another problem.
97. Schwien, *Combat Intelligence*, p. v; Pogue to Paul van Doren, 2 April 1985, in "Decision making and Cognitive Analysis Track: A Historic Failure in the Social Domain," 10th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, p. 20, Washington, DC, March 2005.

Major General John P. Lucas at Anzio: Prudence or Boldness?

STEVEN L. OSSAD

Abstract
For more than sixty-five years, participants and military historians have argued the question of whether U.S. VI Corps commander Major General John P. Lucas should have captured the Alban Hills immediately after the successful landing at Anzio in late January 1944. This article addresses that question beginning with an examination of Lucas's career and the circumstances under which he was selected for command of Operation SHINGLE. Next, it examines the rationale, underlying assumptions, plans, and orders issued for the campaign to ascertain where the responsibility lay for the disaster that ensued. It argues that the senior Allied commanders, especially U.S. Fifth Army commander Lieutenant General Mark Clark and 15th Army Group commander Sir Harold Alexander, bear the full burden of failure. They countenanced the selection of a man they knew to be unfit for command for purely expedient reasons and allowed a complex amphibious operation to proceed in spite of insufficient planning, resources, and rehearsal. Ignoring basic internal inconsistencies between the British and American positions about SHINGLE's purpose, immediate goal, and ultimate objective, Fifth Army then issued written orders that were intentionally ambiguous and designed to give the top commanders cover in the event the operation foundered. When that happened, they placed the blame on Lucas. The controversy over the Alban Hills was a "straw man" argument and irrelevant in assessing Lucas's role at Anzio. It is difficult to find a more cynical example of perfidy in the Allied high command during World War II. The treatment of John Lucas – an honorable and brave soldier who should have been hailed a great hero after Salerno, but instead languishes in the shadow of history – contains a warning that will always be relevant.

Keywords
Alban Hills; Alexander, Sir Harold; Anzio; Churchill, Winston; Clark, Lieutenant General Mark; Colli Laziali; Kesselring, Field Marshal Albert; Lucas, Major General John P.; Operation SHINGLE; U.S. VI Corps

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Introduction

Hitler called it an "abscess."[1] Churchill, the chief sponsor and loudest cheerleader for the endeavor, called it a "disaster"[2] and admitted that it was his "worst moment in the war."[3] Lieutenant General Mark Clark, CG, U.S. Fifth Army, described it as a "barren little strip of hell."[4] American GI's, their British brothers-in-arms, as well as their German adversaries had more profane and gruesome descriptions, most of which would never pass a censor or editor's review. The bloody four-month agony of Anzio was one of the most difficult and costly campaigns ever fought by an Anglo-American army. In spite of its disappointing results, it was also a heroic stage upon which the grim determination, bravery, and sacrifice of soldiers from both sides was displayed. In just one measure of gallantry and courage, of the nearly seventy Medals of Honor awarded to ground soldiers fighting in Italy, one in four went to men who fought at Anzio.[5]

Even before the end of the battle, however, arguments about its purpose and outcome had begun, and they have continued since. While the debate has shifted from the recriminations of military and political leaders to the arguments of historians and soldiers, the question of personal accountability has remained a constant. The pattern remains the same. Once the underlying questions of national strategy and operational responsibility have been addressed, analysts have turned to the tactical decisions of the campaign and their consequences. Simply put, does the principle responsibility for the failure to cut the enemy's lines of communication, force the withdrawal of the Germans at the Gustav Line, and advance rapidly to Rome belong to the American VI Corps commander, Major General John P. Lucas, or does it rest elsewhere? Should Lucas have moved immediately after the dazzlingly successful landing to seize the Alban Hills, or was he right to consolidate the beachhead, build-up his forces, and protect the port which was crucial to survival of his corps? Was it even clear what the Anzio mission was to the men who ordered it, or those charged with carrying it out? As the distinguished Second World War historian Martin Blumenson framed the ques-

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1. *Anzio Beachhead (22 January-25 May 1944)*, American Forces in Action Series #14 (Washington, DC: Historical Division, War Department, 1948), p. 42 (reprinted by the U.S. Army Center of Military History in 1990, and also available at: <http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/anziobeach/anzio-fm.htm>, last accessed March 2009).
2. Winston Churchill, *Closing the Ring* (New York: Rosetta Books, 2002), p. 583. This is an e-book version of *The Second World War*, Vol. 5, *Closing the Ring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951).
3. Charles Moran, *Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival, 1940-1945* (London: Constable, 1966), p. 210.
4. Mark W. Clark, *Calculated Risk* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), p. 7.
5. The author's calculation of seventeen awards (seven posthumous) of the Medal of Honor related to the Anzio Campaign (22 January – 24 May 1944) compares to a total of 324 Army Medals for all of World War II, 289 for ground combat in all theaters, 214 awarded to ground soldiers serving in the European-Mediterranean-Middle Eastern Theater, and sixty-nine awarded to soldiers fighting in the six Italian Campaigns. For additional information, see <www.history.army.mil/moh.html>, last accessed March 2009.

tion, "Which was the better course of action: prudence or boldness?"[6]

John Porter Lucas was born 14 January 1890 in West Virginia and after graduation from West Point in 1911 (55/82) was commissioned into the cavalry.[7] He served two and a half years in the Philippines working on military surveys of the island of Luzon. In August 1914 he joined the 13th Cavalry Regiment, one of several regular army units charged with defending the southern border. There, in a fabled episode that still stirs America's imagination and shaped its policies and leaders in the early decades of the 20th century, Lucas gained national acclaim.[8] At that time, political upheaval and in-

6. Martin Blumenson, "Anzio: Dilemma on the Beachhead," *Army Magazine*, March 1983 (reprinted in *Heroes Never Die*, New York: Cooper Square Press, 2002, p. 271).

7. Historians have consulted the U.S. Army Military History Institute (USAMHI) John Porter Lucas Papers collection for decades, especially the *Lucas Diary*, as a source for studies of the Anzio Campaign (22 January 1944 – 24 May 1944). The collection includes thirteen boxes, one of which (Box #10) is labeled "John P. Lucas Diary." Eight of the boxes contain military documents (especially concerning 3rd Infantry Division, II, IV, and VI Corps), maps of Italy, as well as Personal Correspondence and other Lucas family material. The five most relevant boxes to the study of Lucas' World War II career contain various versions of the *Lucas Diary*. Box #4 contains the earliest surviving version of the diary, here referred to as *Lucas Diary A*. The files are labeled "From Algiers to Anzio" and are in three parts: Part I, "Sicily"; Part II, "Italy"; and Part III, "Anzio." The first file includes a letter from Lucas to his son, Captain John P. Lucas, Jr. dated 1 January 1946, which describes the document as a "brief journal I kept during the months I spent in the Mediterranean," to which he had added "certain explanatory notes which I hope will make things clearer." Lucas acknowledges omitting some opinions "made under the stress of battle" that he felt were "too personal to be brought to light at this time." In the final version of the diary there was even more editing of comments, especially about the British. The original wartime and handwritten diary is not in the collection and apparently does not survive, except for photocopies of a number of 1943 entries which are in Box #4. *Lucas Diary A* contains two type face versions, a "script type for the original journal" and "straight type for the notes." Lucas clearly intended to distinguish his later additions from his original thoughts and observations. All references to the diary are for dates of entry unless marked "Later Addition." Box #10 contains a copy of *Lucas Diary A*.

Box #14 is labeled "Manuscript" and contains four manila files also labeled "Manuscript." It is dated 21 October 1948 and is a manuscript version of the document contained in Box #6. This will be referred to as *Lucas Diary B*.

Box #6 contains six manila files also labeled "From Algiers to Anzio," and divided into the same three parts as the files in Box #4. While it is clear from an interview of John P. Lucas conducted by Dr. Sidney Matthews of the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH) on 24 May 1948 that Lucas intended to publish his diary, nowhere in the collection is the title "From Algiers to Anzio" used, except on the manila files, and those may have been created by archivists at the OCMH, or the USAMHI. The manuscript in Box #6 is dated 28 October 1948 and is typewritten and illustrated with original photographs and maps. It is the latest known version of the *Lucas Diary* and is referred to as *Lucas Diary C*. The separation between the original journal entries and later additions is marked by three asterisks in the text. Box #1 contains a copy of *Lucas Diary C*.

8. "Night Attack on Border: Bandit and Followers Creep into Columbus and Start Massacre," *The New York Times*, 10 March 1916.

stability had intensified in Mexico accompanied by mounting concern in Washington. The tactics of former general Francisco "Pancho" Villa, in particular, became increasingly identified with the growing lawlessness and threat to American security. As the violent struggle between Mexican President Venustiano Carranza and his challengers escalated, it threatened to sweep over the border with unpredictable results.

Late in the evening of 8 March 1916, 2nd Lieutenant Lucas, commanding the machine gun troop of the 13th Cavalry, got off the "drunkard special," the train connecting his duty station at Columbus, New Mexico with free wheeling El Paso, Texas. He had spent the previous week playing in the inter-regimental polo matches and a "hunch" had moved him to return home after the last match rather than wait until the next morning.[9] Now, bone tired, he was ready to collapse in his bunk. One more chore remained. His roommate, West Pointer 2nd Lieutenant Clarence C. Benson ('14), had gone on maneuvers and had swiped most of the revolver ammunition. Lucas wanted to make sure his .38 was loaded – a second "hunch", or perhaps a premonition of danger. He finally drifted off to sleep well past midnight.

At 0430, Lucas awoke to the sound of a galloping rider passing his cottage. He looked out the window and instantly realized that Villa's outlaws had surrounded his house and were moving on the town. Lucas grabbed his loaded pistol and took a position in the middle of the room, where he could command the door and window. He fully expected to die, but was determined to "get a few of them before they got me."[10] Private Fred Griffin, a sentry from K Troop who was posted nearby – and who paid for his bravery with his life – saved Lucas by shooting a bandit about to enter the bungalow.[11] The outlaws scattered and Lucas, hurrying outside, joined them relying on the darkness to hide his identity. After slipping away and rallying his men, Lucas helped secure the French-made Benet-Mercier machine guns which unleashed a fusillade at the enemy, helping to rout the invaders out of town.[12]

Lucas emerged from the Columbus raid a hero,[13] but in a stroke of bad luck, his commander's recommendation for a decoration was mishandled and

9. "The Pursuit of Villa," *The New York Times*, 8 September 1935.
10. Frank Tompkins, *Chasing Villa: The Story Behind the Story of Pershing's Expedition into Mexico* (New York: J.M. Carroll & Company, 1934), pp. 50-54. Lucas contributed his version of his experience that night.
11. "Night Attack on Border," *The New York Times*, 10 March 1916.
12. James P. Finley, "The Buffalo Soldiers at Fort Huachuca," *Huachuca Illustrated: A Magazine of the Fort Huachuca Museum*, Vol. 1 (1993), available at: <www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/comment/huachuca/HI1-12.htm>, last accessed December 2009.
13. *The New York Times* review of Frank Tompkins' book (see notes 9 and 10) quotes the author: "To John P. Lucas, now major, then lieutenant, belongs more than to any other individual the title of 'The Hero of Columbus,'" "The Pursuit of Villa," *The New York Times*, 8 September 1935.

he received no official recognition.[14] After the raid, Lucas participated in the Mexican Punitive Expedition to chase down Villa and then on the Texas-Mexico border until America entered the Great War. In May 1918, he sailed for France, where he led the 108th Field Signal Battalion of the 33rd Division in combat. On 23 June 1918 during the Amiens Campaign he was severely wounded in the head by shell fragments. Sent home for extended convalescence, he saw no further service during the war. When he returned to active duty he transferred to the Field Artillery and for the two decades between the world wars, his career followed the normal pattern of field and staff assignments, stints as student and instructor at the Army's schools, and glacially slow advancement.[15]

As the expansion of the Army gained momentum, promotions and increasing responsibility came rapidly and in September 1941 Major General Lucas took command of the 3rd Infantry Division. Although he spent just four months in that assignment, the vigorous training programs he initiated established his reputation as one of the few senior American officers with expertise in amphibious operations. As a result, the 3rd ID became recognized as the pre-eminent amphibious landing division.[16] Lucas had already attracted the attention of Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, who described him as possessing "military stature, prestige, and experience."[17] Dispatched by Marshall in March 1943 to North Africa as a GHQ observer, he returned to the United States to take over III Corps, but was soon ordered back to the Mediterranean. Because of his experience and Marshall's endorsement, Theater Commander Lieutenant General Dwight Eisenhower appointed Lucas deputy commander and he acted as Eisenhower's "representative" charged with "keeping him informed as well as I could of conditions that had come under my observation."[18] In that same capacity he observed the Sicilian Campaign attached to Seventh Army, renewing his friendship with Lieutenant General George Patton, which dated back to the Punitive Expedition and included polo competitions along the Mexican border and family Thanksgiving dinners.[19]

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14. "He was recommended for the Distinguished Service Cross for this action, but recommendation was received in the War Department too late to be considered." Official service record of John Porter Lucas, General Officer Files, Washington DC, Center of Military History, 10 April 1948, p. 1.
15. Ibid. Lucas was a major for fifteen years (1920-1935) – one year shorter than Eisenhower and one year longer than Patton – and a Lieutenant Colonel for five (1935-1940).
16. The 3rd Infantry Division participated in four opposed amphibious landings during World War II: North Africa (TORCH), Sicily (HUSKY), Anzio (SHINGLE), and Southern France (DRAGOON).
17. George Marshall quoted in Martin Blumenson, *United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino* (Minnetonka, MN: National Historical Society, 1995), p. 158.
18. Foreword, *Lucas Diary C*, p. 2, Box #6.
19. Ibid, p. 3; Letter, George S. Patton to Beatrice Patton, 27 September 1916, Martin Blumenson, ed., *The Patton Papers 1885-1940*, Vol. I (New York: Da Capo, 1998), pp.

After Sicily, and a brief assignment leading II Corps, Lucas replaced Major General Ernest J. Dawley, CG, VI Corps, on 20 September 1943, eleven days after the Salerno invasion and after the Allies had beaten back the most determined German attempt to crush the beachhead. For the next several months, Lucas led his corps in combat with the tenacious Germans over terrible terrain, and through awful weather, as the enemy conducted a brilliant fighting withdrawal, contesting every yard and defending every major natural barrier. He performed well, justifying Marshall's confidence in him as a steady, unflappable, and experienced combat leader. Clark, noting Lucas' effective employment of artillery and innovative use of pack mules for supply in the impassable terrain, told him in admiration, "You know how to fight in the mountains."[20] By mid-November 1943, the U.S. Fifth Army and British Eighth Army, commanded by General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, had battered their way to the enemy's "Gustav Line," the main defensive position north of Naples which blocked the road to Rome and stopped the Allied drive up the Italian peninsula.

The grueling mountain warfare had exacted a high personal cost on Lucas. He would probably have welcomed relief at that point and a training assignment back home. Events, however, would soon overtake his urgent and obvious need for a long rest. Allied planners had been working on plans to end the stalemate at the Gustav Line and soon found a mission for Lucas. The senior military leaders in Italy, Eisenhower and 15th Army Group commander General Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander, and their political masters – especially Churchill – were considering an amphibious operation to outflank the strong enemy defenses south of Rome. Their goal was shared by Clark, who "realized the merits of end runs in Italy similar to the ones which had been carried out on a limited basis in Sicily."[21] Operations officers soon focused their attention on Anzio, a small fishing and resort town on the Tyrrhenian Sea just thirty-two miles south of Rome and some sixty miles northwest of the Fifth Army front line.

A number of characteristics commended the choice. Most important was the availability of a functioning port, first constructed by Anzio's most famous native son, the notorious 1st century A.D. Emperor Nero, and rebuilt at the end of the 17th century. The allied experts were certain the circular facility would prove sufficient to sustain a major amphibious force operating far behind enemy lines. Furthermore, the beaches and surrounding terrain were suitable for a large-scale landing and subsequent expansion of the beachhead. Finally, Anzio was well within range of Allied ground support aircraft based near Naples.

On 8 November 1943, Alexander issued a directive initiating active plan-

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324, 351, 353, 775.

20. 3 October 1943, *Lucas Diary*, quoted in Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, p. 166.

21. Interview with General Mark Clark by Sidney T. Matthews, 20 May 1948 (hereafter, Clark and Matthews Interview), Part V, p. 5, Sidney Matthews Papers, OCMH Collection, Box #3 (now at USAMHI).

ning for the landing, code-named Operation SHINGLE, and tentatively scheduled for 20 December 1943. Both Alexander and Clark had reservations about the initial recommendation for the size of the invasion force, distance between Anzio and the main Fifth Army line, and the numbers and scheduled availability of landing craft. Because of the latter concern, and other logistical reasons, the original plan was scrubbed, but the idea of an amphibious operation survived and the general outline was later resurrected after a reorganization of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. When Eisenhower left to take command of OVERLORD shortly after New Years 1944, he turned over the Mediterranean Theatre to General Sir Henry "Jumbo" Maitland Wilson, an experienced professional respected by the Prime Minister. The change in top command personnel shifted the decision-making initiative to the British, whose enthusiasm for operations in Italy, including SHINGLE, far exceeded that of their American ally. Churchill, especially, hoped that a bold, daring stroke would force a German withdrawal from the main front and allow a decisive breakthrough right to the gates of the Eternal City. As Clark later remarked, "Anzio was his baby."[22]

Churchill understood that the capture of Rome would rejuvenate the Italian Campaign and reassert the importance of the British to the Allied alliance, which had steadily waned under the accelerating buildup of American and Soviet power. He was constantly pressuring Alexander to speed up operations and show results.[23] At a Christmas Day meeting in Carthage, where Churchill had been laid up fighting off an attack of pneumonia, he brought SHINGLE back to life. There, and at a follow-up meeting at Marrakech on 8-9 January 1944 to which neither Clark nor Lucas were invited,[24] Churchill smothered all opposition to the plan by force of personality and concentrated his energy on motivating his senior commanders. Alexander rallied to the cause. So did the other British commanders, except General Sir Kenneth Strong, Eisenhower's G-2 (Intelligence) who voiced strong fears about German strength, resiliency, and skill and never backed off from his well-founded reservations.[25] Clark found the prospect of being the conqueror of Rome irresistible. Addressing the most critical concerns, Churchill wielded his considerable influence with President Roosevelt and the Combined Chiefs of Staff to secure the necessary resources to make a landing of two reinforced divisions in late January possible. SHINGLE was once again an essential element of the Prime Minister's determination to advance British interests in the Mediterranean, a goal not necessarily shared by the Americans.

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22. Ibid.
23. Interview with Field Marshall Sir Harold Alexander by Sidney T. Matthews, 10-15 January 1949 (hereafter, Alexander and Matthews Interview), Point #6, p. 26, Sidney Matthews Papers, OCMH Collection, Box #2 (now at USAMHI).
24. Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 526; 7 January 1944, Later Addition, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, p. 292, Box #6.
25. Sir Kenneth Strong, *Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer* (New York: Doubleday, 1969), p. 125.

During the course of the "stop and go" planning effort, two distinct approaches to the ultimate objective of the landing had emerged. The British view was that the Anzio operation should be the main tactical focus. Alexander believed that seizing the Alban hills was essential to cut supply to the Gustav line and force a German withdrawal.[26] While he never issued an unequivocal order that specified his wishes, his instructions to Fifth Army on 2 January 1944 came close.[27] Clark was instructed to "carry out an assault landing … with the object of cutting the enemy lines of communication and threatening the rear of the German XIV Corps."[28] On 12 January 1944, Alexander repeated that the object was to "cut the enemy's main communications in the Colli Laziali [Alban Hills] area."[29]

The American view was that the main tactical objective should be forcing an enemy withdrawal from the Gustav Line which was centered on the defensive positions surrounding Monte Cassino. The goal of the Anzio landing, therefore, was to draw off enemy forces from the main front by threatening the rear, thus enhancing the chances of a frontal breakthrough. The beachhead would exist for a week, at most, before a linkup took place.[30] Political pressure from Churchill to move quickly, and the compressed nature of the planning, prevented attempts to reconcile the two views. This schism at the highest level of military operations was a fundamental fault in the whole enterprise. The conflict of national goals just beneath the surface provides context for the recriminations and decades of debate that followed the battle, as well as the widely divergent perspectives of the participants.[31]

Once the decision had been made to proceed, however, the locus of activity shifted to the men responsible for executing the operation. Clark selected Lucas, and his American VI Corps, which would include the U.S. 3rd (Major General Lucian K. Truscott) and British 1st (Major General W.R.C. Penney) Infantry Divisions and a number of smaller units, including the U.S. 751st Tank Battalion, American Paratroops, Rangers, and British Commandos.[32] Despite reservations about Lucas' physical stamina and aggres-

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26. Interview with Major General Lyman Lemnitzer by Sidney T. Matthews on 16 January 1948 (hereafter, Lemnitzer and Matthews Interview), pp. 9-10, Sidney Matthews Papers, OCMH Collection, Box #3 (now at USAMHI).
27. Martin Blumenson, *Mark Clark* (New York: Congdon & Weed, 1984), p. 170.
28. Martin Blumenson, "General Lucas at Anzio," in Kent Roberts Greenfield, ed., *Command Decisions* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1960), p. 329, accessed at: <www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/70-7_13.htm>, last accesed December 2009.
29. Ibid., p. 330.
30. 12 January 1944, Later Addition, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, p. 310, Box #6.
31. Clayton D. Laurie, *Anzio* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, nd.), pp. 5-6.
32. 28 December 1943, *Lucas Diary A*, Part II, p. 157, Box #4; *Lucas Diary C*, Part II, p. 279, Box #6. The first explicit mention of SHINGLE suggests that Lucas knew about the operation before this date: "Clark sent for me yesterday afternoon. There is a new chicken in the pot, but I don't dare speak of it yet. Even here." Lucian Truscott states that he first heard of the proposed operation at a meeting called by Clark at Lucas's HQ on 13 November 1943. Lucian Truscott, *Command Missions* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press,

siveness, Clark couldn't afford any delay and quickly settled on him. The Anzio landing would commence in a matter of weeks; nothing would change that. Bringing in a new man would only complicate matters. Alexander expressed his agreement, noting that Lucas "had proven an able corps commander in the advance from Salerno to the Winter line,"[33] and at a meeting on 9 January 1944 Alexander told him "We have every confidence in you. That is why you were picked."[34]

The endorsement was disingenuous. Alexander viewed Lucas (like most Americans) as a lightweight, and in his postwar memoir and interviews he revised his reasons for approving the selection of Lucas, stating "he was the only available corps commander who was not actively engaged at the time,"[35] a statement that is stunning given Alexander's later criticism of Lucas. It is also not entirely true. For example, subsequent events establish that George Patton could have been selected, even though he had last commanded an army.[36] Most of Alexander's British colleagues shared his low opinion of Lucas. The lack of mutual respect, especially among his British subordinates, and the general level of tension between the allies this late in the war is particularly striking.[37] Penney had no faith in Lucas or his staff, confiding to Alexander during the battle that Lucas had never visited the 1st Division front and did not seem to "have any idea of what to do about the situation."[38] Lucas was equally blunt about Penney, telling Clark that the British officer knew nothing about tactics.[39] Such opinions were common among Americans of all ranks.[40] During a visit to the front in early February, Clark observed that Penney, who had been Alexander's Chief Signals Officer, had his division strung out in an exposed salient which alarmed Clark, who characterized Penney's abilities as a division commander by observing that he "was a good telephone operator."[41] Lucas had a more sweeping critique, viewing all British officers as soldiers secondarily, and first and foremost servants of imperial politics, "trained to think in terms of Empire safety

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1990), p. 286.

33. Alexander and Matthews Interview, Point #9, p. 27.

34. 10 January 1944, *Lucas Diary C,* Part III, p. 296, Box #6.

35. Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis, *The Alexander Memoirs, 1940-1945*, John North, ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), p. 126. Alexander writes that Lucas might have been overly cautious because "Salerno had been his first experience of an amphibious landing, and the going there for the first week had been pretty rough," but Lucas did not relieve VI Corps commander Major General Ernest Dawley until 20 September, eleven days after the landing. Lucas' first combat experience with amphibious operations was Sicily.

36. Blumenson, *Patton Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 415-16.

37. Truscott, *Command Missions*, p. 329.

38. Alexander and Matthews Interview, Point #10, p. 28.

39. Interview with Major General John P. Lucas by Sidney T. Matthews on 24 May 1948 (hereafter, Lucas and Matthews Interview), p. 5, Sidney Matthews Papers, OCMH Collection, BOX #2 (now at USAMHI).

40. Truscott, *Command Missions*, p. 329.

41. Clark and Matthews Interview, p. 6.

and advancement" regardless of their allies' interests.[42]

Such radically different temperaments and demeanor were bound to exacerbate the normal tensions of a coalition command. What his American admirers regarded as a prudent and deliberate nature, Lucas' British colleagues viewed as dullness and chronic lethargy. Uncomfortable with Lucas' style and that of his staff, British visitors to his headquarters described it as lacking firm direction, confidence, and clarity of purpose. Even sympathetic Americans, especially those with experience dealing with the British, like Truscott, saw some merit in this criticism. He thought that Lucas' staff was not tough enough and exercised too much direct authority, resulting in headquarters conferences that "resembled debating societies."[43]

While Clark's choice of Lucas was reasonable on its face and non-controversial, it was certainly not inspiring. Stolid, methodical, cautious, and careful, Lucas was no one's idea of the aggressive, decisive commander suited to a desperate venture, or likely to be bold when confronted with dangerous decisions in the midst of combat. Truscott felt that Lucas "lacked some of the qualities of positive leadership that engender confidence."[44] Small in stature, slow of gait, studious, and looking very much like a small town librarian or accountant, he looked older than his years. Variously called (not always with affection) "Sugar Daddy," "Foxy Grandpa," or "Corncob Charlie," just eight days before the landing he celebrated his birthday at a party hosted by Truscott, noting in his diary, "I am afraid I feel every year of it."[45] A British soldier observed that he acted as if he were "ten years older than Father Christmas."[46]

From the start, Lucas was openly skeptical of the Anzio plan and stated his concern that he lacked the men and ships to conduct a successful landing, hold the beachhead and the port, and mount a serious threat to the German rear.[47] Amphibious operations typically required months of planning and preparation and the special logistical problems of a "joint" American-British undertaking were especially challenging.[48] All concerns, questions, and suggestions, however, were dismissed peremptorily by the high command. Lucas was especially put off by the bravura and overconfidence of the British. Churchill actually told Alexander that the landing would "astonish

42. Letter, John P. Lucas to Captain John P. Lucas, Jr., 1 January 1946, *Lucas Diary A*, Box #4.
43. Truscott, *Command Missions*, p. 329. Raleigh Trevelyan, *Rome '44: The Battle for the Eternal City* (New York: Viking, 1982), pp. 78, 156; Wynford Vaughan-Thomas, *Anzio* (London: Longmans, 1961), pp. 88, 123.
44. Truscott, *Command Missions*, p. 320.
45. 14 January 1944, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, p. 310, Box #6.
46. Trevelyan, *Rome '44*, p. 42.
47. Martin Blumenson, *Anzio: The Gamble that Failed* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963), p. 61.
48. 29 December 1943, Later Addition, *Lucas Diary A*, Part II, p. 160, Box #4; and *Lucas Diary C*, Part II, p. 281, Box #6; 4 January 1944, Later Addition, *Lucas Diary A*, Part III, pp. 2-6, Box #4; and *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, pp. 285-90, Box #6.

the world," and at the least "certainly frighten [Field Marshal] Kesselring."[49] This cavalier attitude shocked Lucas who was "amazed at the ignorance of war displayed by the leaders of a people who have been at war for so many years."[50] The specter of the 1915 disaster at the Dardanelles – also promoted by Churchill against all objections – haunted Lucas during the planning for SHINGLE and he noted "The whole affair has a strong odor of Gallipoli."[51] He said as much to Admiral Sir John Cunningham, the senior British naval officer in the Mediterranean and also a critic of the proposed landing plan, who replied, "If that's how you feel you had better resign."[52]

The incredibly short time period between the decision to proceed and the target date and the losses during a hastily arranged landing rehearsal on 19 January 1944 seemed to confirm the risks of haste. Lucas felt the landing delays, confusion, and equipment losses of the exercise supported the legitimacy of his concerns, but all his previous entreaties for more time had been summarily rebuffed with an air of supreme confidence, and he knew there was no possibility of postponement.[53] The inexorable pressure to move quickly suggested to Lucas that his superiors knew more than they were revealing, "Apparently everyone was in on the secret of the German intentions except me."[54] His intuition was vindicated with the much later revelation of the role ULTRA, the secret and successful Allied code-breaking operation, played in the overconfidence of the Allied high command.[55] No one below Army level was privy to the ULTRA secret.

In spite of his reservations, apprehensions, and fears, Lucas was a disciplined professional and prepared himself for the task with grim resolve. His natural fatalism was not eased by the counsel of his confidants. Just before the landings, George Patton flew up from Palermo to say goodbye and wish Lucas well. Patton was uncharacteristically restrained, but finally warned his friend, "John, there's no one in the Army I hate to see killed as much as you, but you can't get out of this alive. Of course, you might only be badly wounded. No one ever blames a wounded general for anything."[56] Lucas was unmoved. His life was following orders, no matter what he thought about them.

Those orders, as issued to VI Corps by Fifth Army, were deceptively

49. 10 January 1944, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, p. 295, Box #6.
50. 4 January 1944, *Lucas Diary A*, Part III, p. 1, Box #4. This line does not appear in *Lucas Diary C*.
51. 10 January 1944, Later Addition, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, p. 305, Box #6. The first version of the diary reads, "The whole affair has a strong odor of Gallipoli and apparently the same amateur was still on the coach's bench."
52. Cunningham quoted in Vaughan-Thomas, *Anzio*, p. 39.
53. 10 January 1944, Later Addition, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, pp. 303-04, Box #6; 19 January 1944, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, pp. 319-20, Box #6.
54. 19 January 1944, Later Addition, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, p. 322, Box #6.
55. Martin Blumenson, "Will 'ULTRA' Rewrite History?," *Army Magazine*, August 1978 (reprinted in *Heroes Never Die*, pp. 185-86).
56. 10 January 1944, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, p. 305, Box #6.

simple: first, establish and protect the beachhead; second, "advance on the Colli Laziali" (also called the Alban Hills).[57] Alexander's previously stated intention of cutting enemy communications and threatening their rear was not included in the final order. The selection of words, it was explained to Lucas, was intentionally vague and calculated.[58] But, what does "advance on" actually mean? As Lucas understood them, the words were "an established military term meaning to 'move in the direction of.'"[59] But does it mean "advance toward," or "advance all the way to," or could it be interpreted to mean "advance until you take" the hills? Clark justified the imprecise language claiming that it offered Lucas a measure of flexibility to react according to circumstances, that is, the speed, scale, and intensity of the German reaction. In actuality, it wrapped the whole mission in another layer of uncertainty and ambiguity at the very start. A confidential discussion on 12 January 1944 between Lucas's staff and Clark's G-3 (Operations), Brigadier General Donald W. Brann, suggested that most of the Fifth Army staff believed VI Corps would have its hands full just establishing and protecting the beachhead.[60] As Clark later put it, he did not think it wise to order Lucas "to take the Colli Laziali hill mass" before the beachhead and the port were secure.[61] The cancellation of a scheduled airdrop of the reinforced 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment at H-1 at the hills reinforced this idea. The drop would have been a real reason to advance quickly to link up with them:

> No man knows of course what would have happened had the original plan been carried out and the 504th actually dropped in front of us. My own feeling in the matter has always been that much more progress could have been made in the direction of Albano and that a position on the Rome-Cisterna railroad might have been secured.[62]

At 0200 hours on 22 January 1944 VI Corps landed on the beaches of Anzio and Nettuno. It was, arguably, the most stunningly successful amphibious landing of the entire war. Even the skeptical Lucas thought it was "one of the most complete surprises in history."[63] Achieving a total tactical coup, VI Corps landed more than 35,000 troops, thousands of vehicles, and most of its heavy weapons, with the loss of less than 150 men killed, wounded, or missing. Two German battalions were quickly destroyed and for forty-eight hours there were virtually no opposing enemy forces in the area. During that time, Lucas achieved all his initial objectives, establishing a seven-mile deep beachhead, probing cautiously forward with negligible resistance.

The first U.S. official history states "For the first two days, the German

57. 13 January 1944, Later Addition, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, pp. 308-10, Box #6; Headquarters, Fifth Army, Field Order #5, 12 January 1944.
58. Blumenson, *Anzio*, p. 58.
59. 13 January 1944, Later Addition, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, p. 310, Box #6.
60. Ibid, pp. 307-10; Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, p. 356.
61. Clark and Matthews Interview, Part V, p. 7.
62. 18 January 1944, Later Addition, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, pp. 318-19, Box #6.
63. 24 January 1944, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, p. 324, Box #6.

defenders believed that they were too weak to stop an Allied advance against Colli Laziali."[64] Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, a very capable and experienced officer and Commander-in-Chief of Army Group C, was more equivocal. Observing that the Allies had missed a chance of "capturing Rome and of opening the door on the Gaigliano front," he also noted that on 22 January, the morning of the landing, he "already had the feeling that the worst danger had been staved off" because the enemy forces were consolidating rather than advancing, and because the beachhead was even then being ringed with powerful artillery forces.[65] The last thing Clark said to Lucas before the invasion was, "Don't stick your neck out, Johnny. I did at Salerno and got into trouble."[66] The priority of consolidating and strengthening of the beachhead was endorsed by Clark and Alexander who visited the beaches on D-Day, expressing great appreciation and satisfaction with Lucas and the way things were developing.[67]

More than satisfied with the results of the landing, and feeling he had won a great victory against all odds, Lucas dug in and waited for more men, tanks, heavy weapons, and supplies to strengthen his hold on the beachhead and port and prepare for the inevitable German counterattack. He limited his offensive operations to small-scale patrols and reconnaissance, and made no significant "advance on" the hills, or even beyond the front line specified in the pre-invasion planning, feeling he could not support an attack in strength. He firmly believed any force he sent to the hills would have been a useless sacrifice:

> Had I been able to rush to the high ground around Albano and Velletri immediately upon landing, nothing would have been accomplished except to weaken my force by that amount, because the troops sent, being completely beyond supporting distance, would have been completely destroyed. The only thing to do was what I did.[68]

The German Fourteenth Army, under Eastern Front veteran General Eberhard von Mackensen, soon had elements of eight divisions ringed around the beachhead. Enemy pressure increased in the air and on the ground and soon no place at Anzio was safe. On 26 January during an intense German bombing raid on the port, Lucas hurried to the scene and amidst the flames and explosions took personal charge, rallying the troops and displaying great personal courage for which he was later awarded the Silver Star.[69] Headquarters and other high value targets received special attention from the German gunners. On 27 January, a bomb shattered the remaining glass in

64. *Anzio Beachhead*, pp. 19-20.
65. Albert Kesselring, *The Memoirs of Field Marshall Kesselring* (London: William Kimber, 1953), pp. 193-94.
66. 25 January 1944, Later Addition, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, p. 333, Box #6.
67. *Lucas Diary C*; Clark and Matthews Interview; Alexander and Matthews Interview.
68. 29 January, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, p. 344, Box #6.
69. Official service record of John Porter Lucas, General Officer Files, 1948, p. 2.

the window in Lucas's room.[70] Even after VI Corps headquarters moved inside a wine cellar it was harassed by carefully spotted artillery fire. One salvo killed the Corps Surgeon right outside the front door just minutes after Lucas had passed by.[71]

In spite of greatly anticipated difficulties, Lucas had presided over a tactical triumph and Clark and Alexander had concurred with his decisions. While Lucas strongly suspected that his superiors were impatient for an advance to the hills, they never changed his orders or formally signaled their displeasure.[72] Meanwhile, the German buildup of forces exceeded expectations, and Lucas's attempts at the end of January to move out from the beachhead met bloody failure opposite the American lines at Cisterna. At the other end of the landing beach, the British enjoyed initial success before reversals at a small group of buildings in Aprilia quickly dubbed "the factory."

As the siege deepened, losses quickly mounted on both sides. Confidence in Lucas continued to erode as he increasingly withdrew into his CP. A "Maginot Line mentality" developed among his senior staff. At one conference, Lucas seemed confused and forgot the name of the crucial hill mass to the northeast that dominated the terrain and was implicitly the ultimate goal of the whole endeavor. In a conference with newsmen he seemed to praise the German's fighting spirit, oblivious of the impact such a statement might have on the morale of his men.[73] Even as late as 10 February, however, there were conflicting signals about Lucas at the highest levels. Field Marshall Sir John Dill, representative of the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington, cabled Churchill that Wilson had changed his mind about Lucas and was "now entirely satisfied with him."[74]

After the disastrous Ranger-led attack on Cisterna on 30 January, however, dissatisfaction with Lucas, especially among the top British commanders, became irresistible. Despite Clark's resistance, Alexander had suggested three separate times, the first after a visit to Anzio on 25 January, that Lucas should be relieved.[75] Clark's original plan was to turn over Fifth Army to Lucas after Rome had been taken so he could step up to Army Group command, but that was now impossible.[76] On 15 February, Alexander sent a radiogram to Eisenhower claiming that "Lucas and his VI Corps headquarters in the Anzio beachhead were negative and lack the necessary drive and enthusiasm to get things done. They appear to have become depressed by events."[77] Clark took the first step on 16 February, relieving Truscott from

70. 27 January 1944, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, p. 341, Box #6.
71. 9 February 1944, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, p. 370, Box #6.
72. 29 January 1944, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, p. 344, Box #6. These diary entries reference what Lucas thought Clark and Alexander wanted.
73. Trevelyan, *Rome '44*, p. 79.
74. Cable, Dill to Churchill, 10 February 1944, CHAR/20/156/94, Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge University.
75. Alexander and Matthews Interview, Point #3, pp. 5-6, and Point #10, pp. 28-29.
76. Blumenson, *Mark Clark*, p. 156.
77. Blumenson, *Patton Papers*, Vol. II, p. 415.

command of 3rd Infantry Division and assigning him as Lucas' deputy. The debate about a change in command stopped that day when the Germans launched Operation *Fischfang*, their major effort to destroy the beachhead. Neither Clark nor Alexander wanted to relieve Lucas right in the middle of a desperate fight. This was not the only time – before or after – that such a calculation delayed a much-needed change of command.

As the German attack lost momentum and the threat of defeat passed, Alexander, who blamed Lucas solely for the failure at Anzio, pressed Clark, "You know, the position is serious. We may be pushed back into the sea. That would be very bad for both of us – and you would certainly be relieved of your command."[78] Clark, who had feared being relieved after the near disaster at Salerno, must have seen Alexander's warning as a threat rather than a neutral observation. Even though Clark had already relieved one Corps commander and was vulnerable to the charge that he was a poor judge of subordinates, he had to act.

On 22 February, Clark summoned Lucas to his hut and told him that he was being relieved, without prejudice, because of pressure from Alexander who felt Lucas was "defeated," and General Jacob L. Devers, Wilson's American deputy, who thought him "exhausted." Lucas was not surprised, believing that Alexander had been badly shaken by events, but he was angry about Devers, since everybody was exhausted and Lucas had just been told he had just won a great victory.[79] While taking full responsibility, Clark agreed with Alexander that Lucas was "worn out physically and mentally," but Clark never said he had lost confidence in Lucas and that "he had done all he could at Anzio."[80] Major General Lyman Lemnitzer, Alexander's American Deputy Chief of Staff, confirmed right after the war that Alexander's justification was physical exhaustion, not anything Lucas had done or failed to do at Anzio.[81] The next day Truscott took over VI Corps.

Months of hard fighting followed until the Allies finally broke through the Gustav Line and out of the beachhead, linking up on 25 May and marching into Rome on 4 June 1944. The victory did not justify the suffering. The Normandy landings completely overshadowed the event, robbing Clark and his men of glory, and Churchill of his much coveted strategic and political master stroke. For reasons that form the basis of yet another controversy, Kesselring once again managed to conduct a successful withdrawal, and the Germans kept fighting in Italy until the very end of the war in Europe.

The cost of Anzio had been terrible; VI Corps alone suffered more than

78. Alexander, *The Alexander Memoirs*, p. 126. There is similar wording in Matthews' interviews with Alexander during mid-January 1949, e.g. "You know what this Anzio beachhead will mean for both of us if there is a disaster at Anzio," Point #3, p. 6; and "I very much fear that there might be a disaster at Anzio with Lucas in command and you know what will happen to you and me if there is a disaster at Anzio," Point #10, p. 28.
79. 22 February 1944, Later Addition, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, p. 394, Box #6.
80. Clark and Matthews Interview, p. 7.
81. Lemnitzer and Matthews Interview, p. 10.

29,200 combat losses (4,400 killed, 18,000 wounded, and 6,800 missing or prisoners), as well as 37,000 non-combat casualties. Most of these losses occurred in the six weeks following the landing. The German Fourteenth Army suffered roughly equivalent combat losses of 27,500 (5,500 killed, 17,000 wounded, and 4,500 missing or prisoners) and probably an equivalent number of non-combat casualties.[82]

After a brief rest, Lucas became Deputy Commander of Fifth Army. His relief was not publicly announced until months later.[83] By that time, he was back in the United States, where he took command of Fourth Army – another promotion – and performed well in a series of training commands. His career was not officially marked with a failure and in 1946 he was named chief of the American Army Advisory Group at Nanking, China, further evidence that George Marshall, then Secretary of State, and by implication the military establishment, still held him in high regard. He served in China, without much success, until early 1948. Lucas, a man who loved to dance, died of a blood clot on the ballroom floor on Christmas Eve 1949 at the age of fifty-nine. In a poignant irony of military history, at that time he was serving as Deputy Commander, Fifth Army, the same job he held after being relieved at Anzio. The first of the memoirs of the political and military commanders at Anzio began to appear shortly after his death.[84] Only his brother and young son, a relatively junior field grade Army officer, and the testimony of his extraordinary diary, remained to defend him. The judgment of history, however, has not been generous.

Until the end of his life Lucas believed that he had been given an impossible task, and then abandoned – betrayed may not be too strong a description – by his superiors and his friends. His diary, while generally discreet about colleagues, especially the British, is full of self-justification.[85] It offers a bitter commentary in real time and with later reflection on most aspects of the battle. It is especially blistering in its depiction of the perfidy of those who ordered him to do one thing, but expected him to do another, who praised him for carrying out his orders, and then blamed him when their unexpressed expectations were not met. It is clear from the diary, and his conversations with others at the time, and afterwards, that he was bitter about what happened, especially towards Clark and Alexander, and of course, Churchill.[86]

While it is difficult to find any compelling defense of the decision to land at Anzio that justifies the bloodletting, or the men who made the decision,

82. Laurie, *Anzio*, p. 25.
83. "Truscott Has New Post: General Commands Sixth Corps of Fifth Army in Italy," *The New York Times*, 31 May 1944. The article does not mention Lucas.
84. Clark, *Calculated Risk*, 1950; Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, 1951; Kesselring, *Memoirs*, 1953; Truscott, *Command Missions*, 1954; Alexander, *The Alexander Memoirs*, 1962.
85. Letter, Lucas to Captain John P. Lucas, Jr.; Lucas and Matthews Interview, p. 1.
86. Truscott, *Command Missions*, p. 328.

discussion about Lucas has generally proceeded along two lines of thought.

First, the bold school of thought: Lucas should have gone for the Alban Hills (and Rome), if not immediately, certainly within the first few days of the landing. Unsurprisingly, one proponent of this opinion was his old friend George Patton. After a meeting in London on 26 March 1944, Patton wrote in his diary that Lucas "was timid at the Anzio beachhead. He said he did not feel justified in expending a corps. He did not expend it because he did not try. Had he taken the high ground, he might have been cut off, but again he might not have been."[87] Support for this viewpoint also relies heavily on the testimony of the German participants, who expressed surprise at his lack of aggressiveness. Kesselring's respected Chief of Staff, General Siegfried Westphal, in a much-quoted observation suggested that even "the road to Rome was open."[88] Of course, these opinions are totally self-serving. A daring move to the hills made too soon, and rebuffed with great Allied losses, would have been an operational triumph for the Germans with strategic implications. At the very least, the bold school of thought holds that Lucas should have mounted a more credible threat to the German rear by taking several objectives beyond the beachhead.

Second, the prudent analysis: the mission was flawed from the beginning; capturing and holding the hills were beyond the capabilities of VI Corps; taking and holding Rome was a fantasy, and Lucas did what was necessary to preserve the beachhead and the port. His harshest British critic, General Penney, dismissed the idea of taking Rome, "We could have had one night in Rome and 18 months in P.W. camps."[89] Lucas' efforts were not sufficient to redeem the promise or cost of the landing, which failed in its stated purposes, but he did prove that a well defended and supplied amphibious landing against rapidly gathering German forces would not be thrown back into the sea – the main strategic German objective at Anzio and a crucial preoccupation of the Allied leadership before OVERLORD. Regardless of the answers to the lingering questions, the lessons of failure remain. What are they?

First, the choice of a field commander for a difficult mission should never be based on expedience, political acceptability, or be accompanied by weak endorsements. It must be based on: 1) physical and moral fitness for command; 2) a thorough understanding of the mission and its requirements, and the individual best matched to those demands; and 3) a shared belief by all concerned in its chances for success. Mark Clark should have realized that Lucas was spent, and both physically and mentally unfit for the rigors of an amphibious landing behind enemy lines. If he did not, then he was either

87. Blumenson, *Patton Papers*, Vol. II, p. 429; Stanley P. Hirshson, *General Patton: A Soldier's Life* (New York: HarperCollins, 2002), p. 452.
88. Kesselring, *Memoirs*, pp. 193-94; General Siegfried Westphal, *The German Army in the West* (London: Cassell, 1951), p. 158.
89. Carlo D'Este, *Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 7.

negligent or willfully ignored the potential consequences of his choice. Further, Lucas had been frank in his criticism of the concept of operations, its timetable, allocation of resources, and its chances for success. He did everything short of publicly predicting a disaster and was clearly signaling that he should be reassigned.

Second, while Lucas was a poor choice for command, the failure of the operation cannot be laid at his feet. No one could have accomplished the mission. Why? For one thing, almost two thirds of a century later, it is still not clear what the mission was. At the level of operational objectives, there was a fundamental disconnect between the goals of the British, the Americans, and the military realities in the field. Each partner had a different – and essentially contradictory – view of the operation and its purpose. The British hoped to force the collapse of the Gustav Line by cutting the lines of communication at the hills, or threatening it. The landing was the main gambit, but offensive operations at the Gustav Line had failed, so the threat was minimized. The Americans wanted to divert the Germans away from the Cassino Line, forcing a withdrawal of forces, and ease the way for the drive across the Rapido River and beyond, which Clark regarded as the main effort. The wording of his orders, reinforced by Brann's visit, must have seemed to Lucas even more evidence that the high command did not view the hills as an objective for which excessive risks should be taken. Certainly the cancellation of the airdrop must have suggested a lower priority to the "advance on" the hills, since Fifth Army appeared to be unwilling to risk the paratroopers in a truly bold gamble. In a telling comment, Lucas wrote that he was disappointed at the cancellation, suggesting he would have been prepared to risk much if that had been the plan.[90]

Third, whatever the operational goal of the mission, the landing itself was far too weak to achieve anything, neither a decisive blow nor even a credible threat against the German lines of communication, nor was it strong enough to ease the way for the drive against Cassino. Neither of the allied partners was willing to up the ante for their gamble. As Lucas himself noted, the landing of two infantry divisions was not likely to send the Germans running in a panic, particularly since Clark had made no progress in denting the Gustav Line with his far greater forces, supposedly a necessary pre-condition for the landing. Even a cursory look at a map makes apparent that the sheer mass of the objective and its distance from the beachhead and port would have required many times the size of the force that was committed. The altered plan, rammed through by Churchill after the Marrakech Conference of 7-8 January 1944 – really the failure to agree explicitly on a single objective – resulted in two widely separated efforts, each incapable of mutual support and neither strong enough to do the job alone.

Compounding this basic confusion about the main objective of the landing was the respective attitudes of the allies: the British were overconfident

90. 18 January 1944, Later Addition, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, pp. 318-19, Box #6.

and overoptimistic, cheered on by Churchill; the Americans were unenthusiastic and skeptical. The irony is that the Gustav Line collapsed only after the frontal assault that SHINGLE was supposed to avoid. It was a matter of attrition with the Allies better able to absorb the blood-letting. By mid-May, nearly 100,000 men had paid the price at Anzio, and many tens of thousands more did so in front of Cassino.

Fourth, the failure of 15th Army Group and Fifth Army to reach agreement on the campaign objective is bad enough, but Clark's ambiguous order to Lucas – "advance on the hill" – is inexcusable. While supposedly designed to allow freedom of maneuver, the personal briefing delivered by Brann at the start of the campaign left little doubt that Lucas was not expected to act aggressively. When a bloody stalemate ensued, Lucas was caught between Alexander's frustration and Clark's ambivalence, and eventually became the victim of his superiors' conflicting expectations and ambitions.[91] The criticism that Lucas could, or should, have moved on the Alban Hills as early as the first day ignores the first part of his orders.

A fair assessment would have to conclude that the Allies had almost no hope of taking and holding the Alban Hills. Clark said as much at the time and he felt the same way years later.[92] The German build-up was more rapid than Allied intelligence, based on ULTRA, expected. By 25 January, the enemy had more troops at Anzio than VI Corps, and even if captured early, there were not enough Allied forces present, or scheduled, to hold the hills. The Allies had neither the resources, the planning, the logistical support, nor the unity of command necessary for such an ambitious goal. Had Lucas mounted a more concentrated attack within the first few days, he might have taken several of the objectives between Anzio and the hills, e.g. Cisterna and Campoleone, thereby heightening the threat to the German rear, and strengthening the defense of the beachhead and port. That might reasonably be considered the least Lucas should have attempted. Most of those who defend Lucas on the main questions cite this failure in their critique of Lucas' generalship. But even that may not be a valid criticism. First, the Allies never expected to be at Anzio more than a week and did not plan for a protracted defensive battle, or a larger perimeter. Second, the opportunity to move aggressively existed for just a few days after the landing, when Lucas was following his written and verbal orders to consolidate, build up and defend the beachhead and port. He never received any different orders. Third, Lucas had no significant armored forces to exploit his successful landing. Fourth, since ULTRA had revealed to the top command that the Germans were reinforcing much faster than anticipated by Theater, 15th Army Group, Fifth Army, or VI Corps G-2, it is questionable that holding the "defensive" objectives would have been possible.

Whether taking and holding more real estate in an "advance on" the Al-

91. Blumenson, *Mark Clark*, p. 171.
92. Clark and Matthews Interview, p. 6.

ban Hills would have been decisive, or would have prevented the blood bath that resulted, is far from clear, even in hindsight. Whatever the German commanders said after the war, their soldiers fought furiously for every yard in Italy, counterattacked fiercely, and recaptured positions frequently. Kesselring showed a remarkable ability to react quickly and brilliantly. British historian Sir B.H. Liddell Hart, who conducted extensive post-war interviews with many German commanders and points to their "swift reaction and superior skill" concluded, "Lucas' super-caution may have been a blessing in disguise. An inland thrust, in such circumstances, could have been an easy target for flank attacks, and have led to disaster."[93]

Conclusion

Where then does the ultimate responsibility lie for the failure at Anzio? Clearly, the main blame must fall on the political leaders, Churchill most of all. The Americans deserve censure for allowing the Prime Minister to prevail in spite of their suspicions about British intentions. But in the military sphere, as in the case of the relief of Lloyd Fredendall after Kasserine, the answer must be sought at a level higher than the field commander. As distinct from the relief of Fredendall, however, the issue was not the competence of the man selected.[94] The senior battlefield officers of the Mediterranean Theater – Clark, and especially Alexander – bear the major responsibility for the failure and they avoided any personal consequences by shifting the blame to Lucas. They picked the wrong man for a very difficult mission, gave him essentially impossible orders, and refused to take responsibility when the inevitable bloody stalemate unfolded. Their superiors, Wilson and Devers, acquiesced completely by their silence. It is hard to avoid the word scapegoat. Perhaps worst of all, the senior commanders allowed an honorable soldier to bear the historical burden of their failure. Alexander was particularly cynical, suggesting that the enterprise failed because Lucas was "too slow and cautious," lacked "dash and vigour," and was too old and inexperienced to react to a changing situation.[95]

In the final analysis, the operation was doomed from the start and should never have been mounted. All the justifications since are based on arguments about attrition, or diversion of forces, and other strategically bankrupt excuses. The high command should have directed their energies to a more carefully considered and fully supported plan for breaching the Gustav Line, rather than the massive sacrifice they precipitated. Of course, that is easy to

93. B.H. Liddell Hart, *History of the Second World War* (New York: Putnam, 1971), p. 529.

94. Steven L. Ossad, "Command Failures: Lessons Learned from Lloyd R. Fredendall," *Army Magazine*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (March 2003), pp. 45-52.

95. Alexander, *The Alexander Memoirs*, p. 126. While no one would claim that Lucas was a glamorous or dashing figure, it is worth noting that he was the same age as Eisenhower and five years younger than Patton. It is strange to claim that a general is both old and inexperienced, particularly someone who had as much combat experience as Lucas.

conclude in hindsight, but the fact remains that Anzio was a major blunder, paid for in blood, and blamed on a man who had warned them all along that a mistake was being made. It was as if a group of powerful race track owners decided to hold a very high stakes horse race on short notice, selected a tired but steady draught animal as their entry, and then shot the horse when it slowed at the finish line, claiming it did not act like a thoroughbred.

At Anzio, Alexander and Clark – and their political masters who precipitated and then ratified their decisions – selected a competent, prudent, but clearly exhausted soldier, and hurled him into an arduous and bitter fight under the worst possible circumstances. To turn Churchill's oft-quoted and famous comment on its head, anybody who thought Lucas was a "wildcat" was woefully deluded or prone to literary exaggeration.[96] It is hard in retrospect to understand how Clark especially failed to recognize Lucas' diminished condition. The usual explanation – no one noticed he looked old, exhausted, and spent because he always looked that way – is not persuasive.[97] It is not as if Lucas's record, reputation, and personality were unknown.

By the time Alexander and Clark could no longer ignore the effects of their initial mistake, and pressure for a change of command reached a peak, the battle was at a critical moment, and the relief of Lucas would have raised serious morale issues. A poor decision led to cautious indecision and delay, exactly what many have claimed about Lucas at Anzio. It is all the more ironic that the top commanders hesitated to relieve Lucas while a full scale battle raged, later described by the historians of ULTRA as the "heaviest German counter-attack of the whole Italian campaign," a battle one should remember, that Lucas won.[98]

Had Lucas been publicly decorated for that great defensive victory, or dispatched back to America after the Salerno operation, he would have been regarded as a major World War II hero. Instead, he became deeply enmeshed in one of the bloodiest battles of the war, and a central figure in a bitter debate. Many great historians, including American students of the campaign like Martin Blumenson and Carlo D'Este, have mused on "what might have happened" had a different man, particularly George Patton, been in command, or if Lucas had acted more aggressively. One might just as easily ask what would have happened had the fully assembled U.S. 1st Armored Divi-

96. "I had hoped that we were hurling a wildcat onto the shore, but all we got was a stranded whale." Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 591.

97. Blumenson, *Anzio*, p. 58.

98. "On 3rd February BP [Bletchley Park] provided what the normally unemotional Official Historian described as 'one of the most valuable decrypts of the whole war'. It was from a signal dated 28th January containing General Kesselring's detailed plans for his counter-attack on the Anzio beachhead. A number of further decrypts followed, until on 15th February at 1345 hrs BP signaled that newly decrypted Luftwaffe intentions for the coming night heralded the start of the attack. It was the heaviest German counter-attack of the whole Italian campaign, involving 3 divisions and 270 tanks." See Bletchley Park National Codes Centre online archives: <www.bletchleypark.org.uk/content/archive/feb1944.rhtm>, last accessed December 2009.

sion landed on the first day rather than piecemeal over several months, but that implies many other hypothetical questions, many of which might be asked before consideration of who should lead.[99] Once that choice had been made, the commander, like other men, acted as he was, not as one might imagine or hope.

While the historical debate about responsibility has shifted somewhat away from Lucas – even those who defend his actions have been critical – he should not be faulted at all for the failure at Anzio. As his superiors kept telling him, he did everything he was supposed to do. They never told him to do otherwise. Still, something essentially sympathetic about Lucas persists, and his fate is heavy with pathos. Once he had been selected for a command he never should have held, he had no choice but to carry out his orders as he understood them, even though he regarded them at the core as completely misguided – and he was fully prepared to die doing his duty.[100] The only other option would have been to ask to be relieved, thus ending a distinguished career under a real cloud, rather than the historical fog that has settled over his name. John Lucas, who had faced Pancho Villa's men, alone, barefoot, and in the dark, was not prepared to do that.

Author's Note: This article is the result of the direction and encouragement I received from my mentor and dear friend, Martin Blumenson (1918-2005).

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99. Blumenson, *Anzio*, p. 129; D'Este, *Fatal Decision*, p. 406.
100. 10 January 1944, *Lucas Diary C*, Part III, p. 305, Box #6.

A Matter of Age: Division Command in the U.S. Army of World War II

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Abstract
The policies governing appointment to division command in the U.S. Army of World War II included a close consideration of the age factor. General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, and his key subordinate in matters of mobilization and training, Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, considered vitality and stamina to be one of the key prerequisites for the demanding job of division command. A series of new laws and policies, promulgated in 1940-41, facilitated Marshall's desire to promote relatively younger men to posts of high responsibility, including that of division command. Under these policies, the mean age of division commanders dropped by nearly ten years between 1939 and 1943. Moreover, division commanders who actually led in combat were younger, as a group, than the officers who mobilized and trained divisions but never fought them. Officers who departed from division command, whether relieved or elevated to higher posts, generally were succeeded by younger men. Airborne divisions had the youngest commanders, on average, followed by the armored divisions and infantry divisions. The army's sole cavalry division to see combat and its only mountain division had the oldest commanders. All told, the Army employed 263 division commanders from 1 September 1939 to the cessation of hostilities in 1945. Of these, 141 commanded in combat, with a mean age of 50.16 years. These men manifested the balance between experience and youth that Marshall sought in his division commanders.

Keywords
Bradley, Major General Omar N.; command; leadership; Marshall, General George C.; McNair, Lieutenant General Lesley J.; mobilization; National Guard; Pershing, General John J.; training; U.S. Army

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On 1 September 1939 General George C. Marshall became the fifteenth Chief of Staff of the United States Army. Marshall's first day in office was a

momentous one, for it was also the day that Germany invaded Poland, initiating World War II in Europe. During his six years as Chief of Staff, Marshall was responsible for mobilizing and directing in battle the greatest army that the American republic ever raised. In building that army, Marshall demonstrated his conviction that modern war is, relatively speaking, a young man's game.

Marshall's task was a daunting one. When he took office, the U.S. Army (including the Army Air Corps) numbered a mere 14,486 officers and 175,353 enlisted men. By the time World War II ended, it mustered 891,663 officers and 7,376,295 men.[1] The 1939 force included just three "organized" (half-strength) infantry divisions and one "organized" cavalry division.[2] Two years later, the "Victory Program" of 1941 postulated a wartime establishment of 215 divisions,[3] far in excess of the ninety-one divisions that Marshall actually brought into being. Even this smaller figure taxed the Army to its limits.

Marshall's most pressing concern in the creation of the wartime Army was leadership – thanks to selective service, enlisted personnel could readily be obtained, but the officers to command them were in short supply. Fortuitously, a large pool of some 100,000 ROTC (Reserve Officers' Training Corps) graduates stood ready to fill the company-grade slots in the expanding army, until Officer Candidate Schools took up the burden.[4] Leadership at the higher echelons was more problematic. Presumably, one required decades of professional development to command divisions, corps, and armies.

Of particular concern to the Chief of Staff during both mobilization and combat was the problem of division command. Acting on the advice of the War Department's G-1 Section, and most particularly upon that of Brigadier General (ultimately Lieutenant General) Lesley J. McNair,[5] Marshall personally approved all division commanders appointed throughout the war (as he did all corps and army commanders). He had a remarkably free hand in his selections, thanks to a sympathetic Secretary of War who screened him from undue political pressure.[6]

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1. Russell A. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 569.
2. George C. Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War, 1 July 1939 – 30 June 1945* (Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 1996), p. 4.
3. Mark S. Watson, *United States Army in World War II: The War Department: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 1985 [1950]), p. 344.
4. Weigley, *History of the United States Army*, p. 428; Watson, *Chief of Staff*, pp. 263-64.
5. McNair served as Chief of Staff of General Headquarters (GHQ) from August 1940 to March 1942, when he assumed control of Army Ground Forces (AGF). In both posts McNair shouldered the burden of mobilizing and training new combat formations, a task which included nominating to Marshall the commanders for new divisions.
6. Larry I. Bland, ed., *George C. Marshall: Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C.*

Under the doctrine and practice prevailing in the World War II period, the division commander was of pivotal significance in ground force operations. The division was the basic unit of mobilization. Prior to Pearl Harbor, raw recruits flowed directly to the combat divisions, and it was the responsibility of the division commander to orchestrate both individual and unit training.[7] After Pearl Harbor, a newly-minted division commander, provided with a cadre of 172 officers and 1,190 enlisted men, was expected to stand up a new division in as little as thirty-five weeks.[8] New divisions were to be combat-ready before deploying overseas[9] in contrast to the situation during World War I when divisions conducted much of their training in the theater of operations.

The division commander had to be proficient in combined arms warfare. The 1941 edition of FM 100-5, *Operations*, the Army's premier field manual, asserted: "The division is the basic large unit of the combined arms."[10] Infantry and armored divisions contained all of the combat arms and essential services, giving them the capability of fighting independently or as part of a larger formation.[11] (The cavalry division, as designed in 1941, lacked an infantry component. Ironically, the only U.S. Army cavalry division to see combat in World War II fought as infantry.) In the attack, with all nine battalions on line, the infantry division commander was responsible for two and one-half to five miles of front.[12] In addition to its tactical role, the division was also a supply and administrative element. The division commander, therefore, had responsibility for a wide range of logistical and support functions.

As Marshall explained to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, division command on the mobile battlefield of World War II would be significantly more difficult, and demand greater activity, than had been the case in World War I. Stimson noted in his diary that, during the Great War, the division commander had been "hedged in on both sides," and had only to "pass on very small matters." "…Marshall and McNair…think that we would not be

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Pogue, Transcripts and Notes, 1956-57 (Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1986), p. 420.

7. Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945*, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-212 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 609; Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, *United States Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, DC: Historical Division, United States Army, 1947), p. 37.

8. Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, *United States Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces: The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1948), pp. 435, 444.

9. Ibid., p. 565.

10. U.S. War Department, FM100-5 Field Service Regulations, *Operations* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 2.

11. Ibid., pp. 253, 258, 263.

12. Ibid., p. 103.

doing our duty to the soldiers if we did not put them under the very best Division Commanders…."[13]

Division command was also the proving ground for future corps commanders. No man commanded a corps in World War II who had not successfully commanded a division.[14] (Interestingly, no such prerequisite existed for command of a field army. Lieutenant Generals Courtney H. Hodges, Mark W. Clark, and Simon B. Buckner commanded armies in combat, but never led a division.)

As Marshall set about building the World War II army, and selecting the commanders to lead it, he had the example of his mentor, General John J. Pershing, to draw upon. Marshall, a young staff officer in World War I and Pershing's *aide de camp* from 1919 to 1924, was keenly aware of Pershing's standards in elevating officers to positions of high authority, including division command. During World War I, Pershing had combed the Army for competent, ambitious, strong-willed officers to fill key posts within the American Expeditionary Force. He favored young, trim, articulate men possessed of the physical stamina needed to endure the rigors of war. (Marshall and McNair were two such individuals.) In the words of one historian, the "self-serving, the physically unfit, or the intellectually dull" Pershing weeded out and assigned to less demanding jobs.[15] Division commanders who gained their posts by virtue of seniority or political influence rather than ability seldom lasted under Pershing's regime. Likewise, division commanders who demonstrated a lack of energy, or who were physically and mentally exhausted by the demands of combat, Pershing swiftly relieved, regardless of their qualifications.[16]

When it was Marshall's turn to build up an army, he adopted similar, though not identical standards to those of his mentor. Whereas Pershing created a "closed shop" of Pershing acolytes,[17] Marshall established a more broadly-based body of "Marshall men." With many more positions to fill than Pershing, Marshall could not afford to be as idiosyncratic in his selection process as his mentor had been. McNair, another charter member of the Pershing circle, generally shared Marshall's views with respect to higher commanders. In one important respect, Marshall differed from both Pershing and McNair. Having served a tour as senior instructor with the Illinois National Guard, Marshall was less inclined than either Pershing or McNair to be dismissive of Guard officers.

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13. Quoted in Larry I. Bland, Sharon R. Ritenour, and Clarence E. Wunderlin, Jr., eds., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, Vol. 2, *"We Cannot Delay," July 1, 1939 – December 6, 1941* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 656-57n.
14. See Robert H. Berlin, *U.S. Army World War II Corps Commanders: A Composite Biography* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1989).
15. James J. Cooke, *Pershing and His Generals: Command and Staff in the AEF* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), p. viii.
16. Ibid., pp. 18-20, 27, 136.
17. Ibid., p. 26.

When Marshall and McNair selected a division commander, they looked first for an officer with a career pattern of strong efficiency ratings, and a well-rounded background that included successful duty with troops. (Unfortunately, the miniscule interwar Army afforded few opportunities for troop command, so during the early stages of mobilization, leadership ability was difficult to assess.) Appointees to division command generally had spent much of the interwar period as students and/or teachers in the Army's school system. Seniority was a criterion only insofar as it reflected experience.[18] In terms of character, Marshall sought out energetic men who demonstrated "leadership, force, and vigor,"[19] a sentiment wholly in keeping with the Pershing legacy. He also expected candidates for division command to possess the moral courage to eliminate swiftly any ineffectual subordinates.[20] After the war, Marshall recalled informing Major General Edwin F. Harding that Harding would fail at division command because he was too amiable toward his subordinates.[21] (Harding was, in fact, relieved as commander of the 32nd Division in November 1942 during the Buna campaign.)

Nor did it hurt if the prospective division commander was personally known to McNair or Marshall, but this was by no means a prerequisite. (Marshall's legendary "little black book" of prospective higher commanders has never surfaced.) Historians have often noted, in particular, the "Benning connection." From November 1927 to June 1932 Marshall had been Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, a posting that included responsibility for directing the school's Academic Department. During this assignment Marshall had the opportunity to gauge the intellect and character of sixty to eighty instructors and 300 to 500 students at any given time.[22] At least fourteen future division commanders came under Marshall's scrutiny during the Benning assignment. This group included Omar N. Bradley, J. Lawton Collins, Matthew B. Ridgway, Joseph W. Stilwell, and Terry de la Mesa Allen, among others. However, to keep things in perspective, it should be noted that the Benning group represented only seven percent of the appointments made to division command from 1939 to the end of the war.

Other qualifications notwithstanding, one of the key discriminators that Marshall employed in selecting division commanders was simply that of age. In the interwar army, promotions were largely a matter of seniority, thus division command generally came to an officer only as he was nearing the mandatory retirement age of sixty-four. To Marshall, this was far too old.

18. See Gary H. Wade, *World War II Division Commanders*, CSI Report No. 2 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1983).
19. Quoted in Berlin, *U.S. Army World War II Corps Commanders*, p. 15.
20. Palmer and Wiley, *Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, p. 99.
21. Bland, *Interviews and Reminiscences*, p. 340.
22. Larry I. Bland and Sharon R. Ritenour, eds., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, Vol. 1, *"The Soldierly Spirit," December 1880 – June 1939* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 320.

Among other things, he was greatly concerned about the physical demands of division command. During testimony before Congress, Marshall stated: "In my experience in [World War I] – and I saw about twenty-seven of twenty-nine divisions in battle – there were more failures, more crushed careers of officers of considerable rank that grew out of physical exhaustion than by reason of any other one cause."[23] He expected the physical demands of World War II to be even higher. In a letter he wrote for Pershing's signature in 1940, Marshall asserted: "The difficulties of leadership which existed in 1917-18 have enormously multiplied today by the increased mobility and fire power of modern armies, and the necessity for vigorous commanders is greater now than it has ever been before."[24]

Part of Marshall's concern over the age of his selections for division command had to do with mental ability. As he remembered it after the war:

> I found that along about 46 or 47, in some cases, the man began to change in his fine qualities. Of course often [in] the early 50s the changes were more frequent. When he got near 60 they were very frequent. When they got up towards the ordinary retirement age, very few of that period properly were usable.[25]

There were exceptions, George S. Patton, Jr. among them. "…[N]ot everyone of that age [60s] is lacking, but it is the average [man] of that age that is lacking."[26] Although Marshall's standards for higher command seem clear enough, the demands of creating a massive wartime army out of a miniscule peacetime establishment meant that Marshall could not immediately impose those standards across the board.

Conventional wisdom notwithstanding, the United States made significant strides in its preparations for war well before the 7 December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. The Army as a whole (including the Army Air Forces) increased more than eight times in size from 1939 to the end of 1941, growing from 190,000 officers and enlisted men to over 1.6 million. From the four half-strength divisions on hand in 1939, the force grew to thirty-six divisions – five armored divisions, nine Regular Army infantry divisions, eighteen National Guard infantry divisions, two Reserve divisions in Hawaii, and two cavalry divisions. This enormous increase in size was possible only because of the induction of the National Guard and Reserves, authorized in August 1940, and the passage of a Selective Service act in September 1940.

Thus Marshall, who inherited four division commanders in September 1939, had thirty-six such slots to fill over the next two years. This task would scarcely have been possible under the laws and War Department

23. Quoted in Bland, Ritenour, and Wunderlin, eds., *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, Vol. 2, p. 193.
24. Ibid., p. 236. This letter, addressed to Senator Morris Sheppard, argued in favor of the promotion bill that Congress passed in June 1940.
25. Bland, *Interviews and Reminiscences*, p. 498.
26. Ibid., p. 441.

policies prevailing in 1939. Given the regulatory apparatus then in place, and the principle of seniority that it embodied, an officer would attain the two stars of a major general, and assignment to division command, only near the end of his career. Marshall's four division commanders in September 1939 were Major Generals Walter C. Short (1st Infantry Division), who was fifty-eight years of age when he assumed the post; Walter Krueger (2nd Infantry Division), who was also fifty-eight; Walter C. Sweeney (3rd Infantry Division), sixty-one when he assumed command; and Kenyon A. Joyce (1st Cavalry Division), who was fifty-nine. Given the Army's mandatory retirement age of sixty-four, these men were perhaps one assignment away from the end of their careers. This was not the type of individual that Marshall preferred for division command.

Legislative relief came slowly. In June 1940 the President signed into law a bill allowing the Army to promote officers based upon time in service without regard to manpower authorizations. The intent of this bill was to shove forward in rank the "hump" of officers commissioned in World War I who still languished in the company grades. The bill also lowered the mandatory retirement age to sixty for colonels and sixty-two for brigadier generals. The chief impact of this legislation was to move forward in rank, and thus experience, the generation of officers who would fill the field grade slots in the expanding army, and ultimately provide many general officers for the wartime force. Congress followed up in September 1940 with an amendment to the National Defense Act that allowed the War Department to issue temporary rank to Regular Army officers, a policy traditionally implemented only in wartime. This measure served specifically to fill division and corps command positions with major generals. (Prior to its passage, seven divisions were under the command of brigadier generals.)[27] This legislation allowed Marshall to select temporary general officers without respect either to seniority or to permanent Regular Army rank. By the end of July 1941, 865 of 910 active list generals held temporary rank.[28]

Yet another law, signed in July 1941, established a Removal Board to decide the fate of older officers who had been recommended for retirement, but who chose not to resign voluntarily. Chaired by General Malin C. Craig, Marshall's predecessor as Chief of Staff, and composed of six senior retired officers, the board based its decisions not upon the past performance of the individual under scrutiny, but upon his utility to the Army in a time of national emergency.[29] Finally, in September 1941 the War Department announced an age-in-grade policy for officers on duty with troops. This policy placed an upper age limit of sixty-two for major generals commanding divi-

27. Bland, Ritenour, and Wunderlin, eds., *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, Vol. 2, pp. 271-72; and Watson, *Chief of Staff*, p. 251.
28. Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, p. 89.
29. Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942* (New York: Viking, 1966), pp. 97-98. See also "Army 'Plucking' Board Meets, Work Underway," *Army and Navy Journal*, Vol. LXXIX, No. 5 (4 October 1941), p. 1.

sions.[30] Later events would show that this was still considerably in excess of the age that Marshall thought appropriate for division command. Nonetheless, this combination of laws and War Department policies enacted in 1940 and 1941 finally gave Marshall the power he needed to clear away the overage, and move forward the younger officers fit for the demands of war.

Purging the officer corps of its older and less active members was one of Marshall's most onerous duties. To Marshall, who himself turned sixty on 31 December 1940, many of those sent into retirement or diverted from duty with troops were friends and peers. In order to set an example, and forestall criticism of his policies favoring youth, Marshall went so far as to offer his own resignation in favor of a younger man, an offer that President Roosevelt quietly ignored.[31] The purge aroused considerable consternation both within and without the military. "…I was accused right away…of getting rid of all the brains in the army. I couldn't reply that I was eliminating considerable arteriosclerosis."[32] In the end, though, few could disagree with Marshall's ultimate goal of finding the best commanders for the army's new formations prior to sending those forces overseas. As Marshall recalled after the war, "[w]e relieved men on a number of occasions. But we did all our weeding out in this country, whereas in the First World War they left the weeding out to General Pershing in France, and he had a terrible time."[33]

Even so, Marshall could not simply wipe the slate clean and instantly elevate *en masse* a new generation of younger officers to posts of division command. The legislation and policies allowing the advancement of youth emerged piecemeal during the period of prewar mobilization. Moreover, there simply did not exist a pool of qualified young officers from which to draw. Opportunities for command in the interwar army had been scarce. Marshall found it necessary to groom the promising young officers in developmental assignments before elevating them to high command. Nor could Marshall afford simply to discard the wisdom and experience of men who might be too old ever to command in battle. Thus there emerged in the 1939-41 period a discernable group of division commanders who would never command in battle, but whose skills were nonetheless invaluable during a period of dramatic expansion.

These "mobilizers," as one might call them, were far from being passive caretakers. Many of them were responsible for standing up wholly new divisions under rather chaotic circumstances, and with relatively little assistance from higher echelons. During the pre-Pearl Harbor period, troop training was decentralized, and division commanders were often responsible for developing their own training programs.[34] Very often they found themselves

30. "Army Maximum Age Policy," *Army and Navy Journal*, Vol. LXXIX, No. 2 (13 September 1941), p. 47.
31. Bland, *Interviews and Reminiscences*, pp. 441-43.
32. Ibid., p. 498.
33. Ibid., p. 419.
34. Palmer and Wiley, *Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, pp. 369,

supervising individual training for new recruits at the same time that the division was attempting to conduct unit training. Some even had to build their own camps and training facilities. Moreover, these division commanders had to master new force structures and doctrines. The new "triangular" infantry division, and the first armored division, created in 1940, required division commanders to re-conceptualize combined arms warfare even if they themselves never commanded in battle.

Between September 1939 and the end of 1941, the Army employed sixty-six individuals to command thirty-six divisions.[35] Of this number, only eight ever led a division in combat. (Six led their pre-Pearl Harbor divisions, two ultimately led divisions different from those they commanded prior to hostilities). The mean age of these eight commanders, on the day they assumed their posts, was 53.63 years, with a standard deviation of 3.11. A subset of the fifty-eight who never commanded a division in combat was a group of ten who did in fact command higher formations in battle, but never a division. The mean age of this sub-group was 54.40 years, with a standard deviation of 2.22. Among this group of ten was Major General George S. Patton, Jr. who commanded the 2nd Armored Division in 1941, and whose combat commands included II Corps, Seventh Army, and Third Army. Major General Walter Krueger led the 2nd Infantry Division in 1939-1940, and commanded the Sixth Army in combat. Less happily, Major General Lloyd Fredendall, who commanded the 4th Infantry Division in 1940-41, went down to defeat as commander of II Corps at Kasserine Pass. Major Generals Joseph W. Stilwell and Jacob Devers were also members of this group.

This leaves forty-eight officers who served as "mobilizers" in the 1939-41 period, but who never commanded in combat at any echelon. The mean age of this group was 56.56 years, with a standard deviation of 3.70. The youngest of this group was forty-seven and the oldest was sixty-three years of age.

Any consideration of "mobilizers" is intimately bound up with the issues associated with federalizing the National Guard. Each of the eighteen National Guard divisions federalized in 1940-41 brought with it a commander who was not a professional, full-time officer. Marshall was inclined to give these men a chance to prove their mettle. In fact, he was under considerable pressure to do so. Although the President could, by law, revoke the Federal commission of any Guard officer,[36] such a relief was fraught with political peril. Marshall recalled the relief of one National Guard division commander which precipitated a visit from the entire congressional delegation of the aggrieved general's home state. After a heated exchange, Marshall felt compelled to declare, "…if he stays, I go. If I stay, he goes."[37]

McNair, as Marshall's principal advisor in matters of division command,

442.

35. See "Methodology and Sources" for an explanation of criteria used in the enumeration of divisions and commanders.

36. Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, p. 16.

37. Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, p. 100.

was less inclined to give Guardsmen the benefit of the doubt. McNair believed that all general officers should be Regulars, and that any National Guard officer should be more than satisfied to attain the respectable rank of full colonel.[38] In an assessment of the army's highest commanders, prepared during the 1941 maneuvers season, McNair's evaluation of Guardsmen commanding divisions ranged from the lukewarm ("One of the best…if he stays with the job") to the dismissive ("…incompetent…" and "[s]hould go for more than age...").[39] Capabilities aside, the National Guard division commanders were indeed a rather old group. Their mean age was 55.89 years with a rather wide standard deviation of 5.44. The Guardsmen included both the youngest and the oldest of the pre-war "mobilizers," at forty-seven (Major General Clifford R. Powell of New Jersey) and sixty-three years of age (Major General Robert H. Tyndall of Indiana). No fewer than seven of the eighteen were over sixty years old at the time their divisions entered Federal service. If for no other reason than age, this group was bound to undergo considerable reconstitution.

Marshall would have preferred to replace National Guard division commanders with Guard brigadiers from within the same divison,[40] but this did not transpire. One by one the Guardsmen gave way to Regulars. At the end of 1941, only nine of the eighteen Guard divisions remained under the command of a National Guard general. Most of these survivors were gone a year later. Among the more prominent casualties was Major General Edward Martin of Pennsylvania, who turned sixty-two years old in September 1941. He stepped down as commander of the 28th Infantry Division in January 1942, and went on to become governor of Pennsylvania, and later a U.S. senator. Major General Milton Reckord of Maryland was also prominent in state politics, not to mention a key figure in the National Guard Association and president of the National Rifle Association. He turned sixty-two in December 1941 and relinquished command of the 29th Infantry Division the following February.[41] Major General Ralph Truman, cousin of the U.S. senator from Missouri and commander of the 35th Infantry Division, departed less amicably. Relieved of command in October 1941, even though seven months away from his 62nd birthday, he resigned his commission rather than accept a non-command posting.[42]

Thus sixteen of the eighteen National Guard commanders never led their divisions in combat. The sixteen casualties had a mean age of 58.63 years,

38. Bland, Ritenour, and Wunderlin, eds., *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, Vol. 2, pp. 656-57n.
39. Memo, CofS GHQ for General Marshall, 7 October 1941, sub: High Commanders, Box 76, Folder 31, Correspondence, George C. Marshall Papers, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, VA.
40. Watson, *Chief of Staff*, pp. 260-61.
41. Bland, Ritenour, and Wunderlin, eds., *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, Vol. 2, p. 42n.
42. Ibid., p. 649n.

with a standard deviation of 5.28, on the date their divisions were federalized. The sixteen Regular officers who replaced them had a mean age of 54.06 years and a standard deviation of only 2.08. The two survivors among the eighteen Guard commanders were Major General John C. Persons of Alabama and Major General Robert S. Beightler of Ohio. Persons was fifty-two years old in November 1940 when the 31st Infantry Division entered federal service. He commanded the division in the Pacific Theater until 1944. Beightler was forty-eight years of age when his 37th Infantry Division mobilized for federal service in October 1940. A graduate of the Command and General Staff School's National Guard Officers Course and of the Army War College, Beightler's credentials rivaled those of his Regular Army counterparts. He led the 37th Infantry Division in Pacific operations to the very end of the war.

Marshall may well have developed second thoughts on the issue of Guardsmen in positions of high command. He noted rather acerbically during a postwar interview, "I had eighteen National Guard divisions among whom there were only one or two competent commanders. It took me a whole year to get rid of the bad ones."[43] In order to recoup some of that lost time Marshall ultimately assigned a number of his most promising Regular Army prospects to fill the vacancies among Guard commands. Major General Omar N. Bradley, after activating the 82nd Infantry (later Airborne) Division, spent the last half of 1942 bringing the 28th Infantry Division up to standards. Bradley went on to command II Corps, First Army, and 12th Army Group in combat. Major General Leonard T. Gerow, future commander of V Corps and Fifteenth Army, took over the 29th Infantry Division from Reckord. Major General William H. Simpson commanded two National Guard formations – the 30th and the 35th Infantry Divisions – before rising to lead Ninth Army in combat.

The tumultuous period of mobilization preceding Pearl Harbor resulted in a high rate of turnover in division command. Thirty-six divisions had sixty-six commanders in a little over two years. Fifteen divisions (generally those mobilized late in the period) had just one commander. Fourteen had two, five divisions had three, and two divisions (the 2nd and 4th Infantry Divisions) had four different commanders. The greatest turmoil came in the Regular Army divisions – the 1st through the 9th Infantry Divisions, and the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Divisions. As of November 1941, the period of "protective mobilization" came to its conclusion, offering some hope of ensuing stability. The War Department actually had plans to begin releasing Guard units from Federal service in early 1942.[44] The attack on Pearl Harbor rendered such plans meaningless.

America's formal entry into World War II on 8 December 1941 brought with it a new round of mobilization and expansion of the armed forces. The

43. Bland, *Interviews and Reminiscences*, p. 571.
44. Watson, *Chief of Staff*, pp. 362-66.

Army (Army Air Forces included) grew from 1.6 million at the end of 1941 to nearly 8.3 million by war's end. Though numerically much greater in magnitude than the pre-Pearl Harbor expansion, proportionately the wartime growth was actually smaller. From September 1939 to December 1941 the Army had grown by a factor of 8.4. From Pearl Harbor to V-J (Victory over Japan) Day it expanded by a factor of 5.2. Most of this growth occurred in 1942 and 1943. The last two divisions to be mobilized were activated in August 1943. At the end of 1943, with the conclusion of division activation, manpower allotments within the army assigned just over one million men to the combat divisions, as compared to 1.3 million to non-divisional combat elements; 2.2 million to the Army Air Forces; and 2.5 million to service, training, and overhead functions.[45]

The agency responsible for standing up new divisions, as well as non-divisional ground combat elements, was Army Ground Forces, established in March 1942 under the command of Lieutenant General McNair. Out of its allotment for divisional troops, AGF established fifty-five new divisions from June 1942 to August of 1943, in addition to the thirty-six divisions carried over from the pre-Pearl Harbor mobilization. Of the ninety-one total divisions activated for World War II, eighty-seven ultimately saw combat. Two were inactivated having never entered the fighting (both carried the designation of the 2nd Cavalry Division). Two divisions, the 13th Airborne and 98th Infantry Divisions, deployed overseas but missed combat. In effect, the U.S. Army fought World War II without a strategic reserve.

Although Army Ground Forces established a systematic, methodical template for raising new divisions,[46] personnel turbulence sometimes compromised the process. All too often, divisions about to deploy overseas made good any personnel shortages by raiding divisions in the midst of their training cycles.[47] Moreover, the rate of turnover among division commanders continued at about the same pace as prior to Pearl Harbor. There were thirty-six division commanders on hand at the beginning of 1942. Marshall made another 197 appointments to division command through the conclusion of combat operations in 1945, yielding a total of 233 wartime division commanders. Given ninety-one divisions, this means that each division saw an arithmetical average of 2.56 commanders over a period of about forty-four months. This compares to 1.8 commanders per division in the twenty-seven months of the pre-Pearl Harbor mobilization. It is remarkable, perhaps, that fourteen divisions had only one commander from activation through the cessation of hostilities. One of these was a pre-Pearl Harbor formation – Beightler's 37th Infantry Division.

The high turnover among division commanders occurred despite Army Ground Forces' avowed policy by which the commander who mobilized and

45. Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, p. 326.
46. See Palmer and Wiley, *Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, pp. 433-41.
47. Ibid., p. 596.

trained a division would be the individual who led it into battle.[48] In fact, there were from 1942 on a total of sixty-two "mobilizers" who trained a given division but never led it in combat. Of this number, twenty-two commanders, with a mean age of 50.05 years, ultimately led a different division in battle. Fifteen "mobilizers," with a mean age of 52.00 years, trained a division but entered combat as commander at echelons above division. (Two individuals both fought a division different from the one they trained and also commanded in combat at corps or higher.) This leaves twenty-seven pure "mobilizers" who trained a division in wartime but never commanded in combat at any echelon. The pure "mobilizers," with a mean age of 51.33 years and a standard deviation of 2.88, were somewhat older than their compatriots who led in battle.

A total of 141 commanders led U.S. Army divisions in combat during World War II. This figure includes the six commanders from 1939-41 who went on to lead their pre-Pearl Harbor divisions in combat. The mean age of this group was 50.16 years, with a standard deviation of 3.41. The youngest of the 141 "fighters" were Major Generals James M. Gavin of the 82nd Airborne Division and Robert T. Frederick of the 45th Infantry Division, both thirty-seven years old when they assumed command. The oldest was Major General Innis P. Swift, who was fifty-nine years of age when he took command of the 1st Cavalry Division in 1941, and which he commanded until 1944. The second oldest "fighter" was Major General John Millikin, who was fifty-seven years old in 1945 when relieved of command of III Corps and appointed to lead the 13th Armored Division in the closing weeks of the war.

The list of "fighters" includes four National Guard officers. Major General Henry H. Johnson of Texas was forty-nine years old when appointed to command the 93rd Infantry Division. (The War Department apparently considered Johnson to be something of an expert in African-American troops, as he had previously commanded the 2nd Cavalry Division which, like the 93rd Infantry Division, was a "colored" formation.) Major General Leonard F. Wing of Vermont succeeded a Regular Army officer to lead the 43rd Infantry Division in combat. He also was forty-nine when he took command. Major General Charles C. Haffner of the Illinois National Guard, forty-seven years of age, trained and fought the 103rd Infantry Division. Major General Raymond McLain, Oklahoma, was a relatively old fifty-four when he took over the troubled 90th Infantry Division in 1944. McLain subsequently commanded XIX Corps. One additional Guardsman, Major General Alexander E. Anderson of New York, is numbered among the "mobilizers," having died while training the 86th Infantry Division. He was fifty-two years old when he assumed command, and fifty-three at the time of his death.

Analysis of the "fighters" by the type of division they commanded reveals that the four airborne divisions to see combat had the youngest commanders,

48. Ibid., p. 99.

with a mean age of 44.00 years, and a rather large standard deviation of 4.69 among five individuals. Other division types clung rather closely to the overall mean age of 50.16 years for all 141 "fighters." The sixteen armored divisions had the next youngest commanders, with twenty-eight "fighters" yielding a mean age of 50.14 years and a standard deviation of 2.98. The infantry divisions came next, with a mean age of 50.43 years and a standard deviation of 3.11 among their 104 "fighters." The sole cavalry division to see combat showed a mean age of 50.66 years for its three combat commanders. (Subtracting Swift, the oldest division commander to see combat, cavalry's mean would have been 46.50 years). The army's lone mountain division went into battle under a commander who was fifty-two years of age when he assumed command.

Analyzed another way, the 141 "fighters" showed a general trend of decreasing age as the war progressed from the outbreak of hostilities into the middle years of U.S. involvement. The six "fighters" who carried over from 1941 ranged in age from forty-eight to fifty-nine, with a mean age of 53.83 years. (Two additional pre-Pearl harbor commanders, who led divisions into combat other than their 1939-1941 commands, are counted below.) The thirty-four "fighters" appointed in 1942 had a mean age of 51.00 years with a standard deviation of 2.55. The thirty-five appointees in 1943 show a mean age of 49.43 years and a standard deviation of 2.56. The 1944 contingent, fifty-one strong, saw the mean creep up slightly to 49.65 years with a standard deviation of 3.99. The year 1945 saw fifteen "fighters" appointed, with a mean age of 50.20 years and a standard deviation of 3.73. (Subtracting the anomalous Millikin, who stepped down from corps command to take a division at age fifty-seven, the 1945 group had a mean age of 49.71 years).

Similarly, those "fighters" who departed from command of their divisions were, as a group, replaced by slightly younger men. Thirty-two "fighters," with a mean age of 50.50 years and a standard deviation of 3.31, left division command and never led in battle again. Their replacements had a mean age of 49.22 years and a standard deviation of 3.68. (Another five "fighters" left one division to command another in combat, and sixteen left division command to lead a corps in combat.) Among the thirty-two were Maurice Rose of the 3rd Armored Division, and Edwin D. Patrick of the 6th Infantry Division, both of whom died in combat. The loss of these two excellent officers serves as a reminder that the division commander of World War II was, in fact, a tactical-level leader whose responsibilities took him into harm's way.

Conclusion

Under the guidance of George C. Marshall, the U.S. Army's policies regarding division command in the World War II era represented an attempt to balance the wisdom of experience, particularly command experience, with the vitality of youth. During the interwar period, such experience came only by virtue of longevity, and perhaps the slowly fading memories of the Great War, hence the advanced age of division commanders in 1939. When the

outbreak of World War II led to mobilization and ultimately belligerency, command experience became available to progressively younger men. The ages of individuals appointed to division command fell accordingly. The four division commanders that Marshall inherited in 1939 had a mean age of 59.00 years. The pure "mobilizers" of the pre-Pearl Harbor period were 56.56 years. The "fighters" who emerged from the pre-Pearl Harbor group had a mean age of 53.63 years. The "fighters" appointed in 1942 yield a mean age of 51.00 years, while those of 1943 show a mean of 49.43 years. And there the mean age stabilized, actually rising slightly in 1944 and 1945. Thus the forty-nine-year-old commander of 1943 might be assumed to possess the same qualifications for command found in the fifty-nine-year-old of 1939. In fact, the division commander appointed in 1943 might well have held superior qualifications, including service in developmental positions and, in many cases, recent combat experience.

The 141 fighters who commanded eighty-seven divisions in combat, with a mean age of 50.16 years, represented the cutting edge of the U.S. Army's ground forces in World War II. But for all the emphasis on youth, Marshall and the army made good use of older but capable men – the "mobilizers" – who never led divisions into combat, but whose role was nonetheless a vital one. The forty-eight pre-Pearl Harbor "mobilizers," mean age 56.56 years, and the twenty-seven wartime "mobilizers," mean age 51.33 years, forged the sword that younger men wielded.

No fewer than 263 commanders led divisions from 1 September 1939 to the day that each division stopped shooting – an impressive tally for an officer corps that numbered only 14,486 in 1939. Some succeeded better than others in the demanding job of division command, and some failed altogether. It is a tribute to these men that the army's divisions performed competently on battlefields as diverse as the mountains of Italy, the jungles of the Philippines, and the plains of Belgium. It is even more to their credit, perhaps, that a force of ninety-one divisions (eighty-nine by 1945) sprang from virtually nothing in just four years. Such accomplishments suggest that Marshall found the energetic, decisive, capable division commanders that he was looking for. Thanks to the relative youth of the Marshall appointees, these men shaped the character not only of the wartime army, but of the institution for years to come. Four successive Army Chiefs of Staff – from 1948 to 1959 – can be found among the 263 division commanders of the World War II era: Generals Omar N. Bradley, J. Lawton Collins, Matthew B. Ridgway, and Maxwell D. Taylor. Thus the division commanders of World War II did more than fight a global war – they ushered the nation and the army into a new era.

Methodology and Sources

In order to establish some standard benchmarks for the historical and statistical analysis featured in this article, the authors felt compelled to make some arbitrary but reasoned decisions about what is meant by "division command." First and foremost, the analysis focuses upon appointments to divi-

sion command, not necessarily upon the individuals themselves. Men appointed to division command more than once are counted once for each appointment. However, in an attempt to filter out temporary and interim commanders who would hopelessly complicate any analysis, the authors excluded commanders holding the post for one month or less. As for the ages of the commanders, unless otherwise stated, any age given is the individual's age on the date he assumed command of the division. For National Guard commanders, individual ages are those as of the date that a given division entered federal service. As for ranks, in some cases elevation to division command preceded by a brief interval the individual's promotion to major general. To simplify the narrative flow, the rank of major general is given in such instances.

With regard to the divisions surveyed in this study, the authors chose not to include either the Hawaiian Division or the Philippine Division. Both of these formations appear in Marshall's biennial report of 1941 under the heading "Overseas Garrisons" rather than among the "Divisions." The makeup of the Philippine Division was unlike that of any other formation, being composed largely of Philippine Scouts rather than U.S. troops. As for the Hawaiian Division, it had no wartime existence, but rather spawned two other divisions that did participate in the conflict – the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions, both of which are included in this study.

The time period covered in this analysis varies from division to division. Excluding the four divisions in existence when Marshall assumed his post as Chief of Staff, this analysis encompasses the period from each division's activation until the division ceased combat operations. For the four 1939 divisions, the analysis generally begins on 1 September 1939. For the 2nd Cavalry Division, in both of its manifestations, analysis runs from activation to deactivation. The authors chose to include both incarnations of the division because both touch upon the period of American belligerency. For the two other divisions that did not see combat, analysis spans the period from activation until cessation of hostilities in the theater to which they were assigned.

For the benefit of the non-mathematically inclined, a word about statistical terminology is in order. The term "mean" denotes the common arithmetical average obtained by adding together all values and dividing by the number of observations. "Standard deviation" is a common measurement of variation in data for indicating how widely the individual values sampled vary, on average, from the mean. A small standard deviation indicates that the samples are "clumped" near the mean. A large standard deviation suggests that the individual samples are scattered well above and below the mean.

A useful introduction to statistical analysis that would be appropriate for the historian is: Richard A. Johnson and Gouri K. Bhattacharyya, *Statistics: Principles and Methods*, Fifth Edition (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2006).

In addition to the sources listed in the footnotes, the authors utilized the following for information on the divisions of World War II, and on appoint-

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U.S. Army Air Force Forward Airfields in the Second World War

DANIEL L. HAULMAN

Abstract
During the Second World War, before aerial refueling, the limited ranges of aircraft made forward airfields extremely important. Allied victory demanded the construction of scores of new airfields near enough to vital enemy targets for round-trip flights without landing in enemy territory. The larger and heavier aircraft themselves demanded improved airfields, not only in dimension, but also in materiel, such as pierced-steel planking, asphalt, and concrete. As U.S. ground forces advanced on every front, the airfields of tactical fighters and transports needed to advance with them. This article describes the organization of engineer aviation battalions, including large numbers of African-American personnel, and the vital services they performed in constructing important airfields all over the world, often from scratch. It magnifies the interaction between ground and air forces. The article considers the airfield construction in each of several geographic areas, including Britain, the Mediterranean, the continent of Europe after the successful invasion of Normandy, the Aleutian Islands of Alaska, the subcontinent of Asia, and the many islands of the southwest, central, and western Pacific Ocean areas. Each combat theater presented its own set of challenges for the aviation engineers to overcome. Historians cannot truly understand the Second World War without looking at this often neglected area.

Keywords
IX Engineer Command; Army Services of Supply; Davison, Lieutenant Colonel Donald A.; engineer aviation battalion; Iwo Jima; Lee, Major General John C.H.; Marianas; pierced-steel planking (PSP); prefabricated bituminous surfacing (PBS); Saipan; Tinian; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

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Introduction

Combat air units contributed immeasurably to Allied victory in the Second World War. The construction of hundreds of quality airfields in appropriate locations all over the world gave those units the bases they needed to accom-

plish their missions. Commanders with strategic vision chose sites from which to launch effective air raids against crucial enemy targets. The U.S. Army Air Forces developed its own organizations for airfield construction in combat zones and aviation engineers within those organizations demonstrated their flexibility in overcoming the challenges of both nature and war.

The Genesis of Aviation Engineers

During the First World War, airfield construction required little engineering because grassy plains could serve as runways and trench warfare opened little territory on which to build new bases closer to the front. During the period of isolationism following the war, the U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps improved the quality of Air Corps bases within the United States. Development of larger, heavier, and faster military aircraft called for construction of sturdier runways and advanced support facilities. As the Second World War erupted in Europe, Congress and the War Department transferred military construction responsibilities within the United States to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. At the same time, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Congress vastly increased the number of Air Corps combat groups, each of which required its own base to host the crews and aircraft of three or four squadrons. After the United States traded a number of aging destroyers to Britain in return for a string of western Atlantic Ocean bases in 1940, the Corps of Engineers also began overseas base construction. As the Corps of Engineers struggled to meet the high demand for new airfield construction, Germany's introduction of "blitzkrieg" tactics in Europe created dynamic fronts, requiring rapid air base construction in moving combat zones. In 1941, Lieutenant Colonel Donald A. Davison, the Army's chief aviation engineer, proposed that the Army Air Forces have the resources to build its own bases in forward areas. The result was the formation of self-contained aviation engineer battalions.[1]

Within a year, the number of engineer aviation battalions increased from twelve to fifty-one. By the end of December 1942, well over half of these were overseas. Eventually there were scores of aviation engineer battalions in every theater, many of them composed primarily of African-American personnel whose opportunities were limited in other areas. By July 1944, there were sixteen aviation engineer battalions in the Ninth Air Force alone as its forces prepared to move from England to Europe. By January 1945, there were eight aviation engineer battalions in the China-Burma-India

1. For more historical background information, see "The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: A Brief History," <http://www.usace.army.mil/History/Documents/Brief/03-transportation/transport.html>; John E. Fagg, "Aviation Engineers," in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, Vol. VII, *Services Around the World* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), chapter 9, pp. 240-41; Peter C. Bahm and Kenneth W. Plasek, "Tactical Aircraft and Airfield Recovery," in *Air Command and Staff College Seminar and Correspondence Lesson Book*, Vol. 6 (Maxwell AFB: Air University, 1994), reading 8, p. 59.

Theater. In the first half of 1945, no less than thirty-six aviation engineer battalions operated in the Philippines, the largest number in any one theater.[2]

Forward Airfield Construction in U.S. Territories in 1941

In 1941, with war raging in Europe and the Far East, U.S. aviation engineers constructed or improved airfields to defend the Panama Canal, the Hawaiian Islands, and the Philippines. In the Canal Zone, they cleared 1,000 acres of trees and poured 180,000 square yards of concrete in building Howard Field. They worked on four airfields in the Hawaiian Islands, including one on Kauai and three on Oahu. The most important of these was Hickam Field next to Pearl Harbor. Other aviation engineers developed Clark and Del-monte airfields on the islands of Luzon and Mindanao in the Philippines. In fact, shortly after the Japanese attacked Hickam and Clark on 7-8 December, the 804th and 803d Engineer Aviation Battalions at those respective bases immediately turned their attention from new construction to runway repair.[3]

New Airfields in the Aleutians

In early 1942, the 807th Engineer Aviation Battalion constructed an airfield on Umnak in the Aleutian Islands to protect Alaska, which was even closer than Hawaii to Japan. After Japanese forces took the islands of Attu and Kiska in the same archipelago, the Eleventh Air Force launched air raids against them from Umnak, but the great distance made missions difficult. Aviation engineers constructed three more airfields in the Aleutians, one each on the islands of Adak, Amchitka, and Shemya. From them, American fighters and bombers struck not only Attu and Kiska but also facilities and shipping in the Japanese-held Kurile Islands of the northwestern Pacific. The 807th and 813th Engineer Aviation Battalions completed the construction at Adak and Amchitka. Late in the war, a civilian contractor from Seattle ex-tended the runways on Shemya and paved them with concrete, anticipating B-29 raids on Japan itself.[4]

Airfield Construction in England

The largest aircraft carrier in World War II was Great Britain. During the war, the Allies built nearly 500 new airfields on the island and Army Air

2. Craven and Cate, *Army Air Forces in World War II*, Vol. VII, pp. 266, 292, 300; Fagg, "Aviation Engineers," pp. 241-43, 296.

3. Major P.J. Toussaint, "AAF-USAF Airfield Construction, 1939-1982," Air Command and Staff College Student Report, Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) call no. K239.043-26 1939-1982, p. 25; "Construction of Air Bases, 1933-1945," United States Army Strategic Forces, AFHRA call no. 703.04-1, pp. 24-25; Fagg, "Aviation En-gineers," pp. 241-42.

4. Barry W. Fowle, *Builders and Fighters: U.S. Army Engineers in World War II* (Fort Belvoir, VA: Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1992), pp. 367-69; Fagg, "Aviation Engineers," pp. 242-43; Toussaint, "AAF-USAF Airfield Construction," pp. 25-26; A. Timothy Warnock, *Air Force Combat Medals, Streamers, and Campaigns* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1990), pp. 74-76.

Force units eventually operated at more than 140 of them. Almost all U.S. bases were located in the East Anglia area of England, north of London. Civilian contractors under the British Air Ministry constructed most of them, but because of a native labor shortage, AAF engineer aviation battalions independently constructed fourteen of them. By the end of 1942, sixteen U.S. aviation engineer battalions had deployed to England and in the next few months the number rose to twenty-four. Although the battalions were assigned to the Eighth Air Force, they were attached for operational control to the theater Services of Supply under Major General John C.H. Lee.[5]

At its peak, the Eighth Air Force utilized fifty-eight bomber bases in Britain. A typical class A airfield, according to British design, included three intersecting concrete runways, each 150 feet wide, the longest of which stretched 4,800 feet. A fifty-foot wide taxiway connected the ends of the runways. Such a base consumed approximately 175,000 cubic yards of concrete following removal of numerous hedgerows and trees. Each airfield took between two and three months to complete and by late 1943 could host a group with four squadrons, each squadron equipped with eighteen B-17 or B-24 heavy bombers. Until 1944, the possibility of a German invasion and occupation of England required that the bases be equipped with demolition charges.[6]

Aviation Engineers in the Mediterranean

In the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO), the situation was different. Moving fronts there called for rapid construction of temporary forward airfields so that short-range tactical fighters could support ground troops in battle. Tactical air forces had to be located within a hundred miles of the front lines, and those lines could move a dozen miles a day. In North Africa, ten aviation engineer battalions eventually constructed airfields in French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Aviation engineers built five airfields in central Tunisia within seventy-two hours. Runways for fighters could be as short as 3,600 feet, but for fighter-bombers and medium bombers they had to

5. Roger A. Freeman, *Airfields of the Eighth: Then and Now* (London: After the Battle, 1978), pp. 8-10; Alfred Goldberg, "Establishment of the Eighth Air Force in the United Kingdom," in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, Vol. I, *Plans and Early Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), chapter 17, pp. 649-50; Fagg, "Aviation Engineers," pp. 246-47; Toussaint, "AAF-USAF Airfield Construction," pp. 27-28; Barry Anderson, *Army Air Forces Stations: A Guide to the Stations Where U.S. Army Air Forces Personnel Served in the United Kingdom During World War II* (Maxwell AFB: USAF Historical Research Center, 1985), pp. 4-11; R.E. Smyser, "Origin of the IX Engineer Command," AFHRA call no. 544.01-3 Nov 1943-May 1945, p. 1.

6. Freeman, *Airfields of the Eighth*, pp. 8-10; Goldberg, "Establishment of the Eighth Air Force in the United Kingdom," pp. 649-50; Fagg, "Aviation Engineers," pp. 246-47; Toussaint, "AAF-USAF Airfield Construction," pp. 27-28; Anderson, *Army Air Forces Stations*, pp. 4-11; Smyser, "Origin of the IX Engineer Command," p. 1.

be considerably longer, 5,000 feet and 6,000 feet respectively.[7]

The Northwest African Air Force experimented with airborne engineer battalions that could fly to airfield sites and begin construction as needed. In December 1942, fifty-six C-47s carried two companies of the 871st Airborne Engineer Battalion and their equipment from Morocco to Biskra in North Africa, where in twenty-four hours they had a runway ready for B-17s from Oran. The 888th Airborne Engineer Battalion built an airfield on Pantelleria after the Allies captured that small Mediterranean island. Although some of these airborne units were very successful, they contained fewer personnel than regular engineer aviation battalions, and their smaller machines, designed for airlift, could not perform very heavy construction work.[8]

Recognizing that aviation engineers in a theater with quickly moving front lines were more effective when serving a tactical air commander, Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower in October 1943 authorized a provisional engineering command for the Twelfth Air Force, which became the Army Air Force Engineer Command, MTO, Provisional. The reorganization reduced friction between the Army Corps of Engineers and the aviation engineers.[9]

Newly constructed air bases in the Mediterranean theater greatly influenced operations. Placing warplanes near the front gave them a more immediate impact on evolving battles and reduced fuel consumption. From installations in Algeria, fighters and medium bombers attacked enemy targets in Tunisia. From Tunisia, they struck Sicily, and from Sicily, in turn, they raided the Italian mainland. Allied pilots, once they had bases available in southern Italy, could strike enemy forces in northern Italy more effectively. Aviation engineers built two airfields in one month to cover the landings at Anzio. They battled rain, mud, hostile artillery fire, and dust to build or repair more than forty airfields in Italy. Once enough of the country was under Allied control, the Fifteenth Air Force used bases there for a new strategic bombardment campaign against Germany from the south, supplementing the continuing bombing campaign from England in the west. After the invasion of southern France, aviation engineers there constructed four new airfields and converted twenty-one existing fields for Allied use, which made possible air raids on German forces from still another direction.[10]

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7. Toussaint, "AAF-USAF Airfield Construction," p. 33; Fagg, "Aviation Engineers," pp. 248-53.

8. Fagg, "Aviation Engineers," pp. 248-53.

9. Fagg, "Aviation Engineers," p. 258; Toussaint, "AAF-USAF Airfield Construction," pp. 33-35; Smyser, "Origin of the IX Engineer Command," p. 1.

10. Fagg, "Aviation Engineers," pp. 254-65; Toussaint, "AAF-USAF Airfield Construction," pp. 34-35; Warnock, *Air Force Combat Medals, Streamers, and Campaigns*, pp. 138-63. Before moving to England to support the invasion of Normandy, the Ninth Air Force also launched bombers from Libya against Axis oil refineries in Ploesti, Rumania. See Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller, *The Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology, 1941-1945* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1973), p. 168.

The IX Engineer Command

The Ninth Air Force entered combat in North Africa, but moved to England in October 1943. Its medium bombers, fighters, and transports at first raided northern France in preparation for the Normandy invasion. At the time of the invasion, troop-carrying airplanes dropped airborne troops and delivered equipment and supplies to Allied forces in the beachhead area.[11]

In northern Europe as in northern Africa, the Ninth Air Force moved from bases in one country to bases in the next. From England it attacked France, and from France it attacked Germany. The Ninth Air Force gained control of engineer aviation battalions through a provisional IX Engineer Command, modeled on the one in the Mediterranean. Under Brigadier General James B. Newman, the new command assumed management of sixteen engineer aviation battalions that were eventually grouped into four regiments and two brigades. The IX Engineer Command supervised the construction of most new airfields built across northern France and western Germany between D-Day on 6 June 1944 and V-E Day on 9 May 1945. In February 1945, all aviation engineer units in the European Theater were placed under Engineer Command (Provisional), United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF).[12]

Aviation engineers served among troops in the initial assault at Normandy. On Omaha Beach the third day after D-Day, the 820th Engineer Aviation Battalion developed Poupeville as the first emergency landing strip and St. Laurent-sur-Mer as the first operational transport field in France. Transports used the latter to deliver cargo and men and evacuate wounded. Aviation engineers also developed an airfield at St. Pierre du Mont in Normandy to serve as an advanced landing ground for P-47s, the first Allied fighters based in France since 1940. Fighter pilots based in England sometimes used the forward airstrips at Normandy as staging bases, where they rearmed and refueled. Engineer aviation battalions constructed twenty-six airfields in Normandy in 1944. After the breakout from the Normandy beachhead, Allied supply lines lengthened, increasing the demand for supply and evacuation strips for transports. By 15 September 1944, IX Engineer Command had placed more than eighty airfields in operation, while British engineers constructed seventy-six. Between 6 June and 5 December 1944, the command had supervised the construction or rehabilitation of 103 airfields.[13]

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11. Maurer Maurer, *Air Force Combat Units of World War II* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), pp. 464-65.

12. R.E. Smyser, Jr., "Six Months of Airfield Construction in France," AFHRA call no. 544.01-3 Nov 1943-May 1945, p. 1; 1Lt David C. Johnson, *U.S. Army Air Forces Continental Airfields (ETO) D-Day to V-E Day* (Maxwell AFB: USAF Historical Research Center, 1988), p. 2; Toussaint, "AAF-USAF Airfield Construction," p. 28; Fagg, "Aviation Engineers," p. 266.

13. Smyser, "Six Months," p. 12; Toussaint, "AAF-USAF Airfield Construction," pp. 29-31; Fagg, "Aviation Engineers," pp. 266-69; Johnson, *U.S. Army Air Forces Continental Airfields*, pp. 1, 5-7.

In dry weather and on stable ground, rolls of prefabricated bituminous surfacing (PBS) served as an adequate surface for runways, but in the winter of 1944/45, rain, snow, and alternately freezing and thawing ground required engineers to strengthen runways in eastern France and Belgium with pierced-steel planking (PSP). Delays in front line movement because of weather and the last German counteroffensive in the Ardennes gave engineers the time to complete their work.[14]

In Germany, the need to build air bases from scratch decreased. Many *Luftwaffe* fields could be rehabilitated quickly by removing mines and filling in craters left from Allied bombing. Engineers could build a new runway on rough terrain in twelve days, but they could sometimes rehabilitate a captured German field in as little as two. In some cases, straight stretches of the famed *Autobahn* highway system served as runways. In six days, aviation engineers converted the German airfield at Venlo for Allied use. At Remagen, where the Allies crossed the Rhine River, aviation engineers quickly constructed a supply and evacuation strip. Such strips, necessary to deliver fuel and carry out wounded, demanded longer runways than the fighter strips because they had to accommodate the larger, cargo-laden transport aircraft. By V-E Day, 9 May 1945, seventy-six of the 126 airfields made operational east of the Rhine River were supply and evacuation airfields. By then, the IX Engineer Command had built or repaired a total of at least 241 airfields from Normandy to Austria in less than a year.[15]

Airfield Construction in Asia and the Pacific

In the war with Japan in the Pacific and eastern Asia, the Army Air Forces eventually deployed scores of engineer aviation battalions (eventually thirty-six in the Philippines alone). Army and Navy theater commanders did not allow their air component commanders to set up engineer commands, even on a provisional basis. During the Philippines campaign, a majority of the aviation engineers were devoted to construction not directly related to air force needs. The 842d Engineer Aviation Battalion in the Pacific spent only a tenth of its time in the theater on airfield construction. Tactical air commanders sometimes complained that they did not have control over the aviation engineers and that such a situation violated the principle of unity of command. Nevertheless, theater commanders had good reason to pool engineering resources. After all, bulldozers could not reach an airfield construction site if the roads and docks they needed were not built first. Moreover, the Corps of Engineers and Navy Seabees worked on airfields as much as on other projects. Although aviation engineers often had to build roads, camps, docks, hospitals, and depots with the help of the other Army engineers and the Seabees they also constructed 200 runways between Aus-

14. Johnson, *U.S. Army Air Forces Continental Airfields*, p. 9.
15. Ibid., p. 10; Toussaint, "AAF-USAF Airfield Construction," pp. 31-32; Fagg, "Aviation Engineers," pp. 273-74.

tralia and Okinawa.[16]

The Southwest Pacific

As in other theaters, engineer aviation battalions were active in the Southwest Pacific. For example, in 1942, the 808th Engineer Aviation Battalion constructed airfields around Darwin, Australia and Port Moresby, New Guinea. As in North Africa, the Army Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific often employed airborne aviation battalions. At Tsili Tsili in New Guinea in July 1943, a company of the 871st Airborne Engineer Aviation Battalion that had flown in C-47s to the site with light machines, rapidly constructed an airfield that could handle 150 transports a day.[17]

Just as in the Mediterranean and European theaters, the Army Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific moved from one set of bases to another as the front advanced. In the west, units deployed from airfields in Australia and Java to the Port Moresby area of southeastern New Guinea, from which they attacked the Japanese on the northern and western sides of that island. As they advanced northwestward across the eastern coast of New Guinea, American forces constructed new airfields at Milne Bay, Dobodura, the Markham River Valley, Hollandia, and Cape Sansapor. Other AAF units farther east moved from New Caledonia to Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides, from which they attacked Guadalcanal in the Solomons. From Henderson Field in Guadalcanal, U.S. aircraft struck the Japanese at Bougainville. Newly constructed airfields north of New Guinea on the islands of Wakde, Owi, Biak, Noemfoor, Morotai, and in the Admiralties provided bases from which to attack other Japanese forces remaining in the East Indies and to neutralize by air the bypassed major Japanese installation at Rabaul on New Britain Island. From bases in the central East Indies, the Far East Air Forces, composed of the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces, raided enemy oil installations to the west on Borneo and reached northward toward the southern islands of the Philippines. From bases on Morotai, Leyte, and Mindoro, American aircraft struck Clark Field on Luzon and supported General Douglas MacArthur's retaking of Manila. Once Clark was retaken, U.S. bombers used that base to raid Japanese installations on Formosa (Taiwan) to the north.[18]

The Army supervised the Southwest Pacific Area, but kept the engineer aviation battalions in that theater in a pooled construction arrangement. Fifth Air Force commander Major General George C. Kenney wanted control of the engineer aviation battalions through an engineer command such as the provisional one in the Mediterranean, but theater commander General Mac-

16. Craven and Cate, *Army Air Forces in World War II*, Vol. VII, p. 292; Karl C. Dod, *The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), p. 721; Fagg, "Aviation Engineers," pp. 247, 262, 276-78, 281, 291, 293; Toussaint, "AAF-USAF Airfield Construction," pp. 35-36, 40.
17. Fagg, "Aviation Engineers," pp. 276-77, 280.
18. Fowle, *Builders and Fighters*, pp. 353-63; Warnock, *Air Force Combat Medals, Streamers, and Campaigns*, pp. 65-73, 77-85, 93-103.

Arthur did not approve. The Army Services of Supply retained control of the engineer aviation battalions, directing them to work on whatever construction was needed, including roads and docks, and not just airfield construction. In the South Pacific, Seabees at first led construction efforts, but by 1943, the Thirteenth Air Force assumed control of aviation engineer battalions through its air service command. In March 1945, an engineer construction command (ENCOM) was established in the Philippines under Major General Leif J. Sverdrup, but it was not devoted exclusively to airfield construction. General Henry "Hap" Arnold, head of the Army Air Forces, was aware of the desperate need for more airfields in the war against Japan, and he approved the deployment of engineer aviation units to the Pacific even before they were fully trained.[19] During the first half of 1945, there were no less than thirty-six engineer aviation battalions in the Philippines. On Okinawa there were twenty-six. The Army Air Forces had plans for ninety-three aviation engineer battalions in the western Pacific by the end of 1945, but the war ended before all could be activated or deployed.[20]

China-Burma-India

Early in the war, the Japanese took over coastal and northeastern China, French Indochina, Burma, Malaya, and Singapore. By cutting the Burma Road, they forced the Allies to airlift war materiel from British bases in northeastern India over the Himalayas (the "Hump") to airfields in southern China. By that airlift, the United States and Britain encouraged the Chinese to remain in the war. The Allies also used the northeastern Indian bases to raid the Japanese in Burma. Some of the cargo flying the Hump was intended for new B-29 bomber bases in China, from which the Army Air Forces attacked the Japanese home islands before more practical bases became available in the Marianas.[21]

As early as December 1943, advanced AAF echelons arrived in India to organize the building of airfields in India and China. Thousands of Indians labored to construct four permanent bases around Kharagpur in eastern India, while across the Himalayas in China, 1,000 miles to the northeast, about 350,000 Chinese workers toiled to build four staging bases near Chengtu. By April 1944, eight B-29 airfields were available in Asia. A Japanese ground offensive threatened these bases, and the United States eventually chose to launch most of its B-29 raids on Japan from the Marianas Islands in the Pacific.[22]

In the China-Burma-India theater, the Services of Supply managed the Army Air Forces' engineer aviation battalions, employing them on any con-

19. Craven and Cate, *Army Air Forces in World War II*, Vol. VII, p. 293.
20. Fagg, "Aviation Engineers," pp. 277, 292, 296, 307.
21. Warnock, *Air Force Combat Medals, Streamers, and Campaigns*, pp. 104-19; Craven and Cate, *Army Air Forces in World War II*, Vol. I, pp. 506-12.
22. Daniel L. Haulman, *Hitting Home: The Air Offensive Against Japan* (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1999), p. 7.

struction projects needed. Both Major General Claire Chennault and Major General George E. Stratemeyer, the commanders of the Fourteenth Air Force in China and Tenth Air Force in India and Burma, wanted to control the aviation engineers in their areas of responsibility to hasten the construction of airfields. They believed that having the Services of Supply in the chain of command merely delayed the time between a request for construction and its achievement. Stratemeyer was particularly concerned with Army Air Force management of the engineers who would build the B-29 bases in India and China. In August 1943, Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell placed airfield construction units in the CBI theater under the CBI Air Service Command.[23]

Between June 1944 and June 1945, aviation engineers in Burma constructed twenty-seven runways, eight for fighters and nineteen for transports, despite monsoon rains from May to October and the difficulty of finding flat ground among the mountains. In March, many of the units began moving into China, using more than 200 trucks.[24]

Central and Western Pacific

In the central and western Pacific, joint Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and Army Air Forces efforts drove the Japanese successively from one island group to another. As in other theaters, the Army Air Forces moved from one set of bases to the next as surface forces advanced relentlessly westward into enemy territory. From Funafuti and Nanumea in the Ellice Islands, Seventh Air Force airplanes raided the Gilbert Islands such as Tarawa. From the newly captured Gilberts, air units struck the Marshall Islands. From new bases on captured Marshall atolls such as Kwajalein and Eniwetok, Seventh Air Force units struck the Marianas. After the islands of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam in the Marianas were taken, they became strategic air bases for the Twentieth Air Force, whose B-29 bombers were then in range of the Japanese home islands to the northwest. Tactical air forces continued to move into new bases on islands captured from the Japanese in the western Pacific, including Angaur and Peleliu in the Palau Islands, for air raids on the Japanese in the Philippines. From the bases in the liberated Philippines, Army Air Force aircraft struck the Ryukyus Islands, including Okinawa. The capture of Okinawa provided bases such as Yontan and Kadena for raids on southern Japan.[25]

In these island groups, Navy Seabees ultimately under Admiral Chester Nimitz, the theater commander, often constructed Army air bases. The Seabees, however, did not work alone. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Marine Corps engineers contributed, as did AAF aviation engineers. For example, the 804th Engineer Aviation Battalion constructed an important com-

23. Dod, *Corps of Engineers*, pp. 429, 437-38.
24. Toussaint, "AAF-USAF Airfield Construction," pp. 35-36.
25. Warnock, *Air Force Combat Medals, Streamers, and Campaigns*, pp. 89-91, 121, 123-25.

pacted coral airstrip on Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands during February 1944. In the Marianas, engineers of multiple services built B-29 airfields for the XXI Bomber Command for raids on the Japanese heartland. The Navy built the bases on Tinian, but Army and AAF aviation engineers took part on Guam and Saipan. No less than five aviation engineer battalions worked on the Saipan airfields.[26]

From bases on Saipan, Guam, and Tinian, no part of Japan was beyond the reach of American B-29 Superfortresses. At very great cost, U.S. Marines took the island of Iwo Jima, between the Marianas and Japan, to facilitate the missions. Once taken, Iwo Jima could not put up interceptors against the B-29s or warn Tokyo of coming raids, and the island became available as an air base for emergency landings and fighter escorts. Superfortresses from the Marianas bombed Tokyo with incendiaries on the night of 9/10 March. Resultant fires destroyed sixteen square miles of Japan's capital and largest city. Other fire-bombing raids that spring left the hearts of virtually all of Japan's cities burned-out ruins. B-29s also dropped mines around the waters surrounding the home islands that cut shipping lines by which Japan imported food and other essential supplies from mainland Asia. The final blows came in August, when B-29s from Tinian dropped atomic bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Only five days after the second atomic attack, Japan agreed to surrender.[27]

Conclusion

With each territorial advance by Allied surface forces, new base sites became available from which the Army Air Forces could effectively raid the enemy, both strategically and tactically. Moving from one set of bases to the next was possible only with the help of aviation engineers, who constructed airfields from scratch or refurbished existing bases for AAF use. This was true in theaters all over the world, including the Mediterranean, northern Europe, the Pacific, and southern Asia.

As early as 1941, the Army Air Forces developed its own engineer aviation battalions to supplement the work of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers by concentrating on forward airfields. In the Mediterranean and European theaters, the Army Air Forces established provisional engineer commands in order to better manage engineer aviation battalions.[28]

Aviation engineers in World War II overcame a number of man-made challenges. Near the front, they faced enemy air raids that often interrupted construction and generated casualties. Hostile fire in combat theaters discouraged the use of civilian contractors. Use of airfields recently captured from the enemy required not only filling in craters left by Allied bombing

26. "Construction of Air Bases, 1933-1945," pp. 96-106; Toussaint, "AAF-USAF Airfield Construction," pp. 40-41; Fagg, "Aviation Engineers," pp. 276, 297, 304-07.
27. Haulman, *Hitting Home*, pp. 22, 26, 32-37.
28. Dod, *Corps of Engineers*, p. 437; Fagg, "Aviation Engineers," pp. 240-41, 258, 266, 277-78.

and removal of mines and booby traps, but also improvements and adaptations to accommodate American aircraft. Poor logistics adversely affected the Army Air Forces' efforts to construct forward airfields, especially in distant theaters. Unreliable shipping in the face of enemy submarine attacks, extremely long supply lines, and very limited airlift capacity hindered delivery of construction equipment and supplies.[29]

Environmental challenges more than matched enemy obstacles. Dense jungles on Pacific islands and stubborn hedgerows in northwestern Europe had to be cleared before runways could be graded. In the Mediterranean, dust posed a persistent problem, as did rocky soil and mountains that restricted airfield site selection. Where there was abundant flat land, as in northern Europe, it was often too low for proper drainage in rainy weather. In all theaters, rain and mud degraded airfield surfaces. Engineers largely solved this problem by using interlocking pierced steel planks (PSP) placed over properly prepared surfaces. Concrete and asphalt offered more permanent but also more costly and time-consuming solutions. Frozen and thawing ground in the Aleutians and shifting sands on Pacific island beaches often proved to be unstable, and had to be fortified with imported soil or packed crushed coral before it was suitable for paving. High surf endangered the landing by sea of construction equipment and supplies. Climate also challenged the engineers, who faced sandstorms in North Africa, blizzards in the Aleutians, and monsoons in the western Pacific. Finally, there were natural disasters, such as Pacific typhoons and the eruption of Mount Vesuvius in Italy in the spring of 1944, which damaged and destroyed a host of B-25s stationed around its base.[30]

As air units and bases moved ever closer to the heart of shrinking enemy territory, previously constructed or developed bases sometimes became useless in the rear. Engineers must have been discouraged at times to know that many of the bases on which they labored would not be needed for very long, and new ones would have to be constructed closer to the front. They were more than compensated by the prospects of victory.

The Second World War provided the U.S. Army Air Forces, and later the United States Air Force, institutional experience in organizing and managing aviation engineering units. The first great generation of aviation engineers demonstrated courage, initiative, and flexibility in accomplishing its most important mission. Its story continues to instruct and inspire.

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29. Toussaint, "AAF-USAF Airfield Construction," p. 34; Fagg, "Aviation Engineers," pp. 247, 249.
30. Toussaint, "AAF-USAF Airfield Construction," pp. 34-36; Fagg, "Aviation Engineers," pp. 247, 249-50, 259-60, 267, 270-78, 283, 286, 290.

DC: Center for Air Force History, 1993); *The United States Air Force and Humanitarian Airlift Operations, 1947-1994* (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998); *Hitting Home: The Air Offensive against Japan* (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1999); *Air Force Aerial Victory Credits: World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam*, with William C. Stancik (Montgomery, AL: Gunter AFB Press, 1988); and *The Tuskegee Airmen: An Illustrated History, 1939-1949*, with Joseph Caver and Jerome Ennels (Montgomery, AL: New South Books, 2011).

Surrender and Capture in the Winter War and Great Patriotic War: Which was the Anomaly?

ROGER R. REESE

Abstract
This article seeks to explain the apparent anomaly of the vast capturing of encircled Soviet soldiers in 1941 by comparing them to the similar, but generally much smaller, encirclements experienced by the Red Army during the Soviet-Finnish Winter War (30 November 1939 to 12 March 1940). In contrast to 1941, in the Winter War, surrounded Red Army units most often held out, avoiding capture and refusing to surrender. In both cases the majority of Soviet soldiers lost as prisoners of war were due to battlefield circumstances, which laid bare the Red Army's doctrinal, training, and command failures, and less so soldiers' political sympathies. Attitudes regarding Stalinism came into play only after unit cohesion dissolved and officers' command and control fell apart. But, in both cases, encircled forces were destroyed and soldiers taken prisoner because disintegrated leadership and organization put soldiers in the position of having to choose either to resist for no evident purpose, or save themselves. When units tried to hold out, they might be annihilated, but as long as the chain of command remained intact few men would be captured. It was unit disintegration in the act of breaking out from encirclements that led to catastrophic losses of prisoners.

Keywords
capture; encirclement; Great Patriotic War; prisoners of war; Red Army; Soviet Union; Stalin, Joseph; surrender; Winter War; World War II

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Introduction

Historians have suggested two opposing explanations for the huge numbers of Soviet soldiers who surrendered or were captured during the disastrous 1941 campaign. George Fischer, Robert Conquest, and (by implication) Joseph Stalin have accused these soldiers of rejecting the Stalinist state. By contrast, Robert Thurston and post-Stalinist Soviet historians have attributed

these losses to the fortunes of war, in particular to the poor generalship and lack of preparedness of the Red Army in contrast to its German opponent. Indeed, Thurston contends that those Soviet soldiers who fought at all under such adverse circumstances were in effect pro-Stalinists.[1]

This article seeks to explain the 1941 capture of encircled Soviet soldiers by comparing them to the similar, but generally much smaller, encirclements experienced by the Red Army during the Soviet-Finnish Winter War (30 November 1939 to 12 March 1940). In contrast to 1941, in the Winter War, surrounded Red Army units most often held out, avoiding capture and refusing to surrender. Given the apparently similar circumstances in which both the Finns and the Germans surrounded entire Red Army units, why did the results differ so greatly?

The very act of surrender can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, most armies consider it cowardly and even treasonous to surrender when one still has the means to resist. On the other hand, however, there are sometimes compelling circumstances where continued resistance would only increase friendly losses without affecting the outcome of the battle. If, for example, soldiers lack ammunition, food, water, or effective leadership, they may be justified in surrendering. Indeed, such soldiers are usually described not as voluntarily surrendering, but by the passive expression of being captured. Even Stalin's Russia made allowances for capture.

If, therefore, one argues that Soviet soldiers detested the Stalinist regime in both 1939 and 1941, why were there so few instances of capture or surrender to the Finns?[2] If anything, one would expect a larger proportion of

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1. Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: A Reassessment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 456, 468; George Fischer, *Soviet Opposition to Stalin: A Case Study in World War II* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 5-6. Fischer and Conquest maintain that soldiers simply were not willing to fight for the Stalinist Soviet Union. I, too, in earlier works, have postulated that some responsibility for the poor performance of the Red Army in 1941 can be ascribed to lack of support for the regime by peasant soldiers disaffected by collectivization and dekulakization, and workers disaffected due to poor living and working conditions, and others alienated by the terror purges. Regarding pro-Stalinist sentiments, see Robert Thurston, "Cauldrons of Loyalty and Betrayal: Soviet Soldiers' Behavior, 1941 and 1945," in Robert W. Thurston and Bernd Bonwetsch, eds., *The People's War: Responses to World War II in the Soviet Union* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), pp. 235-41; and Vladimir Petrov, *"June 22, 1941": Soviet Historians and the German Invasion* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968). Robert Thurston is very confident of popular support for the regime, more so than most historians. In his *The People's War* he shows that even though over three million men were taken prisoner by the Germans between 22 June and the end of December 1941 out of an army of approximately nine million (roughly 33% POWs), there could have been more. Many fought to the death in hopeless encirclements and tens of thousands others died trying to break out of encirclements. Thousands others successfully evaded capture and rejoined retreating Soviet forces. Thurston then assumes that fighting the Germans equated to support for the regime, and that the Great Patriotic War was the "acid test of Stalinism," which, he concludes, it passed.

2. Evgenii Balashov, *Prinimai nas, suomi-krasavitsa!: "Osvoboditel'nyi" pokhod v Finliandiiu 1939-1940 gg. Chast' I* (St. Petersburg: Galeia Print, 2000), pp. 176, 180. Soviet

surrenders in 1939, due to the residual anger from the great purges and forced collectivization of agriculture, which had just ended, than in 1941, when the pain of these events had abated. Moreover, the contrast between these two conflicts makes ideological explanations appear even more improbable. If supposedly-disaffected soldiers fought desperately to avoid capture, and would not surrender voluntarily to the Finns, who posed no threat to the survival of the Soviet state, why would so many of those same soldiers fight less aggressively and surrender to the Nazis who had invaded and laid waste to the Soviet Union? By the same token, if the tenacity of the Red Army soldier in the Winter War indicated pro-Stalinism, why was it not replicated in 1941? In short, I submit that ideological outlook and antagonism to the Stalinist regime are at best marginally relevant to the decision of Red Army men to fight, surrender, or get captured in either conflict. The explanation for the frequency of capture in 1941 lies not in ideology, but rather in differing circumstances on the battlefield.

Comparison of the Winter War and Great Patriotic War

An analysis of the experience of the Winter War would not lead one to anticipate the massive numbers of Soviet soldiers going into German captivity in 1941. In the first months of this short war the Red Army, largely road-bound, advanced in long narrow columns into Finland. The Finns let the divisions get strung out before attacking them from the flanks and dividing them into smaller manageable sections, soon called *mottis*, which they then encircled and sought to destroy. A *motti* could be as small as a rifle company – or as large as a tank brigade. Commanders of these *mottis* immediately went into all-round defense, dug in, and awaited instructions and relief. The Finns managed to overrun and destroy many, others broke out with heavy casualties, and the rest held out until the end of the war. Few yielded significant numbers of prisoners; none surrendered.

During the Winter War there were two examples of gross failure. The first was that of the disaster of the 163rd and 44th Rifle Divisions of 9th Army, which attacked Finland at its mid-section from the east during late December 1939 through early January 1940. The second was that of the 18th Rifle Division and 34th Light Tank Brigade of 8th Army in the vicinity north of Lake Ladoga. In the first phase of 9th Army's attempt to cut Finland in two, the 163rd Rifle Division attacked west and then turned south to capture the town of Suomussalmi and its important road junction. The 44th Rifle Division attacked west along the Raate road and also headed for Suomussalmi to link up with the 163rd Rifle Division. First the Finns attacked the 163rd Rifle Division while it was strung out on the road and very nearly annihilated it. Then they turned their attention to the 44th Rifle Division and did the same. The Finns successfully destroyed the 163rd's division command, two of the 163rd's rifle regiments, and accompanying artillery and

documents report only 5,486 men taken prisoner by the Finns.

support troops, taking several thousand prisoners. Two regiments, the 662nd Rifle Regiment and the 3rd NKVD Regiment, closest to the Soviet border were the last to be attacked. While under attack and realizing encirclement was imminent, Colonel Sharov, the commander of the 662nd Rifle Regiment, and his commissar Podkhomutov, according to investigators, "abandoned the regiment and fled with a group of soldiers."[3] For their cowardly flight, Sharov and Podkhomutov were executed, as were Captain Chaikovskii and Cherevko, commander and commissar respectively of the 3rd NKVD Regiment, who also performed dismally.

The case of the 44th Rifle Division was a little different. After heavy fighting, the road-bound division, having suffered very heavy casualties, was encircled by the Finns, who divided it into several *mottis*. The 47th Corps commander, General Dashichev, did not authorize an immediate breakout. Instead, the *Stavka* (the Soviet high command) ordered his superior, 9th Army commander, General Dukhanov, to send a relief expedition to bring the division out, and told him he would be held personally responsible for the success of the mission. Furthermore, he was told, "neither one heavy weapon nor a single machine gun would be left in the hands of the enemy."[4] Despite the fact that Dukhanov had insufficient forces to mount an effective relief effort, he threw into battle what ski battalions came available to him, but to little effect. After nearly a week of fighting, the division managed to fight its way out, but with only one thousand men remaining in each regiment. The losses of materiél were substantial: seventy-nine artillery pieces, thirty-seven tanks, 130 heavy machine guns, 150 light machine guns, six 82mm mortars, and 150 automobiles and trucks. All company, battalion, and regimental radios had been lost. Of the men that made it out, forty percent had abandoned their rifles.[5] The division had been destroyed.

The reason the materiél losses had been so heavy was because of the nature of the battle and terrain, and poor decision-making on the part of 9th Army. Because the division was surrounded, it could not be resupplied with fuel, and because 9th Army waited so long to give the order to break out, the tanks and motor vehicles ran out of gas. The artillery towed by vehicles was thus lost. Horse-drawn artillery was also lost because the horses were either killed by combat action or starved for lack of fodder. Under these circum-

3. "Doklad zamestitelia nachal'nika politupravleniia 9-i armii nachal'niku Politicheskogo upravleniia Krasnoi Armii ob otkhode 163-i strelkovoi divizii i merakh po navedeniiu poriadka v ee chastiakh," Russian State Military Archives (RGVA), f. 34980, op. 5, d. 211, l. 400, published in *Tainy i uroki zimnei voiny, 1939-1940* (St. Petersburg: OOO Poligon, 2000), p. 225.

4. "Prikazanie General'nogo shtaba komanduiushchemu 9-i armiei o merakh po vyvodu 44-i strelkovoi divizii iz okruzheniia," RGVA, f. 37977, op. 1, d. 233, l. 104, published in *Tainy i uroki zimnei voiny, 1939-1940*, pp. 259-60.

5. "Doklad nachal'nika Politicheskogo upravleniia Krasnoi Armii chlenu Glavnogo Voennogo Soveta o prichinakh porazheniia i poteriakh v 44-i strelkovoi divizii," RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1386, l. 119, 120, published in *Tainy i uroki zimnei voiny, 1939-1940*, pp. 270-71.

stances it was very unfair to blame the division command for the loss of the equipment. The order to bring it all out, which originated in a warm office in Moscow, was unreasonable and unrealistic.

Even though he had brought what was left of his division out of encirclement under incredibly adverse conditions, the commander, General A. Vinogradov, his chief of staff Colonel Volkov, and commissar Pakhomenko were all arrested. After an investigation, a military tribunal convicted them of negligence and overall failure of leadership and ordered their execution. Simultaneously, General Dashichev was reduced in rank to colonel, and relieved of his command. General Dukhanov kept his rank, but also was relieved of his command.

The 18th Rifle Division and 34th Light Tank Brigade, acting together, became encircled in January 1940. The Finns immediately cut them into thirteen separate *mottis*, some quite large. As with the encirclement of the 44th Rifle Division only weeks earlier, the *Stavka* did not give immediate permission to break out. Instead, the Chief of the General Staff, General Boris Shaposhnikov, chided 8th Army for overestimating the strength of the Finns, insisting that all it should take is one hard "fist" to punch through the enemy.[6] He urged 8th Army to avoid "the disgrace experienced by the 44th Rifle Division of 9th Army." However, it was the *Stavka* that had underestimated the Finns' strength. The Finns were not strong enough to destroy all the encircled forces at once, but they eventually did concentrate their forces long enough to annihilate most of the 34th Light Tank Brigade.

The 18th Rifle Division ended up holding out for a month before attempting to break out. In that time, the Finns took the high ground and key terrain around the division without a fight. The commanders of the 18th Rifle Division and the 34th Light Tank Brigade ceased to lead their units and sent panic telegrams to all and sundry. At the critical moment when the detachments finally broke out of encirclement on the night of 28/29 February, the two commanders delegated command to their chiefs of staff.[7] General S.I. Kondrat'ev, commander of the 34th Light Tank Brigade, escaped the encirclement, but soon thereafter lost his life to a firing squad for negligence and cowardice.[8] The commander of the 18th Rifle Division, Grigorii F. Kondrashov, was also arrested and convicted of treasonous and negligent handling of his unit during the encirclement. Waiting so long to break out made it all the more difficult because the men suffered extreme hunger and were

6. "Direktiva Stavki Glavnogo voennogo Soveta komanduiushchemu iuzhnoi gruppoi voisk 8-i armii o priniatii mer po deblokirovaniiu okruzhennykh chastei," RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1377, l. 51, published in *Tainy i uroki zimnei voiny, 1939-1940*, pp. 314-15.

7. E.N. Kul'kov and O.A. Rzheshevskii, eds., *Zimniaia voina 1939-1940 gg. Kniga 2: I.V. Stalin i finskaia kampaniia: (Stenogramma soveshchaniia pri TsK VKP (b))* (Moscow: Nauka, 1998), pp. 120-22.

8. Pavel A. Aptekar', "Opravdanny li zhertvy?: O poteriakh v sovetsko-finliandskoi voine," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 3 (1992), p. 43.

greatly weakened by the lack of food. In its breakout, the 18th Rifle Division suffered heavy casualties and left behind the bulk of its equipment. The important point in all these cases is that even when these men thought they were facing certain death, they did not consider surrender.

In comparison, the encirclements of 1941 were far larger than those in the Winter War because of the large scale maneuvering made possible by the terrain and German use of mechanized forces. The 1941 encirclements held hundreds of thousands of soldiers seemingly capable of forming pockets that could hold out as in the Winter War, but none of significant size formed except at Mogilev and the Brest fortress. It has been commonly assumed that surrounded units did not fight to the death, but surrendered after they failed to break out. A close examination reveals that this was not the case at all. Consistent with the Winter War, we have no evidence that any large units surrendered. If the units did not surrender, then how did so many men end up as prisoners? The answer partially lies in Soviet doctrine. The most accurate description of Red Army doctrine on how to handle encirclements is to say that it was arrived at informally. That is, neither the temporary field regulations of 1936 (PU-36) nor those of 1939 contained a single paragraph dedicated to handling encirclements. They did mention encircling the enemy on offensive operations, but that is all. Nevertheless, on the eve of the Winter War in 1939, there existed an understanding among unit commanders that if one found his unit surrounded, the immediate task was to break out of encirclement and rejoin friendly forces to the rear. Yet, inexplicably, this was seldom practiced.

In the Great Patriotic War, every major unit encircled was ordered to break out, and not to go on the defensive until relieved as in Finland, and this is where the problem lay. The process of breaking out very often destroyed the units' cohesion and command and control. When officers were killed or lost control of their unit, men usually broke into small groups or fled on their own. It was under these circumstances that most soldiers were taken prisoner. The huge scale of the encirclements made command and control especially difficult. The scale of violence was elevated far above what was experienced in the Winter War. Units were under frequent and intense heavy artillery and aerial bombardment. They were attacked with tanks, and cut off from food and water supplies for days. Officers and men experienced stress, fear, and confusion at all levels to a degree never before seen in modern warfare.

An understanding of why it was that larger encirclements usually failed to break out, while much smaller ones often succeeded begins with the idea that it is sometimes easier to capture half a million or more leaderless and disorganized men than small, well-led, cohesive units. In military operations it is fundamentally easier for an isolated regiment or battalion commander to form a pocket of resistance or quickly break out than for a division or larger unit. The one commander does not need to coordinate his activities with others or wait for orders. The isolated or cut off regiment or battalion commander can see the terrain that will govern his choices and he can physically

meet with his subordinates without having to rely on radio or telephone communications. The 10,000 or 100,000, or 600,000 men, however, divided into major units of armies, corps, or divisions, must coordinate their activities through a chain of command over great distances. If communications break down it can prove very difficult for large units to coordinate efforts, or take the initiative to act independently of the chain of command. The geography they are trying to defend or break through is rather large, making communications more difficult, and they are often disrupted by enemy action. When a large unit is surrounded, the subordinate units do not have the right to act independently. Each commander must look up the chain of command for instructions.

What happened in the Great Patriotic War was that in the great battles of encirclement in summer 1941, for example, at Minsk in June, Smolensk in July, and Kiev in September, the breakouts were mismanaged at the highest levels. At Minsk, three armies were surrounded in one encirclement and, rather than work as one entity, each attempted to break out on its own in different directions. All failed, the armies being destroyed in the process, and hundreds of thousands of men either surrendered or were captured. At Smolensk, two armies were encircled, but attacking together, they did temporarily breach the German lines allowing tens of thousands of men to escape, though several hundred thousand were captured when the Germans closed the breach and reduced the pocket. At Kiev, after twice being denied permission to retreat to avoid encirclement, five armies were enveloped by rapidly moving German tank forces, and the overall commander, General Kirponos, was killed shortly after the breakout was ordered. His death, lack of preparation, and poor communications prevented the development of a coordinated escape effort. Instead the situation quickly devolved to every man for himself. Thus, hundreds of thousands of men breaking into small groups running pell-mell without leadership and no heavy weapons made it easier for the Germans to capture them.

On the one hand, the *Wehrmacht* must be given its due for this stunning success. Effective planning, leadership, training, and equipment put to use in *blitzkrieg* tactics overwhelmed a generally unprepared Soviet defense. On the other hand, the Red Army proved unable to react efficiently for a variety of reasons. The Red Army's most important disadvantage was that the Germans had the initiative. The Soviet command was left to guess where the enemy was heading and then move sufficient forces to engage them at the right place and the right time. This often proved to be impossible. In contrast, the Red Army had had the initiative in the Winter War and it was the Finns who had to react to their moves. The *Luftwaffe* interdicted Soviet reconnaissance planes preventing the Soviet high command from getting a clear picture of German movement. German bombing caused the destruction of telephone lines and radios, and often the deaths of commanders and their staffs. Units often ran out of fuel and ammunition because of extended maneuvering and fighting. Logistical units often could not keep up due to poor planning, disrupted communications, and destruction of transport. So, even when combat

units arrived at their intended destinations in timely fashion they often arrived in piecemeal formations, sometimes without artillery, often without armor, and with inadequate ammunition. In the course of movement many units lost contact with their higher headquarters. Thus, the Germans overwhelmed them in short order with the combined weight of armor, artillery, and tactical airpower, unlike the Winter War, in which the Soviets almost always had outnumbered and outgunned their adversary.

Having given the *Wehrmacht* its due, we have to ask why the Red Army was so inept at breaking out. The problem lay with training. According to General Shaposhnikov at a post-war conference on the lessons of the Winter War held in April 1940, breaking out of encirclement in fact was practiced as a regular feature of many pre-Winter War maneuvers. He said:

> All our training problems devoted much time to fighting in encirclement and breaking out of encirclement. This was the favorite subject of our games. This was done in all military schools, it was played everywhere, one encircled, the other broke out.

He complained, however, that those skills disappeared when the war began: "Troops were encircled but there was no breaking out of encirclement."[9] General Kurdiumov contradicted Shaposhnikov saying, "I think it's a big minus in our manuals that, while we have paid attention to defenses and the guarding of flanks and junctions, we have not taught the troops how to act properly in encirclement."[10] General Kirill Meretskov, an army commander during the war with Finland, later added that the problem with encircled units was the passivity of unit commanders. Once surrounded, they just hunkered down and waited for someone to save them. He assessed the problem as one of lack of initiative, not lack of training.[11] It seems, then, that there was no formal or uniform Red Army policy on encirclements and inconsistent training on how to deal with them before the war with Finland.

Why, after the experience of the Winter War, was the Red Army still not prepared to deal with encirclements in 1941? The war with Finland should have been a learning experience. The lessons the Red Army took from the Winter War regarding encirclements can be summed up thus: Commanders were not to panic or lose control over their forces; units were expected to break out, but only with permission; when breaking out units were expected to bring their equipment with them; relief efforts were to be mounted, but encircled forces should not count on them getting through; the Red Air Force would help defend and supply encircled units, but could not be a deciding factor in their relief; and finally, punishment awaited those who

9. Kul'kov and Rzheshevskii, eds., *Zimniaia voina 1939-1940 gg. Kniga 2*, p. 188.
10. Ibid., p. 129.
11. "Stenogramma plenarnogo zasedaniia komissii GVS po voprosu voennoi ideologii," 13-14 aprelia 1940 g., in *"Zimniaia voina": rabota nad oshibkami (aprel' – mai 1940 g.): Materialy komissii Glavnogo voennogo soveta Krasnoi Armii po obobshcheniiu opyta finskoi kampaniia* (Moscow: Letnii sad, 2004), p. 360.

failed. The April Conference produced training guidelines and established the emphasis of training for the summer of 1940 based on the experience of the Winter War. This training consisted of attack and defense of fortified areas, night training, and use of armor and cavalry on the flanks. Dealing with encirclements was conspicuously absent.[12]

All told, of the approximately three million Soviet soldiers who went into captivity in 1941, 1,972,000, almost two-thirds, were a result of failed breakouts from encirclement at Uman, Minsk, Roslavl, Krichev, Gomel, Smolensk, Kiev, Viaz'ma, and Briansk. Of the remaining 978,000 some of them also were captured in smaller encirclements. The way these encirclements were handled by the Red Army virtually ensured their destruction. They did not hunker down and hold out like encircled units in the Winter War *because they were not expected to*. The scale of the encirclements worked against successful escape. As we have seen, the greater the number of men and units in a pocket, the lower were the chances of successfully breaking out. The very act of breaking out increased the chances of being captured when the chain of command disintegrated and soldiers were left to their own devices.

The Human Element

Though the circumstances of the encirclements point to rational and unemotional reasons for being captured, the question of how soldiers felt about the Stalinist regime and how this affected their motivation to fight is a valid and important component of understanding the enormity of the losses in 1941. Looking at the soldiers' psychological state illustrates that another difference between the Winter War and the Great Patriotic War was the psychological impact of the reverses on the men in 1941 compared with the early failures in the war with Finland. Despite the tactical failures in the first months of the Winter War, the soldiers were always certain that the USSR would win. The Red Army had the initiative and was fighting on the enemy's territory. This feeling did not diminish even during the worst moments, so a defeatist attitude at the personal level seemed unworthy. In the Great Patriotic War, however, for months, soldiers doubted not only victory, but also whether the state would survive. The men had to ask themselves if it was worth fighting if the USSR was doomed. One is reminded of John Bushnell's observation that obedience among Russian soldiers during the Revolution of 1905 rose and fell with their perception of the strength and legitimacy of the tsarist government.[13] The same might be said of the soldiers' motivation to risk their lives in 1941. Still, soldiers who viewed the war as a lost cause and refused to fight in what they considered hopeless situations cannot automatically be

12. "Prikaz o boevoi i politicheskoi podgotovke voisk v letnii period 1940 uchebnogo goda," RGVA, f. 4, op. 15, d. 30, ll. 336-56, published in *"Zimniaia voina": rabota nad oshibkami (aprel' – mai 1940 g.)*, p. 397.

13. John Bushnell, *Mutiny Amid Repression: Russian Soldiers in the Revolution of 1905-1906* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985).

considered anti-Stalinist. Some may have been supporters of Stalin who had benefited from Soviet power, but a lost cause is, after all, a lost cause.

The experience of soldiers in situations where they were faced with the choices of death or capture sheds some light on the decisions they made and how those decisions were shaped by circumstances and personal outlook. Israel Peltzman, an infantryman in a hastily organized and poorly trained volunteer unit, suffered encirclement on the Karelian front in the early weeks of the war. In July his regiment endeavored but failed to break out. The regimental commander gave up hope of breaking out or of being relieved and ordered the men to sneak out in small groups. Peltzman and his group easily slipped through the first line of encircling forces, but soon ran into trouble. As they were running across a road in the enemy rear area he tripped and fell in a ditch. At the same moment a German armored car opened fire on them with a machine gun and killed everyone still standing. Peltzman recalled: "I was lucky. I only survived because I fell into that ditch." Even so, he was wounded, but still managed to crawl to the safety of Soviet lines. His unit suffered nearly 100 percent casualties from death, wounds, and capture, but none from surrender.[14]

Nina Erdman, a medic in an infantry regiment, experienced the chaos and breakout from Smolensk in July 1941. She recounted that:

> We were surrounded. It was terrifying – weapons lying around, no one knew where to go, panic! How awful! We were not traveling lightly, because we had the wounded with us. We are going out to the field: in which direction to move? Everything around us is burning. The leaders are running about. Where to go – he doesn't know. We couldn't find our way out for a long time.[15]

Vasilii Kotov, a tank gunner in 1941, thought this of why so many men were taken prisoner:

> Look, a unit like ours is left by itself for several days. The officers are scared to sneeze without a special order. There is neither an order to withdraw nor a food supply. And besides, they are running out of ammunition. Silly gossip circulates through the unit. The unit becomes demoralized. And at that very moment the Germans are approaching in armored cars. Bitte-dritte, welcome to surrender! And we don't even have a[n anti-tank] gun to shoot at them.[16]

His is an example of a unit in a very vulnerable situation with the leadership paralyzed by the breakdown of communications with their higher headquarters.

Alexei Gorchakov, who had just been commissioned a cavalry lieutenant in June 1941, presents another experience of surrender. His regiment had

14. Israel Peltzman, author interview, December 2008.
15. Nina M. Erdman, interview located at <www.iremember.ru>, accessed July 2006.
16. Vasilii Kotov, interview located at <www.iremember.ru>, accessed July 2006.

been badly mauled in the border battles in June and July and neared disintegration. His cavalry troop, which had gathered in a large number of soldiers separated from their units, was acting as a rear guard when an unknown general drove up to them. He ordered Gorchakov to lead his men in an attack on advancing German tanks. Gorchakov protested: "Comrade General, we have only one light machine gun for the whole troop. What can that do against tanks?" The general shot back: "Don't try to reason! Go at the tanks with bayonets and grenades!" Gorchakov turned the column around, and the general drove off leaving the motley assembly of men scared and angry. Gorchakov sized up the situation and appreciated that engaging the tanks would be suicidal and unsuccessful. He instead led the men into the forest where he tried to organize a defense. About twenty men, not from Gorchakov's unit, remained mounted with their rifles pointed in his direction. One of their members told the lieutenant: "Comrade Commander, we have decided to go over to the Germans. The Soviet power won't hold out and we don't want to sacrifice ourselves in vain." Gorchakov told them that because they were not in his unit he had no authority over them and they could do as they wished. The men rode off in the direction of the Germans.[17] Subsequently, Gorchakov and his men did not stay to fight, but continued east and eventually rejoined their regiment. The men who went over to the Germans may have done so out of ideological motivations or out of the psychology that it was not worth fighting for a lost cause – we do not know. Gorchakov would not surrender or put his unit in a position to be captured, but neither would he engage in combat he thought would result in fruitless loss of life.

A final, and yet again different experience of encirclement and capture is that of Private Georgii Khol'nyi. In the battle for Smolensk in 1941 his battalion was cut off from its regiment. The commander called a council of war among the leaders and headquarters staff to decide a course of action. The commander suggested the unit dissolve and the men try to sneak through the German lines in small groups of three or four. Khol'nyi spoke up even though "I was only a private" and suggested they form a partisan unit. He brought up the example of 1812 and pointed out that winter would soon be upon them, which would make the Germans vulnerable, like the French had been, because it "was our weather." His commander rejected the idea and finally ordered the battalion to disband and for the men to make their way east in small groups. The Germans eventually captured Khol'nyi and two other soldiers who possessed only one rifle between them.[18]

In this case the battalion commander was the key. It seems he really did not want to fight either to the death in an encirclement, or as a unit in a breakout. Not knowing the battalion's situation regarding armaments, food, ammunition, communications, and the strength of the enemy, this may have

17. Alexei Gorchakov, "The Long Road," in Louis Fischer, ed., *Thirteen who Fled* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), pp. 73-74.
18. Georgii A. Khol'nyi, interview located at <www.iremember.ru>, accessed July 2006.

been the most rational decision under the circumstances. But the contrast is unmistakable when compared to regiment and battalion commanders in the Winter War who chose death over the rational choices of surrender, capture, or fleeing each man for himself.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis of the battles of encirclement and their associated breakout attempts in both the Winter War and the first months of the Great Patriotic War lead to the conclusion that the vast majority of Soviet soldiers lost as prisoners of war were due to battlefield circumstances, which laid bare the Red Army's doctrinal, training, and command failures. The soldiers' political sympathies are largely unknown and at best were a lesser factor. Attitudes regarding Stalinism came into play only after unit cohesion dissolved and command and control by the officers fell apart. In Finland, units became surrounded because of good Finnish and poor Soviet tactics. In 1941, units became encircled due to German military proficiency, Soviet military inefficiency, and because Stalin and the *Stavka* failed to allow forces in the field to maneuver to avoid being cut off. But, in both cases, encircled forces were destroyed and soldiers taken prisoner because disintegrated leadership and organization put soldiers in the position of having to choose either to resist for no evident purpose, or save themselves. When units took up an all-around defense they might be annihilated, but as long as the chain of command remained intact and functioning few men would be captured. It was the act of breaking out from encirclements that led units to suffer catastrophic losses of killed, wounded, and prisoners. So, in the end there is no anomaly, there has been only a lack of understanding of the nature and context of the encirclements and of the Red Army's way of reacting to them.

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Questions and Answers: Anthony Clayton

ROBERT VON MAIER
H.P. WILLMOTT

Born in 1928, the son of a British Army officer, Anthony Clayton was educated at the Sorbonne and St. Andrews University before entering the Colonial Civil Service in 1952. He served in Kenya until 1956 before returning to Britain where he remained with the Kenya service until after independence. In 1965 Dr. Clayton was appointed to the academic staff at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, where he remained as a Senior Lecturer until 1994. He served with the Conflict Studies Research Centre between 1994 and 1999, was an Associate Lecturer with the University of Surrey until 2008, and a Senior Research Fellow with the Institute for the Study of War and Society, De Montfort University. One of Britain's leading military historians, he was made a *Chevalier dans l'Ordre des Palmes Académiques* in 1988 in recognition of his expertise in French military history. A reserve army officer, first with the infantry and finally as a Lieutenant Colonel with the Intelligence Corps, Dr. Clayton is the author of *The Zanzibar Revolution and its Aftermath* (London: C. Hurst, 1981); *The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919-39* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986); *France, Soldiers, and Africa* (London: Brassey's, 1988); *Three Marshals of France: Leadership After Trauma* (London: Brassey's, 1991); *Forearmed: A History of the Intelligence Corps* (London: Brassey's, 1993); *The Wars of French Decolonization* (London and New York: Longman, 1994); *Frontiersmen: Warfare in Africa since 1950* (London and Philadelphia: UCL Press, 1999); *Paths of Glory: The French Army 1914-18* (London: Cassell, 2003); *The British Officer: Leading the Army from 1660 to the Present* (Harlow and New York: Pearson Longman, 2006); *Defeat: When Nations Lose a War* (Ely: Melrose Books, 2010); *Warfare in Woods and Forests* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, forthcoming); *Government and Labour in Kenya, 1895-1963*, with Donald C. Savage (London: Frank Cass, 1974); and *Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Colonial Africa*, with David Killingray (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989).

Q: What brought you to the study of military history? Surely you did not specialize in this at university?

A: No, indeed. When I was at university, St. Andrews 1947-1951, historians were very sniffy about military history and certainly much of it at the time was dull. It was argued that it was a subject for antiquarians, of no real importance in the causation and consequences of major historical events, and also rather boring; was it really of interest that one division went up this road and a second went up that one? The view of military history as an important thread in the complex web of history only emerged at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s.

My interest came from two sources, family and ships. I suppose my interest lies somewhere in my genes. I am the fifth consecutive generation in my family to hold the sovereign's commission to be an officer in the British Army, service dating from a Guards officer in the French Revolutionary War. My father had a very varied and interesting career. Being a gifted linguist – he would often read the Bible in Greek – he was sent to Russia to learn Russian in 1907-1908. After Staff College, he was an "Old Contemptible" – the British army in France and Belgium in August 1914 – being wounded at the first Ypres battle, with after-recovery service in the Salonika/Macedonia campaign from 1915 to 1918, where he was wounded again. After the 1918 armistice, he was sent to south Russia as part of the British military mission tasked to support the White Russian fight against the Bolsheviks, and after that he was sent to Poland where as part of the British mission he was present at the Battle of Warsaw in 1920 when Pilsudski's scratch force repelled Tukachevsky's Red Army. In 1939 my father was recalled to represent the Army in the British mission to Poland following the British guarantee of support in the event of war with Germany. He was a surprising choice, already arthritic. But he had been a very well-liked military attaché in the 1920s. When war came, my parents' great affection for Poland led them to offer free hospitality to Polish Air Force officers seeking a quiet seaside leave period. These officers, recounting very modestly their operations, awakened in me an interest in air warfare.

But more importantly, directing me toward general military history was my boyhood love of ships – trips to Portsmouth and Plymouth to see the great ships of the inter-war years, His Majesty's ships *Hood*, *Rodney*, *Furious*, and others, an interest of course developed by the naval events of the Second World War. I read a good deal of twentieth century naval history and that prepared me for wider military history later.

As it happened, my first works were about colonial history, a book written jointly with a Canadian historian on Kenyan history, a book of my own on Zanzibar history, and a small work on East and West African soldiers' songs from the early twentieth century to the end of the Nigerian Civil War. My direct lead-in to military history was my fourth book, *The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919-1939*, published jointly by Macmillan and the University of Georgia. In these inter-war years, China and the Soviet Union were pre-occupied with their own internal affairs, likewise the United States: Germany was not a military problem and neither was France, recovering from the war. The British Empire appeared, and I repeat appeared, to be

massively strong, the only world superpower. My work set out to describe all the military, naval, air, and police force commitments in the 1920s and 1930s, British domestic and Irish unrest, domestic unrest in South Africa, Australia, and Canada, the containment of Indian non-cooperation campaigns, the Bengal uprising and the North West Frontier operations, campaigns in Egypt, Iraq, and later Palestine, colonial conflicts in British Somaliland, Sudan, Kenya, Cyprus, Burma, and the West Indies, and the occasional use of British naval power in international conflicts, most notably in Turkey and the Spanish Civil War. Sources were full, rich, and at Sandhurst, readily available: memoirs, professional journal articles – especially those of the journal of the Royal United Services Institute – academic service histories, and regimental and police histories, together with a few notable interviews. The book showed how the British ascendancy seemed so secure in the 1920s but, faced with Japan and German challenges in the 1930s, reinforced the comment of Arthur Balfour before the First World War: "Britain can defend itself or the Empire; it cannot do both." The era came to an end on my eleventh birthday on 3 September 1939.

Q: As a former colonial official, do you have any views on Britain's record as an imperial power?

A: Imperial history will forever be a field in which the widest divergence of views abound. In Ghana, the statue of an enlightened British colonial governor remains and is respected. In India, statues of British administrators and soldiers are consigned to museums.

You ask for my views and they can be summarized. British colonial rule in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was oppressive, often very brutal. The balance in the nineteenth century was more mixed, much violence still in acquisition and repression, but also the foundations of real progress: the ending of the slave trade; railway, port, and road construction; irrigation work in India; and early education and medical work. After the end of the First World War and after the lessons of the Amritsar massacre had been learnt, in India and in Africa policy became centered on Lord Lugard's Dual Mandate – economic development and paramountcy of the interests of the indigenous peoples – colonial rule was beneficial. Blemishes on the record there were, but also fine moments. In June and July 1940, when Britain was backs-to-the-wall after the fall of France, Parliament found time to pass a Colonies Development and Welfare Act, and of course the Commonwealth and Empire's finest hour was the period from June 1940 to June 1941 when it defied Fascism alone.

Much present-day history writing, reflecting the spirit of our times and concentrating on the eye-catching stains on the colonial record, leaves for me an impression of imbalance. The Chinese minister Chou En-lai when asked his opinion on the French Revolution replied that it was a little too early to say. The colonial world left for its successor legacies of a *Pax Britannica*, infrastructures of transport, currency, banking, and credit systems, a

world with language for use anywhere, results of curative and preventive medical research as well as trained personnel, with similar results and personnel in agricultural and veterinary service, school systems with colleges and universities, standards in labor legislation and inspection, a respect for corruption-free government and its officials, and last, but by no means least, sport in many different games. In some territories, within sixty years peoples who had never seen a wheel were, under imperial tutelage, advanced to nationhood. And, of course, there was an underlying "Britishness" in the endings of empire. The British common law tradition, that a community of people expressing a justifiable aim through a truly representative assembly cannot indefinitely be denied that aim, gave us a bipartisan Westminster consensus on the granting of independence to colonies; that tradition spared us from Dien Bien Phu, Algeria, and the Portuguese campaigns.

We did learn something from the War of American Independence.

Q: Why did your interests turn to the French Army?

A: First, my father, whose life was saved by a French Army medical officer at Ypres in 1914 and who remained a Francophile all his life. Photographs of officers with whom he had served in Macedonia or Poland hung in our sitting room – General Weygand and a Colonel de Clermont-Tonnerre. Second, in 1946-1947 I did a diploma course at the Sorbonne in Paris, and can handle French texts. Third, life at Sandhurst. The pattern was and still is that one might include one or two classes a day, but the rest of the day was free. But you had to take your class; you could not pin a notice on a door saying, "You will not meet in class today; come along next Tuesday." This was a pattern of life ideal for research by post, of which I took full advantage. Also, one day I found lying around in an empty classroom a battered copy of a French military history magazine special issue on the *Armée d'Afrique* setting out the histories of the various regiments, and I realized that no work in English covered this field.

So, onward to several books. The first was *France, Soldiers, and Africa*, which set out all the complex relationships between France and North and Black Africa not only in Africa itself, but in France, Germany, Italy, Syria, and even Indo-China. Then followed *Three Marshals of France*, *The Wars of French Decolonization*, and finally *Paths of Glory: The French Army 1914-18*.

The one essential requirement for any historian working on any aspect of French history is an ability to speak French. Questions put to French officers would almost invariably be answered fully and courteously, but questions put in English will not produce results, even if the officer speaks English.

Q: Why did France have such large colonial forces? And what were they?

A: France had to have large colonial forces for three main reasons. The first was her overall manpower imbalance *vis-à-vis* European rivals, particularly

Germany – an imbalance at least in part caused by the consequences of the Napoleonic era. The second, in particular in the post-1870 era of the Third Republic, was the French constitution. All young Frenchmen had to serve as a conscript – their duty to the Republic. But the Republic could only deploy them in the defense of metropolitan France and could not send a conscript overseas without the individual's consent. Some other soldiers were therefore needed. Third, France needed men to acquire and then garrison overseas territories, if necessary suppressing local resistance. The age of empire was for France very much a military story, just as its ending was to be.

There were two main colonial forces, very different from each other: the *Armée d'Afrique* and *La Coloniale*.

The *Armée d'Afrique* was a non-official title applied to what was officially the 19th Army Corps, based in North Africa, Algeria at first, then including Tunisia and finally Morocco. Its origins lie in the French conquest of Algeria, beginning in 1830 and extending to include regiments from Tunisia and Morocco after their conquest and occupation. The regiments varied in numbers according to the needs of the time. They were, as units, smaller than British battalions or cavalry regiments, with cadres of French officers and NCOs from the French metropolitan army, usually individuals bored with French garrison life who wanted adventure and a medal or two. Some spent their whole regimental service in North Africa. Cadres were later increased for technical and also political reasons.

The regiments were firstly the Zouaves, originally largely indigenous Algerians, but becoming filled first by young French settlers in Algeria and by 1914-1918 almost entirely metropolitan French. The Zouaves were elite, with a great reputation, and were emulated elsewhere: Federal forces in the American Civil War called themselves Zouaves and wore the baggy red sarouel trousers of the French Zouaves. In the days of political unrest in France in the 1930s, a regiment of Zouaves was kept near Paris to be available if there was an 1871-Commune-style insurrection.

At the same time came the *Chasseurs d'Afrique* light cavalry regiments, like the Zouaves originally carrying a percentage of Algerians, but becoming wholly French before long and having a number of French aristocrats among their officers and even among their troops. Next were the *Infanterie Légère d'Afrique*, at their peak five battalions of petty criminals serving out sentences imposed by French metropolitan courts. Their nickname was "*Les Joyeux*," the joyous ones, their life-style and service the reverse.

From the 1830s also dated the Foreign Legion, *Légion Etrangère*, at its peak in the 1920s over 25,000 officers and men, including a cavalry regiment. As a broad generalization, the *Légion's* recruits were drawn from men who wanted to be soldiers, but had nowhere to go – for example, after 1939 many Spanish republicans, after 1945 many Germans. Very few foreigners were allowed to become officers though in one of the *Légion's* most famous engagements, the battle of Bir Hakeim in North Africa in 1942, a regiment was commanded by a Georgian prince. The *Légion* to this day has its own traditions, its own depot near Marseille, its own music and songs, and provi-

sion for veterans of lifetime service.

Then, over time, came the regiments of indigenous light cavalry, the several *Spahis Algériens*, *Tunisiens*, and *Marocains*, and numerous indigenous light infantry, *Tirailleurs Algériens*, *Tunisiens*, and *Marocains*. Recruitment was voluntary in Morocco, "encouraged" or coerced in Tunisia, and often by the draft in Algeria. In 1914 the draft in Algeria was for a longer period than in France, thought to be a suitable expression of gratitude for French rule.

Regiments could be composed or three or more battalions. The several battalions could in times of conflict be required to furnish one or two *Régiments de Marche* of the fittest, without supporting personnel.

Finally, in the *Armée d'Afrique* should be mentioned the semi-regular Moroccan *Goums* – small 200-strong detachments, 120 on foot, fifty mounted on ponies and a mule support section, drawn from the Berber mountain clans of the Atlas. The *Goums* were to play a vitally important part in the 1944-1945 Italian campaign. Earlier, one of these was led by a particularly adventurous French officer, one Henry de Lespinasse de Bournazel, who became a national hero and cult legend in the 1930s after his death in Morocco.

The Crimea in the 1850s saw the first use of *Armée d'Afrique* regiments outside the Empire. Thereafter in successive campaigns very large numbers of North Africans served in major wars – 172,000 Algerians, 54,000 Tunisians, and 37,000 Moroccans in the 1914-1918 war alone. In 1940, twelve *Armée d'Afrique* divisions and three brigades of cavalry fought in metropolitan France; by late summer 1944, over a quarter of a million North Africans were in French uniforms. In the Indo-China war, 29,500 North Africans and 18,000 Africans were serving in the colony by 1953. Loyalty started to become a concern in 1944-1945 and assumed serious dimensions during the Algerian war.

La Coloniale had different origins. It began as garrison regiments of long-service volunteer regulars engaged by the Navy to garrison more remote colonial parts. After the the Franco-Prussian war, several officers saw the possibilities of the use of Black African soldiers to help contain German numerical superiority and the raising of regiments of Black African *tirailleurs* began. These were all recruited under the generic title of *Régiments de Tirailleurs Sénégalais* with the exception of those from Madagascar and Indo-China. In 1900 all these regiments, white and black, were transferred to the Army as a force known as *La Coloniale* with an autonomous status in some ways comparable to the U.S. Marine Corps protected by legislations and with its own depot at Fréjus, music, and culture. An anchor is included in the badge of all former *Coloniale* regiments to this day. *La Coloniale* officers made their whole careers in *La Coloniale*, rising to general and in the case of Gallieni, a marshal. The *Coloniale* regiments of infantry, colloquially known as *marsouins* (dolphins), and artillery, known as *bigors* (shellfish), were recruited from volunteers in France, conscripts who opted for it, volunteers from the pre-Revolution French colonies, and by "encouragement" in the colonies, the latter turning to a very oppressive draft in 1917-1918.

La Coloniale's divisions and regiments, having long-service regulars and

hard field experience, were generally the best French Army formations. Brigades were often formed of two indigenous *Sénégalais* battalions and a battalion of "*Coloniale Blanche*" (whites). In 1914-1918 *La Coloniale* provided two army corps on the Western Front, three divisions in Macedonia, and troops for the Togo (1914) and Cameroon (1914-1916) campaigns. Eight *Coloniale* divisions participated in the May 1940 campaign in France, and *La Coloniale* regiments figured conspicuously in the Italian and French liberation campaigns and again in Indo-China where *bigors* from Guinea provided artillery at Dien Bien Phu.

La Coloniale's officers were generally southern Frenchmen, less conservative than northerners and also less conscious than the upper-class northerners of the horrors of the Spanish Civil War that so frightened Pétain and others. Many, notably Jaques Massu, rallied to de Gaulle, and at the end of the war *Coloniale* generals figured disproportionately in the Army, some becoming exponents of hard-line counter-revolutionary techniques and figuring in such unsavory episodes as the Battle of Algiers in 1957. In 1958, *La Coloniale* was rebranded as *Troupes de Marine*, its special status unaltered. The most famous *Coloniale* regiment, the *Régiment d'Infantrie Coloniale du Maroc* (RICM), became the *Régiment d'Infantrie Chars de Marine*, and still serves in France's African garrisons.

Great rivalry existed between *La Coloniale* and the *Armée d'Afrique*. The two most decorated regiments in the French Army are the RICM and the 3rd Regiment of the Foreign Legion. The *Troupes de Marine's Régiment de Marche du Tchad* is currently serving in Afghanistan.

In Britain, proud though we are of the forces, British-officered Indian Army and the colonial African regiments, the latter never fought on British soil and never made a massive contribution to liberation of the metropolitan homeland from foreign occupation. The French experience is significantly different.

Q: What led you to write *Paths of Glory: The French Army 1914-18*, and what do you think people will gain from reading it?

A: The short answer is simple: I was invited to do so by the publishers with an attractive advance! But I can also offer a more thoughtful answer. I believed that there was a gap in First World War writing. Studies in English of particular battles, notably the Marne in September 1914 and Verdun in 1916 existed, as did biographies of Joffre and Foch, and whole libraries of biographies of Pétain, but there was no overall view of the French military contribution to the war, covering both the Western Front and other theaters. Nor had any work in English covered the contribution of France's North and Black African troops. Furthermore, while works on the British Army on the Western Front continued to appear every year, this concentration was creating an imbalance in people's minds. The major Allied military force on the Western Front throughout the war was the French Army – at its peak 150 divisions in 1916 compared to the British sixty-five to seventy. The French

casualties in the four years of campaigns were even greater than those of the British, with at least 1,250,000 dead, and an additional 100,000 from the empire killed. Survivors included 3,300,000 wounded in varying degrees of severity, 1,100,000 disabled, 200,000 gassed, and some 700,000 war widows. Moreover, France had been invaded and large areas of northern France were devastated.

In the opening chapters I set out the state of the French Army after 1870-1871, noting the divisive effects of the Dreyfus affair, the anti-Catholic witch-hunting within the Army in the time of the Combes government of 1903, the use of the Army in putting down industrial unrest in 1906-1907, and the unhelpful views of the socialist Jean Jaurès calling for a citizen army. Within the army itself, the motivation of soldiers had had a firm foundation in the nationalist and militarist teachings in schools, but the prevailing military philosophy of attack, particularly in the areas taken by Germany in 1871, and the ignoring of intelligence concerning Germany's Schlieffen Plan for an attack through Belgium, were to lead to massive loss of life.

For the Western Front, successive chapters set out year by year specific sections not only concerned with operations, but morale, weapons and equipment, and life in the trenches. The "mutinies" of 1917 are in my view best seen as more industrial protest than a revolutionary mutiny, though revolutionary agitators were present; only one officer was killed and the troops in the front-line trenches at the time stood firm. Of the three main commanders, Joffre's claim to fame must result on the Marne in August-September 1914; thereafter his series of bloody offensives were disastrous. Pétain, gloomy and pessimistic, deserves praise not only for Verdun and the restoration of morale in the Army after the 1917 troubles, but also for his strategy of limited cost-effective attacks restoring the Army's confidence thereafter. Foch made a number of errors in the early years but, backed by Clemenceau, in his 1918 Eisenhower-style role as Allied commander-in-chief, was able to rally an exhausted army for the final push to bring victory in 1918 – though it could possibly have been achieved at less cost in 1919. In one final chapter, French operations in the Middle East, the Dardanelles, Macedonia, and Italy, often overlooked, are described along with the big contribution of North and Black African regiments. I then summarize casualties and the financial exhaustion of France at the end of the war and the measure to which the misery, hardship, casualties, and declining birth-rate contributed both to the defensive sclerosis of French generals in the 1920s and 1930s and to the disaster of 1940.

In two appendices I give a description of the organization of periods of service, recruitment, training, and equipment of the 1914 army and short biographies of the eight generals at the time or a little later appointed Marshals of France: Fayolle, Foch, Franchet d'Esperey, Gallieni (posthumously), Joffre, Lyautey, Maunoury (posthumously), and Pétain, together with de Castelnau, Mangin, Nivelle, and Weygand who were not honored.

I used a wide variety of sources, some British, but mostly French, which

are set out in a bibliographical appendix. I found of special interest personal accounts by Frenchmen in the trenches and French works containing excerpts from trench newspapers and views taken by the censors from soldiers writing letters home.

I hope readers will gain a wider and more sympathetic view of what the 1914-1918 war meant for France both at the time and in the two decades that followed.

Q: Why did you write *Three Marshals of France: Leadership After Trauma*, and why are the three you chose so special?[1]

A: First the context. Marshal of France is not a military rank like a British field marshal, it is essentially a civic honor. To be a Marshal, a general has to have won a big battle or a campaign. Then a motion can go before the French legislature for the honor to be conferred, but correctly the title is then, for example, General Foch, Marshal of France, though of course he is usually referred to as Marshal Foch. The title can, and recently has been, awarded posthumously. The Marshal's wife becomes *Madame La Maréchale* and the Marshal's privileges include a Paris apartment, a car and driver, and an ADC for life. If a Marshal misbehaves, he can lose the privileges, but the title of Marshal can never be taken from him as that would demean the soldiers who fought in his battles. Pétain in prison remained a Marshal. My book is about three French Second World War commanders who became Marshals, one posthumously, one on his death-bed, and one who lived on – and had his privileges removed. These were, respectively, Philippe de Hauteclocque, better known as General Leclerc, Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, and Alphonse Juin.

The French are a Latin people. A British professor, Martin Turnell, writing on French literature noted an element of passion in French classic drama, with a delicate poise between reason and passion, tension and repose, and ambivalent attitudes to authority, all giving high degrees of emotional vitality, but also high degrees of order. These exist not only in classic drama, but also and very much so in generalship. Speaking to a staff officer, de Lattre remarked: "*Vous allez voir, nous allons faire des choses passionantes.*" (You will see, we are going to do some passionate deeds.) No British or American general would have used these words.

All three men were exciting, larger-than-life personalities with lives filled with drama and renown; the careers of all three ended in tragedy. Their styles of command differed, but all three displayed personal tensions. All three had the most appalling tempers. When after 1945 de Lattre was Inspector-General of the French Army, regiments would post scouts on the main road of the town of their barracks lest de Lattre would arrive unexpectedly and explode. Of the least volatile of the three, Juin, General Bedell

1. This work will soon be published in French.

Smith remarked after a row with him that if he had been an American he would have "socked him on the jaw."

The three had no common background. Leclerc was a member of a pre-Revolutionary aristocratic family. De Lattre was country minor gentry – de Tassigny was added to his name only later. Juin was the son of an ordinary French *gendarme* of Corsican peasant stock, serving in an unimportant town in Algeria. And for him, Algeria was his beloved home. By sheer ability, he entered the French West Point, St. Cyr, and passed out top choosing an unfashionable regiment of Algerian *tirailleurs* in which to serve. In the First World War he served continuously with Moroccan regiments, being wounded twice; his right arm was so badly damaged that for the rest of his life he was allowed to salute with his left arm. In the inter-war years he served and fought with distinction in the North African pacification campaigns. May 1940 found him as a division commander in France.

De Lattre's temperament is best described as volcanic, but after eruptions he could mount a *coup de charme*. He was wounded four times in the First World War and twice more in later fighting in North Africa. He, too, was a divisional commander in May 1940 renowned for his record and impeccably smart appearance. Leclerc, much younger and only a captain, was slightly wounded and captured by the Germans in June 1940. He escaped and on a girl's bicycle he reached a Paris apartment owned by a cousin where he was hidden by the *concierge*. There Leclerc heard de Gaulle's 18 June broadcast from London and instantly decided that he must join him. There is something epic about this – open defiance of authority and of his social class – as the aristocracy generally supported Pétain and the armistice; no hesitation, no "let's wait and see," just simply the belief that a truce with occupying Germans could never be right. Meanwhile, Juin had no opportunity to choose, being a prisoner of the Germans, and de Lattre, with great misgivings and a pro-de Gaulle wife, accepting Vichy. For all three, the defeat was a trauma, no less, but each with burning patriotism reacted differently.

Their subsequent Second World War careers are better known. Leclerc was sent by de Gaulle to West Africa to claim the colonies for Free France; he then led an epic march across the Libyan Sahara to join the British outside Tripoli and fought well in the Tunisian campaign. He was then given a special division by de Gaulle tasked after the Normandy landings to be the first into Paris. After Paris, Leclerc's division fought alongside the Americans – he flatly refused to serve with de Lattre. De Lattre commanded troops in Vichy's army in the south of France at the time of the November 1942 German entry into unoccupied France and, disobeying orders, took his men into the field to oppose them. For this gesture, he was arrested and imprisoned by Vichy; with the aid of his son, he escaped over a wall and was secretly flown to England. He was then given command of the French army to land in the south of France, which he led with dash and brilliance in hard fighting, finishing in southern Germany. Juin was given senior commands by Vichy and played an important role in the confused November 1942 situation in Algiers after the Allied landings in North Africa. He figured in the

Tunisian campaign, but his greatest achievement was his outstanding leadership of the French Expeditionary Corps in the Italian campaign, his North African soldiers better accustomed to mountain warfare than anyone else. The American theater commander, Mark Clark, included Juin in his open vehicle for the triumphant entry into Rome. Juin then became de Gaulle's Chief of Defense Staff.

Their post-war careers were no less dramatic. Leclerc was sent to Indo-China to restore French authority and actually achieved a working relationship and agreement with Ho Chi Minh, an agreement unfortunately disavowed in Paris so leading to three decades of conflict. Leclerc returned home and was killed in an airplane accident in 1947. De Lattre was sent to Indo-China in late 1950 after serious French reverses. There followed "The Year of de Lattre," when with all the passion of a man terminally ill with cancer he won several spectacular successes against the Viet Minh, but in one battle his only son was killed. He returned to France to die in early 1952, being honored with his *Maréchalat* a few days before his death. Juin served as Resident-General (Governor) of Morocco, but found himself in the 1950s increasingly torn apart by events in Algeria. Openly critical in words and actions of de Gaulle, this sad old soldier was deprived of his Marshal's privileges. Later, after a stroke, he was reconciled with de Gaulle and his privileges were restored, but he was a broken man.

English-language biographies of de Lattre and Leclerc exist. Writing on Juin was difficult. Some French writing is hagiographic, but several historians are critical of him and reference his very reactionary political views over Morocco, within Europe, and later Algeria. Writing this book I drew almost entirely on French sources; it was for me as adventurous a story as the lives of these three extraordinary men.

Q: You wrote an important book on the wars of French decolonization. What did you make of these wars?

A: I was invited to write this book by Longmans. While it was a fascinating book to write, it was saddening – the suffering and thousands of lives lost.

First, why did it all happen? There were several factors particular to France. France is a country with a strong centralist tradition, Roman law, the Catholic church, the Jacobins, and later Napoleon, all factors in the concept that a territory departing from this French hub and rejecting French culture must be essentially wrong. Then the two world wars, especially the second, suggested to many, especially in the military, that empire and imperial soldiers had played key roles and were indispensable for France continuing as a fully independent nation; some, notably Juin who was the country's only surviving marshal, further arguing that French North Africa was the southern flank of NATO. In Algeria, there were some 750,000 French settlers, some with influential connections in Paris, who warmly supported this view. And lastly, there was the dysfunctional French Fourth Republic political system with a number of parties and so requiring the building of coalitions. In the

late 1940s, the Communists were polling over 20% of the vote and after 1947, turned to opposition to colonial re-assertion in any form; other parties and political figures could not be seen to ally with or even be seen to be sympathetic to this Communist view without being labeled fellow travellers. The support given to nationalists by the Soviet Union and China only added to this view. The result was that, with the exception of the brief period of the government of Mendès-France between 1954 and 1955, concessions to nationalist demands could only be inadequate half-measures conceded to French puppets such as the Emperor Bao Dai. The known anti-colonial views of the United States, expressed clearly during the Algerian war, only added to suspicion: What were American motives? To weaken France? Oil? Furthermore, an unrelated geographical factor added to the cost and manpower of both of the major campaigns – the vast size of both Indo-China and Algeria.

The 1946-1954 Indo-China War saw the use of classic Maoist tactics by the Viet-Minh against the French with its arrangement of an essential union between front and rear, with a first phase of political mobilization of the masses, preparation of safe areas, and the training of cadres; a second phase of further acquisition of "liberated" territory obliging the enemy to disperse his forces; and a third phase of open conflict with formal military forces engaging the enemy on a front, while insurgent groups harassed the enemy's rear, throwing him into confusion and bringing about his collapse. The French, fighting a war that was very unpopular at home and forbidden the use of conscripts, never had the necessary manpower to cope and found themselves endlessly wrong-footed, especially after the arrival of Chinese support with a firm base north of the border from 1950. The only French general to achieve real success against the Viet-Minh was de Lattre, later described by Giap as the one French general whom he feared. The war ended, of course, in 1954 with the shattering defeat of the French at the badly chosen battlefield of Dien Bien Phu.

A consequence of their defeat was the development of the ruthless counter-revolutionary warfare teaching by elite force officers that revolutionary war was an all-embracing good-evil contest in which all means could therefore be justified: order preceding law, military needs overriding legal and political factors, and if necessary, the military taking over political leadership in a ruthless system, which could extend to harsh communal punishments, the forced removal of whole communities, and prisoners subjected to severe interrogation. The exponents of this policy failed to see the irreconcilable contradiction between these actions and the positive side of their policy, psychological campaigning, and social and economic development.

The Algerian conflict, which began in late 1954, intensified in the following two years; Paris – under a socialist government – eventually authorized the use of conscripts in Algeria, their being used in the system of quadrillage first devised in the 1925 Rif War. This divided the territory into zones in which conscripts held an area while the elite forces (*Coloniale* and *Légion*), using helicopters, mounted pursuit groups to follow insurgent bands. By

1958, France was deploying over 400,000 soldiers in Algeria at enormous cost to the economy and France's international standing, and also aroused protest against abuses in France itself. As a consequence of both Algeria's long and bloody history and the counter-revolutionary teaching followed by the elite-regiment generals, the war became ever more brutal.

In May 1958, the French political system and the whole Fourth Republic constitution collapsed under the strain, and de Gaulle was returned with (temporarily) virtually dictatorial powers. Within two years, de Gaulle had come to realize that France could not secure a lasting victory, but he authorized an exceptionally able general, Challe, to mount one final massive offensive to show who could be the military master. There was to be no second Dien Bien Phu. But over the century, the settler *colon*-dominated Algerian government had prevented the emergence of any moderate indigenous leaders and de Gaulle was forced to negotiate with the rebel leadership. Two serving and two retired generals, supported by the elite regiments, attempted a *coup* against him in 1961. De Gaulle, appealing over the heads of the generals to the public and conscript soldiers, asserted his authority, and a year later, on 3 July 1962, amid bitterness on all sides, Algeria became independent, the *colon* settler population fleeing to France as ethnic cleansing gripped the country.

Who won? France, freed from colonial wars and with an economy quietly developed by its post-war civil servants and under the strong leadership of de Gaulle, was quickly able to return to a lead role in European and world affairs. In Algeria, the population increased, land and work opportunities did not: violent divisions soon opened between the internal and external freedom fighters, Arab and Kabyle, and later Muslim fundamentalists and secularists that continue to this day.

Massive bibliographies exist for both conflicts, both in French and in English, and the major works are well known and need no listing here. Less well known, much lighter to read, but casting informative light and detail on the two wars are the novels of Jean Lartéguy translated into English: *Yellow Fever*, about Indo-China; *The Centurions*, about both Indo-China and Algeria; and *The Praetorians*, about Algeria.[2]

Few wars are necessary; neither of these two wars should have been fought.

Q: Considering all you have written on France, you must have formed an opinion of Charles de Gaulle.

A: Yes, indeed, I have my own opinion of and admiration for de Gaulle. He is one of the twentieth century's great figures. He played the lead part in his country's history three times. He gave a country back its self-respect, which

2. Jean Lartéguy, *Yellow Fever* (New York: Dutton, 1965); *The Centurions* (London: Hutchinson, 1961); *The Praetorians* (New York: Dutton, 1963).

it had lost in military defeat and occupation. I do not think any other twentieth century leader had quite such a profound effect on his country – perhaps only Nelson Mandela, but few others. The worlds of Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, and others have mercifully all gone. De Gaulle's impact on France remains and it is difficult to take a Marxist view and say that if it had not been him, someone else would have done. His impact was so personal.

De Gaulle was what the French call "*un dur*," a hard man. A man with a rebarbative personality; apparently he often used the third person when talking to his wife: "De Gaulle won't be in for dinner." A man very tall with a natural commanding personality and immensely strong willed. He does not seem to have had friends, only people who admired and worked for him. And he could be very vindictive.

But his three great moments, especially the second, are epic. The first, the radio appeal of 18 June 1940, "France has lost a battle, France has not lost the war," made by a newly promoted, but little known major-general prepared to oppose Marshal Pétain, the hero of Verdun, and the entire French political and military establishment from a base in a foreign country, Britain, that was profoundly distrusted. Second, and by any standard one of the most dramatic moments in French history, on 26 August 1944 striding down the Champs Elysées, shots still to be heard around him, turning every now and then to his followers and saying, "A few steps behind me." This was not a vain de Gaulle ego trip, it was to present a historical record (albeit hardly very accurate) that France had liberated herself and must take pride in this; he was just the symbol. And he was also saying: "I am here. There will be no 1871-type commune; this moment is the moment which I, not the communists, symbolize." And third, later, his acceptance that however bitter and divisive it might be, France had to leave Algeria, symbolized in his broadcast on the day of the revolt of four senior generals and the elite regiments against him in 1961, an appeal over the heads of the officers in revolt to the ordinary soldiers and people, "*Francaises, Francais, aidez moi*." The French departure was bitter. De Gaulle personally ordered French units not to help or protect loyalists or help them to get to France, an order disobeyed by many. And there was a bitter divide in the military. I recall a French exchange visit to Sandhurst in the mid-1960s when one of the French officers took me aside to say that the toast at the dinner should be to France and not to the President as otherwise several officers would not be able to rise and drink.

I think one clue to de Gaulle's wider views can be found in his pre-1940 military career. Unlike most French officers, he had never served in any of the colonies; he had served in Poland and been a prisoner in Germany. He was interested in and wanted a Europe led by France with a defense policy of "all directions," not one led by America and Britain. In the years of his presidency and despite its humiliating end, de Gaulle gave France back its national self-respect and the admiration of other countries, even if he drove Washington and London to distraction in the process.

A final story that I think shows de Gaulle's personality very well occurred

in 1962 when an attempt to assassinate him was launched by an Air Force colonel as de Gaulle and his wife were leaving Paris by car. The attempt failed. De Gaulle left the car saying, "*C'est une mauvaise plaisanterie*" (That is a bad joke), and later confirmed the death sentence on his attacker. Normally such men, including the 1961 generals, only received prison sentences. But de Gaulle was reported to have said that he did not mind attempts to kill him, but when the attack was also on his wife, the would-be assassin must pay the penalty. As I said earlier, "*un dur*," a hard man, but a very great one.

Q: How would you assess the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the Maginot Line?

A: André Maginot, a disabled and decorated First World War sergeant, was a "frontier politician" whose home area near the Lorraine border with Germany was ravaged by the Germans in 1870-1871 and again in 1914-1918. Maginot saw his mission in post-1918 France as one of ensuring that this did not happen again. He used his personality – he was very tall and always walked with a stick as a result of his wound – and war record to lobby for the construction of the line that bears his name. Some, notably Marshal Foch, were critical of the concept, and others, including Marshal Pétain, were warm advocates of the project.

Despite its obvious failure in 1940, some justification for it can be made. Its worst and fatal failure was that it was not extended to cover the Ardennes, which Pétain, with all the authority of the hero of Verdun, had declared to be too difficult for use by the Germans for an attack. In fact, it would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to extend the Line to the sea. Many areas were industrialized and others liable to flooding. The Line could be and was turned.

The Line's second, but not necessarily fatal, flaw was that it was a work of 1920-1934 military technology, while the last of the pre-war years were to witness a revolution in military technology, notably the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive-bomber (the Line had no anti-aircraft weaponry) and the increasing signals communication capabilities, especially with reference to armored units on the battlefield.

Third, the Line represented and fostered the sclerosis of the French military command in the inter-war years, in fairness itself a product of the huge casualties suffered in the 1914-1918 years. The Line, purely defensive, induced complacency, a lack of any offensive spirit, and inattention to intelligence and efficient command procedures. Churchill and Brooke were both very concerned with the relaxed climate of security. Money, resources, and training would have been better devoted to an all-professional armored army as advocated by Colonel de Gaulle. The cost of the Line, estimated to equal the cost of a hundred modern battleships, distorted the defense budget, while the demand for 50,000 men for the forts' garrisons reduced the number of men that might be available for other areas in acute danger.

Finally, the "hype" and propaganda about the Line extended to public opinion and politicians as journal article after journal article praised the Line's invincibility. The unexpected failure of the Line was a major cause of what is best described as France's national post-traumatic stress disorder of the summer of 1940.

In the Line's defense, however, arguments can be advanced. The *Wehrmacht* had a healthy respect for the Line, about which it was well informed from the reports of agents and from aerial observation. The May 1940 German plan required Army Group C only to mask the Line, while Army Groups A and B attacked through the Ardennes and Low Countries. The Germans held insufficient heavy artillery for both the Line and the priority assault sectors. Moreover, the Line could have been used as Churchill – and much earlier, Foch – had considered: to be a useful *couverture* and line of sally ports for a French offensive while the Germans were busy in Poland. But the French command was in no frame of mind for such an attack and the political leadership was hoping that the war would go away. The best that can be said for the Line is that its garrisons, locally domiciled reservists, had given the country protection while it mobilized and brought North African divisions to the front, and also later relieved the Army's best units for service elsewhere – in the event misused by entry into Belgium. By 1940 it was all too late. The French Army had lost any offensive spirit during a very severe winter, while the Germans had gained very valuable experience in the Polish campaign and had perfected their communications between aircraft and armor.

In the event, the Line was not broken, only one small hurriedly-built fort at the western end had fallen, its garrison asphyxiated. The Line had required some 100,000 German soldiers to mask it. But when the interval troops – regiments deployed between the main forts – had to be withdrawn to fight elsewhere, the Line's forts were surrounded front and rear. The Line's commander, General Condé, still wanted to fight on and not surrender – his fortress regiments had lost only some 2,000 dead.

Perhaps Maginot's early death was a kind fate as he did not have to see the failure of his grand design.

Q: How did your service in the Territorial Army affect your life and work?

A: The Territorial Army (T.A.) was created in the years prior to the First World War, and was intended to be a force capable of defending Britain should the island be attacked while the regular army was elsewhere, defending the empire or serving alongside a continental ally. As formed, it was structured to provide fourteen divisions covering regions over all of England, Wales, and Scotland: for example, the West of England Division was the 43rd Wessex Division, while at the other end of the island was the 51st Highland Division. Towns all had "drill halls" for a battalion or a company, and recruitment was local and entirely voluntary. The obligation for T.A. members was one, perhaps two, evenings of training per week, one, perhaps

two, weekends of training per month, and two weeks of continuous training in camp in the summer. T.A. regiments had their own officers up to the rank of major and a few units were commanded by regular officers if there was no T.A. officer suitable or who could give the unit the time. A cadre of one or two regular officers and several warrant officers and sergeants were attached for training, drawn from the regular battalions of the local regiment.

T.A. units were in action on the Western Front in 1914 as early as October and T.A. divisions, after general mobilization, served on many fronts. Lord Kitchener, however, did not like the T.A., regarding its members as amateurs, and raised his own "New Army" with the result that in the First World War there were three types of British army organization in the field. All this can create confusion for historians. For example, in the 1914-1918 war the 6th Queen's Royal Regiment was a Kitchener battalion, but in the 1939-1945 war the 6th Queen's was T.A. and proud of its 1914-1918 service as the 22nd London (Queen's).

In the 1939-1945 war there was no attempt to create a Kitchener army. The T.A. Divisions took the field to support existing regular divisions and newly created armored formations such as the elite 7th Armoured Division (the Desert Rats). But even within these armored divisions, T.A. battalions might be included, the lorried infantry of the Desert Rats from Alamein to the Dutch border (via Salerno) were three south London and Surrey T.A. battalions of the Queen's Royal Regiment.

The T.A. was reformed in 1948, but by the 1960s the military world had changed. The cost of the now thirteen division structure was too great, recruitment was inadequate, and the home defense role seemed improbable. The T.A. was then cut drastically, units no longer being intended to fight as battalions or regiments, but intended to supply additional reinforcement or replacement manpower to the regiments of the British Army of the Rhine, or to provide specialist support for certain professions, in particular medical personnel that could not be kept on the permanent establishment. Pay was improved, but call out and mobilization oligations were greatly strengthened.

Essentially this has remained the T.A. structure to this day though a small number of home defense units were later accepted, more to control Britain in the event of a nuclear attack than to repel an invader. In 2010 the Cameron government directed a review of the role of the T.A., but the numbers called out for service in Iraq and Afghanistan filling gaps at platoon, field hospital, or intelligence level will have to be taken into account.

Service in the T.A. is a unique experience for an office-, shop-, or factory-based civilian; a wet and windy weekend in a ditch or on an open plain is not the choice of most men and women. But the rewards of friendships across professions, across social classes, are very great, and for individuals it represents a special bonding.

I joined the T.A. in the St. Andrews University's Officer Cadet Training Unit, which gave us splendid hill walking in the Scottish highlands as part of our weekend and summer camp training. After passing various examinations and selection boards, I was commissioned into a very gentlemanly West of

England battalion – the Devons, motto *Semper Fidelis* – in which I served until I went to Kenya. On my return to Britain, I rejoined the T.A. and living in London was sent to a T.A. battalion of the Queen's Royal Regiment that recruited in Bermondsey, a dockland working-class area of the capital. I learned much from the soldiers of that very poor area of London, both about Bermondsey life in the war years and the no-less-equally grim years of the 1930s.

At the end of one training weekend a brother officer who was a civilian lecturer at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst asked if I would be interested in becoming a lecturer at the Academy. My work in the Kenya Government's London Office was obviously ending after Kenya's independence. I could not have had a more fortunate mid-life career change.

This change in my life was followed by another, again consequence of service in the T.A. The 1960s reduction of the T.A. infantry led to my transfer to the Army's T.A. Intelligence Corps unit in which one company composed of Russian and German speakers was being trained for battlefield tactical questioning of any prisoners captured in a conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. I could speak German and made an effort to learn Russian up to high school level. We were trained of course in the formation structure of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the East German National People's Army. I found the latter particularly interesting and began serious reading and study of the German Democratic Republic. I went into East Berlin several times while serving in the T.A., and a short time after the collapse of the G.D.R. I visited Berlin again and took a train to Dresden. I am a lover of the baroque in architecture and music – the great churches of south Germany and Austria and the music of Josef Haydn. The jagged stumps of the ruins of the Dresden *Frauenkirche* saddened me and when later I learned that the church was to be rebuilt I sent a cheque to the Bishop of Coventry, with which Dresden was twinned, at the time thinking no more of it than well wishing. This was not to be. The chairman of Britain's Dresden Trust, charged with raising money for a British contribution to the re-building, was soon on to me and I found myself joint editor and author of three chapters in a book, *Dresden: A City Reborn*.[3] The book was launched by the Duke of Kent, all royalties going to the Trust. The chapters that I wrote were very interesting to research. I shall never forget the German protestant lady pastor telling me of the reaction of Christian churches to the catastrophe that had destroyed the city. Nor shall I ever forget attending services in the rebuilt church in 2008.

Dresden: A City Reborn was the first book that was a consequence of my T.A. service and experience. The second was a very different work. I was attending an Intelligence Corps officers dinner when I received a message that the Colonel Commandant of the Corps, a very senior serving general,

3. Anthony Clayton and Alan Russell, eds., *Dresden: A City Reborn* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 1999).

wanted a word with me. The words, nine in fact, were simple: "Tony, I want you to write the Corps history." One does not decline the honor of being invited to write the history of one's own corps.

It was not an easy book to write. Almost immediately after I had agreed to write it a man in a suit came down from some Whitehall cavern and said, "Of course you cannot have access to classified material." The Corps held quite useful material on the work of early intelligence officers in the nineteenth century and on the Field Intelligence Department of the 1899-1902 South African War. From various sources, I was able to put together an account of the 1914-1918 war Intelligence Corps. For the 1939-1945 war I created my own archive by writing to innumerable members and former members of the Corps. I had to be very careful here as there were many officers at work in army intelligence who were badged to other regiments; my work could only concern members of the Corps. I divided the Second World War chapters into ones concerned with first, strategic intelligence, including air photography work and members of the Corps working at Bletchley Park; second, operational intelligence, most notably the Y Service of battlefield signals intelligence; and third, security both in Britain and the colonial empire. I was advised that there would be no restrictions on Second World War material except in the work of some personnel operating with Special Operations Executive – agents working in occupied Europe. However, the S.O.E. archivist helped me as much as he could.

Events since 1945 were much more sensitive and the nearer the time that I was actually writing this book, the late 1980s, the less material was permitted. I was not allowed even one sentence on Northern Ireland. However, I was able to make some references, large or small, to almost all the other British Army operations since 1945 from Malaya to the Falklands. Even then there remained problems with final clearance. The Prime Minister of the day, to whose staff the manuscript had to be sent, gave her opinion that no work on intelligence should ever be published. Happily, her successor took a more liberal view and the work appeared a little later.

Q: Please tell us about *The British Officer: Leading the Army from 1600 to the Present* and your work at Sandhurst.

A: I wrote the book on the British officer following an invitation from Pearson Education. Obviously, the subject had immediate attractions for me, both from a personal and family point of view and my work at Sandhurst. I start with the Restoration, the first period in our history that the state maintained a standing army (albeit very small), and for a length of time, Parliament and the country thought professional soldiers could be dangerous – "Bonapartism" – and anyway we had the Royal Navy to protect us. Officering the Army, to ensure against upstarts, was by the system of purchases and sale of commissions – you bought your first, then sold it to purchase one of a higher rank, finally selling off your colonelcy for a nice retirement lump sum. Pay was very poor and officers were expected to have private incomes;

many supplemented their incomes by shady arrangements, often at the expense of their soldiers. Nevertheless, this system produced the officers for Marlborough and for the Napoleonic wars, though while only a few were truly outstanding, most were physically very brave.

It was recognized that officers for the engineers and artillery would need training and for this reason the Royal Military Academy Woolwich was opened in 1742. After the war of American Independence the need to provide some form of training for officers entering the cavalry and the infantry was appreciated and after some temporary lodgings, the Royal Military College Sandhurst was opened in 1812, but attendance was not obligatory and right up until 1914 men could gain commissions by several "back door" methods. The worst abuses, that of the sale of commissions, was finally ended in the 1870s, but for a long time regular officers were expected to have private incomes and even to this day in a few regiments officers will have to limit participation in some of the Officers' Mess social activities if they do not have some private funds.

After the end of the 1939-1945 war the R.M.A. Woolwich and the R.M.C. Sandhurst were amalgamated and became the R.M.A. Sandhurst with the title "Gentleman Cadet" replaced by "Officer Cadet." But real change only came in the late 1960s with the massive expansion of university education in the U.K.

The Sandhurst that I joined in 1965 was very gentlemanly in style. The course was one of two academic years, the cadets were boys, most but not all from private schools, middle and upper class backgrounds. The emphasis was on character development stressing adventure training with sports and games of all sorts; academic work was of high school level and not taken too seriously. It was a happy institution, wise commandants appreciated that over two years boys must have enjoyment. For the staff, the mixing of military and academic was close, most instructors of each side foregathered for a pre-lunch drink in the Officers' Mess.

However, in the late 1960s the Army appreciated that in the new world of university expansion if they wanted officers they would have to take graduates, men they had previously distrusted as being likely to be too smart, and graduates would not tolerate two years. So in 1971 there began a reorganization of courses. The school leavers course was cut to one year and special shorter courses for graduates opened. Complaints then followed that young officers were poorly trained and over time developments led to a one year course, common to all graduates and non-graduates, men and women. The academic staff was reduced, languages and military science being taught elsewhere, and the level of teaching raised to graduate, in some cases, such as military-civilian relations and the new political dimensions of military operations, to post-graduate levels. Many more Ph.D.s appeared in departments. Leadership training replaced character development. Some two-thirds to three-quarters of cadets were graduates, and street-wise. Women, who had had a rather charming little college of their own, were admitted to Sandhurst. Initially, women did not participate in the big passing out Sovereign's Parade

until on one occasion the Queen asked why. An unwise commandant replied, "They can't march, Ma'm," and received the frosty reply, "I did." Change followed. The style of the present day Academy is one of gritty professionalism, training is urgent not leisured, a very few have a hurried drink before lunch, and if they do, it will be non-alcoholic. Regional accents can now be heard in almost all officers' messes. In the new world of mortgages, consumer society, and repayment of university loans, career prospects, good and bad, play a much larger part in officers' lives and plans than forty years ago, not always to the good of the Army.

For me, appointment as a lecturer with neither teaching nor post-graduate experience was initially hard going, but the atmosphere and company of both the civilian academic and the military staff was immensely stimulating and carried me on to a doctorate and to the several books that I have written. I drew particular inspiration from the writings of John Keegan and associations and conversations with Peter Young, Christopher Duffy, John Selby, and Antony Brett-James of the Military History Department (later War Studies Department), and learnt from example of experienced colleagues how to develop my own style of teaching. Later, the works of other contemporary military historians of the time, notably Sir Michael Howard and Alistair Horne, further developed my interest in military history.

Initially, I taught a European inter-war history course and an African course on the Academy's old two-year program, then on a pre-university specialist African history course, and finally, I became interested in communications work and studies.

Many military careers owe much to Sandhurst, as do a number of academic careers. My debt is the greater as my academic career only began when I was thirty-six years old.

Q: Why did you write *Warfare in Woods and Forests*?

A: It goes back to my high school days. At my school all the fit boys were members of the school's officer training corps and once a week we donned First World War-type khaki uniforms and went out for drill and field training with Lee Enfield rifles that could not be fired, but had to be cleaned. One exercise, on a glorious summer day in 1943, was clearing a wood. Notional Bren gunners lay in the sun on the wood's edges to enfilade any enemy running out of the wood. The less fortunate, myself among them, tramped through the wood, undergrowth, and bracken. It all seemed so simple, surgical, that it remained in my memory, to reappear sixty-four years later.

My first thoughts were of the Finland-Russia Winter War of 1939-1940 and accounts relating to the Finnish tactics of *mottis* encouraged me to look further. Then a local friend told me that he had a copy of the U.S. Army Center of Military History's *Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign*.[4] This

4. *Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of

set out, post-war, the results of questioning German officers and was fascinating. I began to realize that woods and forest warfare was a very singular type of battlefield combat that merited study and one on which no one had written. Forests are difficult to reconnoitre in advance and they present formidable difficulties of command and control of front-line units and equally difficult problems of supply for either horse-drawn wagons or wheeled trucks and vans. Shots fired at an enemy hit trees, shells bring down splinters as well as shrapnel and there may be a spooky atmosphere of fighting in a gloomy wood or forest that can unnerve a soldier – or in some cases lead him to a greater ferocity if he is caught in an ambush amongst the trees and survives. Prisoners are often killed out of hand, no soldiers being available to guard them.

Three types of forest and woods warfare emerged as I proceeded with my work. First, the battles fought in the woods, an early example being the defeat of Varus' Roman legions by the German tribes in the battle of the Teutoburger Wald in A.D. 9 and leading on to the great battles of the two world wars of the twentieth century and to, in our own time, Chechnya. Second, battles in which commanders used woods and forests to force their opponent into ground of their choosing from which flank attacks could be mounted from woods, notable examples being Agincourt, Morat in Switzerland, and Malplaquet. And third, forest-based guerrilla, of which there were plenty of medieval and early modern warfare examples, but by far the most significant being guerrilla operations in Russia against the armies of Napoleon and Hitler.

The British Army learnt forest warfare the hard way, beginning with General Braddock's defeat at Monongahela in 1755. From the American Civil War I chose Chancellorsville and the Wilderness as the two most instructive examples. In the First World War Americans were to learn the hard way at Belleau Wood, but all forest battles pale into insignificance compared with the tremendous Battle of Hürtgen Forest in 1944-1945. At Hürtgen every possible special feature of forest warfare was to make its appearance: dread, determination, and death.

It is possible that technological advances, in particular imagery analysis and the ability to move troops very rapidly by helicopter, may have altered the traditional balance of advantage held by a defender in forest warfare, concealment no longer being assured. But with fortune, this will remain academic surmise.

Two lessons nevertheless emerge from this overall study. The first is the importance of topographical intelligence. Commanders need to know the types of trees, density, seasonal features, paths, and tracks. If they are not fully briefed, problems will soon appear. The second, even more important, is training. Sending troops trained to fight in farmland or open country into a forest leads to disaster.

Military History, 1982).

General Lord Guthrie in a preface speculates that the first two types of forest warfare may be less frequent in the future, but forest-based guerrilla warfare will remain with us and perhaps increase.

Q: Are you working on any new book projects and if so, would you provide us with a few details?

A: Yes. I am at work on a project – probably a short book – "Battlefield Rations," which details what the British front-line soldier had been given to eat immediately before or during a battle. The piece will cover the period from the 1899-1902 South African War to Afghanistan today, from traditional hard biscuit and "bully beef" to more sustaining "Compo" rations, where possible supplemented by local purchases. This project is at an early stage, but I can mention a few interesting points.

In the 1914-1918 war a daily rum issue of one-sixth of a pint was authorized for soldiers in the trenches, with the approval of the area divisional commander. Many authorized the issue for wet weather, and rain seems to have been very common to many battalions. In Burma in 1942-1945 regiments were reduced to half rations during the monsoon seasons as the RAF could not fly in air drops. A Welsh battalion of infantry besieged by Serbs in the Bosnian town of Gorazde in the summer of 1994 was reduced to half rations, and sometimes less, for several weeks. Pillage occurs frequently. In the South African War, a general requisitioned a whole ox wagon convoy of food for a battalion to feed himself and his staff. Food dropped by air sometimes fell to volunteer collectors who exacted their own premium. In Gorazde, soldiers suffered from scurvy, actually losing hair and teeth. An area that I plan to research further is the expert advice offered in the early years of the 1939-1945 war by Arctic explorers with packed sledging rations experience.

Q: Would you name eight books which have influenced your thinking and writing and which you would recommend for others?

A: Yes. For the British Empire, 1919-1939, I would recommend Sir Charles Gwynn's *Imperial Policing* together with Brian Bond's *British Military Policy between the Two World Wars* and James Lunt's *Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century*.[5] For naval operations, obviously Stephen Roskill's two-volume *Naval Policy between the Wars*, which provide full information on the Royal Navy's policies and operations in the period.[6] Roskill's important work is usefully supplemented by Sir James

5. Sir Charles William Gwynn, *Imperial Policing* (London: Macmillan, 1934); Brian Bond, *British Military Policy between the Two World Wars* (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); James Lunt, *Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century* (London: Macdonald, 1981).
6. Stephen Roskill, *Naval Policy between the Wars*, Vol. 1, *The Period of Anglo-Ameri-*

Cable's *Gunboat Diplomacy*.[7]

It is difficult to select three English-language books on the French Army from the many excellent works on individuals and campaigns. The three that I recommend are both good introductions to their particular subject and works attractive to read. Other works written both before and after these were published include further detail or different points of view, but these, in my view, remain classic. They are Alistair Horne's *The Price of Glory* on the French Army in the 1914-1918 war, in particular Verdun; Jacques Dalloz, *The War in Indochina, 1945-54*; and Alistair Horne again, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962*.[8]

Q: Considering the many French-language books you have read, would you suggest four that you think worthy of translation?

A: This is a very difficult question to answer. Should one choose major and lengthy works of scholarship – and if so, one to cover the course of battles or another concerning a more specialized topic – or books of a general historical interest, books that might appeal to American readers, books that cover a niche topic, or finally, an unusual work that "caught my eye?"

The first that I have chosen falls into the first category, a "definitive" work of high quality: William Serman and Jean-Paul Bertaud's *Nouvelle Histoire Militaire de la France, 1789-1919*, which combines a mass of information not easy to obtain elsewhere succinctly set out with analysis and judgement.[9] The book is written, like much modern French history writing, in the present tense that carried me along well, but I am not sure should be preserved in translation. For a special topic, but very useful for any student of the First World War, I would select Jean Nicot, *Les Poilus ont la Parole: Dans les tranchées, Lettres du Front, 1917-1918*, a collection of excerpts from letters written home from soldiers at the front, all of which had to be read by censors.[10] The work illustrates very vividly the changes in morale of the French soldier in this very difficult time for the French Army – fatigue and despair following the opening of the German 1918 offensives, views of French soldiers on the British and Americans, resentment against generals who were "*buveurs de sang*," and excitement in the last weeks of the war.

I have tried to combine a more general historical work with a possible ap-

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can Antagonism, 1919-1929 (London: Collins, 1968); *Naval Policy between the Wars*, Vol. 2, *The Period of Reluctant Rearmament, 1930-1939* (London: Collins, 1976).

7. James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force* (London: Chatto and Windus for the Institute of Strategic Studies, 1971).

8. Alistair Horne, *The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916* (London: Macmillan, 1962); Jacques Dalloz, *The War in Indo-China, 1945-54* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1990); Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

9. William Serman and Jean-Paul Bertaud, *Nouvelle Histoire Militaire de la France, 1789-1919* (Paris: Fayard, 1998).

10. Jean Nicot, *Les Poilus ont la Parole: Dans les tranchées, Lettres du Front, 1917-1918* (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1998).

peal in America by suggesting Bernard Pujo's *Juin: Maréchal de France*.[11] A marshal with his record deserves a biography in English; a Seine bridge in Paris bears the name of his greatest success, Garigliano. However, an introduction would be necessary making politely the point that much criticism can be made of his post-war political activities in Morocco, over the proposed European defense force, and over de Gaulle's policies in Algeria. Pujo was Juin's *aide-de-camp* and is always loyal to his master. Readers with an interest in the Italian campaign might welcome this book.

For a special niche topic, I would strongly recommend Marc Michel's *L'appel à l'Afrique*.[12] It is an excellent account by a distinguished French historian on the service of Black African troops in the First World War – the *Force Noire* project of General Mangin. It covers the various uses to which Black troops were put; the concern for their welfare and *hivernage* (withdrawal from the trenches in winter); and the cruel 1917 recruitment campaign in Africa leading to the resignation of the Governor-General of French West Africa, van Vollenhoven, who returned to the front line and was killed in action while serving with the elite *Régiment d'Infantrie Coloniale du Maroc*. There is a great deal to be learnt from this book.

You asked for four books. I am going to suggest a fifth, one that "caught my eye." In all these questions and answers women have not figured at all and I have avoided personal battlefield memoirs. This small, rather charming book fills both gaps: Geneviève de Galard's *Une Femme à Dien Bien Phu*.[13] De Galard was a very brave woman, the only one in the battle, and was subsequently captured by the Viet-Minh. An aristocrat, with very limited nursing training, who arrived in the fortified camp expecting to be flown out while escorting wounded, but when further flights were suspended she found herself in the roles of nurse, confidante, and even mother for the wounded and dying. This is not an academic book, but as a personal account, a very moving account, women readers will especially appreciate it.

I should also mention an important recent work which I am reading at present: *De Quoi Fut Fait l'Empire: Les Guerres Coloniales au XIXe Siècle*.[14] In a long review in the journal of Britain's leading think tank, the Royal United Services Institute, the reviewer notes that the author, Jacques Frémeaux, a highly respected Paris professor, mounts a prolonged criticism of Europe and America's colonial campaigning and its legacies of resentment. The journal strongly recommends the book for translation; so would I.

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11. Bernard Pujo, *Juin: Maréchal de France* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1988).
12. Marc Michel, *L'Appel à l'Afrique: Contributions et réactions à l'effort de guerre en A.O.F., 1914-1919* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1982).
13. Geneviève de Galard, *Une Femme à Dien Bien Phu* (Paris: Arènes, 2003).
14. Jacques Frémeaux, *De Quoi Fut Fait l'Empire: Les Guerres Coloniales au XIXe Siècle* (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2009).

A Giant among Pygmies

ANTOINE CAPET

Finest Years: Churchill as Warlord 1940-45. By Max Hastings. London: HarperPress, 2009. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. xxiii, 664.

Churchill "aficionados" and Second World War scholars alike cannot have enough of new insights into the great war leader's "finest years,"[1] as Sir Max Hastings appropriately calls them. Contrary to Lieutenant Colonel (U.S. Army, ret.) Carlo D'Este, the author of the most recent previous offering on "Churchill as warlord,"[2] who as an American can be supposed to have a detached view of British party politics, Hastings is indelibly associated with the staunchly Conservative *Daily Telegraph*, which he edited in the halcyon Tory days of Margaret Thatcher and John Major (1986-1995). And even though he has a number of fine books on the war to his credit,[3] we then fear the worst about Hastings' new insights, since rightly or wrongly the works of the "Thatcherite" historians have been interpreted as an unmitigated denunciation of Churchill's wartime choices which, they argue, led to a dramatic reduction in Britain's ability to intervene in the affairs of Eastern Europe and made the country powerless to arrest the dislocation of the Empire – all because of Churchill's wrong-headed alliance with Stalin after June 1941.[4] Pro-Churchill readers will be relieved to know that in this respect – on both accounts – the villain of the piece is the wily/naïve American President, Roosevelt. In his former capacity, he deliberately wrecked Churchill's post-war Imperial vision – in the latter, he gullibly furthered Soviet expansionist ambitions.

The central thesis of the book seems to be that since Stalin showed that he was prepared to shed the blood of his population as much as was needed to

1. There is of course no consensus over Churchill's life and actions – except probably on this point, since even his most bitter critics are prepared to admit that they were his "least bad" years.

2. Carlo D'Este, *Warlord: A Life of Churchill at War, 1874-1945* (London: Allen Lane, 2009). Reviewed in *Global War Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2010), pp. 87-108.

3. Notably *Bomber Command* (London: Michael Joseph, 1979); *Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944* (London: Michael Joseph, 1984); *Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-45* (London: Macmillan, 2004); *Nemesis: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45* (London: HarperPress, 2007).

4. This is of course an oversimplification. But this very largely reflects the reception of, for instance, John Charmley's *Churchill: The End of Glory: A Political Biography* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1993). Without naming them, Hastings alludes to their "supremely cynical insouciance." Hastings, *Finest Years*, p. 152.

contain and then repulse the German onslaught – totally unlike the Western Allies, who were always wary of needless massacre – he would have been in a position to exact the price of blood anyway at the conference table, in the hallowed tradition of past war settlements: but President Roosevelt's inept handling of the Soviet dictator made things far harder (impossible, in fact, with the sole exception of the Greek deal, which the White House disapproved of) for Churchill, who hoped that the Western Allies' belated (in Soviet eyes) landings in North-West Europe gave them at least some negotiating cards, to obtain any concessions from his Eastern Allies. As far as the final outcome of the war for Britain is concerned, this is not much removed from what can now be called the "Charmley thesis": from a material point of view, the United Kingdom gained nothing by declaring war on Germany on 3 September 1939 – and in fact lost much. But then Charmley largely blames Churchill's hollow rhetoric for this disaster, whereas Hastings' monograph reads like a Greek tragedy: the hero is pure, but he is doomed regardless – by forces which are far superior to his poor mortal endeavors. Hastings constantly suggests that Churchill's ultimate failure, his doomed attempt to preserve Britain's status as a Great Power, was only partially due to his personal faults and mistakes: against the forces of geopolitical history, most vividly demonstrated by the awesome war effort of the Russians, in troops engaged and in human sacrifice – "the twenty-eight million Russians who died in the struggle to destroy Nazism"[5] – on a 2000-mile front, only the United States could have been a match – certainly not "the poor little English donkey."[6]

As the author of many military books, Hastings is of course perfectly aware of the importance of actual war operations – something which more "political" or "diplomatic" historians sometimes seem to lose sight of. Hastings believes – and it would of course be difficult to contradict him – that in war the politico-diplomatic balance of power is almost entirely dependent on military factors. Thus, leaving out the war in the Pacific and the Far East, which only obliquely affected the discussions among the "Big Three," he very usefully reminds us of the forces engaged in 1944:

> At the British Army's peak strength in Normandy, Montgomery commanded fourteen British, one Polish and three Canadian divisions in contact with the enemy. The US Army in north-west Europe grew to sixty divisions, while the Red Army in mid-1944 deployed 480, albeit smaller, formations. Seldom was less than two-thirds of the German army deployed on the eastern front. Throughout the last year of the war, Churchill was labouring to compensate by sheer force of will and

5. Hastings, *Finest Years*, p. 445.

6. Cf. Churchill's famous passage in his war memoirs, quoted by Hastings (*Finest Years*, p. 435): "There I sat with the great Russian bear on one side of me, with paws outstretched, and on the other side the great American buffalo, and between the two sat the poor little English donkey who was the only one… who knew the right way home."

personality for the waning significance of Britain's contributions.[7]

This "waning significance" was compounded by the difference in the violence of the engagement on the Western and Eastern fronts – with both Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia staking their all on crushing an enemy prepared to fight to the finish on both sides. In this connection, Hastings does not fail to remind his reader of the colossal casualties of the USSR – some twenty-eight million dead – and how, he argues, this shaped events from 1943:

> There was one important aspect of the Casablanca conference [between Churchill and Roosevelt, January 1943], and indeed of Allied strategy-making for the rest of the war, which was never expressly articulated by Western leaders, and is still seldom directly acknowledged by historians. The Americans and British flattered themselves that they were shaping policies which would bring about the destruction of Nazism. Yet in truth, every option they considered and every operation they subsequently executed remained subordinate to the struggle on the eastern front. The Western Allies never became responsible for the defeat of Germany's main armies. They merely assisted the Russians to accomplish this.[8]

Indeed, if we are to believe Stalin's reported opinion, by the time the Normandy landings took place, they were no longer decisive: by then, the Red Army was sure of victory single-handed. And Hastings continues with unpalatable arguments:

> For all the enthusiasm of George Marshall and his colleagues to invade Europe, it remains impossible to believe that the US would have been any more willing than Britain to accept millions of casualties to fulfill the attritional role of the Red Army at Stalingrad, Kursk, and in a hundred lesser bloodbaths between 1942 and 1945. Roosevelt and Churchill had the satisfaction of occupying higher moral ground than Stalin. But it is hard to dispute the Soviet warlord's superior claim to be called the architect of victory.[9]

Earlier in the narrative, when discussing the decision to fight alongside the Soviet Union in 1941, Hastings had already added a cautionary note to the notion of a "higher moral ground": "Churchill was far too wise to waste much consideration upon the moral superiority of Britain's position over that of the Soviet Union," because he was perfectly aware that "Stalin saw only one reality: that while his own nation was engulfed in battle, blood and destruction, Britain remained relatively unscathed and America absolutely so."[10]

From that decision, it was *Realpolitik* that dominated relations inside the

7. Hastings, *Finest Years*, p. 484.
8. Ibid., p. 362.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 331.

"Grand Alliance" – and even an old practitioner like Churchill could not outwit Stalin into making concessions (on Poland, for instance) which were not justified by the military situation. To make things worse for Churchill, on the two points which most commentators tell us really mattered for him – the preservation of the British presence and influence in the Mediterranean Basin with the overriding aim of safeguarding communications with India, and the future of Eastern Europe, especially Poland – his American allies (masters, in fact, by 1945) were more than unhelpful: often deliberately obstructive.

On Poland, Hastings of course does not fail to quote Churchill's war memoirs, when he reports President Roosevelt's most unfortunate public remark during the 6 February session at Yalta: "Poland has been a source of trouble for over five hundred years."[11] There were in fact three points at issue between the Allies: the principle of a westward shift of Polish territory; the definition of the new frontiers, especially the western ones; and the composition of the postwar Polish Government, including its mode of election. Hastings shows that in all three cases, Churchill was initially hesitant – but that he eventually made up his mind in a way which implied confrontation with Stalin on the latter two points, with little or no support from President Roosevelt.

Before Barbarossa, Churchill was totally opposed to the *de facto* annexation of Eastern Poland by the Russians – it was after all only their side of the bargain, the booty gained from their betrayal, when they signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939. International morality dictated that treachery should not be openly rewarded. One must remember that the Allies – at the time this meant the British and French, supported by the exiled Czechoslovaks and Poles – had briefly envisaged a joint attack on the Soviet Union in the spring of 1940. Hastings has an interesting description of Churchill's gradual acceptation of *Realpolitik*, however:

> On 6 March [1942], Rangoon was abandoned.[12] Next day, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt urging that the Western Allies should concede Rus-

11. Ibid., p. 553. For a useful discussion of the evolution of President Roosevelt's position regarding Poland, see the essay by Professor Piotr Wandycz of Yale University, "The United States and Poland, Part II: Historical Reflections." <http://www.electronicmuseum.ca/Poland-USA/usa_and_poland_2.html>, last accessed December 2010.

Readers of this review may be interested in Churchill's answer to the President's quip: "All the more must we do what we can to put an end to these troubles." Their acerbic exchange is reported in Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. 6, *Triumph and Tragedy* (London: Cassell and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1954) [London: Reprint Society, 1966, p. 306].

12. One more humiliation for British arms in their Eastern Empire, of course – coming after the surrender of Singapore three weeks before (15 February 1942), described by Churchill as "the worst disaster and largest capitulation of British history." Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. 4, *The Hinge of Fate* (London: Cassell and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), p. 92.

> sian demands for recognition of their 1941 frontiers[13] – which Britain had staunchly opposed the previous year. The Americans demurred, but the prime minister's change of attitude reflected intensified awareness of the Allies' vulnerability. He was now willing to adopt the most unwelcome expedients if these might marginally strengthen Russia's resolve. Amid alarm that Stalin might be driven to parley with Hitler, eastern Poland became expendable.[14]

Pursuing his idea that Churchill's position followed the fluctuations of the Western Allies' fortunes, Hastings points to his U-turn only a few weeks later after receiving cheering news from the Pacific:

> The spring of 1942 brought some lifting of Allied spirits, especially after the US Navy inflicted heavy damage on the Japanese in the 4 May Battle of the Coral Sea. Churchill changed his mind yet again about acceding to Russian demands for recognition of their territorial claims on Poland and the Baltic states.[15] 'We must remember that this is a bad thing', he told the cabinet, 'We oughtn't to do it, and I shan't be sorry if we don't'.[16]

By the end of the following year, at the Teheran[17] Conference from 28 November to 1 December 1943, Churchill had now adopted what was to be his definitive position:

> Churchill was by now reconciled to shifting Poland's frontiers westwards, compensating the Poles with German territory for their eastern lands to be ceded to Russia. That proposal represented ruthlessness enough. But the US president's behavior went further, making plain that Stalin could expect little opposition to his designs in Poland or elsewhere.[18]

Hastings does not really expatiate on the second bone of contention with Stalin, the dispute over the so-called Oder-Neisse[19] border in the West, which Churchill covers at length in his war memoirs – preferring to concentrate on the complex three-cornered game between Churchill, Stalin, and

13. The frontiers on the eve of Barbarossa, that is in fact the frontiers determined by the secret clauses of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939.
14. Hastings, *Finest Years*, p. 244.
15. Recognized as independent in 1920 and formally accepted as new members of the USSR in August 1940. They of course had been given no choice.
16. Hastings, *Finest Years*, p. 256.
17. Hastings uses the modern spelling, Tehran – not the then accepted spelling (and therefore probably the only historically correct one), Teheran. Churchill would have strongly disapproved of that – he deplored the loss of connection between "Ankara" and the beautiful "Angora cat," as attested by a framed letter now at Chartwell.
18. Hastings, *Finest Years*, p. 434.
19. Unfortunately spelled "Niesse" on p. 552. This is one of the very few typos found in the text, which has evidently benefited from serious proof-reading. Another is "[TUC General Secretary] Morrison" (which Herbert Morrison MP never was) on p. 396. It is a confusion with Walter Citrine, alluded to just before in the same sentence.

Roosevelt (the self-appointed arbiter, as well as player) on the third and last point at issue over the future of Poland: its form of government. There, discussing Yalta, Hastings harks upon the enormous chasm between the President's apparent indifference to the internal affairs of postwar Poland, so long as he did not alienate the Polish-American vote, and Churchill's last desperate efforts to ensure that the so-called "London Poles," whom the Soviets preferred to call the "*émigrés*," that is the exiled Polish Government of 1939 and the troops loyal to it, would be allowed to be repatriated and participate in the election and formation of the new Polish Government, alongside with the so-called "Lublin Poles," the Communist Partisans supported by the Soviet Union – and installed in power by the Red Army. The vocabulary was a foretaste of the Cold War doublespeak to come: "*émigrés*" recalled the French Royalists who had fled the Revolution and thereby lost the confidence of the people, while "Free Elections" – as indefatigably advocated by Churchill – was (rightly) seen as a "propaganda weapon" denying the self-appointed "vanguard of the proletariat" the right to speak in the name of the people. Hastings clearly blames "the leader of the United States," "the wreck of a man"[20] for not giving the least ounce of moral comfort to Churchill, who had to accept the accomplished fact of absolute Soviet domination over the fate of Poland without American policy-makers lifting an eyebrow. It must be noted however that in this instance Hastings does not denounce Roosevelt the "natural dissembler"[21] – simply his failure to reassure Churchill that it was not a deliberate snub, but a mere acknowledgement of the consequences of military events:

> No course short of war with Russia could have saved Polish Democracy in 1945, and by February only a compound of vanity and despair could have caused Churchill to pretend otherwise. The Soviet Union believed that, having paid overwhelmingly the heaviest price to achieve the defeat of Hitler, it had thus purchased the right to determine the polity of Eastern Europe in accordance with its own security interests. To this day, Roosevelt's admirers declare that he displayed greater realism than Britain's prime minister by recognising this. The Western Allies lacked power to contrive any different outcome.[22]

The result was unpalatable, and we can follow Hastings when he concludes his chapter devoted to Yalta on Churchill's unenviable situation as he left the Conference: "Churchill, who had fought as nobly as any man in the world to deliver Europe, was now obliged to witness not the liberation of the East, but the mere replacement there of one murderous tyranny by another."[23]

Yet, as a man who fought for the liberation of oppressed peoples,

20. Hastings, *Finest Years*, p. 547.
21. Ibid., p. 194.
22. Ibid., p. 556.
23. Ibid.

Churchill could easily be perceived as a hypocrite, a master practitioner of double standards since he did not apply to the Empire, notably India, the precepts which he applied to Eastern and Western Europe. In this context, Hastings usefully reminds his readers of Churchill's past brushes with Gandhi,[24] and most pointedly recalls how the Indian leader has made his case worse in Churchill's eyes in 1940:

> Churchill was ruthlessly dismissive of Indian political aspirations, when the Japanese army was at the gates. He could scarcely be expected to forget that the Mahatma had offered to mediate Britain's surrender to Hitler, whom the standard-bearer of non-violence and Indian freedom described as 'not a bad man'. Gandhi in 1940 wrote an open letter to the British people, urging them to 'lay down arms and accept whatever fate Hitler decided'.[25]

Quoting one of Gandhi's major biographers,[26] Hastings then gives the tenor of the appeal, which indeed could "scarcely" endear Gandhi to the British warlord: "You will invite Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini to take what they want of the countries you call your possessions." This was difficult enough to swallow for Churchill-the-Imperialist, but there was worse – and totally intolerable for Churchill-the-Bulldog, as he liked to be perceived in 1940: "Let them take possession of your beautiful island with your many beautiful buildings. You will give all these, but neither your souls nor your minds."[27] Apparently, in the United States, this irenic position of the Indian Nationalists was not perceived as a danger at a time when their extreme pacifist stance could easily become a form of defeatism in case of Japanese aggression. Hastings writes:

> Many Americans explicitly identified India's contemporary predicament with that of their own country before the Revolution of 1776.

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24. Though Hastings unexplainably omits Churchill's most famous attack against Gandhi, in a speech at Epping, his constituency, on 23 February 1931: "It is alarming and also nauseating to see Mr. Gandhi, a seditious Middle Temple lawyer, now posing as a fakir of a type well known in the east, striding half-naked up the steps of the vice-regal palace, while he is still organizing and conducting a defiant campaign of civil disobedience, to parley on equal terms with the representative of the King-Emperor." Robert Rhodes James, ed., *Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963*, Vol. 5, *1928-1935* (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974), p. 4985. Robert Rhodes James comments in a note: "This speech was the most violent and memorable by Churchill on the Indian question to date. In particular, the passage on Gandhi made an immense impression on opinion – not least in India, where it has never been forgotten or forgiven."

25. Hastings, *Finest Years*, p. 255.

26. D.G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi*, 8 volumes, (1) *1869-1920*, (2) *1920-1929*, (3) *1930-1934*, (4) *1934-1938*, (5) *1938-1940*, (6) *1940-1945*, (7) *1945-1947*, (8) *1947-1948* (Bombay: Vithalbhai K. Jhaveri & D.G. Tendulkar, 1951-1954) (New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1960-1963. New Revised Edition. Reprinted 1988-1990). Hastings' quotation is from vol. 5 of the New Revised Edition, p. 291.

27. Hastings, *Finest Years*, p. 255.

> 'You're the top / You're Mahatma Gandhi' wrote Cole Porter euphorically,[28] reflecting the huge enthusiasm of his countrymen for the guru of the Indian independence movement. Such sentiment was wormwood to Churchill.[29]

Hastings also makes use of a secret survey of American opinion by the Office of War Information in 1942 which showed the uphill struggle faced by Churchill in his conquest of American hearts over to the cause of Britain: "She didn't pay her war debts after the last war. She refuses to grant India the very freedom she claims to be fighting for. She is holding a vast army in England to protect the homeland while her outposts are lost to the enemy."[30] Even the Anglophile 1940 Republican candidate for President, Wendell Willkie, we are told, "urged that the prime minister should make a speech on post-war policy showing that he realised that 'old-fashioned imperialism' was dead." "Churchill, of course, had no intention of doing any such thing," Hastings immediately adds.[31]

But then, of course, there was the "Special Relationship" which Churchill was so keen to develop with the President immediately after the war started – what Hastings calls "Churchill's courtship of Roosevelt," describing it in admirative terms considering how much it must have cost Churchill deep inside:

> Churchill, least patient of men, displayed almost unfailing public forbearance towards the USA, flattering its president and people, addressing with supreme skill both American principles and self-interest. He was much more understanding than most of his countrymen of American Utopianism. […] If Churchill had not occupied Britain's premiership, who among his peers could have courted the US with a hundredth part of his warmth and conviction? […] To a degree that few of his fellow countrymen proved able to match between 1939 and 1945 he subordinated pride to need, endured slights without visible resentment, and greeted every American visitor as if his presence did Britain honour.[32]

Indeed, through the book, Hastings strives to suggest that Churchill's unconditional cultivation of the President was in fact only an act – so perfect that even such a close aide as Anthony Eden was taken in by it:

> Eden claimed that Churchill regarded Roosevelt with almost religious awe.[33] Yet the Foreign Secretary almost certainly misread as credulity Churchill's supremely prudent recognition of necessity. […] He could

28. The song dates from 1934.
29. Hastings, *Finest Years*, p. 255.
30. Ibid., p. 299.
31. Ibid., p. 300.
32. Ibid., pp. 177-79, *passim*.
33. Interestingly, this kind of vocabulary reappeared in the 1980s, whenever Margaret Thatcher was filmed watching President Reagan giving a speech.

not afford not to revere, love and cherish the president of the United States, the living embodiment of American might.[34]

Possibly the culminating point in his wartime seduction number towards the American public was his address to Congress on 26 December 1941, when he once more[35] alluded to his Anglo-American parentage: "I shall always remember how each Fourth of July my mother would wave an American flag before my eyes."[36]

Churchill went back home with the prize for which he had made the trip in the first place: the American assurance that it would be "Europe first / Germany first" for the United States, in men and equipment – a bitter defeat for the U.S. Navy, which pressed for a "Pacific first / Japan first" policy. Even Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, who could have rejoiced that the priority given to the European theater meant that his land and air forces[37] would be the main beneficiaries, was immediately wary of Churchill's undue influence on the President as he saw it.

Hastings naturally draws on the best American sources[38] – memoirs and reminiscences – to explain how minor suspicions were gradually built into open resentment (except in the presence of British delegations) at Churchill's perceived manipulative tactics among the President's diplomatic aides and military advisors – the only exception being perhaps Harry Hopkins, who remained a firm Churchill supporter all through the war. But by mid-1944, Hopkins had become a spent force as far as the representation of British interests at the White House was concerned:

> The British had been dismayed to note the absence of Harry Hopkins from Quebec.[39] Even when their favourite American sage appeared at Hyde park, it was plain that Hopkins no longer enjoyed his old intimacy with Roosevelt. Especially in a US election year, he represented baggage which the president did not wish to be seen on board, not

34. Hastings, *Finest Years*, p. 231.

35. Hastings also quotes his much earlier allusion to it, in a speech given in Boston in December 1900: "I am proud that I am the natural product of an Anglo-American alliance; not political, but stronger and more sacred, an alliance of heart to heart." (*Finest Years*, p. 177).

36. Ibid., p. 223. This appears to be a confusion. Churchill did allude to his American ancestry, but not with these words. The speech contained the famous joke which set the assembly bursting with laughter: "By the way, I cannot help reflecting that if my father had been American and my mother British, instead of the other way round, I might have got here on my own." The full speech is reproduced on: <http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/Congress.html>, last accessed December 2010.

37. The United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) remained a part of the United States Army until the creation of the United States Air Force (USAF) in 1947. Technically, Major General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of Army Air Forces from 1941, was General George C. Marshall's subordinate.

38. Another strong point of the book is that Hastings received the help of a Russian research assistant, giving him access to recently-released Soviet sources as well.

39. The second Quebec Conference, September 1944.

least because Hopkins was perceived by his countrymen as too susceptible to British special pleading.[40]

Thus Hastings suggests that Churchill gradually lost any friends and supporters he might initially have had in Washington – including probably, in the end, the President himself. One reason was that the "Europe first / Germany first" decision only solved half the problem, since it left pending when and where re-entry into Europe (Hastings reminds us that Churchill always refused the word "invasion," used by the Germans for obvious reasons of propaganda) would take place. Many publications have already appeared about the "soft underbelly approach" advocated by Churchill, leading in fact to a concentration of forces in the Mediterranean in the wide sense, including all the coast from the Straits (Churchill's wild plans to enlist Turkey never came to anything) to the French Riviera. An equally large number of pages have also been written on the controversy with the Americans which it entailed, and Hastings clearly sides with Churchill's most severe critics, castigating him in one of his chapters (whose title it is) as "Sunk in the Aegean."

Here one must be careful not to confuse short-term and long-term war aims. The suspicion in the United States was – and no doubt still is, in some quarters – that the two were indissociable in Churchill's mind: that by re-establishing and re-inforcing the British presence in all these countries which lined the hallowed road to India (via Suez) the military operations would safeguard Britain's continued Imperial ambitions after the war. Now Hastings unmistakably belongs with the school of those who see the "soft underbelly approach" as almost an unmitigated disaster. Not that it did not make sense initially: he most helpfully reminds us that there was no real battlefield which could usefully employ the meagre American expeditionary force in Europe in 1942. And the President wanted the U.S. Army to be seen in action in Europe in 1942, when millions of Germans and Russians were daily confronting each other in fierce combat on Soviet soil. Hence Churchill's easy victory in persuading him to mount a joint[41] operation in North Africa. The chain of logic from there to Sicily and Italy is obvious to anybody who looks at a map of the Mediterranean, and therefore incontrovertible. Hastings also opportunely reminds us of the significant (if British-dominated) Allied forces in presence after the succesful North African operations:

> In January 1943, the Americans had 150,000 troops in the Mediterranean theatre. The British in the region fielded three times as many soldiers, four times as many warships and almost as many aircraft as the US. Once the North African campaign was wound up, the forces immediately available for follow-up operations would comprise four

40. Hastings, *Finest Years*, p. 513.

41. As made clear in the useful map provided showing the various American and British forces engaged. Altogether, the book has ten of these maps, not counting the maps of Europe, in 1938 and in 1941, which form the end papers.

> French divisions, nine American – and twenty-seven British. Churchill's own soldiers, sailors and airmen continued to predominate in the conflict with Germany, albeit employing an increasing proportion of US tanks and equipment. Until this balance of forces shifted dramatically in 1944, British wishes were almost bound to prevail.[42]

But this is where the controversy begins, with Churchill entirely engrossed in the Mediterranean theatre and the rich pickings which he saw in it in the short term by mopping up the German presence in Southern Europe, thereby obviating the need for the inevitable bloodbath which he foresaw if the Allies were forced to land in heavily-defended territory, stuck against the Atlantic Wall. Hastings' narrative is full of letters and pronouncements from Churchill which show his fascination with this easy way out as he saw it. That Churchill was prepared to stake all on a major Anglo-American offensive on the north coasts of the Mediterranean Basin is now beyond doubt – but this does not mean that his intentions were dishonest: this does not mean that he only advocated that with an eye on the future of the Empire, counting his colonial chickens before they were hatched. Thus his clash (and defeat) with the American war leaders, including the President, was not necessarily dictated by unavowable ulterior motives – nobody will ever know what went on in his mind, and like all humans, he perhaps even hid his bad thoughts from himself. So the verdict on his advocacy of a continued Mediterranean strategy because of his subliminal Imperial plans, however seductive when one knows his attachment to the Empire, must be one of *not proven*.

Now, Hastings also dwells at length – for our greatest enjoyment – on the other hypothesis (some American critics conjoined the two): that he clung to his Mediterranean chimeras because he was apprehensive of the result of a head-on confrontation between the Anglo-American Allies and the German Army in North-West Europe. In other words, he was afraid of attack because he feared defeat. His personal courage was never in doubt, of course – he had sufficiently proved his bravery before the enemy in his youth, at "Plugstreet"[43] during the First World War and again when watching the bombs fall on London from the rooftops of Whitehall. Nor was his anti-Nazi zeal in doubt, which probably few of his countrymen remotely matched. Once more the Gallipoli fiasco resurfaced against him. Psychologists have it both ways: they can either claim that an early traumatic experience of failure leaves the victim a listless wimp for the remainder of his life or that it makes him into an unthinking firebrand prepared to do anything rash to overcome it. In Churchill's case, judgements of the effects of his Gallipoli trauma have oscillated between the two, depending on the judge. Hastings undoubtedly ranges himself among those who opt for the first interpretation: Churchill was

42. Hastings, *Finest Years*, p. 358.
43. See, Antoine Capet, "Winston Churchill 'poilu': mythe et réalité," in Henry Daniels and Nathalie Collé-Bak, eds., *1916: La Grande-Bretagne en guerre* (Nancy: Presses universitaires de Nancy, 2007), pp. 83-94.

rendered over-cautious by his memories of that botched and bloody amphibious operation. All through 1943, we are told, "he vacillated repeatedly."[44] The Casablanca Conference in January 1943 had seen a polite confrontation between the Americans and British over the date of ROUNDUP, the initial codename for the North-West Europe landings:

> Marshall asserted repeatedly that if the British were as serious as they professed about helping the Russians, they could only do this by executing *Roundup*, a landing in [North-West] Europe in 1943. The British emphasised their support in principle for *Roundup*, but insisted that resources were lacking to undertake such a commitment.[45]

This is an interesting comment, since it suggests that it was not only Churchill who was frightened of failure, but in fact the whole British High Command, a view already put forward a few pages earlier: "if Allied operations had advanced at a pace dictated by the War Office, or indeed by Brooke [the Chief of the Imperial General Staff] himself, the conflict's ending would have come much later than it did."[46] One answer of course is that the Prime Minister had absolute right of hire and fire over his military chiefs, as was repeatedly shown, for instance with the summary dismissal of Auchinlek in 1942. He could have removed Alan Brooke, who pleaded on the side of caution. He could have replaced Admiral Cunningham, who said "I have already evacuated three British armies in the face of the enemy and I don't propose to evacuate a fourth."[47]

But it seems that all the military chiefs were agreed on that policy – in other words there seems to be a *prima facie* case for saying that Churchill was only after all reflecting the best advice of the professionals. But as always when discussing Churchill's complex *persona*, there is in fact a strong case for the contrary view: he did not seem overly eager to contradict, less alone dismiss, the military experts who told him that ROUNDUP was a risky operation, to be undertaken only when the Allies had overwhelming superiority over the potential reinforcements sent by the Germans after a successful beachhead was secured. As at Gallipoli, the real problem was not the landings *per se* – it was how to break out as fast as possible from the coastline.

The opinion which we form from the book is that the guarantee of that overwhelming superiority constituted in fact the main bone of contention between the optimistic Generals Marshall and Eisenhower and the pessimistic Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Prime Minister. The latter two refused to budge (naturally using all sorts of diplomatic and linguistic precautions) until that guarantee was there – in men, in armor, in ships, in aircraft, in general equipment and logistics. Hastings believes that it is "from the late

44. Hastings, *Finest Years*, p. 350.
45. Ibid., p. 355.
46. Ibid., p. 345.
47. Ibid., p. 386.

summer of 1943 onwards" that the American chiefs "perceived continuing British wavering about D-Day which they were now implacably – and rightly – committed to override."[48] The result was disastrous for Churchill's influence on future events:

> Churchill's standing in American eyes would decline steadily between the summer of 1943 and the end of the war, and he himself bore a substantial share of responsibility for this. It is true that his wise warnings about the future threat posed by the Soviet Union were insufficiently heeded. But this was in significant part because the Americans lost faith in his strategic judgement.[49]

The discussion is careful to distinguish between the commitment to a North-West Europe operation, which Churchill somehow always sustained (however reluctantly initially and with a constant regret about the secondary status thereby given to the Mediterranean operations[50]), and his delaying tactics in the literal sense: from 1943, when the principle was no longer negotiable, he constantly tried to put off the date, now fixed at 1 May 1944. He remained fixated on the possible encounter with massive German defending forces. As late as 25 March 1944, when D-Day had been postponed to June by common agreement, he drafted an anguished cable to Roosevelt which was never sent: "What is the latest date on which a decision can be taken as to whether 'Overlord' [the final codename] is or is not to be launched on the prescribed date? …If…20 or 25 mobile German divisions are already in France on the date in question, what are we going to do?"[51] This nagging fear of a bloody disaster was to pursue him until the eve of the landings: "Do you realise that by the time you wake up in the morning, twenty thousand young men may have been killed?," he wrote to Clementine on 5 June. In the event, Hastings tells us, "Instead of the carnage which Churchill feared, just 3,000 American, British and Canadian troops died on D-Day, together with about the same number of French civilians."[52] The adjective "just," minimizing the actual losses as it does, indirectly and retrospectively vindicates Churchill's pleas for caution and delays:

> Most Anglo-American historians agree that a D-Day in France in 1943 would have been a disaster. It is only necessary to consider the ferocity of the resistance the Germans mounted in Normandy between June

48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. As late as October 1943, Hugh Dalton, who sat in the Cabinet, noted in his diary: "In an expansive moment Winston told us his apprehensions about the 'Over-lord' policy which the Americans have forced upon us, involving a dangerous and time-wasting straddle of our transport and landing craft between two objectives when we might have gone on more effectively in Italy and the Balkans." Hastings, *Finest Years*, p. 426.
51. Hastings, *Finest Years*, pp. 447-48. Unfortunately, Hastings does not give his source. The very clumsy system adopted for the notes makes it all too easy to omit references inadvertently.
52. Ibid., pp. 487-88.

> and August 1944 to imagine how much more formidable could have been their response to an invasion a year earlier, when Hitler's power was much greater, that of the Allies much less.[53]

But when Churchill and the British High Command procrastinated on the North-West Europe offensive, it was not only a question of firepower and munitions. There was also what Hastings calls the "great unmentionable": "the notion that, man for man, the British soldier might be a less determined fighter than his German adversary"[54] – a notion that Hastings rightly discusses at some length on various occasions in his narrative, somehow acquiescing with it because the average man rightly worried about his life in the post-war period – his home, his family, his job – and blaming Churchill for not paying enough attention (hardly any, in fact) to these important motivating factors. In this respect, mocking Beveridge and dismissing his 1942 plan for Social Reconstruction was a grave mistake in Hastings' eyes.[55]

Curiously, Hastings does not mention the phrase which must have been in all minds – first and foremost that of Churchill – after the continued accusation that in the Great War the "Tommies" had been "lions led by donkeys," but he has very thorough passages examining the British soldier's will to fight and the competence or otherwise of the officers and generals. Few of the latter find favor with him: Hastings clearly has little positive to say of the British Army officer corps, its recruitment, its training, and its consequent dislike of combat – and he dismisses it with a damning comment: "It was not that Britain's top soldiers were unwilling to fight – lack of courage was never the issue. It was that they deemed it prudent to fight slowly."[56] Hence Churchill's anger at being unable to mount bold operations to impress his American and Russian allies:

> During the war years, his commanders far more often disappointed his hopes than fulfilled them. He was forever searching for great captains, Marlborough and Wellington, yet towards the end he grew impatient even with Alexander, his unworthy favourite. He valued both Brooke and Montgomery, but never warmed to them, save as instruments of his will. Neither the British Army nor its chieftains fulfilled his soaring warrior ideal, and it was never plausible that they should. Much of the story of Churchill and the Second World War is of Britain's leader

53. Ibid., p. 369.
54. Ibid., p. 270.
55. This most emphatically sets him off from "Thatcherite" historians like Correlli Barnett, whose tetralogy constantly denounces Beveridge and the wartime "New Jerusalemers," blaming them for Britain's diminished position in the post-war decades. The tetralogy comprises *The Collapse of British Power* (London: Methuen, 1972); *The Audit of War: The Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great Nation* (London: Macmillan, 1986); *The Lost Victory: British Dreams, British Realities, 1945-1950* (London: Macmillan, 1995); and *The Verdict of Peace: Britain Between her Yesterday and the Future* (London: Macmillan, 2001).
56. Hastings, *Finest Years*, p. 346.

seeking from his nation's torpid military culture greater things than it was capable of achieving.[57]

Hastings does not of course fail to cite the famous phrase, "a giant among pygmies," in its Parliamentary context,[58] but the whole book suggests that he also was a giant (a giant with feet of clay compared with Roosevelt and Stalin?) in the military field, whatever his infuriating fads and foibles. It somehow seems appropriate to end the review of this highly stimulating book with another aphorism, this time from Hastings himself: "His achievement was to exercise the privileges of a dictator without casting off the mantle of a democrat"[59] – and here perhaps we have the ultimate "Thatcherite" *cri de coeur*, a cry of envy, no doubt.

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57. Ibid., p. 596.
58. Ibid., p. 310. Hastings quotes from Conservative MP Sir Cuthbert Headlam's diary entry after Churchill's magisterial handling of the House during the debate (1-2 July 1942) on the motion of censure imprudently tabled against him by malcontents, which was defeated by 475 votes to twenty-five: "He is a giant among pygmies when it comes to a debate of this kind, and I think that everybody realizes it." Stuart Ball, ed., *Parliament and Politics in the Age of Churchill and Attlee: The Headlam Diaries 1934-1951* (London: Royal Historical Society, 1999), p. 322.
59. Hastings, *Finest Years*, p. 592.

McNaughton, Crerar, and Hoffmeister: Recent Canadian Military Biography

RANDALL WAKELAM

The Politics of Command: Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton and the Canadian Army, 1939-1943. By John Nelson Rickard. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010. Illustrations. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. xxviii, 366.

A Thoroughly Canadian General: A Biography of H.D.G. Crerar. By Paul Dickson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. Illustrations. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. xxiii, 571.

The Soldiers' General: Bert Hoffmeister at War. By Douglas E. Delaney. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005. Illustrations. Maps Notes. Index. Paper. Pp. xvi, 299.

Shelves in Canada groan with biographies of Second World War leaders, but not, as you might expect, Canadian leaders. Indeed Canadian veterans, members of the general public, and even the majority of military historians are more inclined to talk about Monty, Bomber Harris, or Ike. For the vets, these were the larger than life figures whom they saw, who commanded them either directly or indirectly, and who became associated with the progress and outcomes of the war. Who then were the Canadian senior commanders, and where are their biographies?

Canadian army formations serving overseas in the Second World War were all part of First Canadian Army, a smallish army of five Canadian divisions and two tank brigades grouped into two corps. After D-Day the Army served as a formation with 21 Army Group, although 1 Canadian Corps had been previously detached to serve in Sicily and Italy from 1943 until the end of 1944 under the British 8th Army. In the Royal Canadian Air Force, personnel were, with the exception of No. 6 Bomber Group and No. 84 Group, 2 TAF, integrated either as individuals or formed squadrons into the RAF. The Royal Canadian Navy's ships and formations were part of the larger Royal Navy effort to convoy throughout the war; however, Rear Admiral L.W. Murray served as C-in-C Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command thus becoming the only Canadian operational level commander during the war.

There have been no extended scholarly biographies written about naval or air force senior leaders, but there have been a fair number of works published which cover most of the army commanders from divisional command-

er up. Many of these are autobiographies or memoirs and one of the more important of the biographies was commissioned by the subject's corps association. One statistic is worth noting: of the five men who rose to corps command, only four have been the subject of some authorship. Concerning the fifth, who became the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff during the early Cold War, there is nothing. Of the three men who had command of the army, General Harry Crerar, who was to command it during its operational employment in France, Germany and the Netherlands, has been without a biography until very recently. Similarly, there had been no monograph about the most successful of Canada's division commanders, Major General Bert Hoffmeister, until 2005. This essay-review discusses these two works as well as one other. Taken together, the three signal a welcome and critical scholarship as they not only chronicle these commanders and their accomplishments, but also provide some valuable analysis about those traits which made them effective, or otherwise.

First, however, it is appropriate to christen the ground, or rather to get a sense of what works have been available until recently. In the 1960s, 70s, 80s, and even 90s a number of seniors penned their autobiographies or memoirs to get their recollections of events and peers into print for posterity.[1] To these can be added a pair of biographies.[2] The only comparative work, in the sense that the author had briefly analyzed the performance of all officers who had held army, corps, and division command, was Jack Granatstein in *The Generals*.[3] At about the same time, Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Dr. Jack English, who had long since established his *bona fides* with *On Infantry*,[4] conducted a critical review of the performance of the Canadian Army and its leadership in North-West Europe. In a bluntly entitled analysis, *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command*, he found that leadership, both in 1944-45 and the years of preparation in Britain, wanting.[5] In his criticisms, English was to some extent repeating

1. Jean V. Allard, *The Memoirs of General Jean V. Allard* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988); Howard Graham, *Citizen and Soldier: The Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Howard Graham* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987); George Kitching, *Mud and Green Fields: The Memoirs of Major General George Kitching* (Langley, BC: Battleline Books, 1986); E.L.M. Burns, *General Mud: Memoirs of Two World Wars* (Toronto: Clarke Irwin, 1970); Maurice A. Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians: Memoirs* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962); Tony Foster, *Meeting of Generals* (Toronto: Methuen, 1986) (by exception a biography); Chris Vokes, *Vokes: My Story* (Ottawa: Gallery Books, 1985).

2. John Swettenham, *McNaughton*, 3 volumes, (1) *1887-1939*, (2) *1939-1943*, (3) *1944-1966* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1968-69); Dominick Graham, *The Price of Command: A Biography of General Guy Simonds* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993).

3. J.L. Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993).

4. John A. English, *A Perspective on Infantry* (New York: Praeger, 1981). A revised edition of this work, with Bruce I. Gudmundsson, was published as *On Infantry* by Praeger in 1994.

5. John A. English, *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Fail-*

the implied criticisms of the official histories of the army which had originally come out in the 1960s. Both volumes dealing with Canadians in combat had been authored by historians who had served as historical officers during the war and, in the case of Charles Stacey, had been a staff officer in the headquarters of the commanders about whom he now wrote.[6] One Canadian historian, Terry Copp, has written that the Canadian army, at both the command and soldier levels, was fully adequate whether compared to the *Wehrmacht* or Allied performance. Copp has written many volumes, but recently two in particular, *Fields of Fire* and *Cinderella Army*, about the Canadian experience in North-West Europe.[7]

To these are now added three works dealing with Crerar, Hoffmeister, and General A.G.L. "Andy" McNaughton who had commanded the Army before Crerar, having "grown" it from a single Canadian division in 1939. McNaughton, an impressive man in any sense, had been Chief of the General Staff and President of the National Research Council (Canada's federal scientific research body before the war), and after leaving uniform in 1944 went on to become Minister of National Defence and later Chair of the Canadian Section of the Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board Defence in the 1950s. But he had been fired as Army commander and the general impression up to now was that he was not up to that job. But from here forward that perspective is in some considerable doubt thanks to the impressive research and hard and compelling analysis of John Rickard. In *The Politics of Command* Rickard sets out to confirm or refute the three reasons which have been commonly accepted as the causes of McNaughton's failure as a commander, which contributed to the decision by the Canadian Government to remove him as head of the field army. To cite Rickard, these reasons were:

> (1) that he refused to sanction the subdivision of the Canadian Army for use in operations; (2) that he was a poor military trainer and a poor operational commander; and (3) that he possessed an abrasive personality that undermined effective cooperation not only with senior British commanders, but also with senior Canadian commanders and government officials.[8]

The author takes a very evidence-based approach to explore each reason in depth. In doing so he is, admittedly, offering readers with more of a case study than a biography, but there is certainly sufficient "story" around the analysis that a reader familiar with the British (and Canadian) circumstances in England from 1939 to 1943 will have no difficulty following the analysis

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ure in High Command (New York: Praeger, 1991).

6. G.W.L. Nicholson, *The Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960); C.P. Stacey, *The Victory Campaign: Operations in North-West Europe, 1944-1945* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966).

7. Terry Copp, *Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004); *Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe, 1944-1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006).

8. Rickard, *Politics of Command*, p. 4.

and conclusions. Rickard has been exhaustive in his research and use of primary sources. Endnotes constitute fully eighty pages of the volume and these reflect some impressive detective work. This evidence is put through a rigorous analysis allowing Rickard to present meaningful and convincing conclusions.

On the matter of splitting the Army to serve on detached missions the author provides several examples where McNaughton fully supported a plan calling for the detachment of formations or units only to see the British cancel it. But he further notes that it was not up to McNaughton to independently send Canadian troops off hither or thither. Until Operation HUSKY, where McNaughton once more endorsed Canadian participation and where 1 Canadian Division did serve, there was no opportunity to put any part of the Canadian Army into action on an extended basis.[9] On the matter of McNaughton's fitness to command Rickard offers explanation rather than disagreement. Pointing to the breadth and complexity of the general's responsibilities the author argues that it would have been all but impossible for anyone to deal with the range of issues confronting McNaughton: a rapidly expanding army, a lack of equipment, and a shortage of trained and competent staff officers and trainers. Rickard, who was a McNaughton critic some years ago, shows that the general's performance, when actually commanding, was on a par with other first time commanders of armies in the field. He also notes that Brooke and Monty would have been only too pleased to replace the Canadian with one of their own.[10] Moreover, observes Rickard, Crerar, who replaced McNaughton, and even Lieutenant General Guy Simonds (Monty's favorite Canadian) were not demonstrably better or more imaginative. Rickard's very plausible conclusion is that McNaughton, given more practice both in training and ops, might have proved to be a "diamond in the rough." Turning to the third issue, Rickard lays McNaughton's troubles with Brooke and other British and Canadian leaders squarely on their questionable professional ethics in not going to McNaughton with their concerns as soon as these became apparent. He further notes that if there were sparks between Montgomery and McNaughton there were equally bolts of lightening in the confrontations with Crerar. That said, Rickard does conclude that it was this third issue that was McNaughton's undoing: the general did have a "definite edge" to his personality which caused him and others to "talk past one another."[11] Having read and considered Rickard's evidence and assessment, a reader will get a much more nuanced view of Andy than has previously been available, and perhaps see a much more plausible figure than has been presumed in the past.

Like McNaughton, Harry Crerar had grown up in Canada and was a man of twenty-six when the Great War erupted. A graduate of the Royal Military College, he was immediately ready for duty and began what was to be more

9. Ibid., pp. 219-21.
10. Ibid., p. 221.
11. Ibid., pp. 221-28.

than three decades of active service, ultimately taking the field army into action in 1944. Paul Dickon's biography chronicles Crerar's complete life, and the times through which he lived, so that the reader gets a full sense of the man, his thinking, his ambitions, and his achievements. Prior to this, Crerar had been more enigma than not. He was known as an ambitious climber who was ready to push any competitor aside in striving for the top, and when he got there, he proved to be a bit of a bust.

Now we are able to see, thanks to an impressive range of primary documents, just what made Crerar tick, what issues were important to him, what things frustrated him, and yes, what his ambitions were. We learn, for example, that Crerar was not at all happy to be recalled from England in 1940 to take the appointment of CGS. He would have preferred, Dickson demonstrates, to stay with the field army, though self-admittedly desirous of divisional command.[12] We also gain a unique perspective of Canadian defense policy and the workings of the defense bureaucracy in the interwar years as Dickson traces Crerar's employment and professional growth in Ottawa. Significantly, Crerar had been head-hunted by McNaughton when the latter became CGS in 1929: Crerar had the intellect McNaughton needed if defense policy was to be properly developed and adopted.[13] At the other end of defense matters, we learn of Crerar's service as Army commander. Dickson recounts Operation VERITABLE, the break-in battle into the Rhineland entrusted to Crerar and a vastly reinforced army (with nine British divisions under command) in the early weeks of 1945. The author notes Eisenhower's appreciation:

> Probably no assault of the war has been conducted under more appalling conditions of terrain than that one…. It speaks volumes for your skill and determination and the valor of your soldiers, that you carried it through to a successful completion.[14]

Not bad for a commander whom Monty had earlier felt was not up to commanding and who was distained by at least one of his corps commanders, Guy Simonds. Not bad, too, as a curative for those who have accepted the veracity of such criticisms in the past.

Dickson spends considerable time recounting Crerar's life after 1945. It is not the happy period that one might anticipate, certainly not one of continued public service at the highest levels that McNaughton experienced. We see instead a man still deeply interested in defense and security matters, but one who is weak and ill after the stress of the war and who at just fifty-seven is frequently described by peers as having aged considerably. We see, too, his commitment to an unexpected ambition – to spend what we would now call "quality time" with his wife who had made do without him for, by Crerar's own reckoning, about ten of their thirty years of marriage. Dickson

12. Dickson, Canadian General, p. 140.
13. Ibid., pp. 88-92.
14. Ibid., p. 381.

captures the various facets of Crerar's professional life and personal qualities through, once again, the words of Eisenhower who wrote to Crerar's wife soon after his death. Ike felt

> respect, admiration and affection: General Crerar was notable not only because of his professional skill and qualities of leadership but because of his personal character, including his selflessness. He was not one to seek the limelight or command headlines; he was one of those great souls whose only ambition was to do his duty to his troops and to his country.[15]

Dickson may not have set out to write revisionist history, but his study of Harry Crerar seems well within the notion of a corrective.

Like the study of Crerar, Douglas Delaney's biography of Major General Bert Hoffmeister follows a soldier through his formative years and war experience, but the author's purpose is not so much to offer a "life and times" work as an investigation of what were the reasons behind Hoffmeister's success. Delaney points this out clearly in his introductory remarks, but the story takes an interesting twist even before it gets started, for the author reminds readers that Hoffmeister was not an experienced professional soldier, but very much a part-time reserve officer, a "militia" soldier in Canadian parlance, whose military experience and expertise in 1939 were for all intents illusory. How then did the general gain the reputation as Canada's most experienced and successful combat leader, in action more or less constantly from July 1943 until May 1945 – and then selected to lead the Canadian division earmarked for the Pacific?[16] With this question laid before the reader, Delaney sets out to see "how Hoffmeister did his business as a military commander. It is not to judge him, merely to look at what he did, how he did it, and how he learned to do it."[17]

Using a range of primary sources, but also conducting extensive interviews of Hoffmeister's soldiers, Delaney reveals a remarkable professional development. Hoffmeister learned much about man and general management in the lumber business in pre-war British Columbia. Working in a range of progressively more responsible positions, he developed an ability to judge men, and gained a self-confidence which allowed him to give out tasks, arrange resources, and then let his subordinates get on with the work. Micro-management was not Hoffmeister's way and when he had to work under the scrutiny of the cold and exacting Guy Simonds, there was no love between the two.[18] But for all he had learned about leadership, the general knew little about the business of soldering and this led him to a mental breakdown in England in early 1941 when he could not carry on pretending

15. Ibid., p. 465.
16. Delaney, *Soldiers' General*, p. 3.
17. Ibid., p. 8.
18. Ibid., p. 225.

that he knew how to conduct combat operations.[19] Delaney not only explains how Hoffmeister came back, but how his leadership earned him three DSOs in combat as well as other decorations and the full confidence of his troops.

One of the greatest values of Delaney's analysis is that he comes at it as a well practiced infantry officer. He is therefore able to expertly read the sources and the views of interview subjects and to translate that evidence into important conclusions. When there are no other works of this nature in the Canadian historiography and when the Canadian Army is currently engaged in combat and peace-making operations, a study that looks at a reserve officer's successes in circumstances not unlike those seen today offers leaders and trainers an important tool for professional development. Delaney concludes that Hoffmeister's success was attributable to a short list of factors. He believes that while Hoffmeister was a natural leader, he willingly learned how to be a military officer and commander – a battle manager. Delaney concludes that once Hoffmeister became confident with the doctrine as it was written, he then had the confidence to innovate. The general believed in flexibility, in stacking units and massing all possible support, not just to win the fight, but also to save lives. And these were things which the troops did not miss.

Taken together, these three studies provide a different, revealing, and altogether engaging lens on Canadian Army leadership than has been the case in the past half century. We see men who are nationalists, who have self doubt, are not perfect, and yet who are ready to serve often without recognition or honors, even after they have failed or been fired. These are professional soldiers, though in one case a part-time volunteer, who are or become very good at what they do, but who are also able to contribute to the national good in other ways. These are not, to be sure, qualities unique to Canadians, but they are embodied in personalities which until now have been largely unknown in the scholarship of Canadian Army senior leaders. And as only a Canadian might say, "Sorry 'bout that."

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19. Ibid., p. 30.

The Art of Amphibious Warfare

DONALD W. BOOSE, JR.

Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare, 1898-1945: Profiles of Fourteen American Military Strategists. By Leo J. Daugherty III. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2009. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. Paper. Pp. ix, 446.

The art of amphibious warfare reached its perfection during the Second World War and no nation carried out more amphibious operations more skillfully and effectively than the United States. In *Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare* Leo J. Daugherty III tells the story of the development of U.S. World War II amphibious doctrine and methods through the lives of fourteen Marine, Army, and Navy officers whom he sees as having been instrumental to that process. It is a subject on which Daugherty, the Command Historian of the U.S. Army Accessions Command and author of several works on military history, is knowledgeable. This book, which he calls a "biographical chronology," was inspired by the research for his doctoral dissertation on the interwar Marine Corps. Since Daugherty's focus is on intellectual development, he has chosen those who "labored tirelessly to forge the Corps' (and the Army's) amphibious warfare doctrine during the first forty-five years of the 20th century."[1] The emphasis is on contributions to theory, rather than on practice, although many of his subjects were also practitioners of amphibious warfare, and Daugherty includes illustrative descriptions of amphibious operations throughout his narrative.

The first section of the book, "The Era of the Advanced Base Force, 1880-1918," deals with the period of the transition from wooden sailing vessels to steam-powered steel ships and from ad hoc Navy-Marine landing parties to trained and dedicated Marine landing forces. It was also a period in which there was serious debate over the appropriate primary role of the Marine Corps: to fight small expeditionary wars as colonial infantry or to be an amphibious force tasked with seizing advance bases for the Navy. Daugherty begins with Colonel Robert W. Huntington, an advocate of reform within the Marine Corps, who commanded the landing force that seized Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 1898 at the start of the Spanish-American War, a key event toward focusing the Marine Corps on amphibious warfare. Daugherty uses the life of each individual to illuminate amphibious and military developments that occurred during that person's career and to identify other relevant personalities. Thus, Huntington provides Daugherty the opportunity

1. Both quotations are from Daugherty, *Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare*, p. vii.

to trace the history of the Marine Corps from the pre-Civil War period through the Spanish-American War. This was an era during which many small Navy/Marine Corps landing operations provided a store of amphibious experience; the Navy and Marine Corps began substantial personnel and educational reforms; and the services underwent a technological, organizational, and intellectual transition.

This transition is a major theme in Daugherty's portrayal of the life of Navy Admiral William S. Sims, a naval gunnery specialist and a participant in exercises at Culebra, Puerto Rico, testing landing force and advance base seizure and defense techniques. The Sims chapter carries the reader through the First World War, during which the admiral commanded U.S. Naval Forces in European Waters and proposed a large-scale amphibious landing in the Adriatic that, had it taken place, would have involved some 20,000 U.S. Marines. Instead, the Marines served primarily with the Army, conducting sustained operations deep inland on the Western Front. The other two subjects of this section of the book were both Marines. Major General George Barnett served as Commandant from 1914 to 1920, the period during which the Marine Corps underwent major reorganization. Major General Eli K. Cole was both a prolific and persuasive writer and an effective field commander, most notably as a regimental commander during the 1915 U.S. intervention in Haiti and as commander of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, U.S. Fleet, during major maneuvers at Culebra in 1924. Daugherty sees Cole as "one of the strongest and most strident advocates of the advance base mission."[2]

The central section of the book, "The Interwar Years, 1919-1940," covers a period in which Japan acquired a broad swath of Micronesian islands, the United States began to see Japan as a future enemy, and war planning focused on the defense or recapture of the Philippines, which would require a seaborne thrust across the Pacific Ocean. During these years, the Marines adopted the seizure of advance bases in the Pacific as their primary focus and began to develop the doctrine, techniques, and equipment to carry out such a mission. In 1933, the advance base force concept was institutionalized with the formation of a permanent Fleet Marine Force. In 1934, the Marine Corps Schools drafted a *Tentative Landing Operations Manual* that would serve as the basis for future Army and Navy amphibious doctrine. And for the rest of the decade, annual fleet landing exercises provided the opportunity to test and develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures to implement that doctrine, while the Navy developed the naval gunfire, aircraft-carrier-based air operations, and sustainment at sea concepts and methods that would make the wartime American amphibious operations in the Pacific possible.

All of Daugherty's exemplars of this period are Marine officers. Brigadier General Dion Williams was a proponent of amphibious reconnaissance, an

2. Ibid., p. 118.

advocate of professional military education, and, as commander of the 4th Marine Brigade, participated in landing exercises in 1924 and 1925 in which Army forces also took part. These years and those exercises were a pre-war high point in inter-service cooperation, which languished during the Depression era of tight budgets, battles over the allocation of resources, and disagreements over command relationships and roles and missions as aviation brought a new dimension to joint warfare. Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Austell Cunningham was a Marine aviator whom Daugherty sees as a visionary of concepts that would later come to fruition as the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and the conduct of air-supported, sea-launched operations deep inland now known as Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS).

Lieutenant General John A. Lejeune, the first Marine to attend the Army War College, commanded the composite Army-Marine 2nd Infantry Division in World War I and was Commandant of the Marine Corps throughout the 1920s. He was instrumental in the reorganization of the Marine Corps Headquarters, instituted the changes in the Advance Base Force that would culminate with the establishment of the Fleet Marine Force in the next decade, established the Marine Corps Reserve on a firm basis, and through his public relations efforts established in the minds of the American public an image of the Marines as the nation's elite fighting force. Lejeune also assigned Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. (Pete) Ellis to the Marine Corps Headquarters Operations and Training Division war planning section. Ellis, a legendary figure in Marine Corps history, played an instrumental role in the writing of a plan for advance base force operations in Micronesia that became the foundation for future Pacific war planning.[3]

Colonel Ellis B. Miller was another eccentric "lone wolf" whose contribution to amphibious doctrine came through his writing and lectures at the Army and Navy War Colleges and at the Marine Corps Schools in the 1930s. Daugherty credits him with considerable influence on the curriculum of the Marine Corps Schools and on the organization of the Advance Base Force that would soon be institutionalized as the Fleet Marine Force. Miller's irascible behavior, however, prevented him from achieving the rank that would have allowed him to exert greater influence within the Corps. The influence of Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlap, who served on Admiral Sims's staff and helped plan the Adriatic amphibious operation during World War I, was also curtailed, in his case because of his premature death in 1931. Nevertheless, Daugherty sees Dunlap as one of the most important theorists of amphibious warfare between the wars, primarily through his lectures and

3. Ellis was a mythic and controversial figure. Troubled by personal issues and alcoholism, he died under mysterious circumstances on the Japanese-occupied Micronesian island of Palau in 1923. Although he most probably died of the effects of alcohol, many believed that he had been killed by the Japanese because of his espionage activities. The most detailed and authoritative account of his life is Dirk A. Ballendorf and Merrill L. Bartlett, *Pete Ellis: An Amphibious Warfare Prophet, 1880-1923* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997).

writings at the Marine Corps Schools, and suggests that he would have likely played a key role in the writing of the *Tentative Manual* and later development of amphibious doctrine. Major General John H. Russell, Jr., a strong advocate of the advance base force mission, served as Assistant to the Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1933 to 1934 and as Commandant from 1934 to 1936. He was thus in a position to encourage the adoption and ensure the continuity of the Marine Corps' amphibious innovations during that time. Daugherty sees Russell as primarily responsible for the "adoption of the amphibious warfare mission as its *raison d'être*."[4]

The last section of the book is entitled "The War Years, 1941-1945." First on stage is Major General Pedro del Valle, another prolific writer and one of the few of Daugherty's amphibious pioneers to command a Marine division during a major campaign in World War II. Del Valle's early theoretical contribution at the Marine Corps Schools and on the Landing Operations Text Board (the organization charged with writing the *Tentative Manual*) was to refine landing force artillery doctrine. He also helped focus the Marine Corps' efforts on base seizure rather than defense: the amphibious assaults across defended beaches that would epitomize Marine Corps operations, especially at Tarawa, Saipan, Pelelieu, and Iwo Jima. During World War II, del Valle commanded the Eleventh Marines (the First Marine divisional artillery) on Guadalcanal, III Amphibious Corps Artillery on Guam, and the First Marine Division on Okinawa.

Navy Rear Admiral Walter C. Ansel was one of the prominent amphibious admirals of World War II. He is included here because of his contribution to the writing of the *Tentative Manual*. Ansel was responsible for the section of the manual on naval gunfire support and this provides Daugherty the opportunity to inform the reader about naval artillery developments between the wars, the important role of naval gunfire support in amphibious operations, and some of the successes and problems with naval gunfire during World War II.

Army Lieutenant General Arthur G. Trudeau truly deserves inclusion among the ranks of the amphibious pioneers. As deputy commander of the Engineer Amphibious Command and Training Center at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, in the early years of the war, Trudeau played a major role in developing the techniques and organization of the engineer units that facilitated landings in the Mediterranean, Europe, and the Pacific. He was also instrumental in conceiving and implementing a plan for shipping prefabricated landing craft to Australia for assembly and use by General Douglas MacArthur's U.S. and Australian forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, where more amphibious operations were conducted than in all the other theaters of war combined. In this chapter, and in the concluding chapter on General George S. Patton, Jr. (who wrote on amphibious warfare in the 1930s and commanded forces in the North Africa and Sicily landings), Daugherty provides

4. Daugherty, *Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare*, p. 263.

a well-informed account of the Army's contribution to amphibious doctrine and operations.

Daugherty knows the subject thoroughly and presents the story authoritatively. There are, however, a few aspects of the book with which one can take issue. The organization of the book into self-contained chapters means that there is a certain amount of inevitable repetition. There are also a number of typographical errors and indications of inattentive editing. Most of these are trivial, but some detract from the book. For example, half the endnotes for the preface have been left out. Some of the errors can also be misleading. Daugherty uses the term "Engineer Amphibian Brigade" to refer to the units that, from late 1942 to 1952, were designated "Engineer Special Brigades" due to the Navy's insistence that the term "amphibian" was within its own purview.[5] Daugherty also uses the term "Engineer Brigade Special Regiment (EBSR)" although the actual nomenclature of these units was "Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment."[6] A reference to the "Engineer Amphibious Corps," presumably a typographical error for "Engineer Amphibious Command," is also confusing, since there never was such an organization.[7]

More significant are some cases where Daugherty fails to prove his case regarding the nature and extent of an individual's influence. Intellectual history is difficult. It is often impossible to show conclusively the linkages through which ideas are transmitted. In most of his examples, Daugherty can point to writing, teaching, and personal contact to persuade the reader of his case, but there are a number of instances in which the reader is likely to remain unconvinced. For example, in his chapter on General Patton, Daugherty argues for the influence of an article written in the 1920s by Army General Edward L. King. Daugherty states that King's arguments for inter-service cooperation "later insured the success of both Torch [the November 1943 North Africa landings] and Husky [the June 1943 Sicily landing]."[8] This is strong and explicit stuff and it may be true, but nowhere does Daugh-

5. Ibid., pp. 343-47 for references to "Engineer Amphibian Brigades." For the development and terminology of the Engineer Special Brigades, see Donald W. Boose, Jr., *Over the Beach: US Army Amphibious Operations in the Korean War* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), pp. 36-38; Arthur G. Trudeau, *Engineer Memoirs*, "Oral History of Lieutenant General Arthur G. Trudeau," EP 870-1-26 (Fort Belvoir, VA: US Army Corps of Engineers, Office of the Chief of Engineers, 1986), pp. 75-111; Blanche D. Coll, Jean E. Keith, and Herbert H. Rosenthal, *United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services: The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1958), pp. 376-87; and Marshall O. Becker, *The Amphibious Training Center*, Study No. 22 (Washington, DC: Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946), pp. 4-17.

6. Daugherty, *Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare*, p. 349. For the "Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment" nomenclature, see Headquarters, Department of the Army, Table of Organization and Equipment 5-512S, *Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 1943 and April 1944).

7. Daugherty, *Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare*, p. 369.

8. Ibid., p. 368.

erty provide actual evidence that the planners for those later operations ever read King's article. One could speculate that as Commandant of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College from 1925 to 1929, King might well have influenced later generations of Army officers, but Daugherty does not make that case. In fact, Daugherty writes:

> While there is no evidence to suggest that Patton read or was even aware of the points raised by King's article, events during the Husky landings suggest that he had some basic understanding of the problems associated with amphibious landings and the period immediately afterwards.[9]

In his chapter on Admiral Ansel, Daugherty does a fine job of explaining naval gunfire and demonstrating Ansel's specific contributions. But he also says he will

> examine the effects of naval disarmament talks that affected both naval gunnery and the displacement of the type of guns and calibers of guns on the ships constructed during the interwar period, since they became determining factors when Ansel and others [wrote] the chapter [of the *Tentative Landing Force Manual*] on naval gunfire…"[10]

However, the treaty-inspired changes to U.S. Navy ordnance had not yet taken effect when Ansel was writing his portion of the *Tentative Manual* and Daugherty's actual discussion of the impact of the treaty is limited to the statement that "the disarmament treaties…had virtually stripped the U.S. Navy of any meaningful offensive power…"[11] This is debatable, for the treaties had beneficial as well as deleterious effects. The strictures of the 1930 London Treaty, for example, led to the development of "light" cruisers that were indistinguishable from "heavy" cruisers except for their six-inch gun armament. As a result of Navy efforts to maximize the firepower of these cruisers within the treaty limitations, the U.S. Navy entered the war with a class of light cruisers each mounting fifteen six-inch guns, roughly equivalent to a battalion of 155mm artillery. These ships provided outstanding service as naval gunfire support ships throughout the war. Ansel commanded one of those formidable light cruisers, USS *Philadelphia* (CL-41), when it helped suppress German artillery at Anzio and Southern France. Daugherty notes that "Ansel applied the lessons on naval gunfire he had written about fourteen years earlier at Quantico with deadly effect," but fails to mention that the *Philadelphia* with its deadly armament was in part the result of the naval limitation treaties.[12]

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9. Ibid., p. 371.
10. Ibid., p. 298.
11. Ibid., p. 302.
12. Ibid., p. 317. For a synopsis of the complex interrelationship between the naval treaty restrictions and the development of U.S. warships in the 1930s, see Thomas C. Hone and Trent Hone, *Battle Line: The United States Navy, 1919-1939* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), pp. 1-18, and Norman Friedman, *U.S. Cruisers: An Illustrated Design His-*

These are minor issues and readers can make their own judgments from the evidence Daugherty presents. *Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare* is a valuable contribution to the literature on amphibious warfare that should be welcomed by both general readers and specialists. Those new to the subject will find it a reliable and readable account of the development of amphibious doctrine. For specialists, Daugherty provides a useful and thought-provoking account of an important aspect of 20th century warfare that rewards rereading, study, and argument.

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tory (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984), pp. 4-5, 109-11, 163-68, and 217-18. For the development of the Brooklyn and St. Louis class heavily-armed light cruisers (of which the *Philadelphia* was one), see Friedman, pp. 183-98, 203-07. Friedman argues that "It is clear from contemporary documents that there never would have been any *Brooklyns* had it not been for a radical change in treaty rules occasioned by the London Treaty for 1930" and that the major wartime cruisers (designed and built free of treaty restrictions) "were evolved directly from the *Brooklyn* design." Friedman, p. 183.

Allied Deception Operations and the Invasion of Normandy

MANNIE LISCUM

D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion. By Mary Kathryn Barbier. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007. Illustrations. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. viii, 268.

In terms of popular military history, Operation FORTITUDE is a relatively little-known aspect of the Allied invasion of Hitler's *Festung Europa*. In contrast to Operation NEPTUNE/OVERLORD,[1] Operation FORTITUDE (and its predecessor Operation BODYGUARD) – the cover/deception plan for the Allied invasion of Europe and subsequent exploitation phase[2] – has remained largely understudied. Even the Transportation Plan (a.k.a., Tedder or Zuckerman Plan) – the Allied Expeditionary Air Force operation to bomb western France in preparation for Operation NEPTUNE/OVERLORD[3] – is more widely known than FORTITUDE. Mary Kathryn Barbier's *D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion* represents an opportunity to bring this important component of the Allied invasion of France to greater light. Although the first printing of *D-Day Deception* in hardcover was not priced for mass consumption, a more reasonably-priced softcover version of the book is now available.[4] Unfortunately, an affordable price tag is not enough to overcome the shortcomings that are likely to keep Barbier's book – a book not without considerable academic merit – from achieving the aforementioned potential.

So what are the positive and negative attributes of *D-Day Deception*? First, Professor Barbier is to be lauded for her considerable historical research, which started with her Ph.D. dissertation[5] and culminated with the book under review here. Barbier is certainly an academic historian who val-

1. Forrest C. Pogue, *United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations: The Supreme Command* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1954), pp. 98-122.
2. Roger Hesketh, *Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign* (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2000), pp. 363-486.
3. Pogue, *Supreme Command*, pp. 127-34.
4. Mary Kathryn Barbier, *D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2009).
5. Mary Kathryn Barbier, "D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Southern Mississippi, 1998.

ues unpublished primary sources as a potential wealth of "new information"[6] and does not rely solely on previously published works to generate her questions and answers. Academic historians will appreciate that Barbier has done much of the "ground work" in researching this historiography, as well as the largely thesis-driven method she has taken to generate the prose. On the other hand, this academician's approach has generated a book that reads much like so many dry and oft uninspiring Ph.D. dissertations, and is thus unlikely to capture the imagination of the average non-academic reader. It is for this reason chiefly that this reviewer is skeptical *D-Day Deception* can effectively bring the story of Operation FORTITUDE to a wider audience. This is not to imply that the work is a poor piece of historiography, rather it represents a solid product of historical research that is simply not pitched beyond the confines of an academic readership.

With any academic work it is always fair to ask: What does this particular work bring to the field of study that was not already part of the collective understanding? A similar, albeit less academically inclined, question can also be posed by the average reader: What will I get from this book that I cannot get elsewhere? In short, *D-Day Deception* may largely succeed in an academic sense as an original piece of work,[7] but when seen through the broader prism of published historical works, it is not particularly new or novel. For example, despite the relative paucity of books on the topic of Operation FORTITUDE available to the general public, at least one, Roger Hesketh's *Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign*,[8] is similar to *D-Day Deception* in the information covered, but superior for readability. Barbier herself appears to recognize the strength of Hesketh's work as she cites it as one of her "Other Published Primary Sources."[9]

Despite the largely overlapping stories told in *D-Day Deception* and *Fortitude*, the contents within could not have been generated through more disparate methods. Whereas Barbier's prose was generated through her research in the hallowed halls of various libraries and archives, Hesketh's arose from first-hand experience as an intelligence officer in Ops (B) – the deception section of G-3 (Operations Division) in COSSAC (Chief of Staff

6. Barbier, *D-Day Deception*, pp. 247-49.

7. Searches of academic journal and thesis/dissertation databases revealed that studies focused largely or entirely on Operation FORTITUDE, or components thereof, are relatively sparse. Barbier cites eight (on pp. 251-55) of the ten journal articles that were found by this reviewer. The two articles not cited are: Barry Hunt, "Operation Fortitude: D-Day and Strategic Deception," *Canadian Defense Quarterly*, Summer 1984, pp. 44-47; and H. Wentworth Eldredge, "Biggest Hoax of the War: Operation FORTITUDE – The Allied Deception Plan that Fooled the Germans about Normandy," *Air Power History*, Vol. 37 (Fall 1990), pp. 15-22. Aside from Barbier's dissertation, only one Master's thesis was found that focuses on Operation FORTITUDE: Scott H. Brunstetter, "Operation Fortitude – The Cover of the Normandy Invasion: The Reasons for Its Success," M.A. Thesis, West Virginia University, 1997.

8. See footnote 2.

9. Barbier, *D-Day Deception*, p. 250.

to Supreme Allied Commander) responsible for the planning of Operation FORTITUDE, as well as its precursors and supplements.[10] *Fortitude* was written in the three years immediately following the war, but because of a security moratorium, Hesketh's manuscript remained "top-secret" until 1976, and was not published until 2000 (thirteen years after Hesketh's death).[11] Though Barbier's extensive research has revealed some details not present in Hesketh's account, *Fortitude* conveys the same essential messages as those in *D-Day Deception*. For example, both authors conclude that the actions of Double-Cross agent Juan Garcia Pujol (a.k.a. GARBO), as well as others (notably, BRUTUS and TRICYCLE), played the greatest positive role in deceiving the Germans as to Allied intentions leading up to and following the invasion. Given that *Fortitude* was published seven years prior to *D-Day Deception*, it would seem that the answer to Barbier's overarching thesis question ("which part or parts of the operation [FORTITUDE] – wireless transmissions, physical displays, or double agents' messages – had the responsibility of preventing the German buildup of forces in Normandy before the invasion and the reinforcement of the area immediately after the Allies landed)[12] already existed. However, this conclusion would be unfair since *D-Day Deception* in large part represents Barbier's Ph.D. work that was completed before *Fortitude* was published. In 1946, General Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote the following in his report to the CCS (Combined Chiefs of Staff) on operations in Europe:

> …it was hoped that the enemy, by his observations based on aerial reconnaissance [physical displays] and radio interception [wireless activity], would conclude that the main assault would take place farther to the east than was in fact intended. As a result of these measures, we also felt that had an enemy agent been able to penetrate our formidable security barrier, his observations would have pointed to the same conclusion.[13]

Given the aforementioned conclusions of Barbier and Hesketh (with the latter making his immediately after the war), one wonders if Eisenhower was merely being purposefully deceitful to maintain secrecy, while at the same time giving a little "wink and nudge" to the Double-Cross system for a job well done.

Where Professor Barbier could have set her book apart from Hesketh's, and at the same time made inroads into bringing the story of Operation FORTITUDE to a wider audience, would have been to present the story in a

10. Thaddeus Holt, *The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004), p. 478.
11. Hesketh, *Fortitude*, pp. x-xxii.
12. Barbier, *D-Day Deception*, p. 182.
13. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1994), p. 13.

more reader-friendly prose. It is fair to say that other than logistics, intelligence and counter-intelligence is probably the area of military history most steeped in factual information poorly lent to engaging prose. Hence it becomes incumbent upon the author to create a prose that conveys such historical information with an *élan* that will capture the reader's imagination. Success in this pursuit can lead to wide readership for the author, whereas failure, even if the product is important to the historical community, can lead to public obscurity of the work.[14] Unfortunately, *D-Day Deception* is written with a literary sterility that is likely to insure that it falls into this latter category. Nevertheless, the product of Professor Barbier's research is an important addition to the historical literature that will find a welcome home in the libraries of the more serious students of military history, and their academic institutions.

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14. One example of a book on intelligence/counter-intelligence that is well-written and has found a fairly broad readership is Ronald Lewin's *Ultra Goes to War: The First Account of World War II's Greatest Secret Based on Official Documents* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978). On the other hand, Roland G. Ruppenthal's authoritative studies of American SOS (Services of Supplies) in the European Theater of Operations – *United States Army in World War II: European Theater of Operations: Logistical Support of the Armies: Volume I: May 1941 - September 1944* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1953); and *United States Army in World War II: European Theater of Operations: Logistical Support of the Armies: Volume II: September 1944 - May 1945* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1959) – represent examples of prose that utterly fails to engage the reader, but contain historical information found in few other books.

The 20th of July 1944

JAY LOCKENOUR

Countdown to Valkyrie: The July Plot to Assassinate Hitler. By Nigel Jones. Barnsley: Frontline Books, 2008. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. xi, 308.

Nigel Jones has written an account of the events leading up to the attempt on 20 July 1944 to kill Adolf Hitler by planting a bomb in his military headquarters, the "Wolf's Lair" in East Prussia. The timing of the book's release in early 2009 was certainly felicitous, coming as it did within weeks of the opening of Bryan Singer's much anticipated film, *Valkyrie*, depicting the same events.[1]

The author's description of the work as a "timeline" is only accurate in the sense that the story proceeds chronologically and that most dates (though not all) appear in bold typeface to highlight the passage of years, months, and days as the fateful 20 July approaches.[2] It is rather a reasonably well-crafted historical narrative that both sets the conspiracy spearheaded by Colonel Claus Schenk Count von Stauffenberg into its broader context and grippingly recounts the important (and some not so important) details of the bombing of Hitler's briefing room and the subsequent coup attempt.

Jones' expertise in German history shows as he sets the scene for the coalescence of the conspiracy around Stauffenberg in late 1943.[3] Jones concisely describes Hitler's rise to the Chancellorship of Germany, his march to and conduct of the war, and several earlier attempts on his life, including a few not involving the 20 July conspirators. Many historians would quibble with some of Jones' characterizations, such as labeling Hitler's "seizure of power" as "inevitable,"[4] or with his account of the Sudeten Crisis,[5] but an unfamiliar reader will become sufficiently acquainted with the broader historical context of the coup: the criminal nature of the National Socialist regime, the brutality and eventual hopelessness of the war effort, the treatment

1. *Valkyrie*, Dir. Bryan Singer, Perfs. Tom Cruise and Kenneth Branagh, United Artists, Motion Picture, United States, 2008.
2. Jones, *Countdown to Valkyrie*, p. x.
3. Jones is also the author of *Hitler's Heralds*, one of the few works on the post-World War I Freikorps movement in Germany. The book is very much like *Countdown to Valkyrie* in being a strictly narrative history of unfortunately limited utility to scholars because it lacks documentation. Nigel H. Jones, *Hitler's Heralds: The Story of the Freikorps 1918-1923* (London: Murray, 1987).
4. Jones, *Countdown to Valkyrie*, p. 24.
5. Ibid., pp. 58-81.

of Jews, and the Holocaust.

One clearly understands the moral outrage of the conspirators not only at the treatment of Jews and Soviet prisoners (among others) at the hands of the Nazis, but also at the senseless waste of German lives in a militarily lost cause. Jones perhaps does too little to develop such nuances in the conspirators' motives and plans, but he does at least make clear that despite their courageous moral stance in opposing Hitler, these men were no angels. All were German nationalists; most hoped to retain at least some part of the "Greater Germany" constructed by Hitler; many long entertained the vain fantasy of continuing the war against the Soviet Union alongside the British and Americans. Readers who sift through the "Acknowledgments and Sources" essay at the back of the book will be referred to Hans Mommsen's and Hermann Graml's outstanding essays in a collection on the motives and plans of the conspirators.[6] Another valuable collection of essays (not mentioned by Jones) that translates the excellent work of several German scholars of the resistance is David Clay Large's *Contending with Hitler*.[7]

With most other historians of the conspiracy, Jones shares an interest in Stauffenberg's biography and treats the reader at various points to a survey of his life, his family background, and his character. His debt to Peter Hoffmann is obvious and Jones appropriately describes Hoffmann's *Stauffenberg: A Family History* as "entirely supersed[ing]" earlier works on the subject.[8] Hoffmann's "family history" of the Stauffenbergs is not the only work, indeed not the only work by Hoffmann, to which Jones owes an enormous (and at least briefly acknowledged) debt. In his acknowledgments and sources section, Jones writes that Hoffmann's 1988 *German Resistance to Hitler* "bids fair to be definitive."[9] But Jones does not mention Hoffmann's earlier work, originally in German but revised and translated in 1977, *The History of the German Resistance*.[10] This work, though supplemented in small ways by the shorter 1988 work and the "family history," does more than "bid fair" – it is definitive. It is a total of 847 pages long, including nearly 200 pages of notes and fifty pages of appendices including documents, maps, and diagrams. It is the single indispensable work on the resistance in English. Despite the fact that Jones' work, which contains not a single citation of appropriate documentary evidence, is clearly not meant to

6. F.L. Carsten and Hermann Graml, eds., *The German Resistance to Hitler* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).

7. David Clay Large, ed., *Contending with Hitler: Varieties of German Resistance in the Third Reich*, Publications of the German Historical Institute (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

8. Peter Hoffmann, *Stauffenberg: A Family History, 1905-1944* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Jones, *Countdown to Valkyrie*, p. 296.

9. Peter Hoffmann, *German Resistance to Hitler* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988). Jones, *Countdown to Valkyrie*, p. 296.

10. Peter Hoffmann, *The History of the German Resistance, 1933-1945* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977). A third edition appeared in 1996 with McGill-Queen's University Press.

compete with Hoffman's 1977 tome, its omission from Jones' bibliographic essay is odd. With very, very few exceptions, every element of Jones' narrative is already discussed and documented in *The History of the German Resistance*.

Granted, authors and editors often feel that footnotes interfere with the flow of a book for the general reader, and Jones' work is obviously written with a more popular audience in mind, perhaps one made curious by the Tom Cruise film.[11] The book moves at a satisfying pace and is well-illustrated with photographs of many prominent conspirators and Nazis alike. A shorter, narrative history is, for better or worse, likely to reach a broader audience than a back-wrenching scholarly monograph.

This otherwise commendable urge for brevity means that Jones leaves other avenues that would have added to the value (and size) of the book unexplored. Jones interviewed Claus von Stauffenberg's son, Berchtold, as well as several others involved on both sides of the coup and includes a brief "memoir" co-authored with Berchtold, in the back of the book. In this Afterword, Berchtold recounts the fate of the extended Stauffenberg family after the coup. This unique, albeit very brief, section of the book could have formed the basis for more original research on the Stauffenbergs and the importance of the coup in postwar West Germany, but Jones unfortunately includes the text without any analytical commentary.

Beginning in the 1990s, scholars began more intensively to examine the memory of the coup and uses to which the legacy of the coup was put especially in West Germany.[12] While in East Germany official histories lauded the heroic resistance and sacrifices of Communist party members, the 20 July conspiracy gradually acquired the status of founding myth in the West.[13] The moral/religious opposition of the generally conservative nationalist conspirators around Stauffenberg, Ludwig Beck, Carl Goerdeler, and Helmuth

11. Even the most recent printings of Hoffman's "family history" are festooned with a sticker calling it "the book that inspired the film."

12. In addition to works cited elsewhere: Peter Steinbach, *Widerstand im Widerstreit: der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus in der Erinnerung der Deutschen: Ausgewählte Studien* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1994); Gerd R. Ueberschar et al., eds., *Der 20. Juli 1944: Bewertung und Rezeption des deutschen Widerstandes gegen das NS - Regime* (Koln: Bund-Verlag, 1994); Regina Holler, *20. Juli 1944, Vermächtnis oder Alibi?: Wie Historiker, Politiker und Journalisten mit dem deutschen Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus umgehen: Eine Untersuchung der Wissenschaftlichen Literatur, der offiziellen Reden und der Zeitungsberichterstattung in Nordrhein-Westfalen von 1945-1986*, Kommunikation und Politik, Bd. 26 (München and New Providence: K.G. Saur, 1994); and Raimund Neuss, "Wem gehört der deutsche Widerstand? Der Streit zum 50 Jahrestag des 20 Juli 1944," *German Life and Letters*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (1996), doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0483.1996.tb01667.x.

13. Ines Reich and Kurt Finker, "Der 20. Juli 1944 in der Geschichtswissenschaft der SBZ/DDR Seit 1945," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, Vol. 39, No. 6 (1991). The *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* later devoted an entire issue (Vol. 42, No. 7, 1994) to the legacy of the coup that contains several interesting articles on East Germany's official stance on "resistance."

James von Moltke's "Kreisau Circle" were the "good Germans" who recognized the evils of Nazism and heroically tried to bring down Hitler's criminal regime. The conspirators helped conservatives in the dominant West German political party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), "to dream of an untainted German conservatism, without Hitler."[14]

Beginning with the tenth anniversary of the coup in 1954, official ceremonies and publications marked the occasion. Public opinion tended to lag behind officials' praise of the plotters, as many Germans viewed the conspirators' actions as treasonous.[15] But such attitudes have tended to soften with the passage of time. In 1994, Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, a friend to Stauffenberg, raised few eyebrows when she claimed for men like Peter Yorck von Wartenburg and the other conspirators a legacy that reached across the political spectrum from conservative to liberal to social democratic.[16] As the son of the principal actor in the July 1944 drama, Berchtold embodies this legacy, and it would have been interesting to connect the short memoir with these larger contemporary themes.

Since the work offers very little that is new, the specialist reader has time to ponder some of the book's errors and eccentricities. The errors I noted were minor. Two mistakes caught my attention in part because I am currently working on Erich Ludendorff, the World War One general and early ally of Hitler. Erich Ludendorff was not an aristocrat (Jones refers to him as Erich "von" Ludendorff[17]) and he ran for President of the Weimar Republic as a Nazi in 1925 not 1927.[18] Other mistakes may have escaped noticed, but Jones is generally careful and provides accurate information, as one can confirm in other sources.

More grating in a relatively short book are some of Jones' thematic and stylistic choices. For the first half of the work, Jones leaves no opportunity unexploited to mention sex, especially allegations of homosexuality. Stefan George's poetry (important to Stauffenberg and his brothers) Jones describes as "homosexual in tone."[19] In his only appearance in the book, Frederick the Great is described as "the homosexual Prussian king" – making Frederick's

14. Frank Stern, "Wolfschanze versus Auschwitz: Widerstand als deutsches Alibi?," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, Vol. 42, No. 7 (1994), p. 650.
15. A public opinion poll in 1951 showed only 40% of the population approved while 30% disapproved of the conspirators' actions. Another 30% expressed no opinion or claimed to have no knowledge of the event. Robert Weldon Whalen, *Assassinating Hitler: Ethics and Resistance in Nazi Germany* (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 1993), p. 41. The former *Wehrmacht* officer corps in particular was resentful of the praise heaped upon those who tried to kill their commander-in-chief. See Jay Lockenour, "'The Rift in Our Ranks': The German Officer Corps, the Twentieth of July, and the Path to Democracy," *German Studies Review*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1998).
16. Marion Dönhoff, *Um der Ehre Willen: Erinnerungen an die Freunde vom 20. Juli*, 1. Aufl. ed. (Berlin: Siedler, 1994), p. 136.
17. Jones, Countdown to Valkyrie, p. 25.
18. Ibid., p. 47. Jones has the date of the election correct in the reference on page 25.
19. Ibid., p. 18.

sexual proclivities his defining characteristic and incidentally settling (or at least ignoring) the contentious debate surrounding the issue.[20] According to Jones, the army's officer corps hated Röhm and the SA leadership for their "more-or-less open homosexuality" whereas on the very next page he has Röhm distrusting the "effete" officer corps – as though sexuality was the foundation of the hostility between the *Reichswehr* and the SA.[21] No doubt the dismissals of Werner von Blomberg and Werner von Fritsch in 1938 for sexual peccadilloes (for marrying a prostitute in Blomberg's case and on fabricated allegations of homosexuality in Fritsch's) were important turning points in the hostility of some officers to Hitler. But to dwell on Blomberg's second wife's career as a prostitute to the point where Jones describes a photograph of her "performing oral sex on a shaven-headed Czech Jew named Lowinger" is unseemly and out of place.[22] A similar criticism could be leveled at the tidbit, traced to Gestapo interrogators, that Georg Elser, who tried to kill Hitler in 1938, was a twenty-five year old virgin "who did not even know how to masturbate."[23] Fortunately, the fixation on sex abates as Jones proceeds to the central narrative concerning the plot that culminates in July 1944.

Other stylistic habits clutter a text otherwise written with admirable clarity. Jones has a noticeable tendency to describe the actors in his story as carnivores. Friedrich von Paulus was a "foxy-faced Prussian".[24] Admiral Karl Dönitz is first described as "lupine," but later crosses genus boundaries to become "foxy-faced" like Paulus.[25] Roland Friesler, the Nazi judge who presided over the show trials of the conspirators was "ferret-faced."[26] Same order, different family. Other redundancies mar the text as well. "Sawdust Caesar" is not so clever a description of Mussolini to warrant its repetition.[27] Hitler's physician, Dr. Theo Morell, appears twice in the book, both times labeled unimaginatively (though not incorrectly) as a "quack."[28] Claus von Stauffenberg's propensity for sloppy dress, noted by a commanding officer, receives mention no fewer than four times in the space of a few pages for its supposed insight into his complicated character.[29]

Moviegoers eager for more background than Singer's *Valkyrie* supplied could do far worse than invest the few additional hours necessary to read Jones' *Countdown to Valkyrie*. Notwithstanding the quirks mentioned above, this work provides an accurate, well-constructed narrative that combines significant detail with appropriate context. But a reader could still profit im-

20. Ibid., p. 30.
21. Ibid., pp. 34-35.
22. Ibid., p. 48.
23. Ibid., p. 94.
24. Ibid., p. 9.
25. Ibid., pp. 143, 205.
26. Ibid., p. 247.
27. Ibid., pp. 5, 208.
28. Ibid., pp. 138, 208.
29. Ibid., pp. 14, 21, 22, 33.

mensely by reaching back for Hoffman's 1988 *German Resistance to Hitler*, which is written by THE expert in the field, is a mere 135 pages, not overly burdened by notes, and not as drearily written as Jones makes it sound.[30] And for a scholarly account, one should risk the eye-strain and delve straight into the other works of Hoffmann, Mommsen, and the other scholars to whom Jones is indebted, not to mention the many German works if one has the language ability.[31]

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30. Hoffmann, *German Resistance to Hitler*. Jones, *Countdown to Valkyrie*, p. 296.
31. Gerd Ueberschär and Peter Steinbach are two authors whose work has appeared unfortunately rarely in English. Steinbach contributed an essay on "the conservative resistance" in David Clay Large's *Contending with Hitler*, mentioned above. Ueberschär's essay on Halder might interest readers of *Global War Studies*. Gerd R. Ueberschar, "General Halder and the Resistance to Hitler in the German High Command 1938-40," *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1988). See also Gerd R. Ueberschär, *Generaloberst Franz Halder: Generalstabschef, Gegner und Gefangener Hitlers*, Persönlichkeit und Geschichte, Bd. 137/138 (Göttingen: Muster-Schmidt, 1991).

Book Reviews

Memories of an S.O.E. Historian. By M.R.D. Foot. Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2008. Illustrations. Index. Cloth. Pp. vii, 208.

The recent publication of Christopher Andrew's *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5* (London: Allen Lane, 2009), the official history of the British domestic intelligence agency, has once more demonstrated the enduring interest in this expanding strand within the study of history. This much smaller volume considers an associated area and benefits greatly from having been written by one who had a distinguished wartime career before choosing to spend the rest of his life immersed in academia and the study of the brave men and women who risked everything to help ensure the Allied war effort proved an ultimately victorious one.

During the course of an entirely engaging self-penned account of the long and distinguished life of Professor M.R.D. Foot, described in his own biographical notes as "the undisputed authority on the Special Operations Executive" and the acknowledged editor of the diaries of one of the greatest British prime ministers, William Gladstone, the writer reveals that he was taught how to review a book by the medieval historian and fellow of Balliol College Sir Maurice Powicke. The advice he had to offer to the then young scholar was succinct, but highly useful: "Say whether it advances knowledge, and if it does, indicate how, in a sentence or two. Say whether it is scholarly in method and well written, then stop." While the professor may have subsequently done his best "to copy this laconic advice," this review singularly fails to adhere to such an obviously sensible approach. Too interesting and informative is the subject matter to produce a summary of only a few lines!

By his own admission, the professor was something of a swot at his prep school regularly winning the form prize and it was here that he first gained the idea that he might be able to one day write. From there he went on to Winchester – where he recounts a talk given by General A.P. Wavell in 1937 which described Russian maneuvers and their use of small teams of parachutists, "a sort of warfare" he presciently felt he would like to get into if another great war broke out – and then New College, Oxford before his education was interrupted as he "went into uniform for six years." The writer had in fact been commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Territorial Army in March 1939 and posted to a searchlight battalion. Following the war's outbreak, with ninety-centimetre searchlights, lorries, and sound locators, he initially found himself in the mid-Thames valley and spent most of the bitterly cold winter of 1939-40 under canvas in the Chilterns covering Bomber Command's headquarters near High Wycombe and the prime minister's residence at Chequers.

The account of the war years is simply a joy to read, a sometimes frantic and always vivid recollection not just of the "Finest Hour," but the long, slow struggle that followed turning the initial blunting of the German thrust into a compelling victory. From the vantage point he would soon move on to occupy at Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ), where he lost little time in adopting "a regular Whitehall warrior routine," he provides the reader with a colourful image of the wartime London he knew. Aside from the damage, death, and destruction there were the occasional cultural treats of a visit to the National Gallery, concerts interspersed with air-raid sirens or moments spent wandering through the bookshops of Charing Cross. His work in his new role was "routine, but interesting routine"; he had arrived amidst the chaos of Operation Jubilee, the disastrous Allied raid at Dieppe in August 1942, and would subsequently see the weekly intelligence reports put out by each of the service ministries giving him some idea of the major combined operations that were pending (whilst he read secret and top secret papers he had no idea about the ULTRA secret nor did any of his colleagues at COHQ besides his commanding officer and a handful of his most trusted aides). From here there followed promotion to major, a mention in despatches, and a move as brigade intelligence officer to the newly forming Special Air Service brigade. As he put it:

> It would mean dropping a rank, then a rule in the army, to deter too many volunteers for SAS. Would it get me anywhere nearer the Germans? – for I was getting very tired of desk work. Yes it would. So I accepted on the spot.

The nine-page account of his time in the SAS, culminating with his capture in occupied France during a mission in August 1944, is the most gripping section of this consistently engaging wartime story and is resplendent in captivating asides and anecdotes. If only one is mentioned it must be that of the plan that the writer put together which nearly led to the capture of one of the greatest German wartime commanders, Erwin Rommel, at his headquarters during the Normandy fighting. The operation failed as the target's staff car had already been shot-up by an RAF Spitfire, but it was an example of the healthy rivalry which existed between each special force as to who could carry out the most audacious raids. Held captive near St. Nazaire, he narrowly avoided execution, was badly injured while escaping – upon being repatriated to England in late February 1945 he was given his medical file which opened with the words "May pull through" – and finished the war working back behind a desk at COHQ.

His post-war career in academia is of course the much more widely known aspect of his long and distinguished life and there are chapters detailing the conclusion of his studies – he had hoped for a first, but joined a celebrated list of seconds – his early career at Oxford, and his subsequent time as Professor of Modern History at Manchester. There is also space to detail his retirement spent as a full-time author, surely the nirvana for all historians. Throughout, the appealing story is greatly enhanced by the candor of

the account of his sometimes complicated but ultimately happily fulfilled private life. For most readers the book's primary interest will no doubt be the details it provides about Professor Foot's extensive work on SOE and they will not be disappointed in this regard (the penultimate chapter will inevitably be widely read by those who are interested in "intelligence history"). It is, however, a much more wide-ranging and fascinating autobiography than simply that, one that it is hoped would have met with the wholehearted approval of his one-time mentor Professor Powicke.

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In the Face of the Enemy: The Complete History of the Victoria Cross and New Zealand. By Glyn Harper and Colin Richardson. Auckland: HarperCollins, 2007. Illustrations. Notes. Index. Paper. Pp. 384.

The stated purpose of this book is to provide the history of the Victoria Crosses related to New Zealand. As might be expected, the work lays out the history of the Victoria Cross, the highest award for courage in the British Empire, then information on the early wars on New Zealand and Africa, before launching into an extensive coverage of World War I, followed by four chapters on New Zealand and the VC during World War II. Extensively footnoted, the book also has a bibliography that will be most helpful for other researches as it includes file and box numbers in the New Zealand Archives and file and manuscript numbers in other archives and libraries for personal papers. For readers of *Global War Studies*, the primary interest will be in the third quarter of the book that covers the Second World War, although in the front there is a brief history of the George Cross (created in 1940 for heroism where a military award was not appropriate) and the George Cross conflicts with the Albert Medal.

Chapter Ten, "The Second World War: Issues and Problems," includes an analysis of the number of VCs given in 1939-1945 by country and by theater. Much of this chapter, besides presenting summary data, includes an analytical discussion as to whether or not the nine World War II New Zealand VCs were proportionally fair, considering that the King awarded 182 during the conflict. Although not explicitly pointed out by Harper and Richardson, all nine VCs were awarded between April 1941 and August 1943. The authors do not question whether any should have been awarded in the last two years of the war.

Biographies of the New Zealand VC awardees from World War II make up a quarter of the book. Naturally included is information on Charles Upham, the only person to win two VCs in the conflict. As the authors have or-

ganized the story of each VC by geography and time (Chapter 11 is "Greece and Crete, 1941" and Chapter 12 is "North Africa, 1941-1943"), Upham's two stories are separated, as his first heroics were in Crete and the second action was in North Africa, where he was captured and spent the rest of the war as a POW, including internment at Colditz for his many escape attempts.

Actions in Greece and Crete in 1941 resulted in two other VCs to New Zealand soldiers. Sergeant Jack Hinton received the only VC to any Commonwealth or British soldier for actions in Greece. His story, like the others in this work, gives some early background on the individual, then provides a detail of the action that resulted in Hinton's award, and a couple of pages about his life after the VC.

Although the book's cover states it is the complete history of the Victoria Cross and New Zealand, it is not exclusively about the VC. Chapter 14 covers the three New Zealand military personnel who received the George Cross and the three who received the Albert Medal. The stories are arranged chronologically. The Albert Medal had two First World War recipients and one from the Second World War. Since the George Cross was instituted in 1940, all recipients were from World War II. The appendix contains the official citations for all of the Victoria Crosses given to New Zealanders.

For those scholars with an interest in the First and Second World Wars, or those who want information about New Zealand soldiers, sailors, and airmen, this is a fascinating work. *In the Face of the Enemy* is also highly recommended for research libraries.

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To Salamaua. By Phillip Bradley. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. xvii, 371.

This book is part of a long convention in Australian military history; the C.E.W. Bean-inspired tradition of writing history from the regimental point of view. This is a genre that is usually dominated by journalists and amateur historians who produce their work with commercial publishing houses and use Father's Day, Anzac Day, and anniversaries of well known battles and campaigns to launch their *magnum opus* into the public domain. Largely based around in-depth interviews with ageing veterans and backed up with varying degrees of archival research, the standard fare of these texts is a celebration of the Australian solider coupled with a poorly (or not at all) camouflaged derision of their commanders, especially popular if they are not Australian, but in the absence of a British or American "villain" in command then an Australian senior officer usually suffices. In 2008, seven out of the

top ten best selling nonfiction books in Australia were military histories of this type. Large in scope, heavy on nationalism, written with an evocative journalistic turn of prose, and with little new research they tend to pose few, if any, historical challenges to the public. The result is that while commercially successful, the vast majority of these tomes are poor history. So it is highly refreshing then to see an addition to this field that adopts the regimental history tradition yet leaves aside the Darwinian-inspired tales of Australian nationalism that Bean so vigorously pursued and the hyperbole that characterizes so many of the popular histories.

Instead, Phillip Bradley's *To Salamaua* concentrates on the experiences of the Australian soldiers and their involvement in patrols, attacks, and defensive actions undertaken under some of the most gruelling conditions and in some of the worst terrain to be fought over in the Second World War. Bradley does an excellent job by concentrating on tactical analysis as opposed to producing the typical nationalist polemic that has come to dominate this style of military history in Australia. This highly effective technique has been forged over the course of writing this and two previous books for the Australian Army History Series on the campaigns in New Guinea: *On Shaggy Ridge: The Australian Seventh Division in the Ramu Valley Campaign: From Kaiapit to the Finisterre Ranges* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2004); and *The Battle for Wau: New Guinea's Frontline 1942-1943* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

It might be that Bradley is inspired by the fact that for most Australians their knowledge of the Second World War in the Pacific begins and ends on the Kokoda Trail. A sad state of affairs that belies Australia's significant contribution to the war in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA). In concert with his previous works, this book is exceptionally effective in shining some light onto the operations post-Kokoda.

One of the most interesting factors of this particular operation is that it was not the centerpiece of the campaign to recapture New Guinea, but rather a diversion. The objective of Major General Stanley Savige's 3rd Australian Division, and his attached regiment (162nd) of the U.S. 41st Infantry Division, was to threaten the town of Salamaua so as to draw the Japanese in central New Guinea away from the real objective, the major base in the town of Lae. It was an operation that was to last from April to September 1943 and as Bradley states "There can be few examples in military history of a campaign that went as long...where the overriding objective was not to be victorious but only to hold the enemy forces in place."

In order to maintain surprise and achieve this objective the Australian high command in the SWPA chose to keep the diversionary mission of the campaign a secret, not only from the Japanese, but also from both the soldiers and senior commanders of the 3rd Division. This decision, along with the clash of personalities between Major General Savige and his immediate superior at New Guinea Force, Lieutenant General Edmund Herring, as well as the differences of opinion as to the role of this masking operation between the Australian Commander in Chief, General Sir Thomas Blamey, and the

staff and commanders at MacArthur's General Headquarters (GHQ), meant that the campaign saw not just heavy fighting against the Japanese, but some high drama and spirited disagreements amongst the senior command.

Despite its tag as a "diversion," the difficult terrain and the high level of Japanese resistance meant that much of the fighting for Salamaua was more intense than the actions leading up to the capture of Lae by the 7th and 9th Australian Divisions. In fact, the very nature of this operation meant that it involved some of the most intense and drawn-out fighting of the Pacific War. These actions were concentrated on endless patrols punctuated with small unit actions at the section (squad), platoon, company, and battalion level and in this regard Bradley's focus on the soldier's battle is perfectly suited to exploring the intricacies of the campaign. The book demonstrates high levels of research, and by making excellent use of Allied Translator and Interpreter Service documents he is able to provide a solid account from the Japanese perspective.

Bradley's concern for the plight of the soldiers as they battle both the Japanese and the jungle is not restricted by nationalism. He is equally empathetic to the U.S. infantrymen of the 162nd Infantry Regiment, 41st Division who came ashore at Nassau Bay in June 1943. He provides even-handed treatment of the United States forces that fought in the campaign, although he does struggle at times to be critical of some of the Australian units that fought with a less-than-perfect combat record. At times he is hesitant to criticize their performance directly and this means that you are often forced to read between the lines in order to pick up on some of his more passive critiques.

This book does have some other drawbacks. The most prominent of these is the difficulties the author has with venturing beyond the tactical battlefield and into a broader operational and strategic analysis of the campaign. Bradley argues that the battle of Wau, which immediately proceeded the Salamaua campaign, had "sowed trepidation into the Australian command" and he implies that in March 1943, with the Japanese having lost strategic control of the airspace over Lae to the Allies, an opportunity had been missed to achieve the goals of the 1943 offensives much earlier in the year. While Bradley points out that this opportunity was largely missed as a result of the limited forces available and Allied supply problems, in particular a lack of available transport planes, he overlooks the broader difficulties that faced U.S. and Australian commanders in the SWPA at this time. The lack of Allied naval strength, in particular amphibious forces, a restricted number of trained and experienced infantry, along with the need to spend considerable time rehabilitating those troops who had fought in the Kokoda and beachhead battles (Buna, Gona, Sanananda), and the need to provide adequate training to newly arrived troops in the theater meant that the early capture of these objectives was beyond the scope of MacArthur's command at this time. Furthermore, General George Kenney's Allied Air Forces' superiority over Lae was not assured and Japanese air strength was to remain a serious strategic threat in the region until August 1943.

After Buna was captured in February 1943 the Allies were worn out. United States and Australian commanders did not want an encounter battle in New Guinea nor did they want to gamble on a rushed counterattack in response to the failed Japanese assault at Wau. What the Australian commander, General Blamey, and his operations chief, Major General Frank Berryman, wanted was a deliberate, well planned assault on Lae built on the firm strategic foundations of air and naval dominance supported by sound supply arrangements. Blamey's strategy for the reconquest of central New Guinea had been decided upon well before New Guinea Force had considered the Japanese advance on Wau as a threat to their operations and, in the end, there was no chance to take Nadzab or Lae in March 1943. Even if Blamey had the forces to undertake such an operation, there is no way that either he, or MacArthur, would have risked such an undertaking. MacArthur had come close to being sacked in January 1943, the vulnerability of his situation having been made strikingly clear with the removal of Vice Admiral Robert Ghormley from command of the South Pacific Area in October 1942. The pause that the commanders of the SWPA undertook between March-September 1943 while their deception plan, the advance on Salamaua, was underway was a wise and astute decision and it meant that when they did strike in September 1943 the Japanese command in New Guinea and Rabaul was completely outmaneuvered.

In order to provide some context to the command arrangements in New Guinea during the advance on Salamaua Bradley also briefly weighs into the divide that existed between some of the senior Australian regular army officers and their part-time militia (Citizen Military Force) colleagues during the war. But here he erroneously leaves the readers under the impression that the senior Australian headquarters in New Guinea was run by regular army officers when in fact its commander throughout this period, Lieutenant General Edmund Herring, was a militia officer and the difficulties at this level of command during the campaign were a result of a clash of personalities rather the mode of service of the officers involved. He also wrongly leaves the reader with the impression that the senior Australian commander at the battle of Wau, Brigadier Murray Moten, had been overlooked for the command of an enlarged Kanga Force (as the troops at Wau were known) because of his performance in the battle. In fact, Blamey's Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Major General Frank Berryman, had written to the C-in-C in February, two months before Major General Stanley Savige arrived, arguing that a divisional HQ was essential to the operations forward of Wau and both Berryman and the other senior Australian commanders in New Guinea remained very satisfied with Moten's handling of the battle.

Strategy and operational planning is not Bradley's forte and he is soon back in the familiar territory of tactical analysis, and this is where his talents shine. He makes excellent use of oral history and he provides good coverage of the air operations by Australian and U.S. air forces, both of whom deserve much more recognition than they generally receive. The author has undertaken a thorough terrain study based on his extensive trekking of the bat-

tlefield, no mean feat in itself as large parts of New Guinea over which these battles were fought have not improved in infrastructure and many are in fact just as difficult to reach today. This perceptive appreciation of the terrain is one of the most important elements of the book and has given the author an incredibly detailed insight into how these battles were fought. Ultimately, Bradley's book catalogs some of the more important, yet overlooked, parts of Australia's operations in New Guinea. He clearly demonstrates that the Australian army had been able to draw on its experiences in 1942 to adapt its troops and tactics to jungle warfare and to prove themselves superior to the Japanese. This Bradley shows was not achieved without some difficulties and the failure of some units and commanders serves to highlight the problems during this transition, especially amongst the less experienced Australian militia and U.S. Army units.

As the campaign started to draw to a close it was these difficulties that saw the personal animosity between the commanders of the 3rd Division and New Guinea Force finally boil over. To break this impasse, Blamey intervened and sent his chief of operations and most trusted military advisor, Major General Berryman, over the Owen Stanley Range to pass judgement on Savige, his commanders, and the men of the 3rd Division. Berryman was well known in the Army for his complete lack of confidence in Savige's abilities, yet after touring the frontline and observing a major assault by the 17th Brigade, he proclaimed the dispositions and plan for the attack as "perfect." Berryman returned to Blamey full of praise for the performance of the division and its commanders and a few days later he wrote to his wife that

> the campaign from Wau to Salamaua [went] through country as difficult as the Owen Stanley's [and] is in my opinion our most successful...the tactical work was as good as if not better than anything to date...History will give it pride of place as a military achievement.

This excellent book is the long overdue chance for the men of this division to have their accolades recorded and their proper place in Australia's military history secured.

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Escape from Davao: The Forgotten Story of the Most Daring Prison Break of the Pacific War. By John D. Lukacs. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. xiii, 433.

This fine piece of historical storytelling is the first book by journalist and sportswriter John D. Lukacs (not to be confused with the military historian, John Lukacs). He brings to life the stunning and largely forgotten 4 April

1943 successful escape by ten American prisoners of war from the Davao prisoner of war camp in the Japanese-occupied Philippines. After their escape, the prisoners of war were fortunate to meet up with anti-Japanese guerrillas on Mindanao, who arranged for them to be sent to Australia by the American submarines that dropped off supplies. If not for the intervention of the guerrillas, the escapees would have most likely been picked up by a Japanese patrol that the guerrillas fought and defeated.

Lukacs weaves his story of captivity and escape from the written and oral testimonies of pilots Ed Dyess and Sam Grashio, former MacArthur staff aide Steve Mellnik, Marines Austin Shofner, Jack Hawkins, and Mike Dobervich, and Navy Lieutenant Commander Melvyn McCoy. His emotional characterization of the thoughts and feelings of the American escapees seems to be well grounded in the memoirs, military debriefing statements, and diaries that he has consulted as sources and the oral history interviews that he has done himself. Nonetheless, some of the conversations that Lukacs produces do lead the reader to question: "Did they really say that or has the author recreated the conversations?" This is distracting at times. However, Lukacs' meticulous and detailed research is recorded in the impressive list of sources at the back of the book. There is no doubt that this book is a very well researched account of the escape from Davao. The maps supplied are excellent for following the journey of the American prisoners of war on the Bataan Death March, their lives in Davao camp, the escape route, and where they travelled with anti-Japanese guerrilla forces on the island of Mindanao. For clarity, Lukacs divides the story into three parts. In the first section, he skilfully introduces all of the ten Americans, and at the same time tells the story of their involvement in the battle for the Philippines. The second section deals with the horrors of the Bataan Death March, captivity at Camp O'Donnell and Cabanatuan, and the subsequent movement to the Davao Penal Colony. The escape is part of the third section which ends by detailing how, upon their return to America, they struggled to get their story out because of censorship. Lukacs examines the reasons for the suppression of stories of the horrors endured by Allied prisoners of war before the January 1944 joint announcements by the American and British governments warning Japan about its behavior towards its prisoners of war.

One of the key points that Lukacs concludes from the Davao escape is that it would not have succeeded if not for the assistance of anti-Japanese guerrillas once the prisoners of war were out of the camp. This is an important factor for any future comparative studies of prisoner of war escapes from the Japanese. The successful escape of Charles McCormac and R.G. Donaldson out of an original group of eighteen prisoners of war from Singapore in April 1942, recalled in McCormac's *You'll Die in Singapore* (London: Hale, 1954), also owed much to the assistance of friendly villagers and anti-Japanese guerrillas in Sumatra and Java. Hank Nelson in *Prisoners of War: Australians Under Nippon* (Sydney: ABC Enterprises, 1985) chronicles also how almost all successful escapes by Australians were made by men who were taken in and helped by anti-Japanese guerrillas or sympathet-

ic local Asians, whether they were escaping in Borneo, Hainan Island, Malaya, or on Ambon Island.

Lukacs suggests that the escape from Davao was unique in being the largest successful mass escape by prisoners of war under the Japanese (p. 149), but a quick glance at the literature indicates that there were other escapes of similar size. Gavan Daws in his *Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific* (New York: William Morrow, 1994) offers some interesting comparisons of escape groups that were large. Lukacs is to be commended for giving us such a detailed study of the escape from Davao so that more comparisons can be made. We can move beyond Daws' general observations that there were few successful escapes because the white skin of the POWs "was a prison uniform he could never take off" and that most were too malnourished to attempt an escape. Indeed, both these statements are true, but as Lukacs ably documents with *Escape from Davao* there were some very surprising escapes that need additional documentation. Lukacs has taken a valuable step in deepening our understanding of the nature of successful escapes from Japanese POW camps with his excellent book.

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Hirohito: The Shōwa Emperor in War and Peace. By Ikuhiko Hata. Edited by Marius B. Jansen. Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2007. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. xxviii, 272.

Ikuhiko Hata is one of the preeminent military historians in Japan. His published works are models of scholarship, research, accuracy, and judicious interpretation. This book is a collection of six essays that Hata wrote between 1979 and 1983 and originally published in book form in 1987 as *Hirohito Tenno itsutsu no ketsudan* (Five Decisions by Emperor Hirohito). This English-language translation benefits greatly from an excellent preface by Marius Jansen, the late Princeton Japanologist. Jansen not only sets the context for Hata's essays, but also reminds readers that for more than sixty years Hirohito presided over a society which witnessed stunning changes, from imperialistic expansion, to total war; from utter defeat to resurrection as one of the predominant capitalist nations. Hirohito's personal journey paralleled the rise and fall of the Japanese empire. From a living god bedecked with military medals during wartime, the emperor transformed himself into avuncular patriarch and symbol of a re-born Japan of post-1945.

The five decisions from the original title involved the emperor's role in suppressing the 1936 military mutiny in Tokyo, ending of the Pacific War, establishing the post-war constitution, deciding not to abdicate in favor of his son, and concluding the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. For the re-

vised edition, Hata added a brief sixth chapter, which conjectures that letters sent by ordinary Japanese citizens to General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander Allied Powers, in support of the imperial system were actually expressions of trust and confidence in Hirohito. While entertaining, it could have been omitted.

Hata's purpose is to address whether the emperor was really Japan's ruler and power-holder or merely a puppet and robot. He concludes that the answer to this complex question lies somewhere in between, although Hata credits Hirohito with considerable political savvy. This acumen appears in Hirohito's handling of the 26 February 1936 Incident, a mutiny led by radical young officers stationed in Tokyo who assassinated senior government and military leaders and occupied the capital for four days. Throughout the upheaval, Hirohito refused to bargain with the rebel officers despite urgings from senior army officers to compromise. In the absence of a functioning government, the emperor had to intervene personally to end the crisis. Hirohito's strong-willed determination stifled army terrorism.

During the summer of 1945, the functioning government was paralyzed by the seemingly insurmountable divisions between civilian and military policy makers over a negotiated settlement of the war, a fight to the finish, or a compromise involving Soviet mediation. Hirohito again stepped forward to resolve the deadlock and ultimately proved the decisive force in Japan's decision to surrender. In both wartime examples, Hirohito used his theoretically unlimited power sparingly and exercised imperial cachet only in the most dire of circumstances.

Under the Allied occupation of Japan, die-hard loyalists in the military schemed to preserve the imperial line. Their machinations fill the longest and perhaps the most fascinating chapter of the book. Just as in wartime, army and navy officers refused to cooperate or share resources and developed separate plots to protect the emperor. In retrospect, the stratagems were foolhardy or hopelessly unrealistic, but at the time the conspirators were deadly serious and their plans carried major implications. The navy effort officially continued until January 1981 (almost thirty-six years from war's end) when seventeen aging former naval officers received formal orders to disband from Genda Minoru (then a member of the House of Councillors and in 1941 a naval officer who planned the Pearl Harbor attack). Past and present had come full circle with Genda's implicit acknowledgment that the throne and Japan were secure.

Some overlap occurs between the military attempts to defend the throne and the issue of Hirohito's abdication in the immediate postwar period. Here Hata focuses on the relationship that developed between Hirohito and MacArthur, emperor and shogun during the mid-20th century. There is a great deal of interpretation and supposition involved in the analysis, much of it overtaken by the subsequent publication of numerous diaries of court officials involved in the process. Nonetheless, Hata's explanations of the nuances of the emperor's decision not to abdicate and how the imperial court worked behind the scenes are illuminating. Hirohito and his retinue relied on

veiled hints, verbal assurances, and indirect approaches to MacArthur to clarify the imperial position.

The final chapter discusses the emperor's role in the new constitution, specifically the famous Article Nine clause through which Japan renounced war as an instrument of national policy. By supporting the American draft and accepting his new constitutional status as a symbol of state, Hirohito was able to avoid a head-on collision between SCAP and the Japanese cabinet, which would have resigned, throwing the barely recovering nation into turmoil.

Although thirty years have passed since Hata wrote the first of these essays, they retain a freshness and appeal. Much of the material has not appeared previously in English, and Hata complements his extensive knowledge of the period by invariably adding his personal touch, the encapsulation of personalities, the colorful anecdote that perfectly illustrates his point, and his insistence on documentation and accuracy, not hearsay, to write history. Taken together, the essays provide Western readers with a different and sophisticated perspective on Japan's modern monarchy.

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Japanese Intelligence in World War II. By Ken Kotani. Oxford: Osprey, 2009. Illustrations. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. x, 224.

One of the largely ignored aspects of the Pacific War remains the efforts and effectiveness of Japanese intelligence. This is due primarily to the language barrier, but contributing to the problem was the wholesale destruction of records after the war and the fact that Japanese ex-intelligence officials have been traditionally reluctant to discuss their wartime exploits. With this background, Japanese scholar Ken Kotani has attempted to address the bureaucratic, organizational, and cultural aspects of Japanese wartime intelligence. This broad topic has been published by Osprey; notably, this is not one of the publisher's formatted series with a prescribed length, but a hardbound volume with some 160 pages of text and another forty pages of notes and bibliography.

There is certainly much to cover in a single, relatively short volume. The author starts with the creation of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Navy's (IJN) intelligence units. In 1903, the IJN established its Third Department, which was responsible for foreign intelligence collection and analysis. Its IJA counterpart was the Committee for Intelligence Compilation. In 1908, this office became the Second Department of the Army General Staff. Not surprisingly, as they were created just prior to the outbreak of hostilities with Russia, the original focus of both offices was providing tactical intelli-

gence on Russian forces.

After briefly tracing the creation of the intelligence departments, the author attempts to outline each service's handling of various types of intelligence sources. Codebreaking was originally a low IJA priority, but in 1923 it established an office dedicated to this skill with the help of the Poles, another power focused on Russia. The author describes some of the successes of the Army's codebreaking efforts including penetration of a U.S. State Department cipher and the breaking of a highly secure U.S. strip cipher. Kotani asserts that with the help of the Germans the Army was able to gain success against British ciphers. The Chinese Nationalists were noted for their very poor security, so the Japanese gained success here as well which they were able to turn into actionable intelligence during the war in China. Against the Chinese Communists they were able to gain only periodic success since the Communists were using secure codes provided by the Soviets. All of these successes were gained despite a lack of trained staff. The few trained Army personnel were augmented by university students with language or mathematical skills and IBM business machines were also employed in the effort.

However, the tantalizing claims made by the author of much success against U.S. and British codes remain vague and unexplored. At one point, the author claims "…these methods resulted in 80 percent success in decryption" (p. 17) and "…the Japanese had temporarily broken U.S. codes by obtaining information about the coded traffic from American POWs…" (p. 18). Both of these assertions, if true, would seem to have the potential to be a major factor in the conduct of operations. However, nothing further is provided to bolster them. It is clear though that throughout the war, the IJA devoted more resources to codebreaking than the IJN, and gained more success, both in penetrating foreign codes and protecting its own codes.

The IJA's human intelligence (HUMINT) collection effort was also focused on Russia. However, the total effort provided only fragmentary intelligence. Though totally ignored in the book, these efforts against the Soviets did nothing to prevent the Japanese defeat at Nomonhan in 1939 and the final calamity which engulfed the Kwantung Army in 1945. One thing the IJA did get right was the failure of the Soviet to drawdown their Far East force levels after the start of the Russo-German war. This was one of the few occasions where the Army staff gained accurate intelligence and used it properly. Despite their desire to strike north to attack the Russians, the IJA was unwilling to move until the Soviets reduced their Far Eastern garrison, something which never occurred.

To bolster its intelligence capability, the Army established the Rear Area Training School in 1937, later to become the Nakano School. This one-year-long school was the Army's first real attempt to train intelligence officers. Some 1,900 gradates were sent to the Pacific during the war, including the redoubtable Lieutenant Hiroo Onada who used his training to hold out in the Philippines until 1974.

The IJA's HUMINT collection program against the British provided useful information during the invasion and quick conquest of Malaya and

Singapore. However, no details are provided to support this claim and the role of intelligence during the Japanese advance down the Malayan peninsula remains unclear. Against the Americans, the IJA entered with only a vague notion of what they were up against, and part of the problem was a lack of priority and resources. (Traditionally, collection against the Americans was the responsibility of the IJN.) Up through the Guadalcanal campaign, there were a total of eight officers dedicated to the U.S. and UK on the Army General Staff. Not until October 1944 – after the defeat at Leyte – was the priority between the U.S. and the Soviet Union reversed, and then it proved impossible to shift resources quickly.

The story of the IJN's intelligence effort is similar. In 1909, the IJN shifted focus to the U.S. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the U.S. was judged to be the IJN's most likely future opponent, up until Pearl Harbor there was a total of ten personnel assigned to the Third Department's Fifth Section which was responsible for the U.S. IJN codebreaking was never as sophisticated as the Army's and was hindered due to the almost total lack of cooperation between the two. The IJN spent less effort on actual codebreaking and more time on intercepting communications where they could examine the externals of the message to analyze amount, frequency, and location. As war was approaching, the SIGINT group under the Third Department became the Special Duty Section directly controlled by the Navy Chief of Staff. One outstanding success was the penetration of the Broadcast for Allied Merchant Shipping cipher which allowed the Japanese to confidently predict the next major Allied move by tracking concentrations of merchant assets. The author contends that this insight included accurate prediction of the January 1944 move against the Marshalls, the Marianas attack in June 1944, and the Iwo Jima attack in 1945.

The IJN's principal shortcoming was in the area of counter-intelligence. The success of the Allies in breaking the IJN's principal codes is well known. The author outlines the Navy's arrogance in believing its codes were unbreakable, despite all evidence to the contrary. This building evidence included the loss of code books from submarine *I-124* in January 1942, the obvious loss of security around the Midway operation, and the suspicious shoot-down of Admiral Yamamoto in April 1943. Another incident in April 1944 served to further underline the IJN's lack of concern with security. Two flying boats were lost in a storm; one carried the Combined Fleet's commander in chief, Admiral Mineichi Koga, who was killed, and the second carried Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome, who was carrying code books and a complete copy of the IJN's future plans for a decisive battle. Fukudome and others were captured by guerillas on the Philippine island of Cebu. The Allies captured both the codes and the plans before copying them and returning them to the area of the crash for the Japanese to recover. The temporary loss of the critical documents was of less concern to the Japanese than the question of whether or not Fukudome was actually a POW during his brief capivity.

Overall, the author contends that Japanese intelligence collection was not

bad. The real problem was in the area of analysis. Culturally, the Japanese saw analysis as putting together the pieces of a puzzle and used mathematically-based procedures to evaluate information. So while the IJA and the IJN used objective basis for analysis, this was hampered by the lack of trained analysts and civilian experts. In 1941, the IJA's Second Department possessed a total of thirty-six officers above the rank of captain; the IJN had a total of twenty-three assigned to its Third Department. Because intelligence gathering was viewed as an easy, simple task, second-rate officers were assigned in intelligence billets. If the incumbent was lucky, his intelligence job was only temporary.

The lack of equal status between the intelligence and operations staffs made it difficult, if not impossible, to share information on an equal basis. Because intelligence officers were viewed as second rate, the operations staff collected information directly and did their own analysis. Not surprisingly, they selected the raw intelligence likely to support their own preconceptions. In short, it is fair to say that the IJA ignored intelligence and that the IJN was indifferent to it.

Because there was little time to distort tactical intelligence, which is naturally more focused, the author makes the assertion that this was an area of success for the Japanese. To support this claim, Kotani states that the Japanese were able to break Soviet signals during the Lake Changkufeng border incident in 1938. The author also states that the IJA was reading Soviet codes during the Nomonhan incident in 1939. While Changkufeng was a tactical success, the Nomonhan incident resulted in a Japanese disaster with the destruction of an entire division, so it is left to the reader's imagination what advantage was gained by this insight into Soviet signals in 1939.

One of the highlights of the book was the description of the use of intelligence to aid the Japanese occupation of French Indochina. This is the only situation in the book where the impact of intelligence is fully described and its effect linked to Japanese actions. In this case, Japanese knowledge of a lack of western response allowed them to proceed with their plans to occupy French Indochina.

Despite the many important contentions raised in the book, overall it was disappointing. It raises many more questions than it answers. It is not well organized as it presents information on the same event in a number of chapters spread throughout the work. Despite a massive bibliography, most from Japanese sources, the main fault of the book is its anecdotal nature when the successes and impact of Japanese intelligence efforts are discussed. The author refers often to the supposed exploits of Japanese intelligence, but these are usually not examined in detail. While he also makes the case that Japanese commanders often ignored or misused intelligence to their detriment, the impact of Japanese intelligence on operations needs to examined in a more meaningful way. In any case, what is clear from the book is that the impact of Japanese intelligence was never comparable to American intelligence that occasionally was so successful that it drove operations. Kotani states that studies on Japanese intelligence are still in their in-

fancy in Japan, and this book reflects that fact. It is a useful introduction to the subject, but much work remains to be done.

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Operation Mincemeat: The True Spy Story that Changed the Course of World War II. By Ben Macintyre. London: Bloomsbury, 2010. Illustrations. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. x, 400.

Deathly Deception: The Real Story of Operation Mincemeat. By Denis Smyth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Illustrations. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. xx, 367.

In April 1943, a body dressed in the uniform of a Royal Marine courier was dropped into the sea off the Spanish coast in the Gulf of Huelva in an attempt to mislead the Axis. Attached to Major William Martin's wrist was a briefcase containing supposedly secret documents indicating that the Allies intended to attack Sardinia and Greece in an imminent offensive in the Mediterranean. The true target, of course, was Sicily, and after the war the deception scheme was the subject of a thinly-disguised novel, *Operation Heartbreak* by Duff Cooper (London: Pan Books, 1950), and two works of non-fiction, *The Man Who Never Was* by Ewen Montagu (London: Evans Brothers, 1953), and *The Unknown Courier* by Ian Colvin (London: William Kimber, 1953).

Following his success with *Agent Zigzag: The True Wartime Story of Eddie Chapman: Lover, Betrayer, Hero, Spy* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), *The Times* journalist Ben Macintyre has completed a detailed account of MINCEMEAT, the operation masterminded by MI5, and his book has been closely followed by Denis Smyth's *Deathly Deception*. While neither disagree on the facts of this now very familiar tale, Macintyre reaches some interesting conclusions. Characterizing the episode "the boldest, strangest and most successful deception of the war," Macintyre says the enemy was completely convinced of the authenticity of the bogus documents, and that they "changed the course of World War II." As a direct consequence, the Germans reinforced Sardinia and deployed the 1st Panzer Division, equipped with eighty-three tanks, to Greece. Aside from these slightly extravagant claims, the author reveals, based on hitherto unseen family papers and some recently declassified MI5 files, that Ewen Montagu's brother Ivor was a Soviet spy and suggests that the *Abwehr* may have had their own motives for declaring the contents of Martin's briefcase genuine.

The value of *Operation Mincemeat* is Macintyre's research into the background of the individual participants. For example, the *Abwehr's* chief in

Madrid, Karl-Erich Kuhlenthal, is traced to a family textile company in Coblenz, while his MI5 counterpart, Charles Cholmondeley, started an agricultural machinery business in Somerset after the war. We also learn that the reason why Montagu received official approval to rush out *The Man Who Never Was* related to Whitehall's determination to sabotage Ian Colvin's scoop. The *Daily Express* journalist was on the trail of Major Martin, having found his grave in Huelva, and the government was anxious to conceal the fact that his body had been utilized without his family's consent. The Home Office had been concerned about religious sensibilities, having pretended that Martin was a Roman Catholic in an effort to discourage a *post mortem* in Spain, and the Foreign Office feared offending *Generalissimo* Francisco Franco.

Ewen Montagu, the real focus of the book, emerges as not a nice man at all, while his brother is proved by more recently declassified VENONA decrypts as a senior source for the GRU's wartime *rezidentura* in London. This latter disclosure is a curious sub-plot, based on the reproduction of what purports to be a VENONA text dated 25 July 1940, identified in the endnotes as having been copied from the version in the National Archives at Kew. However, a comparison between the two documents proves that Macintyre's version could not have come from Kew, but is actually an unredacted text that has only appeared in Christopher Andrew's *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5* (London: Allen Lane, 2009). The cited version is redacted, and there remains an issue about whether Ivor was really codenamed INTELLIGENSIA or NOBILITY. Either way, Macintyre is entirely right in drawing attention to the remarkable coincidence that Ewen's brother was a traitor, working for Moscow during the period of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

While MINCEMEAT's central story will be very familiar to *aficionados*, Macintyre's value is in fleshing out the family histories of the key players, including the British consul in Huelva, the British naval attaché in Madrid, and the *Abwehr's* personnel in Spain. All of this contributes to a very compelling final word on the subject, even if there are some mildly irritating slips. There was no "Naval Intelligence Department" at the Admiralty (it was a Division); GARBO's German codename was ALARIC; and Francis Aiken-Sneath was indeed a distinguished MI5 officer. Macintyre rather insultingly calls his name "too implausible not to be real" and appears to believe the fiction that Charles Fraser-Smith, of a non-existent "Q-Branch," was "chief supplier of gadgets to the Secret Service." Guy Liddell headed MI5's B Division, not "B Section"; William Rolph was never "an Abwehr spy" (although he may have wanted to be); and there is no such statute as "the Treason Act." William Stephenson was neither "a spymaster who reveled in the codename "Intrepid"' nor a front for "British Passport Control"; the Admiralty was not "responsible for running agents and double agents"; and it is ridiculous to assert that NID 17M was "so secret that barely twenty people outside the room even knew of its existence." NID 17 was the Naval Intelligence Division's coordinating unit and included several sub-sections, of which 17M

was but one of many. The existence of NID 17 was not especially secret, although obviously the work undertaken by each sub-section was highly classified.

Macintyre makes some other questionable assertions, such as the claim that Graham Greene based *Our Man in Havana* (London: Heinemann, 1958) "on the Garbo story," which is made without citing any sources in the notes. But overall, the intelligence literature is definitely much richer for this contribution, which is complemented by the work of Cambridge-educated historian, Dr. Denis Smyth, now based at the University of Toronto. His version omits any references to Montagu's brother, but raises an entirely different point, asserting that MINCEMEAT's objective, to give the enemy the false impression that Greece was a target for an imminent Allied invasion, had been supported by another scheme codenamed ANIMALS. According to Smyth, ANIMALS was an operation conducted in June 1943 by a Special Operations Executive team sent from Cairo to blow up the railway viaduct at Asopos. This was "a rip-roaring military success" that kept the route out of action for three months and thereby bottled up the 1st Panzer Division.

What makes this assertion so remarkable is that in this scenario SOE was used deliberately as a conduit for deception. Smyth cites two British officers, Edmund Myers and Monty Woodhouse, as having been "secret advised" at a briefing in Cairo that ANIMALS "would be only a deceptive sideshow," but were cautioned not to mention this to their Greek guerrillas. If true, this is really quite extraordinary, for it implies that Myers and Woodhouse were prepared to place their own lives, and those of their subordinates, in considerable jeopardy for a high-risk venture that had no strategic value beyond a deception plan. So, to be quite clear, the two SOE officers supposedly were briefed on ANIMALS' true objective between March and May 1943, long before they were infiltrated into enemy-occupied territory, but six months after they had participated in a separate mission, codenamed HARLING, the attack on the Gorgopotamos bridge on 25-26 September 1942.

There are, however, a few problems with Smyth's version, quite apart from his minor error concerning the Gorgopotamos operation, which took place two months later, in November 1942. Myers and Woodhouse participated in Operation HARLING, having been parachuted into Greece the previous month. The viaduct was a target because it was the *Afrika Korps'* principal supply route to Salonika, and thence to Tripoli and Benghazi, so SOE's plan was to cut the railway in time for the Allied offensive on El Alamein in October. Because of delays, HARLING took place a month late, but the viaduct remained closed to traffic for about six weeks. However, neither Myers nor Woodhouse could be evacuated by submarine as planned, so they remained in Greece in an unanticipated role as British liaison personnel, working with the local *andartes* resistance. It was in that capacity that in June the following year they were still in Greece when one of their subordinates, Geoffrey Gordon-Creed, was assigned the task, codenamed WASHING, to make a second attack on the railway line to Salonika, this time at the Asopos gorge. After a reconnaissance in April, and an unsuccessful attempt in May,

Gordon-Creed blew up the viaduct on 21 June, and it remained out of action for ten weeks.

So if Myers and Woodhouse were in Greece, how could they have been briefed in Cairo, *after* HARLING, about the planned second attack on the Asopos viaduct and have been warned that it was a deception ploy? The fact that Myers and Woodhouse did not return to Egypt after HARLING rather undermines Smyth's very controversial claim that the plan he calls ANIMALS, but was actually WASHING, was "only a deceptive sideshow." Smyth never mentions the true purpose of HARLING, nor even the fact that in his original brief Myers had been given the discretion to sabotage any of the viaducts at Papadia, Asopos, or Gorgopotamos. ANIMALS was an entirely separate operation timed to coincide with HUSKY, which was scheduled for July.

If Smyth is to be believed, the planning for HARLING began in March 1942, and Myers was told about the deception plan (to cover the invasion of Sicily in sixteen months' time) long before Operation HUSKY had even been contemplated. He then took it upon himself to launch HARLING, in which four of the attackers were wounded, and then WASHING, which was considered almost suicidal. Furthermore, we are encouraged to believe that SOE was in the habit of briefing senior officers on secret future plans, and then sending them into enemy-occupied territory.

Smyth's other claim that the destruction of the Asopos viaduct closed the line "for three months until a replacement could be built" does not stand up to scrutiny. In fact, Greek engineers were supposed to have completed the task in six weeks, but the first structure collapsed, so the job took an extra four weeks, making ten in all.

Under closer examination, Smyth's assertion that SOE participated in a deception plan that involved the Asopos sabotage is rather a manifestation of his misunderstanding of ANIMALS, and his apparent confusion of that operation with WASHING. The issue of SOE's inclusion in deception schemes has always been controversial and dates back to some ancient, groundless claims that SOE personnel were ruthlessly sacrificed in France in an effort to deceive the enemy over the timing of the D-Day landings. There is a distinction to be made between a deception scheme, that has no value of itself, and an authentic military undertaking that has the advantage of fulfilling another purpose, too. Professor M.R.D. Foot scotched the canard that resistance networks had been deliberately sacrificed, but in the absence of much new to say about MINCEMEAT, it seems that at least one other historian is determined to gild the lily. Furthermore, he seems emphatic that Kim Philby was "a double agent" and that there was a British organization named the Radio Intelligence Service (RIS), rather than the Radio Security Service (RSS).

Denis Smyth has performed a useful service by analyzing and rejecting a theory that the corpse was not that of Glyndwr Michael, a Welsh derelict who had killed himself with rat poison, as originally discovered by the intrepid researcher Roger Morgan, but actually a naval rating who drowned when HMS *Dasher* was lost in the Clyde. Smyth's other contribution con-

cerns the debate over the extent to which the German High Command analysts were ever really duped by the documents found in Major Martin's briefcase. A signal ordering the 1st Panzer Division to move by train from Coetquidan in Brittany to Tripolis in the Peloponnese, a location conveniently close to Kalamata and Axios, two coastal sites actually named in one of the letters carried by the bogus courier, was intercepted and decrypted after MINCEMEAT. Thus the Allied objectives, of drawing the enemy into the Balkans and away from Italy and northern France, were achieved, and that particular debate can now be concluded.

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Papa Spy: Love, Faith and Betrayal in Wartime Spain. By Jimmy Burns. London: Bloomsbury, 2009. Illustrations. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. xix, 395.

In 1939, the leading Anglo-Catholic publisher Tom Burns joined the Ministry of Information and, after a brief visit in February 1940, was posted in July to the British embassy in Madrid where he was quickly preoccupied by local intrigues. His task as press *attaché* was essentially one of propaganda, attempting to counter Axis dominance in the distribution of news across the Iberian peninsula. This account of his wartime role, offered by his son, a well-known journalist, places him at the heart of not just Spanish politics but, with access to recently declassified MI5 documents, reveals that the security authorities in London were concerned about his loyalty.

According to the author, MI5's anxieties were not only groundless, but were part of a plot to have him withdrawn that had been masterminded by opponents, among whom were several officers now known to have been serving Moscow's causes, such as Kim Philby and Anthony Blunt.

Burns is described as heading "a powerful and influential nexus straddling diplomacy, propaganda and intelligence" and liaising closely with the naval attaché, Allan Hillgarth, and the local SIS station, having gained the trust of the new ambassador, Sir Sam Hoare. He was also closely involved with Angel Alcazar de Velasco and Luis Calvo, both Spanish journalists who operated in London as German spies. As Burns had approved the appointment of both men, it is hardly surprising that his judgment should have been questioned, although Burns insists that Blunt and Philby collaborated together with MI5's Tomas Harris "to manipulate British policy against Franco's Spain."

Burns says that "the three collaborated in pursuing the case of Velasco and tainted by association the Spanish journalists and diplomats who came into contact with him, thus drawing Calvo into the double-cross system." This interpretation suggests that MI5 entrapped an entirely innocent Span-

iard, and Burns states explicitly that "MI5 set a trap for him" and asserts that Calvo was compromised simply because he responded to a letter mailed to him by an *agent provocateur*, codenamed G.W., and then agreed to meet him "out of journalistic curiosity." This strange version ignores the established fact that Calvo and Alcazar de Velasco were Nazi spies, and G.W. had been paid by both men who were unaware that their agent was actually working for MI5. Indeed, Calvo boasted to G.W. at their very first meeting that he had just completed an espionage mission to north Wales to collect information on aircraft factories.

How odd, then, that Burns should dismiss Velasco as "of extremely doubtful value to the enemy" and Calvo as "a mere pawn." Burns also ignores Calvo's own confession, made after his arrest, and information that Velasco subsequently volunteered to British interrogators after the war. In reality, Velasco saw himself as a master-spy, claiming to run some twenty-one individual spies in England, and employing Calvo as his principal assistant who regularly passed large sums of money to G.W. The evidence for this came from several sources, including intercepted messages to and from Tokyo after Velasco had joined the Japanese payroll, selling information from his network in London. MI5 later concluded that if it had not been for G.W., there was a good chance that Calvo's espionage would have gone undetected, with all that implied for the ability of the Axis to collect intelligence freely in England.

Of course, since Velasco and Calvo were known to Tom Burns, it was only to be expected that MI5 would also take an interest in him, but his son views this as "a conspiracy whose only real impact on the war was in provoking tension between the British and Spanish governments."

Far from acknowledging that Calvo was a dangerous German spy, Burns protests that Calvo was "denied the status and full rights accorded to prisoners of war under the 1929 Geneva Convention" and complains that prisoners held with Calvo at Camp 020 "were subjected to psychological torture of a brutal kind." His treatment was "most ruthless and cynical," says Burns, although actually Calvo survived the war and was returned to Madrid to resume his journalistic career. More than a dozen other Nazi spies were not so lucky.

Although it must be disagreeable to read about one's father in an MI5 file, and see him characterized as "a slippery opportunist," it is hard to deny that Burns had earned the suspicion surrounding him by recommending two Spanish journalists who turned out to be German spies, and a third who was considered highly undesirable. At the very least, as MI5's Dick Broomman-White remarked, this demonstrated rather poor judgment.

Obviously Jimmy Burns is not a disinterested bystander in chronicling what happened to his father, and it is true that he refers to "his pro-Franco leanings and mishandling of certain operations," but does not specify exactly what went wrong. Nor is the author too scrupulous in some of his other assertions. For example, a notoriously unreliable source, Aline Romanones, is cited as an OSS agent in Spain who "helped run a small network of Spanish

maids, secretaries and cooks." In fact, of course, Romanones did no such thing, as is proved by her declassified OSS personnel file. So was Burns himself "working on her [*sic*] Majesty's Secret Service"? Or was Noel Coward an agent of His Majesty's Secret Service? Neither were. Nor was the body of Major William Martin RM, supposedly a man who had died of pneumonia, subjected to an autopsy as part of Operation MINCEMEAT. Minor details perhaps, but they suggest Jimmy Burns has not grasped how SIS operated in Spain. For example, he says "in Madrid MI6 had spent much of the year encoding and decoding the decrypted Abwehr wireless traffic – the so-called ISOS material," whereas these messages never left England, and certainly never reached Madrid. Similarly, in his account of the GARBO double agent case run by MI5, Burns makes some very questionable claims, such as "like all double agents, Pujol was a mercenary who cleverly made himself indispensable to both sides." He also claimed that GARBO had "fed the Germans fake intelligence about the physical damage, or lack of it, wrought by the V1 and V2 bombs," whereas he did no such thing. Nor was there "a struggle between MI6 and MI5" for control of GARBO.

Burns' justification for offering a very distorted version of the GARBO case is the suggestion that "Pujol had applied for accredition as a journalist from the press office in the British embassy in Madrid," adding that "the extent to which several members of the British embassy in Madrid and Lisbon may have been involved in initial contacts with Pujol is difficult to judge given that the intelligence services were selective when declassifying official paperwork dealing with GARBO's activities." In fact, Pujol approached the consulate in Madrid for an entry visa and was rejected. Another attempt in Lisbon was also rebuffed. There was no involvement of the press *attaché* or SIS, and Burns' exaggerated tale is concluded by the wholly unjustifiable claim that

> it was the success of the GARBO operation in tearing apart German intelligence that ensured the ascendancy within Whitehall of those most closely involved. They included Harris, GARBO's case officer, and his friend Philby… who had oversight and overall management of all the communications between GARBO and the Germans.

While GARBO was arguably the most successful double agent case of the war, it was not supervised by Philby and certainly did not bring Tommy Harris any special status within Whitehall.

While *Papa Spy* has considerable value as a chronicle of one diplomat's experiences in wartime Madrid, where he married into a prominent Spanish family, the tendency to involve Tom Burns in operations such as MINCEMEAT and the GARBO deception serve only to undermine the author's credibility. The Security Service concluded that Burns feared that his comfortable life in the neutral capital might be jeopardized by pressure placed on his counterparts in London, and was clearly concerned that he had been more than unlucky in sponsoring so many journalists who turned out to be enemy agents, those fears turned out to be unfounded. But, based on the in-

formation uncovered by Jimmy Burns, there is insufficient evidence to support his view that his father had been victimized by a cabal of real traitors led by Kim Philby and Anthony Blunt.

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Hitler's Man in Havana: Heinz Lüning and Nazi Espionage in Latin America. By Thomas D. Schoonover. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2008. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. xxiv, 218.

Thomas Schoonover's intriguing story of Heinz Lüning, a largely inconsequential figure of limited abilities in Nazi espionage, is based solidly on recently declassified Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) files, as well as the records from archives in Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. In the more than sixty-six years since Lüning's arrest, trial, and execution, there has been very little written about Nazi espionage activities in Latin America, due in part to the reticence of the U.S. government in declassifying much of the historical record. Schoonover's persistence in getting access to this new material is thus worthy of note and offers scholars of U.S.-Latin American relations, Allied counterintelligence, and German espionage a new perspective.

Schoonover weaves a fascinating narrative of Lüning, a somewhat comic figure who ended up a spy not out of any loyalty to the Nazi regime, but out of simple self-preservation. His sensible attempt to avoid serving in the Nazi armed forces, and his inability to find a way out of Germany for himself and his family because of tight Nazi control over exit visas, ironically led him into Nazi espionage. A man with no sympathy for the Nazi ideology was thus left with a choice between serving as a soldier or a spy. In tracing this unexpected path, Shoonover's narrative charts an early life spent without focus, aside from philandering and drinking, and depicts Lüning as a man of limited abilities – something noted by his *Abwehr* instructors.

Lüning's training in the espionage craft began at the *Abwehr* academy in Hamburg in July 1941. From the outset, Lüning was unable to master any of the skills of his new profession. While able to assemble a radio when all parts were provided, when the time came he was unable to acquire the necessary materials, or correctly assemble those parts he did find. Nor was he able to mix and use the secret inks in the way instructed during his training. As Schoonover notes, the "only 'James Bond' characteristics he learned were how to find girls and drinks" (p. 54). None of this escaped the attention of the *Abwehr* instructors, who began withholding information "to minimize any damage to Abwehr activity in the Caribbean if (when?) Lüning was arrested" (p. 55). Unfortunately, Schoonover never provides a clear assessment

of whether Lüning was sent to the Caribbean as a patsy to give Allied counterintelligence someone to chase while more competent agents worked.

After completing his *Abwehr* training, Lüning arrived in Havana in September 1941 posing as a Jewish refugee from Germany. He unwittingly entered a tense milieu of suspicion and intrigue. The agents of many nations worked in Havana – both Axis and Allied. On the Allied side were the eighteen agents run by the FBI Special Intelligence Service, as well as British counterintelligence agents. Added to the mix were Ernest Hemingway's less than helpful private agents supplying overblown and erroneous information about U-boats and *Abwehr* spies to U.S. ambassador Spruille Braden. All of this heightened intrigue, worsened by a particularly black period of the war for the Allies when German U-boats seemed able to locate and sink anything that floated, combined to turn the capture of an inconsequential figure into a major triumph. Lüning's interrogation quickly revealed that he had played no part in German U-boat successes in the Caribbean. Despite this, the desire for personal gain prevented the exploitation of Lüning's capture to expose more of the Nazi espionage network. Instead, Cuban police Chief Manuel Benitez, to bolster his own reputation, publicised Lüning's capture in the local media, and trumpeted him to Cuban leadership as a major spy. He was not the only one to do so. For at least five months after Lüning's arrest, U.S. and Cuban officials, including J. Edgar Hoover, Fulgencio Batista, Nelson Rockefeller, Manuel Benítez, and Spruille Braden, treated Lüning as a key figure for a Nazi espionage network in the theater. Lüning thus went from an incompetent and unimportant figure to master spy for the personal gain of Benitez and others, and to provide a much needed public success story in dark times.

Schoonover weaves an intriguing tale that uncovers a great deal of new information that scholars will find useful. But more clarity is needed on some key issues. Not only is there insufficient evidence provided to substantiate the connection between the price of Cuban sugar imports in 1943 and Lüning's execution, the link between Lüning's life story and the Graham Greene novel, *Our Man in Havana* (London: Heinemann, 1958), is not conclusively proven and seems disconnected with the rest of the account. Of more importance, Schoonover skirts around the key issue of whether Lüning was sacrificed by the *Abwehr* to give Allied and Cuban counterintelligence someone to chase while their more capable agents worked. While there may be no conclusive proof one way or another, the author could still offer a judgement based on the available evidence. Doing so is central to an appraisal of the sophistication of the *Abwehr's* efforts in this theater, and to how seriously the Nazis took the gathering of human intelligence as a source of strategic and operational intelligence. By suggesting at times that the *Abwehr* knowingly sacrificed Lüning, and elsewhere that they were willing to send a less-than-competent agent whose main accomplishment was being the only German spy executed in Latin America during World War II, Schoonover fails to answer the key questions of the overall German espionage threat to Latin America, and the importance of human intelligence and

this theater to Nazi leadership. Still, this book will be a useful resource for historians of German espionage, Allied counterintelligence, and foreign relations in the Americas.

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BRAD GLADMAN
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Intelligence and Anglo-American Air Support in World War Two: The Western Desert and Tunisia, 1940-43. By Brad William Gladman. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Maps. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. xix, 252.

Brad Gladman's work represents an important addition to the historiography of tactical air power development in both the Royal Air Force and the U.S. Army Air Force. His work is based around his Ph.D. thesis completed at University College London in 2002. The key importance lies in his elucidation of the development of the system that was developed in the Western Desert and its relationship with command, control, communication, and intelligence. Another important aspect of this work is its attempt to re-focus the discussion over tactical air power progress away from the much-discussed developments of the *Luftwaffe* to the largely ignored advances of the western allies. This work also complements the recent work of David Ian Hall on the same subject, *Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), and it fits in with the literature on key air power commanders, such as Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham and Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, which have appeared in the past twenty years.

Gladman's key argument is that the success of the Western Desert Air Force, and subsequently the U.S. Army Air Force deployed to North Africa, rested as much on the importance of intelligence as it did on doctrine, equipment, or command relationships. The timely utilization of intelligence allowed the RAF to provide effective Direct and Indirect Air Support to 8th Army in its seesaw battles with Axis forces in North Africa.

The work begins with an examination of the state of tactical air power thinking in both the RAF and USAAF during the inter-war years. It is pleasing to this reviewer to see some recognition given to the work of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, then a Wing Commander, during the 1920s (p. 31). This is something that Hall's book does not do, which is surprising considering the wider scope of his work. Gladman concedes that while the situation was not perfect, there had been a degree of inter-war development and the RAF had the elements required for an effective doctrine.

The core of Gladman's work comes from his analysis of the RAF's development in North Africa and its utilization of intelligence. The work follows a chronological format which allows the author to chart the development as

the campaign progressed. Each chapter deals with a major portion of the campaign, for example, Chapter 3 deals with the period from Operation CRUSADER to First Battle of El Alamein. Gladman's description of the intelligence gathering network is well researched and highlights some of the problems with providing tactical, or real-time, information to pilots during fluid operations such as those that were experienced in North Africa. For example, in describing the early work of the Army Air Support Control (AASC) units during CRUSADER, Gladman notes that they were a failure due to the difficulty of coordination with the pilots (pp. 51-52). Though through experience, the AASC system was refined and proved an invaluable control system that by 1943 was providing the ability to redirect air power when and where it was needed. Though as Gladman notes, this was only as good as the intelligence it was provided with (p. 159).

The author's discussion of the collection and dissemination of intelligence is integrated into the text and shows a good grasp of the history of the campaign. The description of various sources such as signals and "Y" intelligence illustrates their importance in the development and conduct of effective air support for the armies. The work also describes the various units that were used to interpret the intelligence data that was then utilized by planners. These sources of intelligence played a vital role at the operational level and in the interdiction campaigns that were undertaken by the RAF. However, Gladman does note that the failure to utilize human intelligence in the aftermath of the Battle of El Alamein did aid in the failure to cut off the Axis retreat, a mistake he attributes as much to Coningham as Montgomery. The work also illustrates the development of the land-air system in the course of the campaign and shows how after Operation TORCH lessons were learned and integrated and became the basis for future operations.

Overall this is an excellent work that adds to our understanding of the development of Allied tactical air power doctrine and its role in the defeat of the Axis. It raises some important points which deserve further examination. For example, why does the relationship between Tedder/Coningham and Montgomery break down in 1943? While outside the scope of this work, it does open the door to further understanding this command breakdown that was to have an impact in 1944. The book's greatest contribution lies in bringing to the fore the importance of intelligence in conducting effective air operations. As stated by the author, "Intelligence is…a fundamental requirement for the success of tactical air operations." (p. 190). It deserves a place on the bookshelf of anyone interested in air power or the campaign in North Africa. What is needed now is a history of the RAF's Army Co-Operation Command in order to compare the developments occurring in the UK during this period.

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ROSS MAHONEY
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German V-Weapon Sites, 1943-45. By Steven J. Zaloga. Oxford: Osprey, 2008. Illustrations. Maps. Index. Paper. Pp. 64.

V-1 Flying Bomb, 1942-52: Hitler's Infamous "Doodlebug". By Steven J. Zaloga. Oxford: Osprey, 2005. Illustrations. Maps. Index. Paper. Pp. 48.

V-2 Ballistic Missile, 1942-52. By Steven J. Zaloga. Oxford: Osprey, 2003. Illustrations. Maps. Index. Paper. Pp. 48.

Steven J. Zaloga is well known to military historians, wargamers, and those interested in military history. Over the course of a more than thirty years, he has written 100+ books on military topics, though primarily focused on military technology. This review will examine three works by Zaloga on closely related topics – German V-weapons in World War II. All three books were published by Osprey Publishing Ltd., a company founded in 1968 and headquartered in the United Kingdom. (In the interest of full disclosure, the reviewer points out that he has published three books with Osprey.)

The three works under review here are from Osprey's New Vanguard and Fortress series. The first book, *German V-Weapon Sites, 1943-45* (Fortress 72), begins with a brief summary of the *Vergeltungswaffe* (retaliation weapon) programs – including the seldom discussed V-3 *Hochdruckpumpe* (High Pressure Pump) "supergun" and the V-4 *Rheinbote* (Rhine Messenger) short-range ballistic rocket. German V-weapon sites were originally designed as large, well-protected concrete structures near the English Channel. Since the size and scope of these sites attracted Allied bombing, the Germans were forced to try something different. The second group of site designs were less conspicuous and used local terrain and foliage as camouflage. This design faired only slightly better than the first, but was still destroyed by massive Allied bombardments after launches were pinpointed by Allied aerial reconnaissance. The third and final system was designed around mobile V-weapons that were launched from trucks or trains. While largely escaping Allied destruction, the third system failed since the lack of fixed launch locations confused the guidance systems of the weapons and caused them to miss their targets at a much higher rate than before. Zaloga concludes that the entire V-weapons program was a failure, because they failed to produce a strategic result despite a massive investment of manpower, money, and resources.

The second book, *V-1 Flying Bomb, 1942-52: Hitler's Infamous "Doodlebug"* (New Vanguard 106), begins with a discussion of early attempts to create "flying bombs" as well as prototypes of the V-1. Since the German Army was already working on the V-2, Zaloga points out that the *Luftwaffe* only built the V-1 to prevent the Army from controlling the entire "flying bomb" category of weapons. Ironically, the V-1 was much cheaper and easier to build than the V-2. In fact, the V-1 was successful enough that, in December 1944, U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) Major General Clayton Bissell, then serving in the War Department Office of the Assistant Chief of

Staff for Intelligence, argued that the V-1 was a better alternative than conventional bombing in terms of civilian and military casualties versus cost in equipment, fuel, and bombs. Though nothing came of this proposal, the fact that a senior USAAF officer argued for replacing traditional strategic airpower with V-1-type "flying bombs" in 1944, a positively blasphemous claim for an airmen to this day, demonstrates the relative success of the V-1 design. The volume also includes charts of V-1 production by month, the organization of V-1 launch units, and the Allied Operation CROSSBOW bombing campaign attempts to destroy the V-weapon launch sites.

The third book, *V-2 Ballistic Missile, 1942-52* (New Vanguard 82), begins with a brief discussion of early German rocket development. Zaloga provides a detailed discussion of the development of the V-2, an analysis of the weapon's use during World War II, and then the capture and use of V-2s by the U.S. and Soviet Union after the war. While Zaloga acknowledges that the V-2 was absolutely cutting-edge technology, he also argues that it was rushed into production before it was ready. The V-2 was less a military weapon than a finely tuned precision instrument, which was easily damaged or destroyed by seemingly minor accidents. Since it cost almost as much as America's Manhattan Project, but failed to break the Allied will to fight, the V-2 program was ultimately a poor investment by Germany. The volume also includes charts on V-2 targets, manufacture by site and monthly production numbers, and post-war Soviet production of reverse-engineered V-2s.

All three books are well written and well researched. Zaloga provides enough information to keep the specialist interested, while not losing the novice in a blur of technical data. While more detailed books have been produced on V-weapons, such as Benjamin King and Timothy Kutta, *Impact: The History of Germany's V-Weapons in World War II* (Rockville Centre, NY: Sarpedon, 1998) and Michael B. Petersen, *Missiles for the Fatherland: Peenemünde, National Socialism, and the V-2 Missile* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), these slim volumes are worth owning from a time and cost-benefit analysis point of view. I recommend these books and think they would be a welcome addition to most military libraries.

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Tail-End Charlies: The Last Battles of the Bomber War, 1944-45. By John Nichol and Tony Rennell. New York: Thomas Dunne, 2008. Illustrations. Notes. Index. Paper. Pp. x, 420.

Reviewing a book requires clear thinking and unambiguous writing. This review will have neither of these qualities because *Tail-End Charlies* is extremely difficult for me to review.

I make it a practice not to give bad reviews of books, or more precisely, to review books I think are bad. The main reason is because I am apt to be wrong in judging the quality of the book. Such things are a matter of personal taste, and a bad review hurts an author's feelings. I know.

However, this is a bad review. By that I mean the review is flawed, not that the book is bad. Let me be clear about that, even if I am unclear about everything else.

Authors John Nichol and Tony Rennell obviously enjoyed writing this book, and did a great deal of research using an ample amount of both primary and secondary sources. They write very well. However, my review is flawed because two things make it difficult for me to write objectively about it.

The first of these is that it suffers the curse of Stephen Ambrose in that it relies on long, very extensive quotes from letters and personal interviews (as too many historical accounts do now-a-days). This technique seems to be demanded by both publishers and public. Such quotes, used in moderation, are perfectly acceptable. When used to excess however, they begin to sound strangely alike, as if they have been put through some kind of filter that regulates them so that they ultimately seem to stem from just one or two individuals.

My second reason is that the title is not accurate, and is in fact a sort of bait and switch. While it does deal with the two types of "Tail-end Charlies" it defines, and it does concern the last battles of the bomber war of World War II, the book is most important in its discussion of the absolutely scandalous ingratitude of the British to Bomber Command, and in particular to its doughty commander, Air Chief Marshall, later Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir Arthur Travers Harris, GCB, OBE, AFC.

Having warned the reader of my flaws, let us take a look at the book.

The authors defend and define their title early on by noting that the term "Tail-end Charlies" was common to both the Royal Air Force Bomber Command and to the United States Army Air Forces Eighth Air Force. In the latter, the term means the last aircraft in the giant formations that flew over enemy territory. The last airplanes were far more vulnerable. The enemy anti-aircraft had all of the beginning of the formation upon which to register. By the time the end of the formation was passing over, the altitude and airspeed of the formation, along with upper air winds and much else, was well established. Further, with the end of the formation in sight, there was no inhibition about firing as much ammunition as could be loaded. There was far less dispersion of effort and everything could be concentrated against these last few airplanes over the target.

Enemy fighters also took advantage of American "tail-end charlies." To get to them they did not have to fly through the many sets of guns carried by the earlier planes in the formation. If one of the "tail-end charlies" was damaged, it became virtually isolated in the air and a much easier target. As the author's point out, a synonym for flying in the last position was "Purple Heart Corner."

The British used the term "tail-end Charlie" to refer to those brave individuals who flew as tail gunners in the RAF bombers, isolated not only from the rest of the crew, but because of the way Bomber Command flew most of its missions, from the sight of other aircraft. In the compact American formations, with as many as fifty-five aircraft flying in a "box," the proximity of friendly airplanes may have been an illusory comfort, but it was a comfort none-the-less. To the British tail-gunner, the long, individual missions over Germany were hauntingly lonely. They were in addition of course, extremely dangerous, extraordinarily uncomfortable, and totally demanding of the gunner's attention. Any lapse in the latter could easily sacrifice his life and the life of his crew.

Having thus presented two definitions of "tail-end charlies," the authors then select individuals from each group as vehicles for painting a broader picture of the air war. They and others become convenient and valid means of using the "quote to tell" Ambrose approach.

Also very early in the book, the authors emphasize that Sir Arthur Harris, Bomber Command, and the men of Bomber Command were treated shamefully by opportunistic politicians. They were not given the battle honors that were due them, and instead of being honored by the civilian populace on their return, they were treated by the public and press rather in the manner that American veterans were treated after the Vietnam War.

Given the devastating losses of Bomber Command, and given that its efforts were the only effective manner that Great Britain had to strike at Germany proper until late 1944/early 1945, this is amazing. The ever-left leaning media rapidly began to categorize the RAF's bombing of Germany as a war crime, often using the anniversaries of the bombing of Dresden as the *cause célèbre*. This accelerated after the publication of *The Destruction of Dresden* by David Irving (London: Kimber, 1963) and *Slaughterhouse-Five* by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. (New York: Delacorte Press, 1969).

The book points out that this about face from saluting their magnificent heroes to tarring them with the brush of war criminals began even before the war ended. It is heartbreaking to understand that Winston Churchill, the most ferocious enemy of the Germans on the Western Front, also distanced himself from the bombing, and almost certainly restrained the distribution of honors to Harris and Bomber Command. He did this with the full knowledge that 55,000 men of Bomber Command died during the war.

The authors then take the reader chronologically through the last months of the war, with each chapter taking a different tack to convey its message. They record how fear was a very palpable element of life, felt by everyone on every mission. They next show that this very fear generated in some what today would be called "post-traumatic stress disorder," but was then termed "LMF" (Lack of Moral Fibre) by the British. It is hardly surprising that this occurred. What is surprising is that it did not impair the activities of a far greater proportion of the air crews, who grimly set about their tasks in spite of their real knowledge of the dangers involved. As is generally found in all service situations, those that soldiered on did so not so much from patriotism

as from the desire not to let their friends down.

One of the best qualities of this book is the detail in which it depicts the ordinary activities of the air war, from the method in which orders were given, to the feelings a "tail-end Charlie" might experience on returning safely once again, to the sometimes high-school hi-jinks of the officer clubs. Brief vignettes of ordinary life permeate the book and make dipping into it at random inviting.

As the book progresses, it begins to home in on its major theme, the acceleration of the bombing effort, the destruction of Dresden, and then the sudden British disillusionment with Bomber Command. In this process, the authors pay close attention to "Bomber" Harris' pragmatic defense of his tactics. They also carefully attend to disclosing how individual pilots felt about having participated in area bombing raids.

On the whole, the authors leave it to the reader to make a judgment on the morality of the Allied bombing of Germany. They do quote Richard Kohn to the effect that given the length of the war, the fierce resistance of the Germans to the very end, and the terrible suffering the Germans had dealt out to others that "The wonder is that moral scruples entered as much into the calculus as they did."

The book concludes with a discussion of the experience of aircrews as prisoners of war in Germany and a final review of the controversy over the way Bomber Harris choose to conduct his campaign.

I believe that most readers will generally disagree with my assessment of this book as using too many quotes and being somewhat disingenuously titled. My personal regret is that the authors were not more rigorous with themselves. They could have given a more coherent portrayal of the last year of the war if they had distilled and converted more of the quotes into a strong narrative. But that's just my opinion.

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Wolfram von Richthofen: Master of the German Air War. By James S. Corum. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. vii, 421.

This work is the third book James Corum has written on the *Luftwaffe* and the fourth on the general theme of doctrinal development and the operational level of war in the German armed forces from 1911-1945. It is also a full-scale biography of Field Marshal Wolfram von Richthofen, a baron, a gifted air force commander, and a lesser-known cousin of the famous Red Baron, *Rittmeister* Baron Manfred von Richthofen, the most renowned fighter ace of the First World War. By taking a "life and times" approach, Corum sheds

light on the human element in the German development of air warfare and the process by which conceptual thought was translated into the practical application of air power at the operational level of war by one commander whom Field Marshal Erich von Manstein referred to as "the most outstanding air force leader [Germany] had in World War II." (Erich von Manstein, *Verlorene Siege* (Bonn: Athenäum, 1955), p. 258 as cited in Corum, *Wolfram von Richthofen*, p. 1).

The author contends that through an examination of Wolfram von Richthofen's extensive and illustrious military career "we can gain considerable insight about the tactics and operations of the Luftwaffe on the major fighting fronts" during the Second World War. He also states that we can obtain "a deeper understanding of the nature of high command in the Third Reich and the relationship of the professional officers of the Wehrmacht with Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime." In neither respect does the book disappoint. Using the Field Marshal's extensive diaries, Corum provides a logically organized and highly readable examination of Richthofen's personal and professional life. He discusses the Prussian landed gentry that produced Richthofen, his early military career in the pre-1914 Prussian army, his experience in the First World War and his transformation from soldier to airman, his post-war education, and the difficult peace that led to the Nazis and his own involvement in Germany's rearmament and military adventurism including his command of the Condor Legion in support of General Franco's victorious Nationalist forces during the Spanish Civil War. Not surprisingly, the majority of the book focuses on Richthofen's career as an air corps and air fleet commander during the Second World War. Except for the air defense of Germany, von Richthofen played a central role in virtually every major campaign – Poland, the 1940 campaign against France and the Low Countries, the bombing campaign against Britain, the Balkans campaign and the airborne invasion of Crete, the 1941 and 1942 offensives in the Soviet Union, and the defense of Sicily and mainland Italy. The Field Marshal's career ended abruptly in the summer of 1944 when he was diagnosed with a brain tumor and, despite initially successful neurosurgery, he died in U.S. custody at the Bad Ischl hospital complex on 12 July 1945.

Corum details the many technical and operational innovations that von Richthofen was responsible for, as well as his considerable role in developing the close air support tactics that became an essential feature of the initial – and highly successful – blitzkrieg campaigns. Richthofen understood how air power could be decisive in modern warfare, the importance of concentrated force, increasing the range and tempo of operations, and the necessity for centralized command and control as well as sustainable logistics. His uncompromising views brought him into conflict with many of the Army's generals; particularly those who he believed lacked an essential appreciation for the new style of joint campaigns. Richthofen was also a committed German nationalist and an ardent admirer and loyal servant of Adolf Hitler, his *Führer*. Corum clearly admires von Richthofen's industry and military acumen, but he does not shy away from dealing with the more brutal side of this sen-

ior German air commander. In fact, Corum believes that Richthofen, had he survived the war, should have been tried and convicted for war crimes; not for the mass murder of civilians in bombed out cities – something that the air commanders of all the belligerent air forces undertook without any moral qualms or sympathy for the people that were bombed – but for his abuse of and callous attitude towards Soviet prisoners of war. In this respect, Corum condemns all of the senior German commanders who fought in the Soviet Union for their inhumane attitudes and actions.

Among the book's most original contributions to a richer understanding of *Luftwaffe* and German army operations is its attention to the interpersonal relationships between von Richthofen and Hitler, other senior field commanders, and the general staff officers at *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* (OKW). Richthofen questioned the ability of many of his colleagues in the army to appreciate the changing nature of war brought about by the application of mass air power on and above the battlefield. He had even less faith in the generals and staff officers at OKW, who he believed gave Hitler bad advice and regularly undermined operations at the front. Richthofen also enjoyed Hitler's confidence and support. He spoke freely with Hitler, even criticising some of the *Führer's* decisions without suffering any negative consequences. Corum provides additional insight into the nature of their mutual admiration and loyalty, and concludes that it was aided in part by a system of secret rewards which also bound most of Germany's top commanders to Hitler.

This book is well-researched, well-presented, and compelling. The author did not exaggerate when he claimed that "a man with this kind of resumé deserves a thorough biography." Corum has crafted yet another valuable book that merits the attention of anyone who is interested in the German way of war during the first half of the twentieth century.

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Clausewitz Reconsidered. By H.P. Willmott and Michael B Barrett. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2010. Illustrations. Notes. Index. Paper. Pp. x, 236.

Clausewitz's *On War* remains a classic work that is highly valued by historians, political scientists, and military officers. It remains a classic even though Clausewitz never finished the work before his untimely death in 1831 and even though the book focuses primarily on the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. Perhaps even more amazing, in an age of PowerPoint presentations, effects-based operations, and counterinsurgency, *On War* remains a widely read book among military officers, and war colleges and staff colleges continue to offer classes in which Clausewitz is discussed.

The reason is obvious: few works make readers think as hard or as coherently about war as does Clausewitz's *magnum opus*.

Over the last three decades, interest in Clausewitz has increased. The increase has occurred even though his ideas and examples appear less and less relevant to events in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Darfur. As a consequence of changing technology and international politics, some authors, such as Martin van Creveld, treat Clausewitz's ideas as antiquated and irrelevant. Other authors, such as Mary Kaldor, see Clausewitz focusing on "old wars" and societies today facing "new wars." Several authors have attempted to bring Clausewitz's ideas forward in time and to apply his ideas to current issues or the "new wars." The latter include authors such as Michael Handel, Tony Echevarria, Hew Strachan, and Andreas Herberg-Rothe. In that sense, H.P. Willmott and Michael B. Barrett venture onto previously ploughed ground as they seek to recast Clausewitz's framework rather than defend his reputation or explain his meaning. Their work is a brilliant, but not perfect, effort to provide a new basis for analyzing current and future conflicts.

Following Clausewitz's lead, the authors break their work into six books with separate chapters in each book. The first book concerns itself with the "context" of Clausewitz's thought. The authors argue that Clausewitz's concept of war is "peculiarly 18th century" (p. 4) and "simplistic" (p. 190) since it views war pre-eminently as an instrument of state policy and since it emphasizes a clear distinction between war and peace. After the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the emergence of the sovereign state and its virtual monopoly of force within its borders ensured, they say, that war remained an instrument of state policy until the late twentieth century. The authors insist, however, that Clausewitz's ideas have limited application outside this golden age of the sovereign state. Clausewitz, they argue, ignored the great "diversity" of conflicts that occurred before 1618 and could not have known about the even greater diversity that appeared after 1975. The authors also insist Clausewitz's concepts are "dated" because they were crafted before the introduction of modern technology, before the appearance of nuclear deterrence, air power, and the information revolution. With thinking constrained by Clausewitzian concepts of war, modern societies, they say, cannot comprehend fully the diverse forms of modern war existing today or in the future. The authors thus offer a reconsideration of Clausewitz's ideas in order to free the thinking of modern societies from those constraints.

In book two, three, and four the authors examine total war, sea and air power, and conflicts since the end of the Cold War. Throughout these books the authors emphasize the great diversity of conflicts in human history, but they take an especially critical view of sea and air power. They criticize the thought of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Akiyama Saneyuki, Guilo Douhet, and the "notorious" Billy Mitchell (p. 96). They also dissect the ideas of John Ashley Warden III, especially those relating to "Inside-out Warfare" (p. 109). Thinkers outside sea and air power do not escape the authors' scrutiny. Even the fashionable "Maneuver Warfare" school is blasted with its having a "formidable array of arguments, seemingly endless definitions and acronyms,

and a vocabulary that appeared to have been devised in order to confuse rather than enlighten" (p. 108). Some of those, such as Donald Rumsfeld, who have played significant roles in shaping military forces for modern conflicts, however, escape notice or criticism.

As the authors gallop across the landscape of recent conflicts, they devote much of their attention to air power. They observe that the strategic bombing of Japan was "anti-Clausewitzian" (p. 101) since the bombing offensive dominated policy instead of policy dominating the offensive. The authors give air power primary credit for the decisive battle (or *Vernichtungsschlacht*) that ended the 1991 Iraqi campaign, but they remind the reader that the Baghdad regime remained free to suppress internal resistance and had regained full control over its territory by 1995. They also express reservations about the outcome of the 1999 NATO victory against Serbia, especially the growing fixation of American military leaders on "centers of gravity" and "attainable end-states." They are especially critical of "the firm, indeed unshakeable, belief that an end-state can be defined and secured, that war itself can be controlled, and that air power has the means to realize objectives" (p. 121). In essence, the authors argue that military forces, especially air forces, may have the capability to win a campaign, but they may not have the capability to win a war. And the search for a decisive battle against a fragmented, diffuse "polity" may be pointless.

The authors place the meat of their work in book five which corresponds to the first two books in Clausewitz's *On War*. Here, the authors provide basic definitions and address the nature and conduct of war. In the first chapter of this book, the authors state, "[T]he business of war as understood in Western countries over the last three centuries is very different from war as manifest throughout the world at the present time" (p. 152). To explain that "business," the authors provide a graphic and a discussion of "a double helical structure" of DNA (p. 157). They see the eight "elements of war" portrayed in this graphic useful for examining past and future conflicts and determining the "parentage of war" (p. 155). What is true for one strand of DNA or one form of conflict, however, may not be true for another. In the new environment, the one suggested in the "double helical structure," political and military leaders – at all levels – have to understand the international and domestic context of conflicts, recognize the increasing unpredictability and ambiguity of violence, and acknowledge that the use of "steel on target" may be counter-productive. They also have to recognize that there is no easy or simple distinction between military and political domains.

At the end of their work, the authors paint an "apocalyptic" (p. 135) image of the future. A population explosion will be accompanied by racial, ethnic, and religious clashes and civil unrest and strife. Pollution and ecological disasters will transform competition for resources into struggles for existence, and the competition for scarce resources, especially food, will become violent. Significant increases in the killing power and effectiveness of weapons may be largely irrelevant, for while weapons' destructive power may be linear and predictable, their effect on societies and human networks

will not be. Genetic mutations, bacteriological weapons, and cyber warfare may dominate. Conflicts will become more frequent, more diffuse, and less manageable. The specter of Absolute War, the authors believe, is on the horizon.

The question, however, is whether the authors had to "reconsider" Clausewitz to paint such a bleak image of the future. The answer to that question lies in the significant differences they foresee between traditional wars and future conflicts. Without a sophisticated explanation of how conflicts actually have changed in the modern era and moved beyond the Clausewitzian model, the elaboration of apocalyptic scenarios for the future, such as the one in this book, seem more like science fiction than serious analysis. In that sense, Willmott and Barrett have not offered a simple argument, but they have offered important reasons for looking beyond current models.

Unlike Clausewitz, whose analysis ranges primarily from the strategic to the tactical level, Willmott and Barrett's analysis ranges primarily from the strategic to the policy level. They make no attempt to provide sage insights about campaigns or soldiering, but they occasionally offer pithy bits of advice, such as when they say, "[N]ever get involved in a pissing match with a skunk" (p. 161). They nonetheless reject "technological determinism," (p. 176) especially in the thinking of people such as Samuel P. Huntington who have advised relying on technology instead of counterinsurgency efforts. Yet, they say less about counterinsurgency or stability operations than Clausewitz says about "The People in Arms." They do analyze the Maoist concept of Revolutionary Warfare, but they warn that war exists at many different levels and forms, and the "criteria applicable to one form" may not apply to another (p. 154). Their remedy is a very bland emphasis on command and control, joint and combined forces, intelligence, logistics, and lines of communication. Quoting Clausewitz, they warn, "It is easy to conquer; it is hard to occupy" (p. 160). This superficial analysis comes partially from their focus on higher levels of war, but it leaves the reader wondering if the authors have any concrete ideas about how to respond to the new strategic environment.

In contrast, Willmott and Barrett have offered cogent reasons for thinking "outside the box" about important concepts such as "center of gravity" and "end-state." Instead of centers of gravity, the authors prefer to think of "potential points of critical vulnerability" (p. 159). Their preference comes not simply from a change of words, but from a change in focus. Instead of simplistically concentrating on military elements, actors should focus on those "targets" enabling an enemy to ensure its power over a state or community, maintain its economy or finances, and control its militant elements or its armed forces. Vulnerable targets can be attacked in a variety of ways, not only with military force, but also with cyber warfare or by diplomatic, economic, or psychological means. The authors also reject the notion of an identifiable or predictable "end-state." They believe individual commanders can plan and make "rational calculations" (p. 120) but, "In the final analysis, a plan can never be more than the basis of hope" (p. 121). Hope may spring

eternal, but end-states do not.

Throughout their work, the authors skillfully use historical examples to buttress their argument. While the number and breadth of these examples are impressive, a reader will invariably find points of disagreement. For example, the authors offer a postscript on why World War I was "fought to the finish with no attempt to seek compromise" and they offer a simplistic final assessment: "The open-ended permanent commitment to total war in order to avenge the dead: utter madness, but for want of an alternative" (p. 49). The authors overlook the importance, especially for the French, of continuing to survive as a country, regaining territory the Germans had swallowed up, and existing in a post-war world with a mortal enemy on its frontiers. Something far more important than avenging the dead was at stake when Georges Clemenceau stood before France's Chamber of Deputies in 1917 and said, "Neither personal considerations, nor political passions will turn us from our duty.... No more pacifist campaigns, no more German intrigues. Neither treason, nor half treason. War. Nothing but war." What may appear irrational today, especially since the results of past actions are apparent, may have appeared eminently rational at the time.

Willmott and Barrett also offer an argument that at times makes Clausewitz seem easily read and understandable. A sentence on page 174 with more than 100 words about war being a "human activity" illustrates this perfectly. The complexity of their argument and the frequency of their diversions reminds this reviewer of a comment by General Stanley A. McChrystal when shown an extremely complex slide portraying military strategy in Afghanistan. He said, "When we understand that slide, we'll have won the war." In that same sense, when political and military leaders understand this book (including the "double helical structure"), they will be well on their way to understanding the many challenges of the modern era. In Michael Howard and Peter Paret's translation of Clausewitz's work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), the editors included "A Guide to the Reading of *On War*." Such a guide, of course, is not available for Willmott and Barrett's work. It is regrettable that the authors paid more attention to expressing compelling ideas than to expressing those ideas clearly and simply.

In the final analysis, this is a good book, a very fine book. While it suffers from a few inadequate historical examples and some convoluted writing, it offers a reasonable, much-needed reconsideration of Clausewitz and includes a host of challenging ideas. The work undoubtedly will not replace *On War*, but those who read it carefully will think more creatively and soundly about conflict in the future.

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War in Human Civilization. By Azar Gat. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. Paper. Pp. xv, 822.

"Is war grounded…in human nature?" asks Azar Gat, Professor of Political Science at Tel Aviv University, and not just rhetorically. In his *War in Human Civilization*, Gat takes on this fundamental question and its transcendental implications in an extensive analysis of human history that necessarily delves deeply into the neighboring disciplines of anthropology and archaeology. He formulates his approach by dividing the length of human presence on the planet (not just human history) into three parts: "Warfare in the First Two Million Years: Environment, Genes, and Culture;" "Agriculture, Civilization, and War;" and "Modernity: The Dual Face of Janus." Each of these parts is sub-divided into several chapters that largely follow a chronological path tracing the parallel developments of humanity's increasing social complexity across the globe and how conflict grew with it.

To explore such a profoundly basic tenet of life from its very roots, in the first Part of his work, Gat must glean useful details from the imprecise sciences of anthropology and animal behavior, since even archaeology has little to present in the pre-agricultural era. Compounding Gat's analysis is the fluid state of understanding in those fields of study. For example, many popular theories on combative animal behavior, particularly amongst primates, have been overturned in just the past half century, shedding a radically different light on comparisons with human warfare. Furthermore, as Gat shows, martial controversies and assumptions about the nature of pre-agricultural societies extend back to the 17th and 18th centuries with the writings of Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. To help sustain his analysis, Gat devotes almost as much space on historiography as to history.

Furthermore, because of the paucity of truly nomadic hunter-gatherer societies today, or at least a shortfall of reliable data on earlier such cultures that were objectively studied in their final years, Gat must rely on few cultural examples to lay the foundation for his understanding of the evolution of human conflict. In this he employs 19th and early 20th century observations of Australian aboriginal tribal feuds and the conflicts of a modern Amazonian tribe, the Yanomamo. From this tentative basis, Gat examines the highly personal nature of combat amongst such fundamental human organizations as family groups and tribes. Not surprisingly, he observes that individuals risk life and injury primarily to gain tangible and intangible advantages not possible through cooperative or non-violent means. Mankind, Gat points out, also possesses a fundamental capacity for ongoing competition and can opt for violent resolution with ease. This tendency helps propagate a motivation for revenge which often perpetuates tribal conflict since campaigns of annihilation are nearly impossible to prosecute.

A dramatic shift is made in the second part when mankind develops the profoundly changing pastimes of agriculture and pastoralism (herding). To Gat, these advances, occurring in just the last ten percent of human existence, fundamentally altered the way humans settled geographically and in-

troduced daily toil, but it did not change the need for violence. Indeed, the "artificiality" agri-pastoralism begat in the human environment produced new channels for the expression of conflict. This plausibly began with the need to protect against raids from nearby hunter-gatherer cultures which rapidly led to organized defenses such as fortifications and militia. Such an overriding need to protect these new (and geographically fixed) resources would lead to a greater centralization of political power beyond the family tribe. Conflict helped introduce government.

Gat points out that an interesting byproduct of agri-pastoralism on human society was the accumulation of wealth and the rise of leadership classes based not necessarily on individual martial prowess as in hunter-gather tribes, but on men who had the political and material clout to muster loyal men-at-arms. But it was during this new era of human productivity that a cruel dilemma emerged amongst the agri-pastoral cultures: with the potential for increased wealth, "armed force remained as essential as – more essential than – productivity for reaping benefits." The cultures of this era struggled to discern which was more advantageous in the long run, constantly waging war or preparing for it in order to secure the fruits of victory (or staving off defeat) or producing much more in the absence of conflict. Since there was always at least one group ready to wage war, all others had to divert resources to prepare for combat as well. To Gat, it took the modern era with the simultaneous abilities to generate force for gain and to exponentially produce as well to break this cycle.

In his final part, the modern age (i.e. the past 500 years) was elevated by the emergence of Europe as a technologically and economically dominant region with global reach. Curiously, Europe's topography, with its long mountain ranges and deeply penetrating sea inlets, played a major role in keeping the European peoples heterogeneous politically when other regions with more consistent geography tended to be dominated by empires. To Gat, this uniquely European feature meant that competition amongst the states begat technological innovations that were translated to armed might and more sophisticated economics.

The adoption of firearms both rendered classical fortifications obsolete and fundamentally challenged the political order of statecraft by strengthening centralized governments and their bureaucracies. However, Gat points out even this paled in comparison to the emergence of a global trading system – borne by sea power – after 1500. The flow of raw materials and finished products over the ocean highways also improved the liquidity of state economies, producing more vibrant tax bases. Cash started to trump agriculture. In Gat's analysis, market economies and the need for military prowess fed off each other, producing superstates even before the Industrial Revolution.

The most breathtaking development, however, occurred in the century after the Industrial Revolution took hold: although this period saw truly global conflict with unprecedented destruction, the actual number of conflicts waged amongst economically developed nations dramatically fell.

Wars between individual nations gave way to a unique three-way struggle between liberal democracy, fascism, and communism. In Gat's view, liberal democracy prevailed first over fascism by a vital alliance employing the manpower of Soviet Russia, and then outlasted the communism because of the economic unviability of that system. In effect, the expansion of global economics and productivity meant in this era that it was far better to avoid conflict with its attendant diversion of resources and destruction of overseas markets.

As the author noted earlier in his introduction, though most of his work had been completed prior to the mass terror attacks of 11 September 2001, the epochal intrusion of such asymmetrical conflict was to Gat an extension of his primary thesis: that terrorism, even practiced on such a vast scale, is simply made possible by the use of modern weaponry and organizational skills that permit such destruction for so little effort. Resorting to deadly violence still boils down to seeing a potential benefit that exceeds the risk incurred. In his conclusion, Gat summarizes, "…the industrial-technological revolution, most notably its liberal path, has fundamentally reduced the prevalence of war…the violent option for fulfilling human desires has become less promising than the peaceful option of competitive co-operation." For Gat, it is the extent to which these benefits can seep into those regions of the globe than have not perceived them that will determine whether war will become extinct.

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Barbarism & Civilization: A History of Europe in Our Time. By Bernard Wasserstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. xxiii, 901.

University of Chicago professor Bernard Wasserstein has established a reputation for thorough research and even-handedness in his published works on modern history, and this entry on Europe in the last century is an exemplar of his style. There is a no more complex cultural region in the world than Europe, a comparatively compact landmass that is essentially a series of elongated peninsulas extending from the broad Asian steppes, and yet it is home to a bewildering array of nationalities, cultures, religious sects, economies, and political outlooks. Although Europe has arguably been the cockpit of global progress for more than five centuries, Wasserstein has chosen the most sanguinary of those, the 20th, to interpret, and to do so in a study that crosses disciplinary lines few historians are competent to undertake.

The main text is some 793 pages and Wasserstein proceeds in a chronological manner, organizing his narrative into twenty chapters that are un-

avoidably defined by the conflict of the day, even in the "peaceful" decades following 1945. Since this is predominantly a socio-political history, the work actually begins on the eve of the Great War in 1914 in the twilight of the post-Napoleonic order and extends into the first decade of the present century in the morning years of a unified Europe. Since this is a broad history, Wasserstein devotes considerable space to humanistic factors that contributed to the dominant political and diplomatic events of the era such as educational standards, living conditions, and even evolving sexual mores. He dives with equal facility into the daunting depths of finance and economics, though he eschews the encumbrances of jargon.

While military students may be disappointed with the shallow treatment given to the campaigns and strategies in the World Wars, Wasserstein still delivers a treasure-trove of information on demographics and politics that helped shape popular thought in Europe during and immediately after these conflicts which left its imprint long after. This approach is quite sensible since the actual fighting during even these massive conflicts consumed only one tenth of the period covered in this work. Another apparent shortcoming is the terse treatment given to American policies during and after both of these conflicts, but Wasserstein is exerting scholastic discipline in limiting his coverage of these matters to European reactions when those policies had an impact on their interests.

The real strength in *Barbarism & Civilization* is its comprehensive look at Europe from 1945 onwards. With the Cold War now two decades past, sufficient time has elapsed to allow a sober appraisal of that dominant half-century when practically all of Europe was no longer in control of its destiny. Here, Wasserstein's talent for weaving the various sectors of human studies into a coherent narrative is a gift to students of the era as he commits equitable space to both sides of the Iron Curtain. More remarkably, he avoids over-simplifying the political impasse between East and West by treating each nation individually and examining the local social, political, and economic situations therein. These insights yield some fascinating details such as the unique fallout of the forced trans-migrations in central and eastern Europe in 1945-46 which virtually removed all ethnic minorities from Poland, Hungary, and Romania. On the lighter side, a whiff of the author's bemusement in treating the tragi-comedic politics in postwar France wafts from the pages.

Another remarkable aspect of the author's style is his balancing act between compassion and clinical detachment. As the work's title suggests, the 20th century was a largely unpleasant era even beyond the wars, and his coverage of Stalin's purges and show trials of the 1930s deftly pierces the leftist smokescreens of the time to reveal the depths of the human tragedy within. On the other hand, the fresh ethnic atrocities in the former Yugoslavia of the 1990s did not attain the same literary level. Although this work is a large tapestry, Wasserstein has a talent for fleshing out the odd individual such as P.G. Wodehouse, a British humorist snatched up by the advancing German army in 1940 and who "incautiously" broadcast from Ger-

many during the war only to find himself without a country afterwards; or how playwright Bertolt Brecht, returned to East Germany from exile in America, mocked the West and in 1955 accepted the Stalin Peace Prize while retaining "his Austrian passport, Swiss bank account, and West German publisher."

In spite of the subject's complexity, Wasserstein maintains a swift pace in his narrative, using an admirable economy of words to convey his ideas. This narrative style and his even-handed treatment of actions and motivations, however, bely the suggestive title of the work. Though factual throughout and academically comprehensive, there is no guiding theme to anchor the work, no recurring motif to serve as a story arc – there is but a single paragraph at the end of the final chapter (and it is a narrative, not a summary chapter) to encapsulate the entire century. All this is not a sin, if the book were presented more as a reference work than a polemical piece. After twenty chapters of remarkably informative presentation, this history ends rather abruptly without a unifying summation setting that provocative century in context with neither the preceding era nor our own uncertain times. But, Professor Wasserstein has performed a yeoman feat in establishing an accessible and intelligent narrative that will serve as a basis for subsequent histories exploring the myriad facets of the European story. Wasserstein has set a magnificent table, now it is up to others to serve the feast.

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The Third Reich: Charisma and Community. By Martin Kitchen. Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2008. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Paper. Pp. xx, 403.

In his recent work, *The Third Reich: Charisma and Community*, Professor Martin Kitchen utilizes a wide range of historical scholarship, including his own past work, to compile a short history about the "uniquely German phenomenon" of National Socialism (p. 1). Unlike his previous book, *A History of Modern Germany: 1800-2000* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), where he justified the necessity of a narrative account, Kitchen provides no explanation in this volume for why he chose to organize his thematic chapters into a semi-chronological narrative. Although this thematic approach is a viable alternative to a chronological account, *The Third Reich* is not as fluidly written as his earlier work. Nonetheless, using this thematic organization, Kitchen synthesizes previously existing theses to explain why "Germany alone among the technically and culturally advanced states fell prey to a radical fascist movement that established an unchallenged dictatorship with breathtaking rapidity" (p. 18). The author also over-

views Adolf Hitler's charisma, discusses its influence in the formation of policies by the Nazi party and government, and appraises how the German people responded to the *Führer's* personal magnetism throughout the rise and fall of the Third Reich.

Kitchen divides the book into ten thematic chapters, which allows him to delve into selective details about each topic. The first one, however, is the most problematic. It ostensibly presents the intellectual underpinnings behind National Socialism, but it does so unevenly. Kitchen admirably explains the context and importance of the philosophies of several intellectuals, most notably Martin Heidegger, Ernst Jünger, and Carl Schmitt. Yet, for dozens of other equally important people, Kitchen simply includes their names without adequately describing their ideas and how those ideas contributed to the rise of Nazism. Without this context, it is difficult to understand how these people and their work influenced National Socialism.

Chapter two, in which the author summarizes the basic history of the Nazi party from its founding to Hitler's appointment as chancellor, is far more readable. Kitchen explains the concepts of nationalism and socialism well and he places these ideas into the historical context of the search in Germany to find national solidarity, especially the quest to create a national identity. He provides a brief but thorough overview of Max Weber's notion of the charismatic leader and connects this intellectual definition with the reality of Hitler's leadership style. This overview and connection are highly significant because Hitler's charisma and its appeal to the German people is the primary link from chapter to chapter.

Chapter three analyzes the time from Hitler becoming chancellor through the commencement of the war. In these years of peace, the author describes the *Gleichschaltung* of the party and the state, Hitler's rule as a hands-off dictator, and the success of the "irresistible" Hitler myth in earning the "adulation" of the German people (p. 115). Chapter four outlines Hitler's economic goals, noting when economic planning succeeded and when it failed, especially during the war when the government sought to balance the production of guns and butter. The fifth chapter presents the relationship between the state and the churches – both the support of and dissent by Catholics and Protestants for the regime; additionally, it evaluates the role of education in Nazi society.

The objective of chapter six is to assess the purpose of propaganda, and it is the strongest one. While the chapter is primarily about the domain of Joseph Goebbels, it does discuss the competition between the Nazi propaganda minister and other party leaders, such as Alfred Rosenberg and Hermann Göring, for control of enlightening the people. It highlights the political purpose of various forms of art, including architecture, cabaret, design, film, literature, music, painting, sculpture, and theatre. Kitchen points out the lack of a uniform Nazi ideal when it came to propaganda, yet showed where and how each type of art succeeded in spite of this lack of clarity. He also discussed the important people within each genre, highlighting the critical fact that most artists willingly worked for the regime and were well-

compensated for doing so; only a few people defied the state, most of the time suffering negative consequences as a result.

Chapter seven discusses the history of the SA, SS, and the police. The development of the SA is unsatisfactory as it is only mentioned in the context of its loss of power and prestige to the SS; its own importance as a mass movement is not adequately developed. Nonetheless, Kitchen describes the Stennes *putsch* with more clarity than most other secondary literature. Otherwise, the bulk of the chapter focuses on the offices within the SS and the police, highlighting the machinations of their leaders throughout the 1930s and 1940s, especially as they formulated policies to eliminate the Jews. With the development of these plans for the Final Solution, Kitchen explores the lack of cohesion within the Nazi state, again underlining how Hitler and the myth of his charismatic leadership was the only thing that bound together all aspects of the Third Reich.

The eighth chapter summarizes German foreign policy and focuses on Hitler's determination to win living space for Germany prior to the war through diplomatic negotiations and physical expansion. Chapter nine shows the development of the Final Solution from the mobile killing units to the camps. Kitchen notes that the six death camps were "not the result of a master plan," but of "individual drives at the local level" (p. 320). However, even with this caveat, he proclaims that Hitler's minions could have never implemented a policy of mass murder "without his approval and encouragement" (p. 305). Finally, chapter ten delves into the war and shows how the charisma of the *Führer* lost "its magic hold over an entire people" as the war turned against Germany (p. 366). In this chapter, Kitchen also emphasizes how changes in the officer corps of the armed forces led to its complicity in mass murder.

Overall, *The Third Reich* has many promising segments; among them are the sixth chapter as well as the bibliography, which organizes the resources thematically and would allow a reader to pursue further research on a particular topic easily. If used in conjunction with an undergraduate course on Nazi Germany to reinforce chronologically-based lectures, this book might serve as a useful reference. It would reinforce lessons on the history of Nazism and the Third Reich – its origins, its ideals, and its prominent leaders. The book would likewise clarify the position and power of Adolf Hitler *vis-à-vis* his supporters in the party, the government, and the general population by placing him, his charismatic appeal, and his actions within the larger context of mid 20th century German history.

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Hitler's Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe. By Mark Mazower. New York: Penguin, 2008. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. Paper. Pp. xl, 725.

Mark Mazower has written an interesting, well-researched, and sometimes provocative analysis of how Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists ruled their extensive conquered domain, 1938-1945. Mazower is Professor of History at Columbia University and also has authored prize-winning books on Greece and modern Europe.

Three major themes dominate Mazower's work. The first relates to the oft-raised question of how prepared the Nazis actually were to deal with their conquered territories. Mazower leaves no doubt here. He argues that the Nazis, rather like the dog that chases a truck and to its surprise finally catches it, did not know what to do after they achieved their tremendous military successes. They had done very little planning relevant to their new world and the very speed of their victories washed over them tsunami-like. For example, Mazower clinically comments, "The German military gave almost no thought to the subsequent occupation [of the USSR]" (p. 141). The frequent result was a confusion of goals, monumental disorganization, and a profusion of improvised, contradictory short-run activities that usually were tied to what someone hoped or believed Adolf Hitler preferred.

Second, Mazower demonstrates that Nazi rule in the West was relatively benign when compared to the Germans' abominable behavior in the East and for several years the Germans even allowed for a modicum of democratic government in countries such as Denmark. The Germans were more interested in economic exploitation of the West than they were in racial crusades. Further, Western Europeans typically did not resist the Germans. Mazower comments, "Europeans fell into line and contributed what they [the Germans] wanted…" (p. 60). He writes that the power of civil servants and police in France actually increased after German occupation because the Germans found they could rely upon most of these individuals to carry out German orders. French artists and performers ranging from Picasso to Maurice Chevalier continued their work and even prospered under the Germans.

Third, Adolf Hitler's views on war and race substantially explain Germany's behavior in its short-lived World War II empire. Hitler believed that war was Germany's destiny. This view, spiced by his ever-hardening racial outlook, molded the Germans brutal rule in its Eastern conquered territories. The attitude of German officials for their conquered Eastern subjects was captured by the comment of a German official in Ukraine who averred, "We are here in the midst of Negroes" (p. 4).

Hitler's Empire is very well researched and documented. The forty-two pages of small print Notes leave little doubt about the materials upon which Mazower relied. Even so, a zest for details is hardly a foreign characteristic to good historians. What sets this work apart is the dozen or so hypotheses he offers relative to what motivated the Nazis and how they behaved in their conquered lands. Few of these hypotheses are original to Mazower, but he states them clearly and they have not before been collected together, ex-

plored, and so thoroughly documented in any volume. Following are several examples.

(1) The German's frequent use of terror as a means to cow subject populations and rule their empire worked better than many perceive. Thus, after the war, Albert Speer mocked, "What French resistance?" (p. 516). Of course, things were different in the East, but Mazower concludes that even there, German terror and disproportionately brutal reactions to resistance actions put a damper on resistance activity until the final years of the war. He remarks, "…German officials in most of Europe had not been overly troubled by resistance until late in the day" (p. 6).

(2) Adolf Hitler portrayed little interest in developing occupation polices that might appeal either to the occupied countries or to his allies. Indeed, he often eschewed specific, written policies because he wanted no constraints on his future actions. In particular, he wanted absolute flexibility in regulations and judicial processes in the East.

(3) German plans to resettle and Germanize huge portions of the conquered eastern territories were wildly unrealistic. There simply were not enough Germans (even loosely defined) to go around and this process would have required decades, not years, even if sufficient Germans could be resettled. Hence, while Adolf Hitler did acquire *Lebensraum* – a notion that did not originate with him – filling that new territory with Germans was another matter.

(4) Germany's imperial fantasies ran amuck in the East and Mazower suggests these actions were partially rooted in racism that can be traced back to Bismarckian and Wilhelminian times. When Hitler issued a general amnesty to *Wehrmacht* soldiers convicted of crimes during the Polish invasion, the message was clear – conventional legal and military strictures were not to apply in the East.

(5) Adolf Hitler's European empire was hardly comparable to either the Roman Empire or the British Empire, both of which were far more enduring, less racist, and more inclined to sustain attempts to bring their definitions of civilization to their subjects than were the Germans. Nevertheless, in Summer 1942, the Germans ruled over an area larger in size, more heavily populated, and more economically productive than the United States.

(6) The 1919 Versailles settlement that stripped Germany of portions of its traditional territories and caused many Germans to leave these lands as a consequence was viewed by Hitler as a "biological threat to the survival of the German people" (p. 43).

(7) It was the "triumphant reception" (p. 48) that Adolf Hitler received in Austria during the *Anschluss* that led him to decide that Austria should disappear as a country.

(8) Though the Germans found the rearrangement of European borders after World War I to be utterly objectionable, they proceeded to do the same thing in their conquered territories. Rumania was one of the major losers, though it temporarily gained other territory as compensation when it joined the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.

(9) Mazower asserts that the Germans ended up occupying much European territory "that offered no obvious benefits of any kind to the Reich" (p. 135). One reason for this was that at most ninety million of the 244 million people under Germany's control could be classified as German (p. 245), almost one-half of whom were classified by the Germans as *rassefremde Volker* (race-hostile people).

(10) While littered with terror, brutality, executions, and exploitation, the post-war Soviet occupation of Eastern and Central Europe is dissimilar to that of the Nazis. Soviet occupation was not genocidal.

(11) The Holocaust was only the beginning of what Hitler and the Nazis conceived of as a massive racial cleansing and restructuring of populations in the East. Mazower suggests that Slavic populations in Eastern Europe would have been a primary future target of the Nazis had the Germans defeated the Soviets.

(12) Hitler's allies in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the former Yugoslavia often rivaled the Germans in their brutality and executions. Old nationalistic, political, and anti-Semitic grudges often flowered into orgies of torture and murder, especially in Antonescu's Rumania. Of all Hitler's allies, the Italians probably were the least likely to imitate the Germans, but even Italy sometimes strayed from the path.

(13) Some 8.6 million civilians subjugated by the Germans died through extermination, starvation, or disease. A massive majority of such deaths occurred in the East. Some of these individuals easily might have taken the side of the Germans against the Soviets had they been approached differently and still others, had they lived, could have mitigated the severe shortage of labor Germany experienced as the war progressed. On top of that, almost 2.0 million Soviet POWs (many potential soldiers or workers) died in German captivity in the occupied USSR before the Nazi/Soviet conflict was a year old.

(14) Hitler preferred to appoint *Alte Kämpfer* ("Old Fighters" from the 1920s) and cronies to administrative posts in the East. These appointees frequently were corrupt and often less competent than the better educated and generally younger officials from the SS, which sought, but except for the Holocaust, did not receive the formal mantel of leadership in the East. Mazower observes that Hitler attached such low importance to the administration of the East that he assigned the quirky philosopher Alfred Rosenberg (whom Mazower labels a "hack," p. 145) to develop the equivalent of a position paper on what the post-war conquered Eastern territories would look like. He then ignored Rosenberg's views.

(15) The Nazis periodically proffered the dream of a Europe united under German domination – one that would rival and even surpass the United States. Even so, they almost completely shied away from movements toward any political integration during their *regnum* and also largely declined to attempt to integrate Western European economies into a coherent continental whole. Mazower does not analyze the views of others that a few kernels planted by the Germans eventually did mature into cooperative develop-

ments such as the European Iron and Steel Community in 1951. Nor does he examine the contention of a few (mostly German veterans) that the troop contributions that German satellite nations and allies made to Eastern Front battles were the forerunner of NATO.

(16) Adolf Hitler exhibited very little interest in reacquiring the limited colonial possessions that Germany lost as a result of the Treaty of Versailles. His focus was on *Lebensraum* in the East. In the Pacific, most of Germany's World War I-era holdings went to the Japanese, who dutifully fortified them. The United States was to find these islands tough military nuts to crack in World War II.

Counting bibliography and notes, *Hitler's Empire* is 725 pages in length. It is not a book for the faint hearted. It is, however, full of interesting analysis, contains several challenging surmises, and is very well documented. It is a must-read for anyone interested in how the Nazis dealt with their conquered lands.

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Barbarossa Derailed: The Battle for Smolensk 10 July - 10 September 1941: Volume 1: The German Advance, the Encirclement Battle, and the First and Second Soviet Counteroffensives, 10 July - 24 August 1941. By David M. Glantz. Solihull: Helion, 2010. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Appendices. Index. Cloth. Pp. xii, 656.

Given the importance of the Eastern Front to the downfall of Nazi Germany, the volume of scholarly literature appearing in English is disappointingly small. Yet, no other historian has done more to rectify this circumstance than David Glantz. His dedication to the field, as well as his productivity, is well known and his latest offering, the first of another multi-volume set, deals with the much-neglected battles in the center of the Eastern Front in the summer of 1941. Specifically, Glantz deals with Field Marshal Fedor von Bock's Army Group Center and Marshal Semen Timoshenko's Western Front during the battle of Smolensk. As his title suggests, Glantz correctly ascribes decisive importance to the fighting in this area. He writes:

> the *Wehrmacht* and Red Army would fight a complex series of battles across a front of roughly 645 kilometers known collectively as the battle of Smolensk. As they did, they knew full well they were engaging in a struggle that could determine the ultimate outcome of the war (p. 135).

On the surface, the fighting at Smolensk was a series of Soviet calamities, which has appeared to confirm the near total dominance of the *Wehrmacht*

in the early period of the war. Yet as Glantz documents through his lengthy citing of Soviet front and army orders, the relentless counterattacks by the Red Army, while horrendously costly, were also having a compromising effect on the motorized divisions of Hoth and Guderian's panzer groups. For the Germans, it was these vital formations upon which the success of the German blitzkrieg depended. As one Soviet report cited by Glantz stated:

> From prisoner-of-war interrogations and captured documents, it has been precisely determined that the tank and motorized divisions operating in front of our forces have been seriously worn down, suffered huge losses, and have, on average, 40-50 percent of their personnel (p. 117).

Of course, such Soviet reports were subject to a degree of guesswork, but from this reviewer's engagement with German military archives, Soviet conclusions remain largely accurate. Bock's heavy losses during the course of his summer campaign precluded the possibility of achieving in September and October what had proven impossible at Smolensk in July and August. Glantz is therefore correct to argue that Barbarossa was effectively being "derailed" during the course of what many have regarded as Bock's "victory" at Smolensk.

In trademark detail, Glantz's first volume of the *Barbarossa Derailed* series charts the course of the fighting up until 24 August 1941. He opens with an assessment of German and Soviet plans, the border battles, and Bock's drive to the Dvina and Dnepr Rivers (chapters 1 and 2). He then assesses the onward German advance to Smolensk, the developing encirclement, and the first major Soviet counteroffensive launched at the end of July (chapters 3, 4, and 5). The German siege of Mogilev, the reduction of the Smolensk pocket, and Guderian's conquest of Gomel (chapters 6, 7, and 8) underline the complexity of operations during the summer as well as highlighting many battles, which in their own right have been largely forgotten. The second major Soviet counteroffensive, from 6-19 August, and the German drive to take Velikie Luki (chapters 9, 10, and 11) round out volume one, leaving the Western Front's Dukhovshchina offensive and the Reserve Front's El'nia Offensive (28 August – 10 September) to be explored in volume two. There is even a third volume of documents in production as well as a fourth volume with specially commissioned color maps.

Overall, a full accounting of the battle of Smolensk such as Glantz offers suggests that a simple tally of battlefield losses is not the only, or even the best, method of assessing the results of the fighting. The onus of what determined success was entirely different for the *Wehrmacht* and the Red Army. While the former aimed for nothing less than a complete victory – with no contingency for anything else – the latter only needed to remain as a force in being, awaiting the advantages of total war mobilization and seasonal change.

Barbarossa Derailed is a meticulously researched and cogently structured study of the Red Army in the battle of Smolensk, which – if I may be permit-

ted – complements my own study of Bock's Army Group Center in the same period (*Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.). This is not to say the two studies agree on everything, which to an extent reflects the differences in using German and Soviet archival material. One example is Glantz's branding of Kuntzen's LVII Motorized Corps' withdrawal from Velikie Luki in July as "premature and ill-advised" (p. 269), a judgment which is not supported by the difficulties graphically set out in German corps and divisional files from 18-20 July. Nevertheless, quibbles aside, there can be no question Glantz is on the road to another towering achievement in the history of the German-Soviet war. I await volume two with eager anticipation.

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Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East. By David Stahel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. xvi, 483.

In *Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East*, David Stahel seeks to reinvigorate debate on the planning of Operation Barbarossa and its execution by Army Group Center. Utilizing archival information on armies, corps, and divisions, the author aims to create a paradigm shift in the accepted Anglo-American view of German operations during the opening phase of the invasion of the Soviet Union. This view, Stahel argues, was influenced by former German generals in the service of the U.S. after the war and those who left memoirs. German historians, it appears, have moved toward studying the German Army's role in the Holocaust and the intertwining of Army policies with that of National Socialism. Few have attempted to reevaluate the *Wehrmacht's* activities on the field of battle and, as a result, most current literature becomes a stale rehashing of banal decade-old myths. Even when Anglo-American historians sought to highlight the multiple weaknesses of the *Wehrmacht* and within German planning, they still adhered to the claim that Barbarossa was a success. Although Barbarossa began as a Blitzkrieg campaign, *Wehrmacht* forces were spent by the time the Smolensk pocket began to form – the end result was positional warfare. Stahel's thesis thus rests on the idea that as soon as attritional warfare set in, both operation Barbarossa and the entire war in the east were doomed to failure.

Dividing the book into two parts, Stahel first analyzes the planning for Barbarossa. Initially, Adolf Hitler viewed the destruction of the Soviet Union as a means to end England's continued resistance. Only at the end of March 1941, when planning for Barbarossa was heavily underway, did other factors seep into Hitler's rhetoric, culminating in the ideologically driven war

he would unleash in the summer of 1941. In analyzing the multiple plans presented to Hitler throughout late 1940 and early 1941, the author concludes that the initial German plans against the Soviet Union contained the seeds of their eventual failure. Victory was a foregone conclusion for the German High Command, there was no contingency planning for defeat. The only real question left was to decide "how best to win a war that none doubted would be won" (p. 79). When presented with unfavorable intelligence, contradicting accepted beliefs *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union's ability to resist and the *Wehrmacht's* ability to wage war, the Army General Staff ignored it or self-censored their own reports. Still reeling from their victory in the west, and particularly aware of the role Hitler played, the General Staff felt the need to compensate for their fear before the invasion of France. Barbarossa featured an enemy most believed incomparable to the armed forces of England and France, and while planning for the western campaign saw the *Wehrmacht* prepare for a six-month confrontation, the destruction of the Soviet Union was planned for half that time. Stahel shows how the early stages of planning for Barbarossa were riddled with information produced to match already accepted decisions, "rather than information being gathered on which to base major decisions" (p. 51).

While much ink has been spilled in evaluating the counterfactual of what would have happened if Adolf Hitler decided to continue toward Moscow at the end of the battle for Smolensk, the author insists this dilemma has inadvertently accrued the significance of deciding between success or failure; especially since wargames conducted in December of 1940 already forecast the division between Chief of the Army General Staff, Franz Halder, for whom Moscow was the main objective, and Hitler, who treated the Soviet capital with marginal interest and mainly concerned himself with the destruction of Soviet forces. Accordingly, in offering a detailed discussion of the planning stages for Barbarossa, Stahel shows the continually weak and divided planning on the part of the German High Command, which failed to take into account the spatial dimensions German forces would be operating in, the climate, the logistical and transportation network needed to sustain advances based on Blitzkrieg tactics, and the inevitable attrition to be leveled against the *Wehrmacht* by the Red Army, no matter the speed of advance. Thus, the question of which direction would convincingly win the war – a continued advance on Moscow or toward Leningrad and Ukraine – for Germany becomes moot. For Stahel, the "general consequences of many factors" made victory impossible (p. 24).

Highlighting the deficiencies of the German Panzer arm, Stahel discusses the various tanks taking part in the invasion, half of which consisted of obsolete light models. While technical details can only tell us a part of the story, the author emphasizes the varied production runs and the continued use of captured equipment, from tanks to trucks, so as to demonstrate the future strain put on both the logistical net following Army Group Center and the enormous amount of spare parts required to keep dozens of models going. In fact, Army Group Center began the war with 2,000 different types of

vehicles and stocked more than a million types of spare parts (p. 131). When compared to the Soviet KV-1 and T-34 tanks, the Germans were undoubtedly behind in their tank designs. The end result was a *Wehrmacht* composed of two separate armies; one that relied on wheels and tracks to perform breakthroughs and Blitzkrieg operations, and the other, making up the majority of the German Army, relying on foot and horsepower.

Unfortunately, as Stahel accurately assesses, the mainstay of the Soviet tank park in June 1941 consisted of light T-26s and BT models, seventy-three percent of which were in need of serious overhauls or lesser maintenance. The result was an initial string of German victories dictated more by poor Red Army performance, and handling of the technology at their disposal, than German military prowess. This, according to the author, is "a point too often overlooked or under-emphasised in much of the existing literature focusing on the German experience in Operation Barbarossa" (p. 121). While light, outdated German tanks weakened the overall ability of the *Wehrmacht* to wage war, Stahel argues the eventual quagmire of the eastern campaign was a direct result of the failure of Halder's General Staff to predict and assess the hazards awaiting the *Wehrmacht*, and Halder's covert actions in attempting to leave the second operational objective of Army Group Center an open question: would it be a continued drive east, toward Moscow, or north and south, toward Leningrad or Ukraine?

The second section discusses the first two months of war on the Eastern Front, concentrating mainly on the two Panzer Groups of Army Group Center and the infighting between the Army High Command, specifically Halder and Hitler, over strategy. Within the first days of Operation Barbarossa the limitations of the road network in the Soviet Union became evident. For instance, during a day which should have produced an eighty-kilometer advance, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, moving along the same road, advanced only eighteen kilometers (p. 156). While most authors scoff at the damage inflicted on German forces by cut-off Red Army units in the initial period of war, Stahel argues that even such actions resulted in a detrimental effect on Army Group Center's ability to advance into the Soviet Union. Due to the chaos and disorganization experienced by the Red Army during the first weeks of war, conventional engagements were rare and decidedly favorable to the *Wehrmacht*. But countless ambushes by Soviet forces left in the rear of advancing Panzer formations caused problems for both logistics and German infantry divisions struggling to catch up to their mechanized comrades. Simultaneously, the climate, terrain, and Red Army resistance were taking a toll on Germany's panzer divisions; a week after the invasion, losses in the 7th Panzer Division constituted fifty percent of Mark II and III and seventy-five percent of Mark IV tanks (p. 173). By 4 July, Hermann Hoth's Panzer group could only field fifty percent of its tank force as combat-ready. Aside from the wear and tear the panzer arm was experiencing, on 6 July German records listed 54,000 men as total casualties, to which Halder added another 54,000 as "sick." Further, due to the fast-paced advances of the armored and motorized formations and the lengthening front, German forces

began to suffer from overextension; individual units from the 29th Motorized Division were cut off and encircled, being forced into costly engagements with Soviet troops in forests and swamps.

When the Belostok-Minsk pocket, the first encirclement of Barbarossa, was finally closed, it could only be called a major success if one ignores the situation on the ground, as Stahel points out: "The southern flank of the pocket haemorrhaged like an open wound for the Germans, with Kluge unable to close it, and Guderian unwilling even to recognize the problem" (p. 185). Only on 8 July was the fighting within the Minsk pocket finally proclaimed over; however, the fact that one-third of the thirty-two encircled Red Army divisions had managed to escape was readily ignored in German claims of great success. What started off as planning for an already expected victory – and feigned unawareness of what operations in the east held in store – transformed into reports of operational success and ignored strategic failures. As further operations for the creation of another pocket in the Smolensk area began, German tank strength continued to fall. For instance, the 4th Panzer Division could field only forty tanks out of an initial strength of 169; the 7th began the war with 300 tanks, out of which 120 were in repair and another seventy-seven written off as total losses by 21 July. Casualties in the army reached 102,588 men by 16 July (pp. 257, 259).

Despite the fact that the Smolensk encirclement eventually succeeded at the end of July, it nevertheless became another costly victory for the *Wehrmacht*. Constant infighting within Army Group Center's command staff deviated planned operations and hindered success as distant targets became new objectives while Red Army forces in the rear continued to resist and put pressure on already over-extended German supply lines. Even before the pocket was closed, Stahel sees the German offensive reaching its zenith. "With units strung out over many miles, and aggressive Soviet counter-attacks growing in frequency and strength, the culmination of exhaustion, resource depletion and supply difficulties spelled the end of the German blitzkrieg" (p. 273). Future operations would be reduced to positional defenses with interrupted spurts of limited offensive action. At this point, a report from Army Group Center finally complemented the reality German forces were confronting; a collapse of the Soviet state in the near future was not to be expected. Stahel thus argues the Blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union did not fail due to the performance of the Red Army; it was not a defeat on the field of battle that stopped the German drive in the east. Rather, the failure stemmed from the depreciating ability of the *Wehrmacht* to win a war which it had previously written off as won. The end result consisted of a German army fighting a war it neither planned nor was prepared for.

While the Smolensk pocket was closing, constant fighting in the Yelnya salient kept up pressure against Guderian's Panzer group. Attrition wore down panzer and motorized divisions as infantry formations advanced to replace mechanized units around the Smolensk encirclement. Because many of the divisions taking part in Barbarossa were newly created, their learning curve seemed, at times, to match that of the Red Army. On 2 August the

251st Infantry Division conducted a badly coordinated attack, resulting in a rout and the dismissal of the divisional commander. Further, losses were so severe that two regiments were forced to disband a battalion each. The fighting around Smolensk was officially pronounced over by the Germans on 5 August. Hitler agreed to a pause in operations to give his mechanized units time to rest and refit. As with the encirclement at Minsk, Stahel also considers Smolensk to be an exaggeration of the reality the Germans found themselves facing. While the haul in prisoners and captured equipment was grandiose, the end result was an initial failure to close the pocket and an ultimate inability to annihilate the Red Army and force a Soviet surrender, the original aim of Barbarossa (p. 345).

As German formations struggled to hold on to their gains against continuing Red Army attacks, Hitler vacillated between continued operations toward Moscow or splitting off forces from Army Group Center toward Leningrad and Ukraine. Unfortunately for the *Wehrmacht*, the constant pressure by the Soviets necessitated the periodic need for German panzer formations to stabilize the situation at the front; consequently, the time for refitting and rest continued to drag as units were constantly shuffled to the front and back to the rear with mounting losses. Stahel argues that Hitler's decision to suspend the offensive toward Moscow was influenced by the signing of the Atlantic Charter, an agreement between Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt. When Hitler realized the war in the east would not be won through Blitzkrieg but turned into a drawn out conflict with the eventual inclusion of the United States and continued participation of England, he was able to reemphasize the need to acquire natural resources in order for Germany to retain the ability to wage war. Moscow could and would wait; Ukraine was now the target of opportunity. Try as they might, no General or Field Marshal was able to convince Hitler to the contrary.

Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East will undoubtedly stand as a standard work on the first phase of Operation Barbarossa for a long time to come. In his conclusion, Stahel reiterates that the finale of Barbarossa should be traced to the battle of Smolensk. The pause in momentum, necessitated by the inability of the infantry to keep up with the two panzer groups of Army Group Center, substituted a war of rapid movement and maneuver for one of defensive trench work and foxholes. In exploiting archival information on Army Group Center, Stahel has reoriented our understanding of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Putting into context the massive logistical difficulties, attrition rates, and general staff infighting goes a long way in showing the victories of 1941 were, in a strategic sense, little more than illusion, while total victory continually eluded *Wehrmacht* capabilities. The staggering amount of detail offered ensures this is an invaluable addition to Eastern Front literature and Operation Barbarossa in particular. Unfortunately, as with all monographs, there are a few weaknesses. The most glaring one is the author's utilization of German and English sources to tell the story from the Soviet point-of-view. Although the narrative is based on German operations and not those of the Red Army, a

better understanding of the opposition would go far in analyzing the *Wehrmacht's* abilities, limits, defeats, and victories *vis-à-vis* those of the Red Army. Further, while Stahel directly addresses counterfactual histories he does not set up a scenario to disprove them (most likely due to the fact that his narrative stops at the beginning of September). Granted, historians are weary of counterfactuals for good reason, but if the aim is to create a new narrative of the summer of 1941 and seek to disprove accounts adhering to the claim that the *Wehrmacht* could reach Moscow, then such theories need to be addressed. Unfortunately, the author only reiterates that the decision between Moscow and Ukraine was not one between victory and defeat, while showing the desperate situation German units were in during August. In doing so, Stahel does not directly address or challenge those who believe the capture of Moscow would have spelled the end of the Soviet Union. He compares Hitler's campaign to that of Napoleon Bonaparte (although incorrectly claiming that Napoleon took the capital; while Moscow can be claimed to be the "spiritual" capital of Russia, at the time of Napoleon's invasion the capital was St. Petersburg) and believes the Soviet Union would have continued to resist, even with Moscow in enemy hands. Stahel's reasoning rests on his main point: the Red Army would not be destroyed through encirclements, as 1941 proved.

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The Black Prince and the Sea Devils: The Story of Valerio Borghese and the Elite Units of the Decima Mas. By Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo, 2004. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. xx, 284.

The historiography of the Second World War has generally been unkind to the Italian military, with stereotypes of Italian military incompetence created by British wartime propaganda living on for many decades after the conflict ended. Indeed, many post-war British histories depicted their Italian opponents as little short of cowards and interested only in surrendering to the nearest Tommy. Yet Italy did have some real warriors and the Italian Navy had some unique capabilities and aggressive leadership that was able to inflict considerable damage upon their British adversaries. In *The Black Prince and the Sea Devils: The Story of Valerio Borghese and the Elite Units of the Decima Mas*, Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani provide a revealing look at a heretofore neglected aspect of the Second World War – Italian naval special forces. The "Black Prince" was Prince Valerio Borghese, leader of the *Decima MAS* (10th Light Flotilla), a special forces unit created by the Italian Navy for underwater attacks. Under Borghese's

command, the underwater component of the *Decima MAS* achieved one of Italy's greatest successes in the war – the sinking of the British battleships HMS *Queen Elizabeth* and HMS *Valiant* in Alexandria Harbor on 19 December 1941. Throughout the book, the authors strive not only to tell Borghese's story and that of the *Decima MAS*, but also to demonstrate how these innovative tactics developed by the Italian Navy contributed to later special forces units, such as the U.S. Navy SEALs.

The book begins with a short eight-page chapter that provides a brief sketch of Prince Borghese's background and the Italian Navy's initial interest in special operations during the First World War. In 1918, the Italian Navy was able to sink two Austrian battleships, one with torpedoes and one with limpet mines, which encouraged further post-war research on this subject. The second chapter discusses how the Italian Navy continued to develop special warfare tactics in the interwar-period and settled on three types of capabilities: fast explosive-armed boats known as MTs, a human-manned torpedo known as the SLC, and limpet mines carried by combat divers. Aside from the obvious interest in special warfare caused by the success against the Austrians, the authors also mention that during the Depression years the Italian Naval High Command viewed special operations forces as a more economical means of countering French and British battleships. However, the Italian Navy had a change of heart in 1937 and it decided to mothball its incipient special warfare capabilities in favor of building up a large battle fleet. At this point, Borghese enters the narrative when he received his first command, the submarine *Iride*, which was sent to operate off the Spanish coast as part of Italy's intervention in the Spanish Civil War. On the night of 30 August 1937, Borghese fired a torpedo at what he believed to be a Spanish Republican destroyer, but which turned out to be HMS *Havoc*. In turn, the British destroyer counterattacked and called in three additional ships to begin an intensive nine-hour hunt for Borghese's submarine. The authors note that, "this event would mark the first wartime use of sonar" (p. 17). However, Borghese's luck held and he managed to escape the British dragnet. Upon returning to Italy, Borghese found that Mussolini was outraged by the international incident caused by the attack, but the Italian Navy was interested in Borghese's report that the British had a new underwater tracking device. On the verge of dismissal, Borghese's career was suddenly salvaged when the British naval *attaché* commented to Mussolini that the *Iride's* attack had been skillfully conducted, so the *Duce* decided to give Borghese a medal instead. These early chapters are quite interesting, but are relatively short. At barely twenty-three pages total, one wishes that the authors had gone into more detail here.

In the next three chapters, the authors move into the creation of the Italian underwater forces and their tactics and early operations. Although the decision was made to re-activate the underwater units as war approached in 1939, the authors depict the Italian Naval High Command as reluctant to commit significant resources to their special forces units prior to the actual outbreak of war. The authors estimate that there were only eleven SLCs and

a small cadre of divers on hand when Italy declared war in June 1940. The authors do provide a brief technical discussion of the development of the SLC "human torpedoes" and the MT explosive boats, along with some nice profile sketches. They also discuss the training of Italian assault swimmers, which seems particularly exacting: "…this training lasted ten months and was quite demanding, which explains why only some fifty men were employed in this capacity during the war" (p. 31).

According to the authors, the "time lost between 1936 and 1938 was disastrous" (p. 39) since none of the underwater attack techniques were operationally ready at the start of the war. Both the SLCs and MT boats, as well as the diver suits and underwater breathing gear, suffered from numerous defects that were not perfected until well into 1941, which the authors claim cost Italy its chance for a "decisive victory" against the Royal Navy. While this claim might seem exaggerated, the Italian Navy quickly realized after the poor performance of its battlefleet that its only real chance to contest British naval superiority in the Mediterranean was by special attacks. However, the initial Italian attempt in August 1940 to use the SLC human torpedoes against British battleships in Alexandria met with disaster when Borghese's old submarine, the *Iride*, was detected and sunk by a British Swordfish aircraft before it could launch its four SLCs. A second attempt in September also failed with the loss of another submarine. Meanwhile, Borghese was sent to train with the *Kriegsmarine* in the Baltic for a time and when he returned, he received command of the submarine *Scire*, which was also a designated SLC carrier. This proved to be the turning point in Borghese's career.

Borghese was assigned to carry a group of SLCs to attack British shipping at Gibraltar in late September 1940. This chapter is well-written and gripping and includes details such as: "As the operators prepared to leave, there had been one small ceremony left to complete. Each of the six men ready for the operation bent over and received a kick in the butt by Borghese! This was for good luck" (p. 63). One wonders what the effect on morale was with this type of commander, but at any rate, the SLC crews succeeded in penetrating Gibraltar's harbor and laying a charge next to the battleship HMS *Barham*. Although the resulting explosion did no damage, the authors cite this "quasi-success" as "first-blood" for the Italian special warfare community, and the fact that Borghese returned with some of the SLC crewmen increased his reputation.

Six months later in March 1941, when the *Decima MAS* was formerly organized, Borghese was given command of its underwater component. During this period, he was involved in several abortive operations, but in September 1941 an underwater attack on Gibraltar sank two tankers and damaged a third ship. Despite the fact that the raid was intended to sink British capital ships, the Italian High Command was pleased with sinking anything in Gibraltar and Borghese was promoted and decorated for gallantry.

Chapter eight, which covers the attack on Alexandria in December 1941, is easily the best in the book. The authors note that Borghese maneuvered

his submarine to "within a few meters of his objective point after an excellent feat of underwater navigation" (p. 96). The Italian SLC crews received a lucky break and were able to penetrate into the harbor when the gate was briefly opened for returning British destroyers, but the Italian divers suffered badly from the cold water and inadequate underwater breathing equipment. Indeed, throughout the book the authors point out how experimental this underwater technology was and many missions were ruined by equipment failures. Nevertheless, the divers managed to reach their targets and the resulting explosions crippled both battleships, as well as sinking a nearby tanker and damaging a destroyer. Another interesting feature of these raids is that the Italian divers were instructed not to try and return to their mother submarine since the SLCs lacked the battery power, but rather to try and make their way ashore and escape toward pickup on the coast. In practice, most divers were captured ashore. Thus, Italian naval special forces operations tended to be a one-way affair for the operators, with few making it back to their submarine.

With this coup, Borghese's reputation was made and he was sent to take charge of an Italian covert operation in Spain. Here the author's provide quite a bit of detail on a virtually unknown facet of the Second World War. The *Decima MAS* was able to create a secret installation in the hulk of the beached freighter *Olterra* in the Spanish port of Algeciras, right across from Gibraltar. Borghese was installed in a house on the nearby shore, where he could observe British shipping in Gibraltar with binoculars and direct attacks from teams hidden in the *Olterra*. This is a fascinating part of the book and demonstrates the innovative attitude of the *Decima MAS*. However, it took time to smuggle in the equipment without being detected by the British or the Spanish and Borghese was not able to conduct his first attack until 14 July 1942, using combat swimmers to damage four small freighters with limpet charges. The British were flabbergasted and although they suspected the Spanish of colluding with the Italians, they never found Borghese's secret base. Instead, the British created their own underwater unit to defend their naval bases by frequent inspections of ship hulls and installing sonar to detect the approach of SLCs. The book suggests an interesting dynamic between Italian innovations and British responses to counter each in turn.

Chapter 10 covers the last *Decima MAS* operations in 1943, primarily focusing on efforts to curb the Allied build-up in North Africa. The authors do briefly mention that *Decima MAS* sent a detachment to the Black Sea to assist the German siege of Sevastopol, but they fail to note other instances of German cooperation with Italian special forces. In my research for *Leningrad: The Epic Siege* (Oxford: Osprey, 2009), I found in records at NARA that the Germans had requested the *Decima MAS* to support the siege of Leningrad as well. Italian light naval forces were involved in combat on Lake Ladoga in 1942 and a swimmer unit was designated to attack Soviet warships in Kronstadt harbor. Indeed, the Germans were both envious and respectful of Italy's underwater warfare capabilities and were not shy about requesting to "borrow" them for their own purposes. By the time Germany

developed its own underwater special forces in 1944-45, the war was virtually over.

The authors claim that the *Decima MAS* carried out twenty-two attacks of which twelve were "clearly successful," and that these attacks sank or damaged about 203,000 tons of Allied shipping (p. 139). I found this a bit dubious, since it falls considerably short of the tonnage successes mentioned in the text, but certainly the *Decima MAS* had more to brag about than the rest of the Italian fleet. At this point, the mid-part of the book focuses on the Italian Armistice and Borghese's decision to fight with (if not necessarily for) Mussolini's rump RSI state based on Salo. The *Decima MAS* became involved in counterinsurgency operations in northern Italy and parts of modern-day Slovenia and Borghese's alleged involvement with anti-partisan punitive measures earned him the sobriquet of the "Black Prince." I found this part of the book a bit thin on details and I really wanted to know more about Borghese's relationship with Mussolini and specific actions (rather than general allegations) with which the *Decima MAS* was involved. When the war ends, Borghese was saved from execution by the Americans and the authors allege that they wanted him "because he knew how to fight Communists." Since there were about three million German veterans with the same qualification, this claim hardly seems compelling.

Unfortunately, the last half of the book is a disappointing departure from the detail and military-oriented nature of the first half. While depicting Borghese as something of a neo-fascist Cold Warrior, the authors wander around discussing Italian post-war politics and possible covert operations by former *Decima MAS* members. Indeed, Borghese virtually fades from the pages and the authors get involved in a great deal of speculation, beginning with an assertion that *Decima MAS* veterans sank the Soviet battleship *Novorossiysk* in Sevastopol harbor in 1955. In fact, the Russians continued to find old German mines around Sevastopol for decades and one exploded and killed some scrap dealers as recently as 2003, so the authors' assertions that a World War II mine could not have been functional in 1955 are clearly incorrect. When Borghese became involved in right-wing Italian politics in the 1960s and a half-assed plot to overthrow the Italian Government, the authors drag in Richard Nixon, the CIA, and alleged Mafia connections to try and create the image of a pit of vipers. This part of the book reads as if it was written by Bob Woodward and the authors try to keep the narrative afloat on the flotsam of old rumors. Instead, they create an unsubstantiated mush that reads like a scandal sheet rather than scholarly research.

Throughout the book, Borghese appears as little more than the silhouette of a man, with little substance. The authors claim that he destroyed "his papers" after the war, making research difficult, but he also wrote his own book – never quoted and barely mentioned in these pages – and he gave public speeches in the 1950s. Indeed, there are almost no direct quotes from Borghese anywhere in the book and almost nothing is presented about his family connections (which must have been significant for a member of the nobility). Borghese is presented as ambitious, a skilled sailor who was in

love with his own authority, and perhaps a bit reactionary, but little else is revealed. Somehow, I think more could have been done to bring Borghese's character and motivations into focus.

Overall, this is a good book since it brings a fair amount of new material to light about a neglected subject of the Second World War. However, it could have been significantly better if it had provided more information and insight into Borghese as a commander and avoided veering off in hot pursuit of various post-war conspiracy theories.

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US Destroyers 1934-45: Pre-war Classes. By Dave McComb. Oxford: Osprey, 2010. Illustrations. Index. Paper. Pp. 48.

US Destroyers 1942-45: Wartime Classes. By Dave McComb. Oxford: Osprey, 2010. Illustrations. Index. Paper. Pp. 48.

The past quarter century has seen an increasing interest in the technical details of the weapons of war, and warship designs of the Second World War are no exception. For both the dedicated historian and enthusiast, a broadening range of works is available to satisfy this curiosity and Osprey Publishing's New Vanguard series is an inexpensive offering packed with graphics, charts, and an historical narrative on almost any conceivable martial subject. American destroyer classes from World War II form the topic for David McComb's two entries in the series, the first on the prewar designs which followed the First World War's massive four-stacker program, and the other on types which came to fruition during the Second World War.

In the first volume, McComb introduces the three broad classes of U.S. destroyer types which came into service at the height of the prewar naval treaty systems and their immediate aftermath. The work begins with an overview of the economic and political circumstances which defined the American shipbuilding industry in the 1920s and 1930s and how dramatic alterations in both fields dictated a revival in destroyer design in the early 1930s. In the author's arrangement, the first set of prewar designs encompassed the Farragut, Mahan, Dunlap, Bagley, Gridley, and Benham classes, each a logical technical progression in the 1,500-ton range which reflected a mounting expertise in balancing the Fleet's demand for gunnery, torpedo, and endurance performance with the legal need to stay within treaty tonnage requirements. Next, the 1,850-ton Porter and Somers classes are introduced before the collapse of the treaty system in 1937 led to the subsequent Sims and Benson/Gleaves classes. McComb then describes the prewar impact of stability corrections and the need to add radar and even more anti-aircraft

weapons to these designs.

The second half of the work is a chronological overview of these classes' operations in World War II starting with the Atlantic and Mediterranean and then the Pacific and Asian waters. Highlighted actions include supporting the amphibious invasions in Europe, Guadalcanal, and Vella Gulf where these types carried much of the destroyer burden. The second volume follows a similar format, though with only the Fletcher, Allen M. Sumner, and Gearing classes to cover, the technical overview spans only a third of the work. These classes are described as a culmination of favored technologies threshed out in the earlier classes resulting in a standardization of gun, machinery, and operational specifications allowing for a truly mass-production approach as war finally came to America. The remainder of the work describes the activities of these ultimate wartime designs starting at Guadalcanal and concluding at Okinawa, with a mention of their comparatively modest participation in the Atlantic theater.

In keeping with the series' format, each work is lavishly illustrated with photographs, several not widely published before, and custom artwork from Paul Wright which includes side profiles and a central cutaway oblique of the Sims-class USS *Morris* (DD-417) in the first volume, and the Sumner-class USS *Laffey* (DD-724) in the second. The author has also included many organizational tables and technical appendices.

Much like warship design itself, the tight layout of a publishing series like the New Vanguard requires a delicate balance of detail and scope and McComb has done a remarkable job in covering all the bases in such a very short page count. Nice insights like the influence of "lawyer-turned-naval-architect" William Francis Gibbs add distinctiveness to the necessarily concise narrative which must still straddle two different historical genres' technical design and operations. While this reviewer is not convinced that this series' format can suit doing both in the same title for complex subjects like warships, McComb has accomplished a notable compromise in providing both a lucid technical description and a coherent operational narrative. The dedicated historian and the enthusiast should find these works a worthy addition to their libraries.

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Dogface Soldier: The Life of General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr. By Wilson A. Heefner. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2010. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. xv, 377.

Considering the number of books devoted to the lives of Dwight David Eisenhower and George S. Patton, Jr., a casual student of World War II might

be forgiven for thinking that they were the only American generals who mattered in the European Theater of Operations. In reality, Eisenhower had to rely on approximately one hundred army group, army, corps, and division commanders to help bring his "Great Crusade" to fruition. Most of these men performed their duties well, but their achievements have been neglected by historians who remain fixated on a few senior commanders.

One of the best of Eisenhower's forgotten lieutenants was Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., the only American officer in World War II to lead a regimental combat team, an infantry division, a corps, and a field army. Historian Martin Blumenson called Truscott one of his country's greatest combat commanders, and Eisenhower ranked him second only to Patton as an army commander. Truscott made a prospective biographer's task easier by penning two outstanding memoirs – *Command Missions: A Personal Story* (New York: Dutton, 1954) and *The Twilight of the U.S. Cavalry: Life in the Old Army, 1917-1942* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989). Considering Truscott's ability and the magnitude of his achievements, it does not speak well of World War II scholars that he has gone so long without a comprehensive, scholarly biography.

With *Dogface Soldier: The Life of General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.*, Wilson A. Heefner, a physician by training, has produced a biography worthy of its subject. Drawing on thorough research in archival and published sources, Heefner paints a vivid portrait of a remarkable soldier. He also uses Truscott's life to illuminate the character of the U.S. Army and its officer corps from World War I through World War II. The author displays a keen appreciation for the development of American military professionalism, a sensitivity no doubt nurtured by his writing two earlier military biographies – *Twentieth Century Warrior: The Life and Service of Major General Edwin D. Patrick* (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane, 1995) and *Patton's Bulldog: The Life and Service of General Walton H. Walker* (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane, 2001).

Truscott was born in Texas on 9 January 1895, and grew up there and in Oklahoma Territory. Certified as a schoolteacher by age sixteen, he joined the U.S. Army shortly after the outbreak of World War I and received a second lieutenant's commission in the U.S. Cavalry on 15 August 1917. Although Truscott spent the war on the Mexican border, he decided to remain in uniform. During the 1920s and 1930s, he spent eight years commanding troops and twelve years as a student or instructor at the Cavalry School and the Command and General Staff School. Truscott also gained a reputation in the interwar army as a highly competitive polo player. In many ways, the game became a metaphor for his life. As he confided to his son: "You play games to *win*, not lose. And you fight wars to win! … And every good player and every good commander … has to have some sonofabitch in him" (p. 19). With the United States frantically rearming in the wake of Hitler's *Wehrmacht* fastening its claws on Central and Western Europe, Truscott, now a lieutenant colonel, caught the eye of several influential superiors with his efficient staff work.

After Pearl Harbor brought America into the war, Truscott went to England to join Lord Louis Mountbatten's Combined Operations Headquarters and provide American troops with proper seasoning through exposure to combat. Wearing the single star of a newly promoted brigadier general, Truscott proposed the establishment of American commandos, which he subsequently renamed rangers. Truscott would observe his rangers' first taste of battle at Dieppe on 19 August 1942. "I have seen war – and have been in danger – and have seen men die," he wrote his wife of twenty-three years the day after the failed raid. "It was not a success – and all told was a rather grim and gory business. But I have learned many things from having gone" (p. 50). Truscott finally became a combat commander when he led a 9,000-man assault force under Patton during the invasion of North Africa in early November 1942.

Following a brief stint as Eisenhower's deputy chief of staff in Tunisia, Truscott took charge of the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division. He proved to be a superb troop trainer, toughening his men to perform thirty-mile speed marches at a stiff pace they dubbed the "Truscott Trot." Truscott's division invaded Sicily as part of Patton's 7th Army on 10 July 1943. When Patton's subsequent advance on Messina bogged down, he turned to Truscott for a battalion combat team to flank the Germans with an amphibious landing.

Truscott and the 3rd Infantry Division joined Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark's U.S. 5th Army in Italy in mid-September 1943. Unable to penetrate enemy hill and mountain defenses, Clark tried to turn the German right flank by landing his VI Corps (which included Truscott's division) at Anzio on 22 January 1944. Truscott's dawdling corps commander, Major General John Lucas, allowed the Germans to trap the invasion force in a constricted beachhead. Truscott relieved Lucas on 23 February and finally broke out of Anzio between 23-26 May, opening the road for a swift Allied advance on Rome.

After the fall of the Eternal City, General Eisenhower reassigned Truscott and his VI Corps to Operation ANVIL/DRAGOON, the invasion of southern France. Truscott handled his latest amphibious operation with his usual aplomb. In a one-month campaign beginning on 15-16 August 1944, his troops advanced 500 miles, destroying more than half of the German 19th Army. Promoted to lieutenant general, Truscott returned to Italy to take command of the 5th Army on 16 December. He kept up the pressure on the Germans until they finally surrendered on 4 May 1945. At the end of the month, Truscott returned to Anzio to attend a memorial ceremony. When the time came for the general to speak, he turned his back on the audience and faced the rows of white gravestones where so many of his soldiers lay. He apologized to the dead for the mistakes he had made that cost them their lives, and promised to straighten out anyone "who thought death in battle was glorious" (p. 246). This was arguably the finest moment in the career of an officer whose devotion to duty never dulled his conscience.

On 25 September 1945, Truscott replaced the controversial Patton as head of the 3rd Army for occupation duty in Bavaria. Heart trouble forced his re-

tirement from the army two years later. He returned to duty in 1951 for four years as the CIA's senior man in Germany. Following four more years in thankless desk jobs, he retired from his second career. Health problems continued to plague Truscott until his death at Walter Reed Army Hospital on 12 September 1965.

Dogface Soldier possesses numerous strengths that qualify it as a model biography of a model soldier. Heefner excels especially at identifying the traits that caused Truscott to be valued so highly by Eisenhower, Patton, George C. Marshall, and Omar N. Bradley. Truscott believed in leading from the front, not only to inspire his men but also to gain first-hand knowledge of tactical situations. He loved the soldiers who fought his battles for him, and he trained them hard to improve their chances for survival and success. An honest officer, Truscott protested any orders he considered ill-advised, but loyally executed them if his superiors insisted. Truscott's intelligence, energy, flexibility, and multiple levels of professional expertise contributed immeasurably to the winning record compiled by the forces entrusted to him.

Just as Lucian K. Truscott, Jr. deserves a more prominent place in history, Wilson Heefner's *Dogface Soldier* deserves to be read by anyone interested in the U.S. Army's development and performance during World War II.

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Operation Husky: The Canadian Invasion of Sicily, July 10 - August 7, 1943. By Mark Zuehlke. Vancouver: Douglas & MacIntyre, 2008. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. 491.

After the publication of his well-received "Italian Campaign Trilogy," Canadian author Mark Zuehlke has taken a step back in the chronology of the war to bring to light the first sustained land campaign by Canadian forces in World War II. Some readers will be unfamiliar with the Canadian contributions to Allied operations in World War II, but even those with only a passing interest in military history are probably aware of the Canadian landing at Juno Beach on 6 June 1944. They are probably less cognizant of the tragic losses suffered by the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division at Dieppe in August of 1942. What is not widely recognized is that Canadian troops also constituted a significant part of the British force that went ashore on Sicily on 10 July 1943 during Operation HUSKY. Popular culture, epitomized by Hollywood, has embedded into the minds of many the brash and flamboyant actions of Patton and his "race for Messina," sparing only a passing nod to the heavy fighting and losses suffered by Montgomery's Eighth British Army as they "slogged" their way up the eastern coast of Sicily. Fighting on the

left flank in that advance was the 1st Canadian Infantry Division and 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade, units added to the invasion force just weeks prior to the operation in an effort to satisfy Canadian domestic and political cries for more direct Canadian involvement in the war.

Part One of *Operation Husky* sets the stage for the invasion, recounting the political nature of the decision to replace the 3rd British Infantry Division with the 1st Canadian Infantry Division within XXX British Corps. As the story unfolds, the now famous disagreements in the operational planning are discussed as well as the challenges the Canadian staff officers faced given the short timelines with which they had to work. Key command and staff officers are introduced as are the logistical and transportation issues and the introduction culminates with a description of the approach of the naval task force towards the invasion beaches. Part Two takes the reader from the successful, albeit slightly confused, landing phase through the first combat actions as the 1st Canadian Division moved inshore protecting Montgomery's left flank. The book follows the events surrounding Montgomery's fateful, and many agree ill-advised, decision to move west, cutting across the front of the 45th U.S. Infantry Division, and thereby relegating Seventh U.S. Army, and Patton, to a secondary role in the campaign. This had the unpleasant effect of not only unsettling Allied relations, but placing 1st Canadian Division squarely in the sights of the elite Hermann Göring Division, battle-ready, and holding highly defensible terrain. Parts Three and Four of the book examine the Canadian advance, village by village, ridge line by ridge line, through murderous terrain and stiff German resistance through the three weeks of July and into early August culminating with their successful capture of Adrano after which they were moved into the reserve on 7 August 1943. By that time, the Canadian troops in Sicily were certainly no longer untested.

Most readers will surely find value in different sections of Zuehlke's book. *Operation Husky* is another example of his ability to combine a popular writing style with ample research in Canadian archival materials such as unit war diaries, military records, personal papers, and participant interviews to create a highly engaging and informative account of a lesser documented segment of the war. In outline, his book is in many ways a simple recounting of the tactical events of Canadian actions in Operation HUSKY; a "play by play." Zuehlke does begin with the planning stages of the campaign, carrying his narrative through all phases of combat operations. However, his narrative is heavily salted, some might argue excessively so, with the human touch, these being numerous personalized views of the events drawn from the extensive individual soldier's accounts available to him which he has overlain on his solid framework of unit war dairies and secondary source material. Readers looking for a broader campaign analysis may find this heavy detail tedious. Still, for all that, other readers may find the gritty personal accounts worth comparing with relevant sections of personal combat in other books. For a "popular history," his work is laced with an impressive 800-plus endnotes, firmly grounding his narrative in his archival sources. To

his credit, Mark Zuehlke's vibrant style should prevent most readers from feeling bogged down in the Sicilian hills, and the fast pace makes *Operation Husky* an easy read for the historian as well as an informative and enjoyable book for the amateur or casual reader.

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Patton's Pawns: The 94th US Infantry Division at the Siegfried Line. By Tony Le Tissier. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2007. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. xi, 362.

Proving that there is always mileage in a book title containing the name "Patton," British historian Tony Le Tissier gives readers the story of a new infantry division, the 94th, in its first sustained combat. The narrative is engaging and lively, and its value is its coverage of a neglected front in the 1944-45 campaign in Europe.

Led by War Department General Staff (G-3) veteran Harry J. Malony, the 94th Infantry Division was a "draftee division" of the type subjected to scrutiny several years ago by John Sloan Brown in *Draftee Division: The 88th Infantry Division in World War II* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986). Given his background, General Malony surely knew what he was getting into as commander of a unit built virtually from scratch. The challenges of training, deployment, and entry into combat were enormous even at a relatively late point in the war (the beginning of 1945).

Operations of the U.S. Twelfth Army Group between the end of 1944 (the "Bulge") and the Rhine River crossings (in the first weeks of the New Year), still have received scant attention from writers. This has no doubt been due in part to the sheer volume of material concerning the drama in the Ardennes. Even the Rhine crossings, with the exception, of course, of Remagen, have been somewhat ignored. Yet it is important for at least two reasons to consider the lesser-covered late-war ETO actions of the U.S. Army. First, understanding the conduct of tactical ground combat operations requires some knowledge of how armies generate and sustain combat power. By extension, scholars and general readers will better appreciate what the U.S. Army accomplished between 1940-1945 if they realize that even at this point in the war the ground combat soldier, in particular the infantryman, was not extravagantly supported by armor, artillery, or aircraft. In some cases he was not even relatively well-supplied.

After its arrival in France in September 1944, the new 94th Infantry Division participated in limited operations against the Germans remaining in control of the ports in Brittany. Le Tissier reviews the division's work in France and the decisions behind its deployment to the so-called Saar-Mos-

selle Triangle, located southwest of Trier, Germany. Though the author does not evidently intend for his book to make another purely academic statement along the lines of older arguments by Brown or the late Keith E. Bonn in *When the Odds Were Even: The Vosges Mountains Campaign, October 1944 - January 1945* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994), he does infer that the U.S. rifleman performed well despite odds that some still might discount or ignore altogether.

The Third U.S. Army in late fall of 1944 initiated operations in the Triangle. The objective was penetration of a very strong extension of the Westwall (the so-called "Orscholz Switch" Line) and capture of Trier. The German defenses remained inviolate and the Bulge interrupted operations. However, by late December 1944, after the tide began to turn in the Ardennes, Patton was again determined to take Trier. The 94th, with extremely limited combat experience, was assigned to control of Third Army's XX Corps.

Forced by a combination of circumstances to enter combat piecemeal, the corps commander, Major General Walton Walker, allowed Malony to commit only a battalion or two at a time against defenses that could withstand an attack by a regiment or more. Still recovering from the mid-December shock of German resurgence, commanders from Eisenhower to Walker were reluctant to employ their reserves. Armor was in particularly short supply and the initial infantry attacks had little if any tank support. These extremely intense engagements become the centerpiece of Le Tissier's story. The author cites several examples of American small unit commanders taking charge of the situation rather than leading from the "rear." He describes (p. 33) a battalion commander who killed a German machine gunner with his rifle and wounded another. Balancing this are accounts from Germans, including one infantryman who describes the punishment he inflicted on careless Americans. This group of Germans eventually surrendered when it became clear they were surrounded by GIs (pp. 135-37).

The 94th engaged German formations that were still quite resilient and powerful (such as the 11th Panzer Division). Indeed, the Americans were weeks into the fight before Patton obtained release from SHAEF reserve of the U.S. 10th Armored Division to join the operations in the Triangle. As the weeks passed, and more resources became available to the Third Army, Patton directed Walker to broaden the scope of operations and initiate an attack to clear all German forces from the Triangle. In the overall context of the ETO, this fighting does not rank high in scale compared to even Aachen. Yet "size" does not reflect the service Le Tissier's book performs in describing the importance to success of training and front-line leadership.

Concerning the construction and format of the book, it was disappointing to see that the author made little discernable use of primary material such as operations journals, plans, and orders. Such records would have provided a valuable cross-check on the facts contained in the secondary sources the writer did consult. The National Archives' College Park, Maryland facility contains relatively complete operational records of both the 94th and the 10th Armored Divisions; the records of the 5th Ranger Battalion, a unit Le

Tissier also discusses, are also relatively intact and valuable. The author's reliance on the standard English- and German-language secondary sources leads him to eliminate background facts contained in primary source operational records that would have further expanded the story. He does cite the 94th Division's excellent history completed shortly after the war, *History of the 94th Infantry Division in World War II*, which was edited by Laurence G. Byrnes (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1947). The author also makes extensive use of personal memoirs. Though they are less than reliable for details given the passage of time, they are valuable in that they capture the individual soldier's memories of sights and sounds, if not specifics. German-language secondary sources are dependable, particularly Dieter Robert Bettinger et al., *Der Westwall von Kleve bis Basel: Auf den Spuren deutscher Geschichte: Ein Tourenplaner* (Wölfersheim-Berstadt: Podzun-Pallas Verlag, 2002) (a technical study), and Edgar Christoffel, *Krieg am Westwall 1944/45: Das Grenzland im Westen zwischen Aachen und Saarbrücken in den letzten Kriegsmonaten* (Trier: Verlag der akademischen Buchhandlung Interbook, 1989), a very detailed large-format volume. The author could also have improved the value of the study with background information on key leaders. For example, how did General Malony's War Department General Staff experience impact his conduct of operations? A better overview map to orient the reader to the general situation would assist those unfamiliar with the region. Finally, the notes are not as detailed and complete as one would expect from a study by an academic press.

The book needed close technical editing, and it contains numerous minor errors that perhaps do not detract from the author's storytelling, but which degrade the work's authority. For example, Le Tissier mistakenly refers (p. 4) to "regimental level" heavy weapons companies (they were organic to battalions). Infantry regiments had an intelligence and reconnaissance platoon not a "section" (p. 50). The U.S. Army used (and still uses) the term platoon leader, not "platoon commander." A battalion-level operations officer was the S-3 not the G-3 (p. 99). The XIX Tactical Air Command was not a "Tactical Air Force" (p. 13). Another irritating term was "chemical warfare mortar battalion"; such units were "chemical battalions." Strictly speaking, the worst casualties in the Hürtgen Forest were in November and December 1944, not in September (pp. 11-12). Another annoying descriptive term is "vertical resupply" when he refers to what should simply be called "airdrops" (p. 220). Also needed is more discussion of the state of the German Army in the West at that time. More analysis on the impact on combat performance of pre-deployment "stripping" of the 94th for replacements for other units could make the book a very valuable contribution. There are inaccurate descriptions of vehicles, for example, the M18 Tank Destroyer did not have the "same hull" as the Sherman tank, nor was it equipped with a 75mm main gun – it was a 76mm gun (p. 104). German Panther tanks had 75mm main guns rather than 88mm as the author mentions on p. 108. On p. 110, the author mentions an officer being awarded a "Silver Star with Oak Leaf Cluster." One received either the medal itself (first award) or an oak

leaf cluster (subsequent awards), but not both at once. Finally, units did not receive "Battle Honor awards." Award of a Distinguished Unit Citation, for example, was a battle honor.

Still, Le Tissier's descriptions of the crossings of the narrow Saar River (for anyone who has seen it, it is not exactly the Mississippi) are riveting and should remind one that hundreds of such small unit actions, rather than the "big" operations, largely drove success in battle. They all contributed to the momentum needed for success. Le Tissier is justly critical of Patton, whose haste to take Trier made the crossings at that particular time and place "a reckless gamble" (p. 147). Even Walton Walker, the XX Corps commanding general, told Malony that he was apprehensive about success. Plans and orders issued late on the evening of 21 February 1945 for two attacking infantry regiments called for crossings near Saarburg and Serrig to begin as early as 0400 the next morning. One regiment's attack was delayed further because its boats did not arrive on time. Another regiment, attached to the 10th Armored Division, was also delayed and Patton vented his rage on the armored division commander though the delay was not his fault (pp. 152-55).

Le Tissier further describes the handling of the boats by the inexperienced riflemen, who fired blindly into a very heavy fog. Germans, who responded likewise to the firing, fought from behind wire and other obstacles the GIs had to clear by hand due to the difficulties of hauling explosives across the sharply compartmented terrain. Currents swept some boats away and at one site only six of sixteen remained in service after the first wave had crossed the Saar River. Forced to disregard unit integrity, commanders fed into the crossing whatever troops were available. When the fog began to burn away, Germans on the opposite high ground increased their fire. Even the arrival of additional boats did little to help – the outboard motors had not been serviced. The author quotes a German lieutenant colonel (pp. 175-76) recalling that despite the difficulties faced by his enemies, they reached the far bank of the river ready to carry the fight to the defenders.

Chapter 5, "The Second Battle of Sinz," for example, is particularly valuable in that it outlines the tactical decision-making process and considerations that went into operational planning. The observant reader will pick up on the implied discussion of the complexity of ground combat operations in the existent weather and terrain conditions and their impact on the troops who ultimately had to execute the plan. The author vividly describes the situation, mentioning wounded GIs who had to "lay in the mud and icy water" in a patch of torn woods, "not daring to move as the shells crashed down and German tanks and infantry milled around" (p. 99). The author terms one firefight (p. 106) "an unmitigated disaster" for the inexperienced and under-supported Americans. On the other hand, the author identifies (pp. 112-13) the impact of drawing on lessons and learning from hard experience. Careful readers will identify such examples of improvement in units and leadership.

In sum, minor inaccuracies, though numerous, should not deter a reader

eager to learn more about the yet under-reported activities of the U.S. Army and the efforts to learn from experience. The author's examples are well worth the cost of the book, which is a solid contribution to the historiography of the European campaign.

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Normandy to Victory: The War Diary of General Courtney H. Hodges & the First U.S. Army. By Major William C. Sylvan and Captain Francis G. Smith Jr. Edited by John T. Greenwood. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2008. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. xi, 575.

Courtney Hodges is among the least known, yet most important, American generals of World War II. As a lieutenant general, he commanded the U.S. First Army, the largest of all Allied field armies in the European campaign of 1944-1945. Hodges' First Army comprised the critical mass of the U.S. Army in Europe, fighting from Normandy to V-E Day. This made Hodges a central figure, yet he is little remembered by historians and the public alike. There is still no serious biography of him in print – this in spite of the fact that he pulled off the unprecedented feat of rising from private to full general. In World War II, Hodges was clearly overshadowed by such larger than life colleagues as Bernard Montgomery, George Patton, Dwight Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, Matthew Ridgway, and Mark Clark. Hodges enjoyed reasonably good relations with war correspondents, and even appeared on the cover of *Time* magazine in October 1944, but there was something forgettable about the man. Even though he had earned the Distinguished Service Cross for his combat valor in World War I, he looked more like a bank president than a powerful army commander. Unassuming, deliberate, and polite, Hodges tended to fade into the war's background. Perhaps because of this, historians have underplayed, if not outright ignored, his role in the U.S. Army's northern European campaign.

During the war, two of the general's aides, Major William Sylvan and Captain Francis Smith, kept a detailed diary recording the everyday decisions, activities, and experiences of Hodges and his First Army staff. The original version of the diary is at the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. Copies are also available at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland and the United States Army Military History Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. John Greenwood, who recently retired after thirty-six years of service as an Army and Air Force historian, took it upon himself to transcribe and edit that diary for publication. The result is this handsome, and useful, volume that historians will value for its convenient access to the inner workings of Hodges and his First Army staff. As an editor, Greenwood

is anything but heavy handed. He replicated the words of Sylvan and Smith *verbatim*, with few intrusions in the text. Greenwood augmented the diary with a photographic insert and some illustrative maps. As editor, Greenwood's main contribution can be seen in 127 pages of endnotes in the back of the book. In those notes, he includes a great deal of important background information on people who are mentioned in the diary. Everyone from Eisenhower to the lowliest war correspondent rates an endnote biography. Greenwood's level of research is impressive in this regard, although he probably should have included editor's overview notes on battles, campaigns, and well known controversies. In the absence of such background information, the daily diary entries often blend together in a mishmash of situation reports, visitations of various personalities to the command post, and the workaday activities of Hodges. Perhaps Greenwood did this purposely to illustrate what the war looked like from the perspective of the First Army CP rather than through an historian's hindsight.

Few people will read this book cover to cover. An excerpt from the diary entry of 24 August 1944, chosen at random, illustrates the general flow of the text:

> The news this morning is that leading columns of the French Armored are only ten to fifteen miles south and southeast [southwest] of Paris. Perhaps today the city will be occupied. XV Corps passed to General Hodges' control at six o'clock this morning, and representatives from there, XIX Corps, and British XXX Corps arrived here this morning to complete plans of movement and regrouping. Two east-west roads have been given to the British and tomorrow morning at eight o'clock they will start to roll through XIX Corps area. Again at two o'clock they will have a four hour passage, and from the 26th on every two hours, a two hour block, until their movement is completed. At four o'clock General Dempsey and General Corlett arrived in the presence of General Bradley, who had arrived shortly before, another area centering around Le Neubourg was selected for the XII Corps [British]. They also will start movement into this area early tomorrow morning. The 5th Armored Division is moving out at once from the area it has occupied along the Seine from Vernon almost up to Leuviers [Louviers] and this assembly area is reserved for XXX Corps.

While the diary does not exactly make for riveting reading, it is an important reference for any historian interested in the Allied high command, the whereabouts of various generals at specific times and, of course, Hodges as a commander. In this sense, Greenwood has rendered a valuable service for World War II historians.

What struck me most about the diary was how disembodied Hodges and his officers were from the real fighting at the front. The passages are peppered with accounts of sumptuous meals, elegant quarters (especially after First Army made it into Germany), and hobnobbing with generals, newspaper correspondents, and political figures. Enlisted soldiers rarely rate

any mention at all. Indeed, according to the diary, Hodges spent much of his time at his headquarters, working in his office. He often visited his corps commanders and, at times, dropped in to see his division commanders, but he rarely ventured any farther forward. In fact, the diary yielded no specific instance of Hodges ever visiting the actual front lines. As the nightmarish Battle of Hürtgen Forest raged in November 1944, the diary entries seem to indicate that Hodges had no appreciation of what was happening at the front. The diary entry of 4 December did record a chance encounter with battle weary, filthy soldiers of the 22nd Infantry who had just come back from the Hürtgen. Hodges was on his way to Luxembourg when he saw them. The diary indicates that the general did little more than drive past them on the way to his destination, albeit with a wish that "everyone had had a chance to see those men." He and the other headquarters officers could have seen such men any time they pleased, but only if they were willing to visit the front. Another passage from 28 February says that Hodges, on that day, heard a shot fired for the first time in a month! One can hardly imagine Patton staying away from the action that long.

The diary also showcases the general's strong points. He was calm and professional, a man who inspired the respect of nearly everyone who knew him. He treated everyone around him with a fundamental decency and he was slow to anger. His staff officers clearly looked up to him. Sylvan and Smith obviously led the way in that regard. Their high opinion of the general shines through in their entries, even though they maintained a correct professional objectivity in recording the First Army's many doings.

In retrospect, Hodges remains an anonymous figure, in contrast to Patton, Montgomery, and Bradley, because he never made any significant impression on his hard fighting combat soldiers. Nor did he ever make any personal connection with them. He simply was not visible enough. As a result, he has remained a forgettable figure. This diary will do little to change that drab reputation.

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Call for Papers:
Global-Regional Nexus: The Sea and the Second World War

3-5 May 2012, King's College London

The King's College London War Studies Group and *Global War Studies* are pleased to announce a conference on the impact of the sea on the conduct, experience, and legacy of the Second World War. This was the first truly global conflict in which high intensity warfare was waged simultaneously across the world's oceans. The conference aims to investigate the ways in which the war raised the strategic status of the sea to "world's largest maneuver space," linking the experience in different maritime theaters and illustrating its role in national strategies. The conference seeks to promote an interdisciplinary approach, drawing upon the latest international scholarship from a variety of disciplines, including naval, international, social, and cultural history, regional studies, and international relations. Papers addressing one or more of the above questions in the context of the following themes are welcome (suggestions for additional related themes are encouraged and will be considered):

Morale and Motivation / The Indian Ocean / Ports and People
Intelligence / Economics / Grand Strategy and Global War
Land and Sea / The Civilian Experience of Naval Warfare
The Periphery and the Center / Command / Legacies
Amphibious Warfare

Paper proposals should include an abstract and a curriculum vitae. Panel proposals are welcome and should also include a description of the panel's theme. The deadline for proposals is **10 January 2012**. It is planned to publish the conference proceedings in due course. Presenters should be prepared to submit a draft text by 30 March 2012 and an edited version no later than 15 July 2012. Please address submissions and queries to: Dr. Marcus Faulkner (marcus.s.faulkner@kcl.ac.uk) and Robert von Maier (globalwarstudies@gmail.com) respectively.

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