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CONTENTS

ARTICLES

INTERVIEWS

ESSAYS ETC.

BOOK REVIEWS

Joint Actions by Allied Air and Naval Forces at Java on 26-27 February 1942

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Introduction

In mid-January 1942 several Allied headquarters were formed at Java. They belonged to the so-called ABDA-Command (American-British-Dutch-Australian Command or ABDACOM), at the time more commonly referred to as Unified Command. The British general Sir Archibald Wavell was the Supreme Commander of this very first Allied joint combined headquarters with personnel from all ABDA countries and all the military services. Wavell was formally subordinate to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, DC, but had, in practice, two "chiefs," the British and the American Chiefs of Staff. After 20 February 1942 the Allied ABDA area was comprised of little more than Java, some as yet unoccupied parts of the Indonesian archipelago such as northern Sumatra, the northern part of Australia, and the unoccupied parts of the Philippines and Burma. Burma, however, was transferred to the British India Command on 21 February 1942.

After the Allied evacuation of South Sumatra on 16 February 1942, Wavell concluded that Java was doomed and advised the Chiefs not to strengthen Java any further with the exception of troops and equipment already on its way to the island. New and serious setbacks followed on 19 and 20 February. Japanese forces occupied Bali, executed a heavy air raid on Darwin in northern Australia, and landed at Timor. New instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff followed on 22 February 1942. Wavell was transferred to India to become Commander-in-Chief India. The ABDACOM headquarters were vacated on 23-24 February with only some specialized departments, though reduced in size, remaining. One of these was the Combined Operations and Intelligence Centre (COIC), the Allied joint combined combat intelligence center.[1]

The Allied command structure remained as it was, but with Dutchmen at the command positions. The coordinating "Supreme Command" in Lembang near Bandung was formally disbanded on 25 February 1942.

The Commanding General of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL), Lieutenant General Hein ter Poorten, already commanding the Allied army forces in Wavell's time, now also became (as it was now called) Commander-in-Chief ABDA Area. He added some Dutch staff officers and small numbers of Allied liaison officers and specialists from Unified Command to his own staff, the *Algemeen Hoofdkwartier* (General Headquarters or AHK). Also the Allied naval headquarters already had a Dutch flag officer in command, Vice Admiral Conrad E.L. Helfrich of the *Koninklijke Marine* (Royal Netherlands Navy or KM). He too remained in command. The main Allied naval unit, the Combined Striking Force (CSF) consisting of American, British, Dutch, and Australian cruisers and destroyers, also remained in Java. The CSF, based in the naval ports of Batavia (Western Striking Force) and Surabaya (Eastern Striking Force) for logistical reasons, but largely concentrated in Surabaya on 26 February 1942, was commanded by Rear Admiral Karel W.F.M. Doorman of the KM.[2]

The Allied air headquarters ABDA-AIR (or ABDAIR) was slimmed down and renamed Java Air Command (JAC). On the evening of 22 February 1942 Major General Ludwig H. van Oyen, the Commanding General of the *Militaire Luchtvaart* KNIL (the Army Air Corps KNIL or ML/KNIL) took over command from Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse of the Royal Air Force. JAC had three subordinate headquarters, the British/Australian BRITAIR and the Dutch Commando ML in West Java and the American East Group (EASGROUP) in mid-Java and East Java. These headquarters directed the squadrons of combat aircraft. Also subordinate to JAC were Staff Reconnaissance Group (RecGroup or RECGROUP), a small staff directing the flying boats of the Dutch *Marineluchtvaartdienst* (Naval Air Service or MLD), the RAF, the U.S. Navy, and the RAAF, the Commando's *Luchtverdediging* (Air Defense Commands) of Batavia, Bandung, and Surabaya and all anti-aircraft artillery units of the KNIL and the British Army in Java. Also, the COIC became subordinate to van Oyen.[3]

JAC, BRITAIR, and COIC were housed in one building, the complex of the *Koninklijke Militaire Academie* (the Royal Netherlands Military Academy or KMA) on the eastern edge of the city of Bandung, a few kilometers from the impressed complex of the *Technische Hoogeschool* (technical university), where the AHK and ABDA Naval Operational Command (ABDA-FLOAT) were housed. The headquarters was well organized and the operational support of naval and land forces by JAC was well planned. There were, for example, procedures for requesting and allocating air support, which were derived from British procedures based on recent experience from North Africa. Although the available military means were insufficient, the Dutch refused to surrender without a fight.[4]

JAC carried out two air campaigns (counter-air campaigns) from 18

February 1942, one directed against Japanese targets in South Sumatra and the other against (mainly) Japanese targets at Bali. The objective of these campaigns was to win some time for the strengthening of Java's defenses with American and British fighter planes. The longer it would take the Japanese to gain air superiority above Java, the greater the chance to prevent an invasion. The Allied CSF was to put to sea as soon as Japanese invasion convoys were spotted. A RecGroup flying boat discovered the first such fleet on 25 February 1942 at Balikpapan, which undoubtedly had East Java as its destination.[5] Despite some successes, the air campaigns failed.

In Bandung, the Allied headquarters immediately took action. It was decided to concentrate the Combined Striking Force at Surabaya and to ready it immediately for an attack. As many fighters as possible were to be transferred to East Java for the protection of this naval unit. The American 17th Pursuit Squadron (17 PS) was based at Ngoro near Surabaya, but this unit had only eight serviceable Curtiss P-40E fighters at the time. The first three reinforcing fighters from West Java were Brewster B-339s of *Afdeling* (Squadron) 1-Vl.G.V of the ML/KNIL, which arrived from Andir on the late afternoon of 25 February. The next day, between 1400 and 1600, three more Brewster fighters of 1-Vl.G.V and *Afdeling* 2-Vl.G.V, and also six Hawker Hurricanes of *Afdeling* 2-Vl.G.IV of the ML/KNIL arrived at Ngoro, although the Hurricanes were not yet fully operational because of non-operational radios. A seventh Hurricane arrived on 27 February 1942.[6]

Doorman's Air Defense is Put Together (26 February 1942)

On 26 February 1942, during the day, the Eastern Striking Force was resupplied in the naval docks of Surabaya. Part of the Western Striking Force (two cruisers and three destroyers) sent from Batavia arrived early in the afternoon to strengthen this force and make up a Combined Striking Force consisting of five cruisers and nine destroyers. The CSF left in the early evening on a search mission.

The ships were vulnerable in Surabaya and Japanese air units were quick to go to the attack. The fighter defense at readiness at Ngoro consisted of nine P-40Es and three Brewster 339s. They took to the air at 0930 to intercept a formation of Japanese bombers escorted by fighters. The Allied naval ships were rescued by the overcast as the twenty-six Mitsubishi G4M bombers with eight escorting Navy O (A6M "Zero") fighters flew at around 9,000m, a height that could not be reached by the Allied fighters. The ceiling of the P-40E was around 7,500m and that of the Brewster 339 around 8,000m (the ML fighter had a better performance than the P-40E in terms of altitude, range, and turning rate, and was also slightly faster).[7]

The Japanese bombers remained high and threw their bombs through

a hole in the clouds. The accuracy was rather inadequate and almost all bombs fell into the water harmlessly and none hit any of the warships, although a few came very close. Lieutenant William J. Hennon (17 PS) surprised two Japanese fighters at a lower altitude some time later and claimed one of them as shot down. The last of the Allied fighters landed at Ngoro at 1115.[8] The G4M bombers belonged to the Kanoya *Kokutai* (Kanoya air group), which had just moved from Kendari II (East Sulawesi) to Makassar (South Sulawesi) to join the air offensive against East Java. The eight escorting Navy Os came from Bali.[9]

In the afternoon, at approximately 1645, two Brewsters were off again. Meanwhile, a total of six of these aircraft had become available and were attached to 17 PS. The two Brewsters, piloted by Lieutenant G.J. de Haas and Sergeant G.M. Bruggink, flew a sea reconnaissance north of Surabaya prior to the sailing of the Combined Striking Force. The other four Brewsters and four P-40s of 17 PS were kept at readiness for contingencies. Nothing was found, however.[10]

Nightly Planning in Bandung

On the evening of 26 February 1942 the Intelligence department of AHK and the COIC (probably on the basis of intercepted Japanese radio messages and the reported positions of the Japanese ships) warned for a possible invasion of Java early the next morning. The Intelligence department of AHK also warned for a possible Japanese naval operation to the south of Java against the Allied convoy route to Tjilatjap harbor. At ABDA-FLOAT, a possible battle in the Java Sea during the night of 26 February was foreseen. On the morning of 26 February a Dornier flying boat of the MLD discovered a Japanese convoy in the southern part of the Makassar Strait, apparently on its way to East Java. In the west there were still no reports of an invasion fleet on this day, but a Catalina of the MLD did report a few vessels in the Karimata Strait. Details were minimal because of the poor visibility there. Furthermore, the crew of a British Blenheim bomber returning from a mission to Muntok, Banka saw a convoy around 1030 at about 100nm north of St. Nicolaaspunt (the northeast access to the Sunda Strait). This convoy, however, sailed in a northern direction (345 degrees) and including escorts, it consisted of twenty ships at most. The staff officers in Bandung concluded that the acute threat still came from the east.[11]

During the night of 26-27 February 1942 neither the flying boats of RecGroup of JAC nor the warships of the Combined Striking Force and the remainder of the Western Striking Force – three cruisers and two destroyers still based at Tandjong Priok (Batavia) – found any trace of the Japanese invasion fleets. The Operations Staff of JAC had a busy night. The largely Anglo-Dutch staff, which also included an officer of the MLD, had planned a number of missions in the event that a Japanese in-

vasion of Java would take place during the morning of 27 February. Both in West Java and in mid- and East Java the bomber fleet of JAC was kept at readiness to be able to be deployed at sunrise. Also, a few missions to Palembang (South Sumatra) and Den Pasar airport in Bali had been scheduled. Furthermore, the possible move of a portion of the bomber fleet in the west to mid-Java had been prepared.[12]

During the night there was contact between staff officers of JAC and ABDA-FLOAT to coordinate the deployment of their respective forces. In the evening of 26 February the Commandant Marine Surabaya (the KM Commanding Officer of the port facilities at Surabaya and the units based there) requested air support for the Combined Striking Force through ABDA-FLOAT for the following day. At ABDA-FLOAT this request was combined with other such requests and priorities were added. In accordance with the existing procedures, one combined naval air support request for the coming day (from 2400 mid-Java Time) then went to JAC through the AHK. The planning was difficult due to a lack of reconnaissance data.[13]

Around 0200 the staff officers in the headquarters at Bandung concluded that there was no Japanese fleet near Banka or Billiton. The crew of a Catalina of the MLD which (in addition to other locations) checked the Banka Strait, sent a report in the evening of 26 February at 2300. Although some vessels were seen, there was no convoy. The warships of the remnant of the Western Striking Force checked the sea area south of Banka and Billiton. According to the first reports, no enemy ships were found. Two Catalina flying boats of the RAF, operating out of Tjilatjap, also found no trace of a Japanese operation to the south of Java.[14]

JAC decided to send out two planned missions to Palembang and keep part of the other bombers in the west on stand-by from 0500. With regard to the situation in the east, the staff officers were even more cautious. East Java was definitely approached by a Japanese invasion fleet, which was observed in the late morning of 26 February 1942 in the southern part of the Makassar Strait. In response to the air support request of ABDA-FLOAT, JAC sent out an order to East Group in the late evening of 26 February. A heavy bomber was to fly a night reconnaissance up to the coast of Borneo. This was done to expand the limited capacity of RecGroup in the east. (The reconnaissance missions of the flying boats were planned by RecGroup.) The Consolidated LB-30 took off shortly after midnight from Djokjakarta. From sunrise, reconnaissance activities would be further intensified by the deployment of even more bombers. In the west a limited number of ML and RAF/RAAF bombers, but in the east all deployable American heavy bombers, were to fly armed reconnaissance missions in search of the Japanese convoy and its escorting warships. The bombers in the east were re-tasked for bombing missions, however, when in the early morning hours of 27 February the

location data of Japanese shipping became available.[15]

In the early morning hours of 27 February, JAC and the other Allied headquarters in Bandung concluded that the advance of the Japanese apparently was estimated a day too soon, but the fact that they were closing in (at least in the east) was a certainty. The AHK rightly considered landings in both West Java and East Java the most likely, but now there slowly arose some hope that the Japanese might execute a landing in East Java first, followed by a second landing operation at a slightly later date in West Java. This would provide an opportunity for the Combined Striking Force to attack the Japanese invasion fleet in the east first and then redeploy to the west for a second attack.[16]

The Availability of Fighters

In the very early morning hours of 27 February, the Operations Section of the AHK (on behalf of the army commander, the C-in-C ABDA Area Lieutenant General Ter Poorten) ordered the deployment of all available fighter aircraft for the protection of the CSF, which was given priority over the air defense and other missions. To the JAC staff, the order came as somewhat of a surprise because previously, and in consultation with the staff of ABDA-FLOAT, a mission plan for the coming day had been finalized. Also, the air support for Rear Admiral Doorman, the commander of the CSF, had been agreed upon.

Vice Admiral Helfrich (flag officer commanding ABDA-FLOAT) knew that Doorman was carrying out a search operation during that night, but at the time the missions had been planned he had no idea of the exact location of Doorman's naval squadron. He also did not know how far the Combined Striking Force would steam to the west during its search. Even if the Japanese fleet was not located, it would be possible that Doorman would sail into Tandjong Priok (Batavia). Helfrich asked Ter Poorten, therefore, for even more support from JAC.

In consultation between JAC and AHK it was subsequently agreed that at Ngoro (East Java) all deployable American P-40s of 17th Pursuit Squadron and the squadron's seconded Brewster fighters of the ML (sixteen aircraft in total), and at Andir (West Java) all Brewster fighters of 1- and 2-Vl.G.V of the ML (eight aircraft), would be available on a permanent basis from 0500 for the protection of warships during naval operations along the north coast of Java. The deployment of the fighters at Ngoro was already planned, but the deployment of fighters from Andir was now added. The Brewsters at Ngoro and, if necessary, those at Andir, would fly protective patrols with flights of two aircraft at a time above the Allied naval squadron (the range of the Brewster 339 was significantly greater than that of the Curtiss P-40). The main objective was to intercept Japanese reconnaissance planes searching for the CSF. The P-40s were to be put at readiness at Ngoro to be able to rush to the scene

if necessary. That is, if the CSF would be within range.[17]

A total of fourteen Brewsters and ten P-40s were all that were available of these types of operational fighters in Java. Of the other types of fighters in use, the Hawker Hurricane fighters of the RAF and the ML were not suited for the job due to their relatively short range, while the fighters of this type with the ML also were not yet fully operational. Furthermore, the ML had available a few Curtiss-Wright CW-21B fighters, but these were in maintenance and also had too limited a range. The Hurricanes of the RAF could be used to protect Tandjong Priok, however, in case Allied warships were to enter that port.[18]

At approximately 0600 hours it was concluded that there was no evidence of a Japanese naval operation to the south of Java, but nevertheless, a tragedy began to develop in this sea area. The seaplane tender USS *Langley* (AV-3), with a load of thirty-two combat-ready Curtiss P-40 fighters and accompanying personnel, would not arrive at Tjilatjap on the southern coast of mid-Java according to plan, as will be discussed later. The P-40s were the aircraft complement of two fighter squadrons of the United States Army Air Force (USAAF), which were to be based at Tjisaoek (West Java).[19]

The Availability of Bombers and Flying Boats

The completion of lengthy repairs (among other things) to some British Bristol Blenheim bombers increased the bomber strength of JAC in West Java on 27 February 1942 from fourteen to twenty serviceable bombers. The RAF at Kalidjati airbase also possessed three obsolete Blenheim Mark I bombers which were used mainly for coastal reconnaissance missions and were not included in the listed strengths. These aircraft could, however, be deployed for night bombing missions. Also, 36 Squadron RAF at Tjikampek, with ten Vildebeest and Albacore light bombers, was not mentioned for the same reason, but the full strength of this unit could be deployed for night bombing missions against an invasion fleet. The available bombers were only remnants of earlier battles. On the morning of 28 February 1942 it was decided to move 36 Squadron to Madioen (mid-Java) to assist the USAAF.

The status of the different bomber units in West Java on 27 February 1942 at 0500 was as follows:[20]

Unit	Type of ac	Base	Total ac	Serviceable ac
84 Sq (RAF)	Blenheim	Kalidjati	16	7
1 Sq (RAAF)	Hudson	Kalidjati	11	2
Vl.G.I/II (ML)	Glenn Martin	Kalidjati	7	6
Vl.G.III (ML)	Glenn Martin	Tjisaoek	4	2
Vl.G.III (ML)	Glenn Martin	Andir	5	3
Total			**43**	**20**

In mid- and East Java the American East Group of JAC in Malang, Madioen, and Djokjakarta had available only seven serviceable heavy bombers (six Boeing B-17s and a Consolidated LB-30 Liberator) and four serviceable Douglas A-24 light (dive) bombers. It is important to note, however, that the B-17s and LB-30s represented a considerably greater capacity than that represented by the British, Australian, and Dutch bombers in the west. An American heavy bomber could be armed with eight 300kg bombs (2,400kg per unit), a Glenn Martin of the ML could carry only three of this type of bomb (900kg per unit), while the English Bristol Blenheim bombers and the American Lockheed Hudsons of the Australian squadron were light bombers which could only carry a load of 450kg.

The availability of flying boats on 27 February was also very limited. At Morokrembangan, Surabaya (East Java) and several shelters in the surrounding area, the following units were based:

Patrol Wing 10 (U.S. Navy): three Consolidated PBY-4 and PBY-5 Catalinas, of which two were serviceable.
***Groep Vliegtuigen* 6 (MLD):** three Dornier Do-24Ks, of which none were deployable (crews were in mandatory rest period).
***Groep Vliegtuigen* 7 (MLD):** four Dornier Do-24Ks (this group was not available for operations because it's aircraft were in major inspection).
***Groep Vliegtuigen* 17 (MLD):** three Consolidated PBY-5s, including two serviceable aircraft.

In West Java there were seven serviceable Catalinas, all of the MLD, of which a minimum of five were needed for the search for and, if found, the tracking of the expected "western" Japanese invasion fleet. To be able to deploy two flying boats on a semi-permanent basis and have a third aircraft on stand-by for Air-Sea-Rescue and eventualities, five was the minimum. Two flying boats could therefore be redeployed in the east to augment the limited capacity there. However, one of the Catalinas was lost (missing) on the morning of 27 February, limiting the reserve to one.

Reconnaissance Missions by Bombers in the West
Flying boats of RecGroup not only flew during the night, but also during the day. One of the flying boats operating until sunrise (from Tandjong Priok) was the Y-63 of *Groep Vliegtuigen* 2 of the MLD, which (among others) searched the Banka Strait. It did not return from its mission and was lost without a trace. A second reconnaissance report was never received from the crew.[21] Also, beginning at sunrise, a number of bombers participated in the reconnaissance effort. A section of three Glenn Martins and two individually deployed Hudsons from Kalidjati flew sea searches on the morning of 27 February above the western part of the

Java Sea in the direction of Banka and Billiton. The crews found no enemy activities with the exception of one of the Hudson crews.

The Hudson flown by Flying Officer H.H. Siddell of 1 Squadron RAAF discovered by chance (in the midst of very bad weather) a small Japanese convoy about 50nm south of southeast Banka. It was steering a northeastern course. The bomber was fired at, but escaped into the clouds with light damage.[22]

During the first half of the afternoon two reconnaissance missions from Kalidjati were flown (without bombs) to airbase PI, the former civilian airport north of the city of Palembang, and airbase PII, a military airport located southwest of the city in the middle of the jungle. The crew of Flight Lieutenant J.V.C. Wyllie, in a Blenheim from 84 Squadron RAF, discovered at PII thirty parked bombers, saw no enemy fighters, and strafed the bombers on both sides of the runway. The Japanese were surprised; not a single shot was fired when the Blenheim made its low-level high-speed run over PII.[23]

A Glenn Martin of *afdeling* 1-Vl.G.II of the ML flown by Second Lieutenant P.E. Straatman flew to PI. Sergeant mechanic J. Stemerdink (airgunner on the mission) took along a camera from the photo section of Kalidjati and took several photographs of the parked Japanese aircraft. The Glenn Martin briefly came out of the thick clouds right over PI and climbed back into the clouds immediately after taking the photographs. On PI there were many more planes than at PII, at least sixty, and above the airport fighters were seen on patrol.[24]

It was now clear that the Japanese concentrated planes at Palembang for the attack on West Java. At JAC the staff assumed (wrongly) that PII had just been put into use. They (rightly) did not worry too much about the occupation of this airbase. It was difficult to supply and it would take many more days before the Japanese could fly regular operations from PII. A correct assessment. It had escaped attention, however, that the Japanese naval air force had already put PII into use on 24 February 1942. An unsuccessful bombardment carried out on the early morning of 27 February by 3-Vl.G.III of the ML on PI had to be repeated.[25]

The USS *Langley* (AV-3)

On 23 February 1942 the seaplane tender *Langley* (Patrol Wing 10) left the convoy in which it had departed Australia the day before (on orders from ABDA-FLOAT) and steamed to Java at full power. On 11 February 1942, well before the Japanese conquest of Bali and Timor, the Americans already had ferried P-40 fighters to Perth (Australia) for further transport to Java by ship. This was due to the high losses suffered during the ferry flights of P-40s from Darwin in northern Australia, via Timor and Bali to East Java. Apart from two squadrons of the USAAF on the *Langley*, which departed on 22 February 1942 from Fremantle

(the port of Perth), twenty-seven P-40s packed in crates were on board the U.S. Navy auxiliary SS *Sea Witch*. This freighter was loaded in Melbourne on 12 February 1942.[26]

Initially, the cargo of the *Sea Witch* was destined for India (Karachi), but General Wavell (then still Supreme Commander) decided on 22 February that the fighter aircraft should go to Java instead. In the Netherlands East Indies Lieutenant Governor-General Dr. H.J. van Mook had personally intervened to ensure that both ships with their P-40s would sail to Java. The commanding officer of the *Sea Witch* left the convoy on 25 February, from a position near the Cocos Islands.[27]

On 26 February two Catalina flying boats of *Groep Vliegtuigen* 5 (GVT 5) of the MLD, the Y-65 and Y-71, flew out to the *Langley* from Tjilatjap to fly search patterns around the vessel. The minelayer *Willem van der Zaan* of the KM had been instructed to act as escort the previous day. This ship already operated south of Java as an escort and had a modern and relatively heavy anti-aircraft battery. Shortly after the rendezvous with the *Langley* on the morning of 26 February, problems arose with the engine preventing the *Willem van der Zaan* from keeping up with the *Langley*. This problem reduced the speed of the two vessels to 10nm. The problems of the minelayer proved irreparable at sea, and the commanding officer of the *Willem van der Zaan* signalled around 1000 to the KM port staff headquarters in Tjilatjap that he had to refrain from carrying out the escort mission. The commanding officer of the tender decided to press on at full power.[28]

The intention had been to sail the most dangerous part of the route into Tjilatjap during the evening and night of 26 February and early morning of 27 February. During the night, however, on orders from ABDA-FLOAT (most likely in connection with the expected Japanese naval operation south of Java for which a warning had been received), the *Langley* backtracked a number of hours until that order was revoked. As already stated, warships and flying boats of RecGroup could not find any trace of Japanese operations during this night. The delay caused by the *Willem van der Zaan* and the backtracking put the *Langley* many hours behind the original time schedule. At sunrise on 27 February the ship was still hundreds of nautical miles out of Java.[29]

Around 0600 on 27 February another act of the *Langley* drama started to develop in the KMA building in Bandung, now the home of JAC. Major General van Oyen and his staff officers heard that the *Langley* would not arrive in Tjilatjap during the morning as planned. As Vice Admiral Helfrich (ABDA-FLOAT) could not be reached, van Oyen telephoned army commander Ter Poorten to ask whether the *Langley* needed fighter protection on the last stretch to Tjilatjap. The Brewster fighters at Andir could easily be moved to Banjoemas for such a mission. All fighter aircraft, including those at Andir, were to remain available for the protec-

tion of warships of the Combined Striking Force during its operations along the north coast of Java, however. Van Oyen protested and pointed out that the seaplane tender was much more vulnerable then the warships, but his objections were not heard. Due to the small number of fighters available, Lieutenant General Ter Poorten felt that he had no choice and the protection of the Combined Striking Force retained its priority.[30]

The ML personnel in the port of Tjilatjap were informed through the *Staf Commando* ML (the operational war headquarters of the ML) that the *Langley* could be expected in the late afternoon. A team of the technical depot of the ML/KNIL at Andir and some American personnel from the (P-40-equipped) 17th Pursuit Squadron at Ngoro in East Java were in the port to help with the readying for flight of the P-40s. The planes were to fly to Tjisaoek in western Java from an improvised runway on a quay. Infantry soldiers of the KNIL were available to help unload the tender. At Tjisaoek, a reception party of the ML was kept on stand-by.[31]

During the morning of 27 February the worst scenario came true. The *Langley* was spotted by a bomber of the Japanese naval air force. The tender had a new escort of two American destroyers which left Tjilatjap in the evening of 26 February to take over the escort mission. They made rendezvous around 0715 the next morning. The two Catalinas of GVT 5, armed with depth charges, again flew search patterns around the *Langley* on this day. Around 1200 and some 75nm south of Tjilatjap, the seaplane tender was successfully attacked by nine Mitsubishi G4M bombers of the *Takao Kokutai* from Bali. Japanese fighters, Navy Os of the 3rd *Kokutai* and the *Tainan Kokutai* from Bali, also attacked the ships and one of the two flying boats of the MLD. The Y-65 sustained major damage, but was able to reach Tjilatjap for an emergency landing.[32]

The *Langley* suffered a fire that could not be extinguished and was abandoned. Almost all on board were rescued by the destroyers. One of the escorts then sank the *Langley* with artillery fire and several torpedoes. The freighter *Sea Witch* reached Tjilatjap without any problems the next day. The ship carried, as stated, twenty-seven crated P-40s. This cargo was off-loaded with the highest priority and transported by train to Bandung, Maospati, and Tasikmalaja for assembly.[33]

The Air Support for Doorman on the Morning of 27 February 1942

After a primarily nocturnal search for the Japanese invasion convoy, the Combined Striking Force entered the *Westervaarwater* north of Surabaya in the early afternoon of 27 February to replenish in the naval docks. The CSF had (except aircraft) discovered no Japanese activities and had reversed course at about 0930 at the longitude of Rembang for the return trip to Surabaya.[34]

Java Air Command had searched for Doorman the entire night of 26 February to 27 February with several flying boats of RecGroup and an LB-30 bomber of East Group. The latter returned at Djokjakarta after a mission of six hours at 0625. A Catalina of the MLD found one or two Japanese ships at various locations during the night, but no convoy. Due to a defective radio, this message could not be relayed until around sunrise after the landing. After hours of searching in the weak moonlight and partly amid heavy clouds with rain showers, the crew of the LB-30, as well as the crews of the other flying boats, arrived with negative reconnaissance reports.[35]

The Combined Striking Force received fighter protection during several hours in the morning. At approximately 0515 Lieutenant H.H.J. Simons and Sergeant G. van Haarlem left Ngoro for a first protection mission. They flew above the ships at 7,500m from around 0530 to 0700 and were then relieved by Lieutenant G.J. de Haas and Ensign B. Wink. The Allied naval squadron sailed west, relatively close to the coast of Java and west of the longitude of Surabaya. On the ships the crews could only hope that the aircraft seen were indeed the promised fighter protection, because the fighters could not be identified due to their high altitude and the lack of direct radio communication. The Allied fighter pilots had to fly as high as possible, however, to be in a position for a timely intercept of approaching Japanese planes. Radio communication was technically impossible. The radios of the ships and the planes were working in different frequency ranges, which did not overlap.[36]

De Haas and Wink flew above the ships for half an hour at 7,500 to 8,000m when a fast twin-engine aircraft approached at even greater height. The Japanese aircraft (a G4M bomber which probably operated from Balikpapan) appeared to fly at around 9,000m, unreachable for the Brewsters with a ceiling of only 8,000m, and was flying from west to east over the warships. The radio connection with the Commando *Luchtverdediging Surabaya* (Interceptor Control) was not working (possibly because of heavy tropical rain showers in the vicinity) and de Haas decided to return to Ngoro to report by telephone that the CSF was discovered by the Japanese. The warships still steamed to the west and were almost out of range of the Brewster fighters that could have remained above the naval squadron only briefly. The fighters landed at Ngoro at approximately 0745.[37]

At approximately 0800 the crews on the warships were informed that protection by Allied fighters was no longer possible. The Combined Striking Force not only steamed out of reach of the Brewsters, but the pilots' oxygen was much depleted by operations on the previous day. Fresh oxygen from Madioen was enroute, but was not received at Ngoro until the afternoon. After the return of de Haas and Wink, four Brewsters were put on readiness at Ngoro, but this was all that could be done.

Doorman probably became aware of these underlying reasons only when he radioed for fighter protection after an air strike on one of his ships.[38]

On the morning of 27 February, four B-17 bombers of East Group left Malang for an attack on warships that had been discovered (probably by a coast watch detachment) near the coast of Java. One of the crews discovered a group of five large ships and several smaller ones and dropped out of the clouds and bombed one of the ships in two runs around 0900. Only afterwards did the crew of Lieutenant P.L. Mathewson learn that communications had been less than perfect and that the ships which were located were Allied. Fortunately, the British destroyer HMS *Jupiter*, which had been the target, was not hit. The warships shot back with their anti-aircraft artillery, but the B-17 escaped into the clouds. The three other B-17s returned to their base early because of engine problems. At 0735 East Group was informed by JAC that the location given for the attack was probably that of the CSF. However, the B-17s could not be contacted by radio once they were airborne.[39]

Doorman reported the air strike by radio and apparently ABDA-FLOAT subsequently asked the Commandant Marine Surabaya why the agreed fighter defense had not been present over the CSF. The KM staff in Surabaya asked the Commando *Luchtverdediging* Surabaya for details and Lieutenant Colonel H.J. Ente van Gils, the commanding officer of the command, informed them at 1040 about the underlying reasons. Of course, Doorman communicated with two naval authorities, one of which (ABDA-FLOAT) was not aware of the communications by telephone between the Commando *Luchtverdediging* Surabaya (Interceptor Control) and the staff of the Commandant Marine Surabaya.[40]

The Japanese Invasion Fleet Rediscovered in the East

A section of two B-17 bombers left Madioen at 0730 on 27 February 1942 to search for the ships discovered by the MLD Catalina during the night. The crews found a group of warships and bombed at 1020 through a few small openings in the thick cloud cover amidst heavy anti-aircraft fire. That these vessels did not belong to the CSF soon became clear. After the bombing, a Navy O tried to attack one of the B-17s, but failed. Two Navy Os pursued the B-17s for a while, but the Japanese pilots could not intercept the bombers because of the clouds. The American crews also discovered a convoy of about thirty-five ships steering a course of 170 degrees. This discovery could be reported only after landing at 1230. For unknown reasons, it then took a few hours before the report reached the Allied headquarters in Bandung.[41] Japanese sources show that the cruiser *Jintsu* and accompanying destroyers formed the target of the B-17s, but the ships were apparently not hit or seriously damaged by near misses.[42]

The crew of a Catalina of Patrol Wing 10 reported at 1340 that it had

observed an enemy fleet at 65nm north-north-west from Bawean. Reported were twenty transport vessels and an unknown number of destroyers.[43] This RecGroup aircraft was not intercepted. The weather on 27 February 1942 was very bad and the *Tainan Kokutai* had great difficulty maintaining a fighter presence over the invasion fleet. Three of the Navy Os of the *kokutai* that took off at 1230 from Balikpapan went missing. The pilots ran into bad weather but were able to make emergency landings, as it turned out afterwards. From around 1330, there was no fighter presence over the Japanese ships. A second searching Catalina from Surabaya did not report any contacts.[44]

The Catalina Y-45 of *Groep Vliegtuigen* 18 (GVT 18) of the MLD took off at about 0930 from Tandjong Priok (Batavia) for a search mission for the Combined Striking Force. Apart from the planes already in the air, there were no more deployable flying boats at Surabaya, except for the Y-67. The crew of the latter flying boat was on standby at naval air station Morokrembangan (Surabaya) for contingencies such as Air-Sea-Rescue. The Y-45 flew along the coast of Java to the east and saw the CSF at approximately 1100 at the longitude of Toeban sailing an easterly course. In accordance with their orders, the crew searched for enemy submarines near Bawean, but none were found. In the meantime the weather greatly deteriorated and the flying boat flew at low altitudes through rain. When the plane had just cleared the rain showers, at 20nm west of Bawean, the crew discovered an enemy fleet. The fleet was steering a southern course and consisted of (as far as could be observed) twenty-five transport vessels, two cruisers, six destroyers, and probably some smaller warships.

While the crew investigated, a Japanese cruiser launched a catapult plane, which climbed out to the Catalina for an attack. The Y-45 escaped into a cloud bank above Bawean. At 1350 the crew radioed its discovery using the so-called "CZM-golf" (a Dutch naval command frequency) for aircraft.[45] This frequency was also monitored by warships of the KM and messages on the frequency received by the KM in Surabaya were redistributed (more than once) on the "CZM-golf" for ships.

RecGroup had only one radio station available (from a written-off American Catalina) that could be used for the exchange of messages with flying boats of the U.S. Navy only. Search reports from MLD flying boats went to a communications department of the KM. However, in the processing of telegrams (decoding and prioritization), frequent and often long delays occurred due to overloading. There were stacks of telegrams and nearly every sender assigned a priority code to his telegram that was higher than it truly warranted. RecGroup distributed reports it received from the KM communications department immediately on receipt, within the city of Bandung (all headquarters and the COIC) by courier, and outside Bandung through the communications department of the KM.

Doorman received reconnaissance reports from the MLD: once from ABDA-FLOAT and once via the "CZM-golf," which was monitored by his KM warships.[46]

When the Japanese invasion fleet was discovered by RecGroup, the Allied naval squadron had been on the way back to Surabaya and was shadowed for a while by a Japanese floatplane from a cruiser. Shortly after 1020, the CSF was discovered by a floatplane from one of the cruisers of the covering forces of the Japanese convoy.[47]

The official message regarding the discovery of the Japanese invasion fleet, apart from the escort totalling around forty-five transport vessels subdivided into two groups on a north-south line west of Bawean, reached Rear Admiral Doorman through ABDA-FLOAT at 1427, when his squadron already was in the *Westervaarwater* north of Surabaya. The ships of the CSF turned around immediately. The floatplanes of most of the Allied cruisers, sent away (probably on the morning of 26 February) to a shelter in the outskirts of Surabaya, were not taken aboard again although at least one was directed to Morokrembangan in the afternoon of 26 February and was put on stand-by. Only the two cruisers HMS *Exeter* and HMAS *Perth*, which arrived at Surabaya on 26 February from Batavia, still had a floatplane on board. At approximately 1500, the CSF left the minefield to the north of the access to the *Westervaarwater*.[48]

Doorman had not yet received orders from ABDA-FLOAT to leave port for an attack. This order came at 1500. At the same time, three Douglas A-24 light-bombers took off from Malang for a first attack on the Japanese transport fleet (see below). The Japanese navy knew that the CSF had left port. One of the floatplanes of the cruiser *Nachi* reported that Doorman reversed course and at 1518 its crew reported that the Allied naval squadron sailed at a speed of 22nm in a north-westerly direction.[49]

The weather in the vicinity of Surabaya had improved significantly, but was still very poor over Balikpapan, Makassar, and Bali, home bases of the bombers and fighters of the Japanese naval air force. A planned bombing of Surabaya had to be cancelled. All bombers and most of the escorting fighters turned back. Only a couple of Navy Os reached Surabaya, saw no targets, and flew back.[50] The crews of the Allied warships occasionally saw a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft. The floatplane of the cruiser *Nachi* shadowed the Allied naval squadron until it had to return to its ship around 1530. It dropped two light bombs before it left, but scored no hits. The aircraft which appeared next above the CSF were Allied fighters.[51]

On the afternoon of 27 February between 1430 and 1500, orders from JAC were issued to the Commando ML, BRITAIR, and East Group based on an expected invasion of Java on the night of 27-28 February or possibly the early morning of the 28th. All available aircraft had to be

readied for action immediately. RecGroup had, as described, discovered a Japanese invasion fleet in the vicinity of Bawean Island which steamed to East Java. The fleet's course and speed made an invasion the coming night very probable. As of that moment, all the bombers were on readiness, but JAC decided to proceed with a previously planned attack on airport PI (the former civil airport of Palembang, South Sumatra) with a Glenn Martin of the ML and an attack by an American LB-30 on airport Den Pasar (Bali), on the night of 27-28 February. The Japanese air superiority had to be reduced as much as possible prior to an invasion of Java.[52]

Updating the Planning of the Air Support for Doorman

Doorman arrived at the entrance to the *Westervaarwater* north of Surabaya at about 1400. At the same moment in Bandung, arrangements were made between ABDA-FLOAT and JAC to update the nightly planning for the air support of the Allied naval squadron during the coming attack on the Japanese invasion convoy. A full squadron from Ngoro, fifteen fighters strong, would offer air support to Doorman during his attack on the Japanese transport fleet. Douglas A-24 dive-bombers would ascertain the position of this convoy first and perform an initial attack. East Group was entrusted with the detailed planning of the air support mission and the initial attack by the A-24s. JAC and ABDA-FLOAT coordinated the time Doorman would sail with respect to the take-off time of the aircraft.[53]

East Group planned the deployment of the fighters and the A-24s in consultation with Major W.P. Fisher, the USAAF officer in charge of "Interceptor Control" at the Commando *Luchtverdediging* Surabaya, in one mission. The task of the fighters was escorting the A-24s and the "cleansing" of the air in the area of action just before the arrival of the Combined Striking Force. The P-40s and the Brewsters would fly ahead of the Allied warships and protect these ships during the expected sea battle from enemy air strikes. Depending on the outcome of this sea battle, the heavy bombers of JAC would be deployed.[54]

At approximately 1430, Lieutenant George E. Kiser, the acting commander of 17th Pursuit Squadron, and Lieutenant G.J. de Haas, commanding officer of the detachment of Vl.G.V, received their briefing from Fisher. He gave all the known facts about the Japanese ships near Bawean Island, the intent of the mission, the time of take-off from Ngoro, and the time rendezvous had to be made with the A-24s near Surabaya. Fisher also mentioned that the plan for the mission had been discussed with the KM in Surabaya. The two officers then briefed their pilots. Lieutenant Jack D. Dale (17 PS) would lead one of the P-40 sections and de Haas the Brewster section. Kiser would act as overall commander and lead the other P-40 section.[55]

Rear Admiral Doorman apparently had no knowledge of the arrangements made in Bandung between ABDA-FLOAT and JAC about his air support. If he had, he would presumably have waited for the take-off of the aircraft before sailing. This delay had, perhaps, given him the time to take back on board the remaining floatplanes (required for observation during artillery battles). He now radioed (at 1600) for fighter protection, while the fighters were already underway. The Commandant Marine Surabaya reported to Doorman that the fighters had been deployed for the protection of air strikes on the Japanese transport fleet, hence suggesting that they were not available for the protection of his naval squadron.

Apparently, the staff officers of the KM did not have the right idea about the intent of the mission by East Group. This may have been the result of language problems. Major Fisher had passed on the mission details himself, but the naval officer with whom he spoke clearly had not completely understood him. A KM officer tried to verify the mission details with Lieutenant Colonel Ente van Gils, the commanding officer of the Commando *Luchtverdediging* Surabaya. Ente van Gils, however, also did not have a complete understanding as he knew little about the air operations. Major Fisher and a few other Americans formed a separate unit within the staff of his command that was called Interceptor Control and he was not allowed to interfere with their work (the operational controlling of the fighters). It may have been the wrong understanding of the mission plan by the staff officers of the KM that resulted in no initiative being taken to deploy the (slow and vulnerable) floatplanes of the CSF from the shore. This had been possible as Allied air superiority above the Allied naval squadron was expected.[56]

It seems strange that Doorman was not aware of the arrangements regarding his air support, but radio communications on 27 February were occasionally disrupted by heavy monsoon showers, overloading of the network of the communications department of the KM, and jamming of frequencies by the Japanese. It is possible that ABDA-FLOAT did send a telegram about the arrangements, but this was never received by Doorman. The text of the surviving telegram from Helfrich to Doorman with the order to sail does, in hindsight, look unprofessional (unless it was preceded by a more detailed message that did not survive) and was certainly not very motivating and inspiring. It simply stated: "Enemy seen to the west of Bawean, attack." No exact time to sail in accordance with the arrangements made with JAC was given. The telegram was simply sent at the agreed time of departure of ships and A-24 dive-bombers.[57]

The Battle of the Java Sea

Despite the initial bad weather, JAC tried to provide Rear Admiral Doorman with reconnaissance reports during the afternoon. During the first

half of the afternoon of 27 February, at least two flying boats were in the air. The aircraft searched for Japanese ships to the west and northeast of Bawean Island and at other locations but in vain. Doorman used the last reported position and course of the convoy, but instead stumbled upon the Japanese covering force of cruisers and destroyers. In fact, there were two covering forces, one consisting of the light cruiser *Jintsu* and some destroyers from Timor and one consisting of the heavy cruisers *Nachi* and *Haguro* with two destroyers, which had sailed behind the convoy and could make rendezvous just in time. In addition, Doorman was confronted with a portion of the escort of the transport fleet, the light cruiser *Naka* with a number of destroyers.

All in all, the Japanese had two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and fourteen destroyers available for the developing battle. Around 1615 Doorman went into battle with his two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and nine destroyers.[58] Shortly before, as already mentioned, Doorman radioed at 1600 to the KM in Surabaya for fighter protection. The Allied fighters were already on their way, however, and escorted, exactly according to the mission plan, the three (the fourth had a defect) Douglas A-24 dive-bombers of the 27th Bombardment Group (Light) led by captain H. Galusha, that had departed Malang at 1500.[59]

At 1515 the two sections (ten Curtiss P-40s) of 17 PS and one section (five Brewsters) of 1- and 2-Vl.G.V of the ML took off from Ngoro. Near Surabaya, the fighters formed up with the A-24s as planned and flew out to search for the Japanese fleet. Meanwhile, the weather had become fair and the fighters flew at an altitude of 4,800m.[60]

After an hour of flying. the Japanese transport fleet was located at 60nm northwest of Bawean Island and was sailing a southern course. The pilots counted about forty-five transport vessels in a rectangular formation, tightly packed and accompanied by a large number of smaller warships that could not be identified because of the height at which the aircraft were flying. The pilots had first encountered the CSF and a Japanese naval squadron at about 1630. At approximately 10nm to the southeast of the transport fleet, the CSF and the Japanese warships exchanged fire. The pilots of the A-24s dove down to the attack from an altitude of about 3,000m at around 1645. The success was limited. Each plane dropped one bomb of 300kg and two of 50kg. One transport vessel of an estimated 14,000 tonnes was hit, but steamed on. In the meantime, part of the Allied fighter planes had climbed out and took care of the air support for the CSF.[61]

After the bombing, the A-24s did not need any escort and returned to Malang by themselves. One of the A-24s had been hit by the heavy anti-aircraft fire and received light damage. The fighters remained above the warring naval squadrons to provide Doorman the promised air protection for as long as possible. From the air they could see how the two naval

squadrons constantly fired at each other and also how the Japanese had the advantage of a larger number of ships. In the enemy line there were two enormous ships which, the fighter pilots thought at the time, were battleships. In fact, they were the heavy cruisers *Nachi* and *Haguro*. A Japanese ship, believed to be a cruiser, was visibly hit and arced out of the line to return some time later after extinguishing the fire that had developed. Kiser reported the events by radio to Interceptor Control.

The Japanese naval squadron could not be approached by the Allied fighter pilots. Every time they flew into the direction of the enemy warships, the Japanese ships threw up a dense barrage of anti-aircraft fire. Worse still, the Allied warships also occasionally fired at the P-40s and Brewsters with their heavy anti-aircraft artillery. Doorman clearly did not know that the fighter aircraft above him were Allied. This presumably also explains why the Supermarine Walrus floatplanes of the Allied cruisers *Exeter* and *Perth* were not launched for artillery spotting. Direct radio contact, as already mentioned, was technically impossible and the fighter pilots could do no more than report to Interceptor Control, with the request to advise the KM. In order to avoid any difficulties and to be able to locate advancing Japanese aircraft, the Allied fighters continuously flew a rectangular circuit around the two naval squadrons at an altitude of 7,500 to 8,000m.[62]

Japanese bombers, fighters, or reconnaissance aircraft were nowhere in sight. The weather above Balikpapan, Bali, and Makassar, home bases of the attack groups of the Japanese naval air force, was still very bad. Japanese cruiser floatplanes had no chance of survival against the P-40s and Brewsters and the five that were in the air were kept at a distance. Therefore, not only Doorman, but also his opponent, Vice Admiral Takagi Takeo, had to fight the artillery duels without artillery spotting.[63]

With the approach of twilight, the fighter pilots had to withdraw at approximately 1730 to be able to land at Ngoro while there was still some light. The fighter pilots were pessimistic about the outcome of the sea battle. The Japanese transport vessels were to the west of Bawean Island and steamed in a westerly direction. Lieutenant Kiser reported the position and the change of course around 1700 to Interceptor Control and asked to advise the KM that he would soon have to leave the CSF. Shortly thereafter, he reported the position of several warships in relation to a smoke screen. From an altitude of 7,500m it had now become increasingly difficult to see which ships were Allied and which were Japanese. At 1700 Captain Galusha radioed the results of the A-24s and the data on the Japanese transport fleet. He reported, apart from the transport vessels, three cruisers and twelve destroyers. The A-24 pilots believed they had successfully hit three transport ships, but this was not confirmed by the fighter pilots later. JAC, in the end, gave the result as one hit and two near misses.[64]

The last of the Allied fighters had just disappeared from sight when the Japanese commander directed his cruiser floatplanes to fly over the Combined Striking Force. Around 1745, when the Allied naval squadron was reforming, some of these planes dropped some light bombs at American destroyers (without hitting anything) and left. This was the last time Japanese reconnaissance aircraft flew over the CSF as the *Nachi* and *Haguro* had to take their aircraft back on board. An hour later, the battle which would come to be known as the "day battle" of the Battle of the Java Sea ended.[65]

Doorman had sent one of his best ships, the British heavy cruiser *Exeter*, and the only Allied warship with radar, back to Surabaya under the guidance of the destroyer *Witte de With*. At about 1708 the cruiser was badly hit, with six of its eight boilers going down. The smokescreen that the Allied fighter pilots had observed was laid to protect this ship. Furthermore, the destroyer *Kortenaer* was hit by a torpedo and sank at 1715. The British destroyer HMS *Electra* sank at approximately 1800. The Japanese had to withdraw the destroyer *Asagumo* with relatively heavy damage. Some other Japanese destroyers were slightly damaged and the heavy cruiser *Haguro* lost a floatplane in a fire. Measured in the number of vessels still available, Doorman was at a disadvantage, but he was, at this point, far from defeated.[66]

Later in the evening a second part of the sea battle developed, later referred to as the "night battle," in which some of the ships still remaining on the Allied side were lost. Doorman did not succeed in reaching the Japanese transport fleet. Probably at 1857, the CSF commander radioed for the location of the Japanese transport, but this was not precisely known in Surabaya. Apart from the reports of the Allied fighter pilots and dive bomber crews of 1700, a flying boat of RecGroup, probably a Catalina of GVT 17 of the MLD, reported at 1757 thirty-five ships at 70nm north-west of Bawean Island, and at 60nm west of Bawean a cruiser and four destroyers.[67]

The Commandant Marine Surabaya telephoned Bandung and the Commando *Luchtverdediging* Surabaya to verify the data and to ask whether there were more recent reconnaissance reports. There were not and the information from 1700 and 1757 was radioed at 1930 (again) to Doorman. It is not known if Doorman ever received the radio messages sent to him during the sea battle. Radio communication was difficult because of the weather throughout the day, with periods of very poor reception, and at times receiving messages was impossible. Also, as already stated, the Japanese jammed certain frequencies. These included the CZM-frequency for ships, but also the so-called "contact golf," a frequency the Allied naval squadron used for ship-to-ship contact.[68]

Around 1900 the Commandant Marine Surabaya telephoned RecGroup to ask if a Catalina from Tandjong Priok could be made available

in the east, but none was available. However, Captain Frank B. Wagner (U.S. Navy, Deputy Commander of RecGroup) changed the orders for a Catalina crew in Surabaya. Aircraft P-5 of Patrol Wing 10 (pilot Ensign Duncan A. Campbell) was to take-off for a search mission somewhat earlier than already planned. A take-off at 1900 was useless because there was no moonlight at that time. But even with moonlight the Japanese ships would be hard to find in the large sea area. Around 2100 commanding-officer G.F. Rijnders of the stand-by crew at the Dutch naval air station Morokrembangan was called to the staff room. Also, his crew (in Catalina Y-67 of GVT 17) was sent out for a search and departed at approximately 2230.[69]

Ensign Campbell discovered the Japanese transport first, at 2222, to the southwest of Bawean. A contact report was immediately sent to RecGroup. The message went from there to – among other recipients – ABDA FLOAT and then through the network of the overloaded communications department of the KM, whose radio connections were also disturbed by atmospheric conditions from time to time, to Surabaya and Doorman. It was not until 2352 that the message reached the Commandant Marine Surabaya. The crew of the Y-67 discovered the Japanese transport vessels at around 2400.[70]

Doorman's flagship, the light cruiser *De Ruyter* had, at 2334, already been hit by a torpedo. Doorman was unable to find the Japanese transport fleet and came into contact again with a superior number of enemy cruisers and destroyers. During the night battle, the CSF lost two light cruisers, the *Java* and the *De Ruyter*, and the British destroyer *Jupiter*. The Japanese took no losses. The role of the Allied striking force in the defense of Java was finished. Doorman and more than 1,000 men were killed or missing. The sea battle, together with the discovery of the remnants of the Western Striking Force by a Japanese cruiser floatplane in the west, gave Java just one day of respite.[71]

The message about the outcome of the sea battle reached the headquarters in Bandung on the morning of 28 February 1942. The search operations by RecGroup went along according to the original planning until that time. The Y-67 and the P-5 returned to base shortly after sunrise. The planned flights by Dornier flying boats of GVT 6 during the daylight hours on 28 February became searches for surviving crewmembers of sunken Allied ships.[72]

The Effectiveness of the Allied Air Support

Rear Admiral Doorman had been highly dependent on the contact reports of the flying boats and bombers of RecGroup and East Group of JAC. On 27 February flying boats eventually found the Japanese convoy of transport vessels with its escort west of Bawean but could not, thereafter, find a Japanese covering force of cruisers and destroyers protect-

ing this convoy. Although there were only a few deployable Allied flying boats and bombers, this low number was not the only problem.

The Allied flying crews searched very large sea areas for many hours, but on the morning and early afternoon of 27 February were hindered by very bad weather. The weather, however, also meant that in the afternoon no operations over the eastern part of the Java Sea in the direction of Surabaya could be flown from Balikpapan, Makassar, and Bali by the Japanese naval air force. In the morning, only a few Japanese missions were flown from Bali. These were reconnaissance flights to the south of Java, which led to the sinking of the seaplane tender *Langley*.

The availability of the Allied flying boats was limited because of the near total lack of reserve crews. This resulted in a meagre support of the Combined Striking Force (also during the night battle), but generally two, sometimes three, flying boats were in the air at a time, although occasionally a flying boat had to come all the way from Batavia to the east to sustain this effort. On 27 February, from approximately 1500, the American heavy bombers were readied for attacks on the Japanese transport fleet (Japanese landings were expected the coming night) and were therefore no longer available for reconnaissance missions. The low number of remaining serviceable bombers did not allow a continuation of search missions to be flown by a part of the bomber force.

The Catalina and Dornier crews often flew search missions of ten to twelve hours and were then not deployable for a full day. To keep up effectiveness during these long missions, two to three extra crewmen were included. This allowed for regular rest periods during the flight for the "look-outs." Because of the long duration of the search missions, the flying boats accumulated a large number of flying hours and rotated quickly through fifty and 100 hours regular maintenance. Apart from necessary repairs, one in every three planes was in regular maintenance at any given time. Prior to the introduction of the compulsory rest periods for the crews, the Dutch naval air service had a few nasty accidents, but aircraft availability was reduced even further by the compulsory day off.[73]

The cooperation between air and naval forces was good at staff level, but encountered (technical) restrictions in the execution. There were, as explained above, few deployable flying boats for long-distance reconnaissance missions, but JAC filled the capacity gap as long as it could with bombers. In the east all operational American heavy bombers were tasked for armed reconnaissance missions. Unfortunately, one of the B-17s bombed a British destroyer of the CFS because of a communications error, but no damage was incurred. Lieutenant Admiral Helfrich wrote in his memoirs about the air support (by fighters) for Doorman: "This was not realized, nor later in the day." His statement, however, is at odds with reality.[74]

Rear Admiral Doorman was supported by all operational fighter air-

craft at Ngoro on 26 and 27 February. Already on 26 February these were available and at readiness throughout the day for the interception of Japanese air attacks on the Surabaya naval base, and fighters also flew a sea reconnaissance in the evening to help ensure a safe departure of the CSF warships from Surabaya. On 27 February the P-40s and Brewsters provided air cover for the CSF and prevented artillery spotting by Japanese cruiser floatplanes during the day battle.

The Air Support During the Night Hours

The Allied fighters, like the Japanese fighters, could only be deployed during the daytime, but the availability of air support also played a role during the night battle. The Japanese fleet had some cruiser floatplanes that could operate during the night. Thanks to nocturnal reconnaissance sorties, in part with the help of parachute flares, Rear Admiral Takagi was able to keep his naval squadron between that of Doorman and the transport fleet and he was, at least until around 2200, informed by radio of the maneuver of the Allied warships.

Doorman did not have cruiser floatplanes that could be deployed at night and, except for the planes of the *Exeter* and *Perth*, did not have his cruiser floatplanes on board. Because he foresaw a night battle, he had sent his planes (probably on 26 February) to a shelter in the vicinity of Surabaya. The Allied cruiser planes could have been deployed on 27 February during daytime from these shelters or from the naval air station Surabaya, but this was not done.

The Japanese did have reconnaissance capability available during the night, but it was very limited. The two heavy cruisers *Nachi* and *Haguro* had three floatplanes each, two two-seat Mitsubishi F1M aircraft and a triple-seat Aichi E13A1, but they could only be deployed during the daytime. Of these six aircraft, one was lost (aboard the *Haguro*) during the day battle. The remaining five were taken back on board from 1857. The (light) cruisers *Jintsu* and *Naka* had one floatplane each, which were also deployable at night. The aircraft of the *Jintsu* was deployed first to be relieved around 2120 by the aircraft of the *Naka*. With the latter plane, however, no radio communication was possible after 2200, whereas the main part of the night battle began around 2300. Japanese aerial reconnaissance played no role, therefore, in the loss of the cruisers *De Ruyter* and *Java*, both hit by one or more torpedoes around 2330.[75]

The Japanese fleet did not have the benefit of reconnaissance and artillery spotting by its floatplanes during the day battle, nor during the main part of the night battle.

Allied Communications Problems

A major problem on the Allied side was communications. It was technically impossible to maintain radio communication between fighters or

bombers of JAC and Allied warships of ABDA-FLOAT. The communication between the fighters of Ngoro and Doorman, for example, first went by radio from pilot to Interceptor Control. The message was then relayed by telephone to the staffroom of the Commandant Marine Surabaya and then sent by radio again to Doorman. On 27 February radio connections were regularly disrupted by atmospheric conditions and also by Japanese jamming of naval frequencies.

Although delays occurred regularly in the communication between flying boats on one side and Doorman and the staffroom in Surabaya on the other side, overloading of the communications department of the KM also played a role. In the evening of 27 February communications failed at a crucial moment and reconnaissance reports of RecGroup did not reach Doorman in time. Had he received these messages, Doorman, in theory, might have been able to attack the Japanese transport fleet.

Some Conclusions

Doorman did not lose the battle of the Java Sea because of a lack of Allied direct air support. During the day battle, the CSF was the only party which was supported by its own fighter aircraft, which made artillery spotting by Japanese cruiser floatplanes impossible. There was, as this is called today, a temporary (Allied) local air superiority, although Doorman may not have been aware of this for quite a while because of the delays in the forwarding of the messages by the lead fighter pilot. Perhaps he never received these and other messages because of the problematic radio communication. The local air superiority lasted during most of the day battle (until approximately 1730) and was relatively extensive and certainly effective. To maintain relatively extensive air protection for the Combined Striking Force choices had to be made, resulting in no air protection at all (by fighters) for the seaplane tender *Langley*.

The conclusion of some authors that the CSF was shadowed continuously on 27 February by at least one Japanese plane, except perhaps around 1900, is incorrect.[76] At approximately 0730 the Allied naval squadron was spotted by a Japanese G4M bomber. This was the first successful Japanese air reconnaissance of the CSF and the only one by a land-based aircraft. From just after 1020, a Japanese floatplane shadowed the CSF, which continued until about 1530. During the day battle, Rear Admiral Takagi kept five floatplanes in the air, but well away from the area of the sea battle because of the coverage that was given to the CSF by the fifteen American and Netherlands East Indies fighters. Shortly after the departure of the Allied fighters, some of the Japanese floatplanes arrived, once and only briefly, over the Allied naval squadron to drop their light bombs, but then had to be taken back aboard the cruisers. Therefore, the Japanese were not – through air reconnaissance – constantly aware of the maneuvering of the CSF during the day battle.

During the night battle, there was only one Japanese floatplane in the air over the Allied naval squadron. From 2200, however, there was no radio communication with this aircraft. Apart from a brief battle which began at about 1930 and which probably resulted in no hits on ships on either side, the main night battle of the Battle of the Java Sea began around 2300. During the most important part of the night battle, therefore, there was no Japanese advantage from air reconnaissance.

Meanwhile, an American Catalina flying boat at about 2222 rediscovered the Japanese transport fleet, but the message from its crew did not reach Doorman because of delays in the communication system. That Doorman was not successful in his attempts to attack the Japanese transport fleet had, of course, to do with the small number of deployable flying boats of RecGroup. There were, however, no more flying boats available, while JAC had to pull its few serviceable bombers out of the reconnaissance effort to be able to attack the Japanese transport fleet and landings. Doorman was not successful in finding the Japanese transport fleet on his own and was confronted with a superior number of cruisers and destroyers during the night of 27 February 1942.

Notes

1. L. de Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog*, Vol. 11a, part I, 2nd half ('s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij, 1984), pp. 761-776, 778-779, 851, 865-866, 870, 872-873; Sir Archibald Wavell, *Despatch by the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Operations in the South-West Pacific 15 January 1942 to 25 February 1942* (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1948); H. Creutzberg (adjutant of Major General L.H. van Oyen at the time) interview series by author, February 1975; W. Mulder (duty officer with COIC at the time), interview by author, 1 July 1985.
2. P.C. Boer et al, *De luchtstrijd om Indië: Operaties van de Militaire Luchtvaart KNIL in de periode December 1941-Maart 1942* (Houten: Unieboek, 1990), pp. 123-124; Ph.M. Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, Vol. 2 (Franeker: Wever, 1986), p. 272.
3. Boer, *De luchstrijd om Indië*, pp. 123-124; Sir Paul Maltby, *Report of the air operations during the campaign in Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies 8 December 1941 to 12 March 1942* (London: Supplement to the *London Gazette*, 20 February 1948), p. 1394; H. Creutzberg, interview series by author, February 1975; W. Mulder, interview by author, 1 July 1985; correspondence of S.H.A. Begemann (March 1942, via W. Bosman).
4. Ibid.
5. P.C. Boer, *Het verlies van Java: een kwestie van Airpower* (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 2006), pp. 20, 128; Maltby, *Report of the air operations*, p. 1396.
6. Army Air Force Historical Studies 29A (Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence-Historical Division, Washington, DC, 1945); Unclassified report of 17th Pursuit Squadron (P) activity in Java 14 January-February 1942 (Air Force Historical Research Agency [AFHRA], Maxwell AFB, via Gerard J. Casius); H.H.J. Simons, letters to author, 3 April 1991 and 17 August 1991; H. Creutzberg, interview series by author, February 1975; Bob Wink, interview by author, 24 January 1985; Jan B.H. Bruinier, interview by author, 18 March 1988.
7. Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 273; Unclassified report of 17th Pursuit Squadron (P) activity in Java 14 January-February 1942 (AFHRA,

Maxwell AFB, via Gerard J. Casius); H.H.J. Simons, letters to author, 3 April 1991 and 17 August 1991; B. Wink, interview by author, 24 January 1985; Boer, *De luchtstrijd om Indië*, p. 175 (wrongly states that twelve P-40s took off).
8. Unclassified report of 17th Pursuit Squadron (P) activity in Java 14 January - February 1942 (AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, via Gerard J. Casius); Schout-bij-nacht F.W. Coster, Verslag betreffende de krijgsverrichtingen te land in Nederlands-Indië d.d. 20 May 1942, Part E, p. 15 (Marinestaf, Historische Sectie, Bc-8/1, Netherlands Institute for Military History, The Hague); Walter G. Winslow, *The Ghost of the Java Coast: Saga of the U.S.S. Houston* (Satellite Beach, Florida; Coral Reef Publications, 1974), p. 116; L. Schotborg, ed., *Nederlands-Indië contra Japan, Vol. IV: De verrichtingen van de Militaire Luchtvaart bij de strijd tegen de Japanners in en om de archipel, in samenwerking met bondgenootschappelijke luchtstrijdkrachten* ('s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1956), p. 141 (wrongly suggests that the fighters had something to do with the failure of the bombardment); H.H.J. Simons, letters to author, 3 April 1991 and 17 August 1991; see also Christopher Shores and Brian Cull with Yasuho Izawa, *Bloody Shambles: The First Comprehensive Account of Air Operations Over South-East Asia December 1941 – May 1942,* Vol. Two*, The Defence of Sumatra to the Fall of Burma* (London: Grub Street, 1993), p. 234.
9. Military History Department of the National Institute for Defence Studies, *Senshi Sosho*, Vol. 26: [translated title: Naval drive to the Dutch East Indies and the Bay of Bengal] (Tokyo: Asaguma Shinbunsha, 1969), p. 630.
10. G.J. de Haas, interview by author, February 1977; H. Huys, interview by author, 1 February 1985; see also G.M. Bruggink, Opgave van alle operationele vluchten in de oorlogsdagen van 1941/'42 verricht door G.M. Bruggink, letter to Stafofficier Adm. Zaken Hoofdkwartier Militaire Luchtvaart, Batavia, 27 December 1946 (collection Ward, Netherlands Institute for Military History, The Hague). A seventh Brewster returned to Andir with a malfunction, to return to Ngoro on 28 February 1942 (pilot H. Huys).
11. Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, pp. 277-278, 299; Samuel Eliot Morison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, Vol. III, *The Rising Sun in the Pacific: 1931 – April 1942* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951), p. 338; Shores et al, *Bloody Shambles*, p. 233; C.E.L. Helfrich, *Memoires van C.E.L. Helfrich: Luitenant-Admiraal b.d., Eerste deel, De Maleise Barriere* (Amsterdam, Brussel: Elsevier, 1950), pp. 395-396; information about flying boat operations on 26-27 February 1942 received from Nico Geldhof (Afdeling Maritieme Historie, The Hague, February 1985); H. Creutzberg, interview series by author, February 1975; W. Mulder, interview by author, 1 July 1985.
12. Ibid.
13. H. Creutzberg, interview series by author, February 1975; W. Mulder, interview by author, 1 July 1985; Lieutenant H.F. Zeylemaker (ML liaison officer Staf Groep Bandoeng KNIL) describes the procedures in his diary notes "beschrijving oorlogsoperaties" (via A. van Aarem and J. Mossou).
14. L. Honselaar, ed., *Vleugels van de Vloot. De geschiedenis van de Marineluchtvaartdienst* (Rotterdam: Wyt, 1950), pp. 196-197; H. Creutzberg, interview series by author, February 1975; W. Mulder, interview by author, 1 July 1985; Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 299; Helfrich, *Memoires*, pp. 395-396. See also Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 593, note 163 (the text of the two telegrams mentioned concerns the "eastern" and not the "western" invasion fleet).
15. Operations Journal 19th Bombardment Group, 8 December 1941 – 19 March 1942, p. 60 (AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, via Gerard J. Casius); H. Creutzberg, interview series by author, February 1975; A.B. Wolff, interview series by author, April 1990; Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 274 (probably relates to the LB-30; Bosscher wrongly mentions that no heavy bomber could be made available). See also Army Air Force Historical Studies 29A for the LB-30 mission.

16. H. Creutzberg, interview series by author, February 1975; W. Mulder, interview by author, 1 July 1985; Helfrich, *Memoires*, p. 394; Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 275.
17. H. Creutzberg, interview series by author, February 1975; W. Mulder, interview by author, 1 July 1985; G.J. de Haas, interview by author, February 1977; Pieter G. Tideman, interview series by author, February 1977; Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 600, note 251; diary notes A.A.M. van Rest (via Van Rest Family).
18. Boer, *Het verlies van Java*, chapter 1A8.
19. H. Creutzberg, interview series by author, February 1975; J.C. Benschop, interview series by author, February 1976; W. Mulder, interview by author, 1 July 1985; J. Geverdinck, interview by author, 19 March 1988.
20. Army Air Force Historical Studies 29A; part of Operations Summary JAC containing notes on numbers of aircraft per unit (via A.B. Wolff); logbook data W.P. van der Baars (at the time with GVT 7) and letters of KLTZ W.P. Petschi d.d. 7 January 1955 and OVL 1 B. Sjerp d.d. 1 October 1947 concerning GVT 7 (via N. Geldhof).
21. Honselaar, *Vleugels van de vloot*, pp. 196-201.
22. Operations Summary JAC, see note 20; Sir Paul Maltby, *Report of the air operations*, p. 1396, par. 530; Shores et al, *Bloody Shambles*, p. 237; W. Mulder, interview by author, 1 July 1985; C.J.H. Samson, interview by author, 4 March 1985.
23. Boer, *Het verlies van Java*, pp. 139-140.
24. Ibid.
25. Military History Department, *Senshi Sosho*, Vol. 26, p. 628; A.B. Wolff, interview series by author, April 1990; H. Creutzberg, interview series by author, February 1975; W. Mulder, interview by author, 1 July 1985.
26. D. Gillison, *Royal Australian Air Force 1939-1942, Australia in the war of 1939-1945, 3, Air*, Vol. 1 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1962), pp. 434, 436; Schotborgh, ed., *Nederlands-Indië contra Japan*, p. 113; Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, pp. 298-299; data from primary sources available in Austalian National Archives on convoy MS 5, received from G. Busby (e-mail, 31 August 2004).
27. De Jong, *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog*, pp. 887-888.
28. Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, pp. 298-299; K.W.F. Bezemer, *Zij vochten op zeven zeeën, verrichtingen en avonturen van de Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog* (Utrecht: W. de Haan, 1964), p. 327; information concerning GVT 5 received from N. Geldhof (Afdeling Maritieme Historie, The Hague, February 1985); see also Shores et al, *Bloody Shambles*, p. 240; Morison, *The Rising Sun in the Pacific*, pp. 360-361, gives an incorrect description which, unfortunately, has been – partially – copied in other publications, see for example Walter D. Edmonds, *They Fought with What They Had: The Story of the Army Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific, 1941-1942* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951), pp. 417-418.
29. Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, pp. 298-299; Dwight R. Messimer, *In the Hands of Fate: The Story of Patrol Wing 10, 8 December 1941 – 11 May 1942* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985), p. 265; Shores et al, *Bloody Shambles*, pp. 240-241.
30. H. Creutzberg, interview series by author, February 1975; P.G. Tideman, interview series by author, February 1977.
31. J.C. Benschop, interview series by author, February 1976 (2Lt Benschop was in charge of the technical depot group); J.G. Bücker, interview by author, 26 November 1984 (2Lt Bucker was in charge of the reception party at Tjisaoek); J. Geverdinck, interview by author, 19 March 1988 (Lieutenant Geverdinck was CO of the infantry company at Tjilatjap).
32. Conform note 29; Military History Department, *Senshi Sosho*, Vol. 26, p. 662; information concerning GVT 5 received from N. Geldhof (Afdeling Maritieme Historie, The

Hague, February 1985).
33. Conform note 29.
34. Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, pp. 277-278.
35. Army Air Force Historical Studies 29A; Operations Journal 19th Bombardment Group, 8 December 1941 – 19 March 1942 (AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, via Gerard J. Casius); W. Mulder, interview by author, 1 July 1985; Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 274 (wrongly states that no American bomber could be made available) and p. 278.
36. H.H.J. Simons, letters to author, 3 April 1991 and 17 August 1991; B. Wink, interview by author, 24 January 1985; G.J. de Haas, interview by author, February 1977; G.J. de Haas, Rapport, Brisbane, 15 April 1946 and H.H.J. Simons, Rapport, Brisbane, 15 April 1946 (collection Ward, Netherlands Institute for Military History, The Hague). Boer et al, *De luchtstrijd om Indië*, pp. 175-176, is partly incorrect and does date events incorrectly. The reports of Simons and De Haas contain errors, and I received corrections from both.
37. Ibid.; Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 279 (Bosscher wrongly assumes that the planes above the CSF were Japanese); B. Wink, interview by author, 24 January 1985.
38. Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 279 and p. 599, note 233; H.H.J. Simons, letters to author, 3 April 1991 and 17 August 1991; B. Wink, interview by author, 24 January 1985.
39. Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 279; Army Air Force Historical Studies 29A; Operations Journal 19th Bombardment Group, 8 December 1941 – 19 March 1942 (AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, via Gerard J. Casius); see also Shores et al, *Bloody Shambles*, p. 238 and Helfrich, *Memoires*, p. 400 (wrongly notes that it was not confirmed that the attacking planes were American; HQ V Bomber Command offered an excuse to Doorman through JAC and ABDA-FLOAT).
40. Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 599, note 233 (as is explained in the text, this note actually concerns two different things).
41. Army Air Force Historical Studies 29A; Operations Journal 19th Bombardment Group, 8 December 1941 – 19 March 1942 (AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, via Gerard J. Casius); extract of war diary Tainan Kokutai (Military History Office, Tokyo, via P.G. Tideman; the Japanese pilot who tried to attack reported a "flying boat"); Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 279.
42. Military History Department, *Senshi Sosho*, Vol. 26, p. 662.
43. Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 280; information about flying boat operations on 26-27 February 1942, received from N. Geldhof (Afdeling Maritieme Historie, The Hague, February 1985).
44. Military History Department, *Senshi Sosho*, Vol. 26, p. 662; extract of war diary Tainan Kokutai (Military History Office, Tokyo, via P.G. Tideman); information about flying boat operations on 26-27 February 1942, received from N. Geldhof (Afdeling Maritieme Historie, The Hague, February 1985).
45. Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 281 and p. 601, note 256 (H. Dorré suggests in his post-war report that his flying boat was attacked by fighters); Honselaar, *Vleugels van de vloot*, pp. 203-204 (quoting from the report by the Sergeant observer of the Y-45, shows that the Catalina was not attacked by fighters, but by an aircraft launched from a catapult by a cruiser).
46. H. Creutzberg, interview series by the author, February 1975; W. Mulder, interview by author, 1 July 1985; Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 208 and p. 541, note 129; KTZ bd G.G. Bozuwa, "De Reconnaissance Group (ABDA Air) van het Supreme Command (te Bandoeng) van 10 januari tot 1 march 1942" (undated post-war report, probably compiled in 1946, via N. Geldhof, Afdeling Maritieme Historie, The Hague).
47. Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 281; information

from the Military History Department NIDS (Tokyo) regarding the deployment of cruiser floatplanes (23 February 1983, via P.G. Tideman).
48. Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, pp. 280-281 and p. 601, note 255; the remaining floatplane of the *Houston* flew to Tandjong Priok on 28 February 1942 in order to be taken back aboard, see also Shores et al, *Bloody Shambles*, p. 249. The Walrus floatplane of the *Exeter* was, when this ship arrived in Surabaya around midnight on 27-28 February (albeit damaged by "gun blast") still on board, see for example Morison, *The Rising Sun in the Pacific*, p. 343. The Walrus of the *Perth* was still on board when this ship arrived at Tandjong Priok on 28 February 1942, see *Air Britain Aeromilitaria*, Spring 2005.
49. Conform note 47.
50. Military History Department, *Senshi Sosho*, Vol. 26, p. 662.
51. Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 282; information from the Military History Department NIDS (Tokyo) regarding the deployment of cruiser floatplanes (23 February 1983, via P.G. Tideman).
52. Boer, *Het verlies van Java*, p. 140.
53. H. Creutzberg, interview series by author, February 1975; W. Mulder, interview by author, 1 July 1985.
54. H. Creutzberg, interview series by author, February 1975; G.J. de Haas, interview by author, February 1977; Arie J.A. Geurtz (then liaison officer of the ML with 17 PS), telephone interview by author, 18 January 1984.
55. G.J. de Haas, interview by author, February 1977; Unclassified report of 17th Pursuit Squadron (P) activity in Java 14 January – February 1942 (AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, via Gerard J. Casius); see also Shores et al, *Bloody Shambles*, p. 239.
56. Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 282 and p. 602, note 273 (Bosscher wrongly states that the ML fighters were not operational; in fact, only the Hurricanes were not operational for air defense work as no crystals were available for their radios); A.J.A. Geurtz, telephone interview by author, 18 January 1984 (Geurtz received the questions from Ente van Gils at the time).
57. Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 282 and p. 602, note 267.
58. Ibid., p. 282.
59. Army Air Force Historical Studies 29A. According to G.J. de Haas (interview by author, February 1977) Kiser received a confirmation by telephone that the A-24s had taken off at the planned time; Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 602, note 273 (gives the take-off times as they were communicated to the Commandant Marine Surabaya); see also Shores et al, *Bloody Shambles*, p. 239.
60. Operations Journal 19th Bombardment Group, 8 December 1941 – 19 March 1942, p. 60 (AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, via Gerard J. Casius; wrongly mentions that eleven P-40s were deployed as escorts); Army Air Force Historical Studies 29A (this mission summary usually only mentions the missions/sorties by USAAF planes, as is the case with the mission on 27 February 1942, the study mentions only ten P-40s plus three A-24s); Unclassified Report of 17th Pursuit Squadron (P) activity in Java 14 January - February 1942, p. 11 (AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, via Gerard J. Casius; text was drafted after arrival of the squadron personnel in Australia, a combat report for the mission of 27 February 1942 did not survive the withdrawal and evacuation of the unit); G.J. de Haas, interview by author, February 1977; H.H.J. Simons, letters to author, 3 April 1991 and 7 August 1991; B. Wink, interview by author, 24 January 1985; Lester J. Johnsen, telephone interview by author, 19 April 1985; Gerard M. Bruggink, letter to author, 12 August 2003; C.A. Vonck, interview by W. Bosman, 1946 (via W. Bosman). It should be noted that the reports by G.J. de Haas and H.H.J. Simons of 15 April 1946 (see note 36) contain mistakes, and I received corrections from both.
61. Conform (very similar) descriptions by H.H.J. Simons, B. Wink, C.A. Vonck and L.J. Johnsen, see note 60; Operations Journal 19th Bombardment Group, 8 December 1941 -

19 March 1942, p. 60 (AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, via Gerard J. Casius), is based upon the original combat reports and gives the attack time as 1647. According to the interviewed former fighter pilots, it took a few minutes to fly from the location of the sea battle to the Japanese transport fleet. At 1638 (he noted down the time) L.J. Johnsen took some photographs with his private camera when he passed both naval squadrons at 7,500m. B. Wink gives 1630 as the approximate time the Brewster section passed the battling naval squadrons.
62. Ibid. The radio messages from Kiser reached the KM and apparently also ABDA-FLOAT, see Helfrich, *Memoires*, p. 415, first paragraph. I am certain that this text relates to the radio messages of Kiser, although Kiser's American English has been translated very awkwardly, while Helfrich himself has added the names of Japanese ships. It should be noted that the fighter pilots thought the *Haguro* and *Nachi* were battleships. While Kiser talked about an "enemy cruiser burning aft," his remarks concerned, very probably, a light cruiser or a large destroyer.
63. Information from the Military History Department NIDS (Tokyo) regarding the deployment of cruiser floatplanes (23 February 1983, via P.G. Tideman), confirms that during the day battle, no Japanese floatplanes were near the area of the sea battle.
64. Schout-bij-nacht F.W. Coster, Verslag betreffende de krijgsverrichtingen te land in Nederlands-Indië d.d. 20 May 1942, Part F, p. 15 (does speak of British dive bombers, however); Bosscher, D*e Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 610, note 356; G.J. de Haas, interview by author, February 1977; H.H.J. Simons, letters to author, 3 April 1991 and 17 August 1991; B. Wink, interview by author, 24 January 1985; G.M. Bruggink, letter to author 12 August 2003.
65. Conform note 63; see also Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 610, note 358. The process of taking on board a floatplane was a fairly lengthy process. It started with a reconnaissance by the floatplane of the surrounding area and ended with the cruiser coming to a (near) complete stop to be able to lift the floatplane by a crane from the water and to place it back on a catapult.
66. Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, pp. 281-288.
67. Ibid., p. 288 and p. 610, note 349, pp. 609-610 and p. 610, note 346.
68. Ibid., pp. 288-289; W. Mulder, interview by author, 1 July 1985 (confirmed that a KM officer from Surabaya checked in Bandung).
69. Messimer, *In the Hands of Fate*, pp. 268-269; information about flying boat operations on 26-27 February 1942 received from N. Geldhof (Afdeling Maritieme Historie, the Hague, February 1985); Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, pp. 289-290; letter of G.F. Rijnders d.d. 25 March 1986 (via N. Geldhof).
70. Ibid.
71. Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, pp. 288-292; data received from the Oorlogsgraven Stichting (OGS, the Dutch War Graves Foundation).
72. Messimer, *In the Hands of Fate*, p. 269; letter of G.F. Rijnders d.d. 25 March 1986 (via N. Geldhof); see also Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 292. According to H. Creutzberg, interview series by author, February 1975, JAC received the message about the loss of the CSF between 0400 and 0500.
73. Information about flying boat operations on 26-27 February 1942 received from N. Geldhof (Afdeling Maritieme Historie, The Hague, February 1985).
74. Helfrich, *Memoires*, pp. 384-385, 400, 403-404. The observations and conclusions of Helfrich about the air support (see also pp. 409-410) are far from correct and from time to time it even seems, reading the memoirs, that Helfrich and his own staff operated separately. I think that it is impossible, however, that Helfrich did not know of the agreements between the staff officers of ABDA-FLOAT and JAC about the air support. The number of eight (Dutch) fighters that Helfrich mentions (*Memoires*, p. 403) concerns, most likely, the seven non-deployable ML Hurricane fighters and one Brewster 339 fighter left behind at Ngoro. The American bomber which he mentions (*Memoires*, p. 409) concerns the leading A-24 dive bomber.

75. Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 610, note 358, pp. 289-290; for data on numbers and types of the deployed Japanese floatplanes, see for example Masatake Okumiya and Jiro Horikoshi with Martin Caidin, *Zero!: The Story of Japan's Air War in the Pacific, 1941-45* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1956, fifth printing, 1966), p. 31.
76. Bosscher, *De Koninklijke Marine in de tweede wereldoorlog*, p. 613, note 385.

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Winston Churchill, Two Armies, and Military Transformation

RAYMOND A. CALLAHAN

Introduction

"Military transformation" is a much-used phrase, often in a context that makes clear that the writer or speaker feels it is a newly minted concept. In fact, of course, military history is spattered with such transformations, from the enormous impact of the stirrup on European warfare in the 8th/9th centuries through the "military revolution" of the 16th/17th centuries to the upheaval wrought by the coming of the internal combustion engine and powered flight in the 20th century. Such transformations always produce major upheavals, not only in military organizations but, very often, in the political and social structures that support them. These transformations are difficult to negotiate at any time, and doubly so if the armies concerned must simultaneously restructure and fight. This was precisely the situation in which both of Britain's two armies, the regular British Army and the Indian Army, found themselves in 1939-1945. Both armies met the challenge of changing while fighting effectively – in the case of the Indian Army remarkably so. The story, however, is little known, especially in the United States. For this, ironically, Winston Churchill himself bears a considerable responsibility.

Churchill's enormously influential war memoir, the six-volume *The Second World War*, may have lost some of its authoritative character in the eyes of professional historians, but the "Churchill version" remains at the heart of much of the popular understanding of the war.[1] David Reynolds has recently deconstructed in masterly fashion both how Churchill's memoirs were assembled and the guidelines that he followed as he laid out what was intended to be – and still is to many – the quasi-official history of Britain's remarkable war effort.[2] One of those guidelines for the last two volumes, covering 1943-1945 (*Closing the Ring* and *Triumph and Tragedy*), was to move the focus away from battles and onto the major inter-Allied conferences and Anglo-American discussions (often tense and angry) over strategy. Since this was precisely the period when hard-bought experience, new equipment, and new comman-

ders were finally producing transformed British and Indian armies, Churchill did less than justice to the military renaissance occurring during those years. Posterity, outside the small community of specialist historians, followed where Churchill led.[3] It was to enter a corrective footnote to Churchill's account that *Churchill and His Generals* was written.[4]

The British Army was not ready, in any sense, for the war to which it was committed in 1939. Tasked in 1919 with imperial defense and policing, it was only given a "continental commitment" mission on the very eve of the Second World War. Starved for funds even after rearmament began in the mid 1930s, it had unresolved doctrinal arguments over the role of armor, equipment deficiencies, training deficits, and a top-down institutional culture that produced a force slow to react in battle and ill-suited to successful combat against the Germans when it did. Combined arms tactics were, if not unknown, certainly unpracticed. Only courage and dour determination were present in abundance.

The Indian Army was even less prepared. Long the empire's strategic reserve east of Suez, it was highly professional, but nearly unmodernized in 1939 (the year it gave up its horsed cavalry). The Raj's budget did not run to military modernization, and London agreed to cover these costs only in 1938. Although recruits for expansion would never be lacking in India, for a long time nearly everything else was. The Indian Army would suffer both during the war and afterwards in Churchill's memoirs (where he ignored it whenever possible) from the fact that Churchill had never shaken off the British regular army suspicion and disdain for the Indian Army that he had imbibed as a young 4th Hussar over forty years before. (In 1941 he would ask General Sir Claude Auchinleck, an Indian Army officer and a former Commander-in-Chief, India, if he was sure that Indian troops, if fully modernized, would still point their weapons in the right direction.)

When Churchill became prime minister in May 1940, he almost immediately confronted a "worst possible case" far beyond the most pessimistic scenario of any pre-1939 war game. Britain stood in the path of the astoundingly successful (if also remarkably lucky) German war machine with no allies save its ill-prepared Dominions, colonies – and India. At this point, three crucial decisions were taken. The first – basically unavoidable – decision was to replace the mountains of equipment lost in the evacuations from Dunkirk and other places with what the factories could readily supply in quantity, thus condemning all the armies supplied by Britain to fight until 1942 with many weapons known by 1940 to be obsolescent at best. (Those armies included not only the British and Indian armies, but those of Britain's Dominions and colonial dependancies as well.) The second was to hold the British position in the Middle East, a decision that was very much Churchill's own. This deci-

sion shaped the British Army's war for the next four years, setting the stage for the Desert and Italian campaigns. The third and final decision was to grow the Indian Army very rapidly to as large a force as possible in an equipment-starved environment, while focusing its training on the war in the Middle East and North Africa. This decision meant both a diminution of quality not remedied until 1943 as well as a complete unreadiness for the very different war the Indian Army would face in December 1941 against the Imperial Japanese Army in Malaya and later in Burma.

The result of these decisions, interacting with the British Army's preexisting problems, was two years of defeat that led Churchill (and even General Sir Alan Brooke, the professional head of the British Army from December 1941) to question both the army's leadership and its will to combat. In fact, the repeated defeats at Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's hands were due largely to the inherited deficiencies in the army's command structure and its doctrine (or lack thereof). Churchill saw little of this clearly – then or later. What he saw plainly were defeats and debacles that, by July 1942, had Rommel at the gates of Cairo and the prime minister facing the greatest domestic political crisis of the war, brought on by repeated military failures. The Indian Army had added its share to the seemingly endless tale of defeat, retreat, and surrender. Overexpanded, under-equipped, and trained for the wrong war, the Indian Army was comprehensively beaten in Malaya and Burma in 1941-1942. Then, in a premature counter-offensive into Burma insisted upon by the prime minister for political reasons (he needed to respond to American pressure to re-open the Burma Road to China), the Indian Army was once again routed in early 1943. Just at this point, however, as Churchill in his memoirs began to direct his readers' attention elsewhere, a remarkable turnaround began.

The British Army's transformation is linked in popular memory – not least because of what Churchill wrote in *The Hinge of Fate* about the battle of El Alamein – with Bernard Law Montgomery. Certainly Monty, in his vain and misleading *Memoirs*, did his best to position himself as the only man who knew how to guarantee victory.[5] The story, however, is a bit more interesting than that. Monty arrived just as better equipment in massive quantities was at last reaching the British Army. He was, moreover, Brooke's protege. Brooke, a World War I gunner, was the heir to the techniques, heavily reliant on artillery, that had allowed the British in 1918 to finally advance successfully on the Western Front. Monty was an updated 1918 general, adding massive tactical airpower to the equation. His formula, first seen at El Alamein, became the standard pattern for British Army battles for the balance of the war: massive artillery preparation, complemented by the airborne artillery the increasingly unchallenged Allied air forces could bring to bear, followed up by

carefully prepared, cautious infantry attacks – a caution made necessary by Britain's dwindling manpower reserves – and all sustained by careful attention to the logistical underpinnings. It was a formula for incremental success at a sustainable cost, which was what British generals in North Africa, Italy, and Northwest Europe delivered after El Alamein. (After late 1942 it was only when this formula was abandoned – as in MARKET-GARDEN – that the British Army sustained a serious reverse.) All this suited Churchill's purposes – he needed victory both for domestic morale and to keep up Britain's end in the Anglo-American partnership. The fact that Britain nonetheless was ultimately outweighed and overshadowed by the United States was not something the British Army – or the prime minister – could do anything about: the resource disparity was simply too great.

In the war against Japan, however, matters played out much more dramatically. The turnaround of the Indian Army – astonishing in retrospect – began on the heels of the ill-fated 1943 counter-offensive into Burma. The office of Commander-in-Chief, India, held since mid-1941 by a British Army officer, General Sir Archibald Wavell, reverted to an Indian Army officer, General Sir Claude Auchinleck. Command of Fourteenth Army, the principal operational formation facing the Japanese, was given to Lieutenant General William ("Bill") Slim, another Indian Army officer. Under their leadership and supported by a number of talented subordinates, the Indian Army was remade with astonishing speed. Open-ended expansion was ended; doctrine was rewritten, focusing on the war in Burma; training was overhauled to match doctrine. Dozens of other changes were made covering such crucial areas as pay, leave, health care, morale, and much more.[6] In February 1944 Slim field-tested his new army, meeting and pulverizing a Japanese offensive in the Arakan region of Burma (where the Indian Army had been routed eight months earlier). Then between March and July 1944 he met a much larger assault by the Japanese Fifteenth Army on the eastern border of India and, in the most sprawling, complex battle conducted by any British or American general during the war, destroyed it – 55,000 of its 88,000 men died. This victory opened the way for the reconquest of Burma in 1944-1945. By the time Rangoon fell in May 1945, Slim and the rebuilt Indian Army had destroyed a Japanese army group (the Burma Area Army), inflicting on the Imperial Japanese Army the worst defeat it had ever sustained. Slim's campaign, marked by tactical and operational flexibility, an imaginative use of both deception and the potential of air supply, and an insight into his opponent's outlook and tactics that enabled him to turn Japanese strengths into liabilities, was the finest piece of British generalship of the war – indeed, the best since Wellington and a fitting swansong for Britain's Indian Army.

What was Churchill's contribution to the transformations of both the British and the Indian armies after 1942? Surprisingly slight. Monty was Brooke's choice, and the artillery-centered approach to battle that characterized the British Army in 1942-1945 had roots deep in that army's experience in 1914-1918 and in much interwar professional thought and discussion. The prime minister could do little about the internal dynamics that shaped the way the British Army fought the second half of the war – nor did he really try, apart from periodic unavailing complaints about logistic over-insurance. His impact on the Indian Army's renaissance was even slighter – indeed, his principal contribution, if that is the word, was in 1943 to indulge both his dislike of the Indian Army and his taste for charismatic, unorthodox exponents of military shortcuts by casting his mantle over one of the British Army's strangest figures, Orde Wingate, gifting him with World War II's largest "private army" (to which the Americans added a private air force). With this force, Wingate undertook to reconquer Burma, allowing Churchill to meet the American demand that the British reopen the road to China, closed to them when the British lost Burma in 1942. The disruption all this inflicted on Auchinleck's and Slim's work was great, and despite the epic courage of Wingate's "Chindits," the returns were minimal. When the Japanese were beaten, Burma reconquered, and the link to China reopened, it was the work of the Indian Army (only 13% of Slim's troops were British by the time Rangoon fell). Churchill paid minimal attention to all this in his memoirs. He would have paid less if Fourteenth Army veterans had not complained to the redoubtable Slim, by that time Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who then prodded Churchill (and the resultant chapters in *Triumph and Tragedy* were largely the work of Churchill's military assistant, Lieutenant General Sir Henry Pownall).

Where does all this leave us? Nothing, of course, will ever dim Churchill's great achievement in 1940, summed up so well by A.J.P. Taylor a generation ago: "the saviour of his country."[7] But the story of the British and Indian armies in World War II was much more complicated and interesting than the story Churchill's memoirs told. The British Army was unready in 1939 and fought for three years handicapped by circumstances beyond its control (like commitments to Norway and later Greece) as well as by deficits in equipment, doctrine, training, and leadership that could only slowly be remedied amid the pressures of war – and, indeed, some were never fully remedied. Nonetheless, from 1942 on, as its circumstances changed and it could fight its kind of battle, its updated 1918-style approach yielded consistent, if never spectacular, results. Given Britain's dwindling resources, more could not have been expected. The Indian Army's transformation was much more impressive, if underappreciated at the time and later by Churchill. Dynamic leadership and well thought out reforms produced one of the great fighting forces of

the war, Slim's Fourteenth Army. Always resource-poor – at least in comparison with the British Army – it nonetheless wrote a textbook example of military transformation.

I noted earlier that "military transformations" usually had a social/political component. This was true in both Britain and India during the Second World War. Britain's war has been called "the People's War" and there is a considerable measure of truth in that description. The presence of the Labour Party in Churchill's government and the leftward drift of British opinion during the war – the mood swing that would produce the 1945 Labour landslide – both had their military counterparts. British soldiers were not as deferential as their fathers had been in 1914-1918. Under the leadership of the Adjutant General for most of the war, General Sir Ronald Adam (not a Churchill favorite), not only did it become easier for men of working class backgrounds to get a commission, but the Army Bureau of Current Affairs (ABCA) was set up in recognition of the fact that the soldiers of 1939-1945 wanted to know what the war was about and how their lives would change – and improve – after victory. Monty's ploy of speaking informally to gatherings of "other ranks" (while handing out cigarettes) was based on a similar sense that his soldiers, unlike Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig's, needed to be told what they were doing and why it needed to be done – and assured that their lives were valued by their commanders. Ironically, the improving army of 1943-1945 was also incubating the gentle but irreversible British revolution of 1945-1951.

The political impact in India was much more dramatic. The only way to officer the vastly expanded Indian Army, while the British Army also grew exponentially, was to commission Indians. In 1939 about 400 of the 5,000 Indian Army officers commanding the 190,000-man Indian Army were Indians. By 1945 there were 14,000 Indian officers in the 2.5 million-man army – about one-third of the officer corps. A host of factors changed the political situation in India during the war and made the early postwar termination of the Raj a certainty but none, perhaps, was as important as the changes in the army. By 1942 the Director of Military Intelligence at GHQ India admitted in a "most secret" assessment that Indian soldiers expected freedom and self-government in the aftermath of victory,[8] while in 1945 Auchinleck declared that "every Indian officer worth his salt is today a nationalist."[9] The Indian Army of 1939 – long service, carefully isolated from politics – was the Raj's praetorian guard. The Indian Army of 1945 could no longer fill that role. If any single thing made early Indian independence inevitable, that was it.

On the eve of the war, Churchill told a colleague that he wanted to see imperial Britain survive for a few more generations. Perhaps his reluctance to do justice to the astounding transformation of the Indian Army – a crucial step in imperial decline – is not so surprising after all.

Notes

1. Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, 6 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948-1954).
2. David Reynolds, *In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War* (London: Allen Lane, 2004) is a book without recourse to which Churchill's memoirs cannot be fully understood and assessed.
3. David French's authoritative *Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War against Germany, 1919-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) is an example of the fine monographic work that has not yet much affected how the British Army's war is seen in popular accounts. Another excellent monograph, Timothy Harrison Place's *Military Training in the British Army, 1941-1944: From Dunkirk to D-Day* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2000), addresses the foundation of all military performance. It is astounding that it took over fifty years for a study like this to be written.
4. Raymond Callahan, *Churchill and His Generals* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2007).
5. Bernard Law Montgomery, *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G.* (London: Collins, 1958).
6. Two excellent monographs cover this transformation: Daniel P. Marston's prize-winning *Phoenix from the Ashes: The Indian Army in the Burma Campaign* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003) and T.R. Moreman's *The Jungle, the Japanese and the British Commonwealth Armies at War 1941-1945, Fighting Methods, Doctrine and Training for Jungle Warfare* (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2005). Together, they finally do justice to the Indian Army's war.
7. A.J.P. Taylor, *English History 1914-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 4 fn 1.
8. On this and the related question of the Indian Army's loyalty to the Raj during the war, see Raymond Callahan, "The Indian Army, Total War, and the Dog That Didn't Bark in the Night" in Jane Hathaway (ed.), *Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative Perspective* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).
9. David Omissi, *The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994), p. 242.

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Questions and Answers: Max Hastings

ROBERT VON MAIER
RICHARD R. MULLER

Sir Max Hastings is the author of more than a dozen books on military history and current events, including *Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45*; *Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945*; and *Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy, 1944*.[1] He was a foreign correspondent for many years, reporting from more than sixty countries for BBC TV and the *Evening Standard* of London. He has presented historical documentaries for television, including a series on the Korean War and most recently (2003) on Winston Churchill and his generals. For more than fifteen years he was successively Editor-in-Chief of the *British Daily Telegraph* and *Evening Standard*, from which he retired in 2002. A Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature and an Honorary Fellow of King's College London, he was knighted in 2002.

Q: Are there any Second World War scholars who have been an important influence on you as a military historian?

A: I have been reading about the war since I was very young, and I suppose Chester Wilmot's *The Struggle For Europe* was the first big book that made a big impact on me, along with so many others.[2] It still reads very well indeed, and is entirely without the nationalistic taint which mars so much writing on the period.

I much admired the late and lamented Russell Weigley, especially his book *Eisenhower's Lieutenants*.[3]

Trevor Dupuy is a controversial figure, but it seems hard to argue with his impressive statistical analyses of the superior performance of the German Army to that of the Allies.

As a boy, I was captivated by David Howarth's *Dawn of D-Day*, a slight and anecdotal account, now long forgotten, but which gave me an early insight into how fascinating peoples' personal stories of what happened to them can be, and especially of the trivial details of their experiences, which add so much to a convincing "big picture."[4]

Q: If you were asked to recommend five English-language books that should be considered essential reading for anyone interested in the history of the Second World War, what works would you select and what are the specific reasons for your selections?

A: Forrest Pogue's biography of George Marshall and Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke's diaries together provide a peerless picture of the problems of high command in the war, both at a human and strategic level.[5] Alanbrooke's narrative, in particular, while as partial and moody as all diaries are, offers an extraordinarily vivid picture of the difficulties of coping with Churchill, and of making the Anglo-American [alliance] work.

Antony Beevor's *Stalingrad* made a seminal contribution to highlighting for a popular audience the central role of the Eastern Front in the defeat of Hitler.[6]

Ronald Spector's *Eagle Against The Sun* is an outstanding narrative study of the Pacific campaigns.[7]

George MacDonald Fraser's *Quartered Safe Out Here* is probably the best private soldier's memoir of the war, detailing his experience with Slim's Fourteenth Army in Burma, fighting the Japanese in 1945.[8]

Nicholas Monsarrat's thinly disguised autobiographical novel *The Cruel Sea* gives a wonderfully vivid picture of what it was like to serve in a convoy escort in the Battle of the Atlantic.[9]

Q: Vis à vis the need for additional scholarship, what do you believe are the most under-examined aspects of 1) the Normandy campaign; 2) the Allied bomber offensive in Europe; and 3) the final months of the war in Europe?

A: It is not so much renewed research that seems to me necessary on these issues, as a better perspective. Many writers make the cardinal error of imposing the values of the 21st Century on decisions and commitments that were made in the vastly different circumstances of 1944-45. Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Eisenhower's 1944-45 deputy, memorably observed that "war is organized confusion." It is indispensable always to remember that when judging how things were done by weary men under intolerable strains in the greatest conflict in human history.

I am wholly unconvinced by the revisionist historians, most of them American, who, since I published my 1984 book *Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy*, have argued that I overrated the performance of the German army. I believe that the citizen armies of the democracies did as well as we could possibly have expected of them. But, we should acknowledge first that Hitler's troops did quite extraordinary things in the face of overwhelming Allied material superiority in 1944-45; and

second, that it needed commanders and forces possessed of the mass ruthlessness and absolute indifference to human life of the Red Army to do the main business of destroying the Nazi machine, with critical supply assistance from the U.S., and important aid from Allied air power.

Q: What were some of the influencing factors in your decision to research and write *Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45* [*Nemesis: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45*, UK edition][10] and which aspects of your research for the book were the most difficult?

A: I had never written about the Asian war before. Most of the books on the subject address either the Pacific campaigns or the British in Burma, and say next to nothing about the huge and murderous struggle in China. My first purpose was to try to set the war against Japan in context, by considering all these aspects as a whole. I devoted a lot of effort to interviewing surviving witnesses in China, because their role has been so much neglected. I also put in a lot of time talking to the Japanese, because in so many narratives they emerge as cardboard caricatures rather than real people. It was also wonderfully exhilarating writing about the role of the U.S. Navy, because the service did so very well. I had never written before about war at sea. So often in one's books it it necessary to be strongly critical of some things that were done badly or unsuccessfully. It was a great tonic to describe the naval campaign, which represented the United States armed forces at their very best.

Q: Your *Bomber Command* has stood the test of time as an effective critique of the Allied air offensive against Germany, calling into serious question its cost-effectiveness.[11] Recently, scholars such as Richard Overy have suggested that the bomber offensive was much more effective than many historians have allowed. Has any of this new scholarship caused you to revise your thinking on the subject?

A: In some ways, *Bomber Command* remains my personal favorite among my own books, though it appeared thirty years ago. It was the first real success I had, and I would like to think that I broke a good deal of ground that was then new. One important thing I think I underrated, and Overy gets absolutely right, was the significance of the huge resources the bomber offensive obliged the Germans to commit to home air defense, most notably 88mm guns, which could otherwise have done immense damage to the Russian and Allied armored forces.

I would refer back to what I said earlier, about the importance of understanding why and how decisions, including bad decisions, were made at the time. I still believe what I said in *Bomber Command* – that I believe that in the end, the material and moral cost of the Allied bomber of-

fensive outweighed the damage it inflicted on Germany. But Churchill made the commitment in 1941-42, when the Allies had no other means of carrying the war to the enemy. Industrial decisions were made then which only came to fulfillment in the very different strategic circumstances of 1944-45. The most regrettable phase of the offensive came in 1945, when huge damage was inflicted on Germany's cities and civilian population, at a stage when this was largely irrelevant to outcomes. I deplore, however, the current vogue – especially in Germany – for describing strategic bombing as a "war crime." At every stage, the offensive was designed as a military operation to cripple the Nazi war machine. This is utterly different from massacring hapless captives in concentration camps, or for that matter shooting civilians and prisoners of war in cold blood.

I would like to think that the picture which I painted in *Bomber Command* both of how the command decisions were made, and what it was like to fly operations, still stands up pretty well. I had the huge advantage in those days of being able to interview at length a host of participants, including Sir Arthur Harris and several of his staff officers and group commanders. Readers may accept or reject my skeptical conclusion about the overall achievement of the offensive, but nobody has picked significant holes in my account of how it was all done.

Q: Another important addition to the literature is your *Das Reich: Resistance and the March of the 2nd SS Panzer Division Through France, June 1944*.[12] How did you come to write on this particular subject, and would you discuss one or two of the more noteworthy interviews you conducted for the book?

A: Most of my books are "big picture" narratives, but *Das Reich* was a miniature, and I think still possesses some merit as such. I started out thinking of doing a book on Resistance, then decided that this was too big a canvas. Instead, I analyzed a single legendary episode, about which extravagant claims have often been made by French historians, about the scale of damage inflicted by guerillas on a German formation headed for Normandy. In truth, it is very difficult for lightly-armed and untrained men to make much impression on an armored division, and German records paint a very different picture from the extravagant anecdotal claims of Resistance men and their historians. My purpose in *Das Reich* was to show what the experience of Resistance was like, and what are the limitations of guerillas and special forces.

Popular writers love special forces because they seem romantic, and indeed they are. But their strategic contribution is bound to be marginal, and it is foolish to pretend otherwise. Two good modern British historians of France under occupation, Mark Mazower and Julian Jackson,

have observed in recent books that Resistance was much more important as a moral and political force in France than as a military one, and that was pretty much my conclusion back in 1981. But the *Das Reich* story enabled me both to examine the character and behavior of the *Waffen-SS* – and in those days again I was able to interview the principal German survivors involved – and the nature of Resistance, SOE, and special forces.

Q: Your portrait of German military effectiveness in *Armageddon* is subtly different than that advanced in *Overlord*. How has your assessment of the German army evolved over the years?

A: The important change in my thinking is that I have come to believe that if the Anglo-American armies in 1944-45 had fought like the *Waffen-SS*, they would have had to have become like them, which would have defeated the whole purpose for which the war was being fought. Most Allied soldiers preserved inhibitions and decencies on the battlefield for which I think we should be very grateful, and which the German Army – like the Red Army – almost entirely abandoned.

Q: You note in *Armageddon* that our living connection to the events of Word War II is coming to an end, and that you could present little new testimony gleaned from veterans who were above the rank of major at the time. In your view, is enough being done in terms of oral history collection to preserve these reminiscences for the benefit of future generations of authors and historians?

A: A diminishing number of World War II veterans retain memories clear enough to justify interviewing them. Unsurprisingly, given their age, I find a huge difference in their coherence and reliability between their conversations today and those which I recall when I started interviewing veterans more than thirty years ago. I do not see much merit in doing oral interviews in Britain or the U.S., except in cases where veterans were involved in exceptional experiences. The quantity and quality of written material in both British and U.S. archives is so great – most of it collected when those giving testimony were much younger and had better memories – that we should just count ourselves fortunate in what we have. There remains good reason, however, to continue interviewing in Germany, Russia, Japan, China, and other countries where the body of audio and written material is much smaller and less impressive.

Q: Of your considerable body of work on the Second World War, which book do you believe has had the greatest impact?

A: *Bomber Command* made the biggest impact, partly because a great many RAF veterans were then still alive, who hotly and very publicly disputed my findings. Likewise, when *Overlord* came out, I was very struck by the disparity between the reactions of officer and other ranks veterans. A remarkable number of former officers wrote to me, saying that they had always recognized that the Germans were better than Allied ground forces. Many NCOs and privates, by contrast, were deeply resentful and felt – I hope quite wrongly – that I was disparaging their sacrifices and endeavors. In truth, in all my books I seek to pay tribute to the remarkable things that generation did. It is merely that at this interval of time, it seems to me that there is no case for writing romantic yarns – one must try to make hard-headed judgements, while also describing for a generation which has never known the face of battle just what it was like.

Q: You have been active during several decades in which the state of World War II scholarship has changed dramatically, in terms of both quality and quantity. In your view, what are the major trends and developments – both positive and negative – in World War II scholarship over the past thirty years?

A: I am amazed how large the public appetite remains for romantic tales of the war which bear little resemblance to harsh realities. There is a large body of writers who make handsome incomes producing fairy-tales about the war. On the other hand, there is also a huge body of superb scholarship, most of it British and American. But one should add the extraordinary multi-volume series *Germany and the Second World War*, published by the Potsdam Military History Institute and translated by Oxford University Press.[13] This describes the war from a German perspective in extraordinary detail, and with stunning objectivity and detachment.

Q: Of the many lesser-known World War II-era British Army commanders, whom do you believe is most deserving of a detailed biography, and why? Also, within the same context, which Royal Air Force commander would you select?

A: Slim, commander of the British Fourteenth Army in Burma, still deserves a good biography. But we should acknowledge that there were amazingly few really first-class British commanders. The U.S. Army produced far more quality corps and divisional commanders, and was admirably ready to sack those who failed.

Jack Slessor was a second-division wartime RAF leader who ran Coastal Command and held other important appointments. He and Ted-

der were probably the ablest and most clear-sighted British airmen. Too many RAF – and USAAF officers – were much too preoccupied with pursuing the political independence of their services, at the expense of providing close support for the army and navy.

Q: What is your reaction to the scandal regarding forged World War II documents at the National Archives [the National Archives of the United Kingdom in Kew] and the apparent connection with the writer/historian Martin Allen? And have you read Allen's *Himmler's Secret War*, *The Hitler-Hess Deception*, or *Hidden Agenda*?[14]

A: I have not read Allen's books, and have no plans to do so. But I very much regret that there has not been a prosecution or at least a formal inquiry. It is not that I want anybody sent to prison, but I do think it is in the strongest public interest that those responsible for what has happened should be publicly pilloried. The evidence against them is overwhelming. It is a shocking act, willfully to seek to despoil the nation's heritage, and to distort the historical record, in pursuit of personal commercial advantage. If the perpetrator of this fraud is seen to get away with it, the danger must be there that somebody else will play the same wicked game. Most so-called new revelations about World War II turn out to be nonsense. But anybody who comes up with a plausible one can expect to make money out of it. It seems to me that forging documents in this way is a fraud no less culpable than any other form of fraud for gain, and should be punished accordingly.

Q: Would you share a few of the details regarding your forthcoming work on Sir Winston Churchill?

A: I am trying to look at Churchill from the outside in, so to speak, to consider his relationships with the British people, the British Army, the United States, Russia. The story of Britain in the Second World War, it seems to me, is of Churchill, himself a hero, wanting the British people to be heroes, and often finding that their performance – and especially that of their army – fell short of his hopes. In 1940, he was indeed able to rouse them to an extraordinary act of defiance. But it proved impossible to sustain that spirit all the way through.

I have written a chapter about Churchill and SOE – his famous instruction to "Set Europe Ablaze" – which I think was profoundly mistaken, though it is easy to see why he did it. I have written at length about the little-known Cos and Leros campaign of autumn 1943, an extraordinary folly which was his personal doing, and inflicted a wholly gratuitous minor disaster on British arms. But the book will be called *Finest Years*, because although of course there is plenty to criticize, his overall

achievement remains extraordinary. For a start, given the fact that the British and Americans were much less enthusiastic about each other than legend sometimes suggests, only Churchill, I submit, could have wooed the U.S. with such extraordinary success between 1940 and 1942. Of course he failed in his efforts to bring the U.S. into the war – it needed Pearl Harbor to do that – but he played a decisive role in making the Anglo-American alliance work as well as it did.

I will not claim that the book will producing startling revelations – as I said above, most turn out to be rubbish. But I would like to hope that I can offer readers a new perspective on some important aspects of Churchill's leadership. And, of course, it is a wonderful story of a supreme human being, which it is a pleasure to tell.

Q: Beyond the Churchill book, what other World War II subjects can we anticipate you covering in the future?

A: I find it impossible to get my mind around the next book until this one is finished. I shall remain deeply immersed in Churchill until well into 2009. But as long as readers seem so wonderfully willing to read what I write about the war, I guess I shall continue to produce the works about it. My publishers want me to do a single-volume history of the conflict, and I am thinking hard about whether I have enough to say to justify it. The test of any project is always the same: do I have enough fresh to add, to spend two or three years of my life researching, and invite readers to share? I guess I am just lucky, that I find the story and the issues so fascinating, that I never tire of them.

Editor's Notes

1. Max Hastings, *Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45* (New York: Knopf, 2008); *Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945* (New York: Knopf, 2004); *Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy, 1944* (London: Michael Joseph, 1984).
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4. David Howarth, *Dawn of D-Day* (London: Collins, 1959).
5. Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall*, 4 vols. (New York: Viking, 1963-1987); Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman, eds., *War Diaries: 1939-1945, Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001).
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14. Martin Allen, *Himmler's Secret War: The Covert Peace Negotiations of Heinrich Himmler* (London: Robson Books, 2005); *The Hitler-Hess Deception* (London: Harper-Collins, 2003); *Hidden Agenda: How the Duke of Windsor Betrayed the Allies* (London: Macmillan, 2000).

Author's Perspective

MARKO ATTILA HOARE

There is a strong case to be made that, after the Soviet Union, United States, and Britain, Yugoslavia mounted the most impressive military effort against Adolf Hitler's Germany of any country, in the form of the People's Liberation Movement - the resistance movement led by Josip Broz Tito and the Yugoslav Communists, and more commonly referred to as the "Partisans." Certainly, this was the most successful anti-Axis resistance movement in occupied Europe; something not diminished by the fact that the damage it inflicted on the Germans was undoubtedly exaggerated, both during the war and subsequently, in both Yugoslav and Western accounts. Along with the interlinked Partisan movement in Albania, the Yugoslav Partisan resistance grew into the second and last successful indigenous Communist-led revolution in European history, spawning regimes that were able to pursue courses independent of the Soviet Union in the post-war era. In power from 1944 until his death in 1980, Yugoslavia's Tito was one of the most important figures on the world stage; his funeral was attended by four kings, thirty-two heads of state, and twenty-two prime ministers, including Britain's Margaret Thatcher; the Carter Administration in the United States was widely criticized at the time for sending only the vice-president.

It is therefore surprising that this crucially important resistance movement should have been so neglected by historians outside the former Yugoslavia. Up till now, English-language historians have restricted themselves almost totally to discussing Tito and the Partisans in terms of British and U.S. relations with them, rather than as a subject in their own right. My book, *Genocide and Resistance in Hitler's Bosnia: The Partisans and the Chetniks, 1941-1943*, is the first English-language monograph dealing with the core history of the Yugoslav Partisan movement, from its birth up till the autumn of 1943 when it formally established a new Yugoslav state on the ruins of the Yugoslavia that Hitler had destroyed.[1]

That Bosnia-Hercegovina was the seat of the supreme Partisan military command (the "Supreme Staff") for the best part of the war; that the Partisans fought their most famous battles there; and that the new Yugoslavia was established in this mixed Islamic-Christian country has not previously been made much of by historians in the West, but in light of

the war in Bosnia of the 1990s, it is something that can no longer be ignored. My book therefore explores why the Partisans came to center their resistance movement on Bosnia, and how they were able to take power there. Based on extensive research in the archives of Sarajevo, Belgrade, and Zagreb and on a close examination of the existing Serbo-Croat historiography of the Yugoslav Revolution, my book seeks to explain the Partisan achievement by looking at it from the roots up.

Crucial to the rise of what became Europe's most powerful anti-Axis resistance movement was relations between Bosnia's constituent peoples: the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats. As is well known, after conquering Yugoslavia, Hitler established a Great Croatian puppet-state encompassing most of Croatia and all of Bosnia, under the rule of the Croatian fascists, the Ustashas. Extremely anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav, the Ustashas were Croat ultra-nationalists and terrorists whose leadership, under Ante Pavelić, had been based in Italy during the 1930s and early 1940s. Having been Benito Mussolini's protégé, Pavelić rapidly transferred his allegiance to Hitler after his installation in power by the Germans as Croatia's *Poglavnik* (Führer). About a third of the Croatian puppet-state's population was made up of ethnic Serbs; the Ustashas' attempt to destroy their Serb population through a genocidal policy of extermination, expulsions, and forced conversions of the Orthodox Serbs to Roman Catholicism provided one of the motors generating resistance to Hitler's new order.

The establishment of the Croatian puppet-state has, since the outbreak of the war in the former Yugoslavia of the 1990s, often been presented by Western journalists and pundits as proof of a particular German interest in Croatia. In fact, it proved the very opposite. The territory of Croatia and Bosnia was a strategic backwater of relatively minor interest and Hitler chose to rule it relatively loosely through the Ustashas, in contrast to the tighter German control in territories Hitler was more interested in, such as Poland or Serbia. Furthermore, as a nominally independent state, puppet Croatia served as a buffer-zone between Germany and Italy, though German control over it would steadily expand at Italy's expense.[2] The combination of the territory's rule by a weak and unpopular regime, the absence of large numbers of German troops, and competition between the Germans and Italians created ideal conditions in which a resistance movement could flourish.

The scope of Serb resistance to the genocidal policy of the Ustasha regime took the Communists themselves by surprise, and swept them along in its wake. It was also more than the Ustashas themselves, with their ramshackle armed forces, could handle without constant German and Italian military assistance. Yet it was the character of this spontaneous Serb resistance itself that posed the most serious problems for the Communists. Just as the Ustashas slaughtered Serb civilians, women, and children in their goal of creating an ethnically pure "Great Croatia,"

in which the Serbs would disappear and the Muslims be assimilated as "Islamic Croats," so the Serb rebels responded by slaughtering Croat and Muslim civilians, women, and children. Very quickly, elements among the Serb rebels emerged who came to favor this as something desirable in principle: the extermination of the non-Serb population of Bosnia and much of Croatia in order to establish a "Great Serbia." These Serb-nationalist elements had little interest in actually fighting the Germans or Italians. Indeed, they and the Italians quickly came to view each other as suitable partners: following a brutal policy of divide-and-rule, the Italians, having first brought the Ustashas to power, now backed the nationalist Serb rebels as a way of both containing the Communist threat and destabilizing the Croatian puppet-state, in order to extend Italian control.

These Serb-nationalist rebels, who were ready to collaborate with the Italians on an anti-Communist and anti-Croat basis, became the deadliest enemy of the Partisan movement: the so-called "Chetnik" movement. The Communists were, of course, a multinational party comprising Croats, Muslims, Jews and others as well as Serbs, and their goal was to fight the occupiers. The Chetniks' policy of collaborating with the Italians while exterminating Muslims and Croats not only jeopardized the entire resistance to the occupiers, but threatened to wipe out the Communists themselves along with their families. My book analyzes the conflict between the Partisans and the Chetniks, the reasons why the Chetniks seemed for a while to have the upper hand, and the reasons why the Partisans eventually triumphed.

The leaderships of both the Partisans and the Chetniks were initially, in fact, not based in Bosnia but in neighboring Serbia, the dominant part of the former Yugoslavia and the seat of the Yugoslav capital, Belgrade. Conditions here were very different from those in the Croatian puppet-state. Serbia, too, had been organized as a puppet state by the Nazis, but in Serbia there was a much tighter, exclusive German control; there the Germans brutally punished the local population for resistance, carrying out mass executions of one-hundred Serbian civilians for every German soldier killed and fifty for each German soldier wounded; there was, conversely, no actual genocide of the Serbs that made resistance a matter of life or death. Consequently, the Partisan uprising in Serbia that broke out in the summer of 1941 was rapidly defeated by the Germans, assisted by the Chetniks, and Tito and his Supreme Staff were driven over the border into eastern Bosnia. This was to prove a more propitious country from which to lead a guerrilla struggle.

By contrast, the Chetnik leader Draža Mihailović remained oriented toward Serbia and continued to view Bosnia as a strategic backwater. Mihailović was an officer from Serbia of the defeated Yugoslav Army who had refused to surrender following the Yugoslav capitulation and had taken to the hills. He founded what became known as the Chetnik

movement in order to keep alive Yugoslav (effectively Serbian) resistance in the conditions of Axis occupation, though he viewed resistance more in terms of maintaining a guerrilla army to defend Serbian interests as he perceived them, rather than in terms of actually fighting the Axis as such. His guerrilla force was eventually recognized as the "Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland" by the exiled Yugoslav government. But Mihailović was a military man with little political aptitude and a provincial Serbian outlook that made him ill-suited to pursue an all-Yugoslav resistance strategy.[3] His failure to appreciate the particular nature and crucial importance of Bosnia was to prove fatal.

In eastern Bosnia, however, the Communists had to compete with the local Bosnian Chetniks, and here they seemed to be at a disadvantage. Initially, the Bosnian Communists and Bosnian Chetniks were allies against the Ustashas, but they rapidly developed into hostile, antithetical movements: the Communists aimed to mobilize Muslims and Croats into the resistance to fight the Germans and Italians; the Chetniks, by contrast, aimed to collaborate with the Germans and Italians with the goal of exterminating – through a combination of killing, expelling, and forcibly assimilating – the Muslims and Croats. By trying to swell the Partisan ranks with Croats and Muslims and well as Serbs, the Communists threatened to outnumber the Chetniks and make impossible the establishment of a "Great Serbia." By slaughtering Muslim and Croat civilians, the Chetniks threatened to derail the popular uprising, drive non-Serbs into the fascist camp, and destroy the Communist base. It was only a matter of time before the two movements became mortal enemies.

Tito, who arrived with the Supreme Staff in eastern Bosnia in December 1941, quickly came to perceive the Chetniks as a more dangerous enemy than the Germans, Italians, or Ustashas, and pressed the initially reluctant Bosnian Communist leadership to adopt this policy. But the Chetniks won the first round: by agitating on a Serb-nationalist basis for a Great Serbia, and portraying the Communists as an alien, Croat, Muslim, and Jewish anti-Serb movement, they were able in the spring of 1942 to turn the Communists' own Serb Partisan rank-and-file against them, resulting in large parts of the Partisan forces going over to the Chetniks, often murdering their own Communist officers and commissars in the process. Having helped to defeat the Partisans in Serbia, the Chetniks now triumphed over them in eastern Bosnia as well. In June 1942, Tito began his "long march" westward – the journey of his rump force facilitated by a combination of apathy and rivalry among the Germans, Italians, and Ustashas – to seek refuge in western Bosnia.

Titoist historiography has tended to portray Tito and his Supreme Staff as carrying the resistance movement with them wherever they went in occupied Yugoslavia, but this is an inversion of the truth. Western Bosnia and central Croatia proper developed the most powerful wing of

the Partisan movement independently of Tito's command; the latter then took refuge with them following its defeat farther east. In essence, Tito and his Supreme Staff implanted themselves on the powerful Partisan movement in western Bosnia and central Croatia. In these areas, unlike in eastern Bosnia and Serbia, the balance of forces favored the Partisans over the Chetniks. Croatia was home to the most powerful wing of the Yugoslav Communists; paradoxically, the Soviet Union and the Comintern had broadly supported the Croatian national movement during the 1930s, while Nazi Germany had favored the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav regime in Belgrade. The abrupt switch of partners in the spring of 1941 – of Berlin to a pro-Croatian, anti-Yugoslav policy and Moscow to a Serbian-oriented strategy – did not alter the fact of where the Yugoslav Communists had their strongest base: Croatia.[4]

Western Bosnia gravitated toward Croatia. These areas were correspondingly far from the Chetnik center of gravity in Serbia and had, unlike eastern Bosnia, borne the full brunt of the Ustasha genocide – making the Chetniks' collaborationist strategy that much less attractive to local Serbs. All these factors combined to give the Partisans the edge over the Chetniks in this area. Yet the Communist leadership also benefited from having learned the lessons of its defeat in eastern Bosnia in the spring of 1942: given the Chetniks' agitation against them on a Serb-nationalist basis, the Communists could not afford to pursue a purely military strategy that would leave their uneducated Partisan peasant troops vulnerable to Chetnik propaganda. To win, they realized they needed to pursue a political struggle for the hearts and minds of the ordinary Bosnian Serb peasants, by positing an alternative patriotic goal to the Chetniks' Great Serbia: the ideal of a self-ruling Bosnia as the common homeland of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims.[5] It was under the patriotic banner of the Bosnian homeland that the Communists built a powerful Bosnian Partisan movement capable of defeating the Great Serbian Chetniks.

This went hand in hand with an increased emphasis on recruiting Muslims and Croats to the struggle, to create a genuinely multinational Bosnian Partisan army. Finally, the Communists organized the most loyal and disciplined of their Partisan fighters into elite units – so-called "Proletarian" or "Shock" units. Unlike the looser, regionally based Partisan detachments that preceded them, these would be mobile, elite units ready to operate in any part of Yugoslavia. It was this combination of innovations that would bring the Partisans victory.

The Communists possessed one further, entirely decisive advantage that brought them victory, ultimately not only over the Chetniks, but over the Ustashas as well. Their "People's Liberation Movement" was not simply a guerrilla army operating in the hills and mountains, but an urban resistance movement that co-opted influential members of the

Croatian quisling armed forces and administration. This proved decisive when the Partisans sought to capture towns: through their web of activists, the People's Liberation Movements could bring about the surrender and defection of entire Croatian quisling garrisons, and defuse the resistance of the townsfolk to the Partisan entry into the towns. This was something of which the Chetniks, oriented almost entirely to the Serb peasant world, were much less capable: the towns, with their Muslim and Croat majority population, were alien territory for them; ordinary Muslims and Croats, who were ready to let the multinational Partisans in, by contrast rightly viewed the Great Serbian Chetniks as a mortal threat and were willing to fight tooth and nail to defend themselves from the latter.

During the second half of 1942, the Partisans captured a string of towns in western Bosnia, culminating in the capture of Bihać, the regional center of the extreme north-west of Bosnia, in November 1942. It was in this predominantly Muslim town that the Partisans convened their "Antifascist Council for the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia," a legislative body that claimed to represent the whole of Yugoslavia. This was the tip of the iceberg of a state-building project that involved a network of "People's Liberation Councils" covering the whole of Partisan-held territory, and that sought to mobilize the entire population into the resistance movement. It was this solidly constructed base, more than any great success on the battlefield, that gave the Partisans the resilience to survive repeated heavy offensives, military defeats, and losses of territory and manpower at the hands of the Germans and Italians. During the first half of 1943, the Partisan main force retreated eastward across Bosnia in the face of crushing German and Italian pressure, fought the legendary battles of the River Neretva and the River Sutjeska, suffered massive losses, but survived encirclement and annihilation and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Chetniks, who under Mihailović had marched westward in a failed attempt to destroy them.

The capitulation of Italy in September 1943 robbed the collaborationist Chetniks of their military umbrella, while the Partisans were well placed to profit from the resulting power-vacuum, undergoing a massive expansion in the autumn of 1943, which for the first time led to non-Serbs outnumbering Serbs in the Partisan ranks. In November 1943 in the town of Jajce, the former medieval capital of Bosnia, the Partisans held the historic Second Session of the Antifascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia, which formally established a new Yugoslav state that would be organized on a federal basis to ensure the equality of the Yugoslav peoples and lands – the lands of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Yugoslav Revolution thus resulted not only in the birth of a new Yugoslavia, but in the birth of individual republics, including the People's

Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, which Slobodan Milosevic and his Bosnian Serb collaborators would try so hard to destroy in the 1990s.

The Partisans' triumph in their duel with the Chetniks over Bosnia, their relentless resistance to the Axis, and the Chetniks' disgrace through their collaboration, led to the emergence of Tito and the Partisans as the chosen Yugoslav partners of Winston Churchill and the British, as well as of the Soviets, and the Partisans' eventual conquest of the whole of Yugoslavia as respected members of the Allied coalition celebrated in British, American, and Soviet propaganda alike.[6] Yet, as I show in my book, it was the Partisan successes that resulted in Allied support, not vice versa. And this spectacular success can be traced back to decisions taken on the ground, by the Communist leadership during 1942, on how to organize among the Bosnian people.

Notes

1. Marko Attila Hoare, *Genocide and Resistance in Hitler's Bosnia: The Partisans and the Chetniks, 1941-1943* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Particular aspects of the Partisan movement are examined in Jill Irvine, *The Croat Question: Partisan Politics in the Formation of the Yugoslav Socialist State* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); Melissa Bokovoy, *Peasants and Communists: Politics and Ideology in the Yugoslav Countryside, 1941-1953* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998).
2. On the Ustashas, see Jozo Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001); Tomislav Dulić, *Utopias of Nation: Local Mass Killings in Bosnia-Hercegovina* (Stockholm: Uppsala University, 2005); Marko Attila Hoare, "The Ustasha Genocide," *The South Slav Journal*, vol. 25, no. 1-2, Spring 2004, pp. 29-38.
3. On Mihailović and the Chetniks, see Jozo Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: The Chetniks* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1975); Lucien Karchmar, *Draža Mihailović and the Rise of the Chetnik Movement, 1941-1942* (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1987); Matteo J. Milazzo, *The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).
4. On the national composition of the Partisans, see Marko Attila Hoare, "Whose is the Partisan movement? Serbs, Croats and the Legacy of a Shared Resistance," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, vol. 15, no. 4, December 2002, pp. 24-41.
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6. On Allied support for the Partisans, see Walter R. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies, 1941-1945* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987); Heather Williams, *Parachutes, Patriots, and Partisans: The Special Operations Executive and Yugoslavia, 1941-1945* (London: Hurst & Co., 2003).

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Author's Perspective

PETER STANSKY

The First Day of the Blitz: September 7, 1940 is a somewhat different book in terms of what I have written previously.[1] Although my first book, *Ambitions and Strategies: The Struggle for the Leadership of the Liberal Party in the 1890s* was primarily a political history, since then most of my work has been on the cultural history of Britain from the late nineteenth until the mid-twentieth century.[2] It has been cultural history rather broadly defined and not in the newest mode. Rather, I have attempted to explore the world in Britain where cultural, social, artistic, and the political meet, sometimes through a biographical approach, as in a very short study of William Morris (and a longer one concentrating on a particular period in his life) and with my co-author, William Abrahams, in our study of two young Englishmen, Julian Bell and John Cornford, killed in the Spanish Civil War, *Journey to the Frontier*, and our two studies of George Orwell, *The Unknown Orwell* and *Orwell: The Transformation*.[3]

It was in our last work, *London's Burning*, that I ventured into the world of Britain at war and more specifically the Blitz.[4] In that book, we explored the relationship of artistic activities in Britain to the war itself. The book consisted of three connected essays, two directly connected with the Blitz. The first focused on Henry Moore's shelter drawings, his iconic depictions of Londoners seeking refuge on the London tube platforms. We saw this as important work in its own right and also leading to what we regard as his single greatest work, the Madonna and Child in a church in Northampton. We also paid some attention to Graham Sutherland's bombscapes of the City of London and Paul Nash's masterpiece, *Totes Meer*, of wrecked German aircraft. The next essay dealt with Humphrey Jennings' great film about the Fire Service, *Fires Were Started*, a recreated documentary.[5] The last was about Benjamin Britten's most important opera, *Peter Grimes*. We argued that it was heavily influenced by Britten's wartime experience as a conscientious objector, and that he was arguing for the rights of the individual, both during the period of increased conformity that tends to come about in wartime (his sense of being an outsider increased by his being a homosexual) and also that those rights were an important aspect of what the Allies were fighting for. As the opera took place in the 19th century, reviewers found this

contention something of a stretch, but we believed that the themes of the opera (and its premiere marked the reopening, at Sadler's Wells, of opera in London) reflected in important ways the influence of the war.

So, in the course of previous work, as well through my teaching at Stanford University, I had some familiarity with the story of the Blitz. And then 9/11 happened. Several aspects of that event, and the possible parallels with the Blitz, struck me forcefully. There was the tragic similarity of the arbitrariness of those who were killed, civilians who were not part of the armed forces who happened to be in the World Trade Center when it was attacked. Similarly, in both events, those who coped were, in my view, "ordinary" heroes, in New York the police and firemen; in London the firemen and air-raid wardens. *The New York Times* and perhaps other papers were very conscious of the resemblances and used quotations from Constantine FitzGibbon's *The Blitz* as well as the famous photograph of St. Paul's Cathedral surviving under fire on 29 December 1940.[6] The caption read "Ground Zero, London, 1940." There were also the hyperbolic comparisons of Mayor Rudy Guiliani with Winston Churchill. 9/11 was a form of modern terror of which the Blitz had been a major precursor, even though the United States was not at war. Civilians had been horribly bombed before in modern times, most recently before the war in Guernica, Warsaw, and Rotterdam. The London Blitz, unlike 9/11, went on for months, an ultimately ineffective attempt to soften up Britain for invasion or to lead it to sue for peace. The comparison with 9/11 interestingly has been something of an issue for some of the British reviewers of the book. They find it somewhat misguided and inappropriate. I did not think I was making a sweeping claim, but rather that inevitably present events give a new prism with which to assess events in the past. They have to be used with care, but it is obvious that all historians are influenced by the present, and they can help us to perceive aspects of past events we have not noticed before and fuel reassessments. Perhaps wrongly, I see some element of anti-Americanism in this reaction by British reviewers (a position that I share to a degree) as if in some sense I might be claiming that "our" event is more tragic than "theirs." I only meant the discussion of 9/11 to be a lead in to an investigation of the Blitz and also to be suggestive of the continuities in the nature of terror.

How to proceed? I was well aware, as I state in the book, that there were severe bombings outside of London. I had wanted the book to be titled *The First Day of the London Blitz*, but the publishers were not happy with that. The title does support more than I should like the London-centric nature of much of the history of Britain. A study of the Blitz all over Britain or even of the entire Blitz in London, which lasted from September 1940 to May 1941, would be for me an unmanageable topic. The more I looked into the question, the more I became convinced that

the very first day was of crucial importance. I would not go quite so far as one internet site has rather wonderfully said of the book, "twelve hours that changed the world," yet I felt it was a crucial turning point in at least two ways: the course of the war and the future of Britain. London might have broken that first day, but did not. The ability of London's population to cope, reactively rather than proactively, was very important. The British are not braver than other people, but their style of stoicism was particularly helpful given the situation. The authorities (and others) believed that invasion was a very high probability at exactly the time that the Blitz started. But the necessary air superiority for the Germans became less likely rather than more with Hitler's decision to end the Battle of Britain to start the Blitz. And with Churchill as Prime Minister, there was no question that there would be a negotiated peace. The authorities, expecting thousands dead, were woefully unprepared to deal with the thousands who were homeless. Eventually, they coped. I argue that it was the lesson learned on 7 September, not in its inadequate and misguided preparations for being bombed, that resulted in the Government's full acceptance of its responsibility for its population. This became, I believe, ultimately, a crucial element in the creation of the Welfare State after the war.

I was fearful that someone else might write the book. By extraordinary coincidence, while I was finishing my study, two similar books appeared, M.J. Gaskin's *Blitz* and Gavin Mortimer's *The Longest Night*.[7] They deal with the two other most significant days of the London Blitz, the devastating raid in December, as well the most severe one in May, which was also the last one of the Blitz, although London was to suffer later from the bombing of the "Little Blitz," and of course the terrifying V1 "buzz bombs" and V2 rockets. I had decided that I would not seek out survivors to interview. I did not believe that they would dramatically change the story. Those two books contain wonderful interviews, including German airmen. But as histories, I think both fail. Their only concern is to tell the story, the first obligation of the historian, but they do not assess what the significance of that story might be. Legitimately, critics can take issue with the conclusions I reach about what September 7, 1940 might mean. But not making that attempt would be, I believe, a failure.

I did want first-hand witness to the events of September 7, the massive bombing of London in two waves. Much was in print, including many statements from those who had experienced the raids, particularly in 1990 on the fiftieth anniversary. I thought I would need to make more allowance for how long it had been until the experience had been recorded, but I came to the conclusion that it generally made less difference than one might expect. The reactions of the time, such as to be found in the published and unpublished Mass Observation material (the latter to

be found at Sussex University) might be more vivid, but accounts can be selective from the very beginning. I also expected that the earlier reminiscences would be more heroic and the latter less so, but that did not necessarily follow. It was more secondary commentators who in the earlier days emphasized the "myth of the Blitz" as deeply heroic, while more recently there has been far more emphasis on people acting badly. As usual, in my view, the truth lies in between. It was not all heroism and stiff upper lip, but it was far from being all fear and panic and bad behavior, although those elements were certainly present.

My greatest resource was the archives of the Imperial War Museum in London. There were to be found quite a few unpublished manuscript diaries and other accounts, reactions to the experiences of the twelve hours from teatime on September 7 to dawn on September 8. Put into the context of the larger story and combined with already-published first-hand accounts, I could then tell the story of the first day of the London Blitz and what I thought it meant. I have done my best to fulfill those two essential functions of a work of history.

Notes

1. Peter Stansky, *The First Day of the Blitz: September 7, 1940* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007).
2. Peter Stansky, *Ambitions and Strategies: The Struggle for the Leadership of the Liberal Party in the 1890s* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964).
3. Peter Stansky and William Abrahams, *Journey to the Frontier: Two Roads to the Spanish Civil War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); *The Unknown Orwell* (New York: Knopf, 1972); *Orwell: The Transformation* (London: Constable, 1979).
4. Peter Stansky and William Abrahams, *London's Burning: Life, Death, and Art in the Second World War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994).
5. *Fires Were Started*, Dir. Humphrey Jennings, Perfs. Commanding Officer George Gravett and Leading Fireman Philip Wilson-Dickson, Crown Film Unit, Motion Picture, United Kingdom, 1943.
6. Constantine FitzGibbon, *The Blitz* (London: Allen Wingate, 1957).
7. M.J. Gaskin, *Blitz: The Story of 29th December 1940* (London: Faber and Faber, 2005); Gavin Mortimer, *The Longest Night: The Bombing of London on May 10, 1941* (New York: Penguin, 2005).

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Book Reviews

Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943. David Ian Hall. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007. Illustrations. Maps. Appendix. Notes. Select Bibliography. Index. Cloth. Pp. 272.

David Ian Hall's *Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943* fills a gap in the scholarship of air power history in general. More specifically, however, it adds immensely to an understanding of the evolution of British tactical air power between the end of World War I and mid-way through the Second World War. *Strategy for Victory* is very well written, and an impeccable research base provides the foundation for Hall's well-organized, structured analysis.

Hall's vivid description gives readers a clear sense of the problems facing armed forces who are facing a dual problem – fighting a war for survival on their doorsteps and participating in a major expeditionary operation against an enemy at the same time – a factor that is generally disregarded in evaluations of British operational effectiveness during this period. He describes a fledgling service struggling to define itself, as well as to survive the preconceptions and misconceptions of the older, more established services. He does an excellent job of identifying the problems faced by the Royal Air Force during this time – inter-service rivalries, lack of equipment, and lack of understanding from the other services, particularly from the army. During this period, the RAF and the Army frequently clashed over acceptable doctrine. Air power advocates remained consistent in advocating economy of force aspects, while the Army appeared to reject those notions. Protection of ground troops seemed to outweigh everything else and made material elements expendable. Consequently, the Army frequently pushed for aircraft to be placed under their direct command. Although both the Air Force and the Army analyzed the role of aircraft in the wake of World War I, the two services reached different conclusions about the ways in which aircraft could and should be utilized in the future.

The RAF, however, stood firm in their assessment. As Hall argues,

> Extensive analysis of the use and misuse of air forces during the First World War led Britain's airmen to establish the first principles of air warfare – offensive, initiative, air superiority,

> concentration of force, and the need for centralised command and control – which served them well in their development of theory and doctrine throughout the interwar period and the Second World War. Their advancement of 'air power' also led to a bitter rivalry between the Army and the RAF and a fierce political struggle over the proper employment of finite air forces in war, which remained unresolved until the spring of 1943.[1]

On several occasions, Prime Minister Winston Churchill had to intervene and force the two services to work together or to make a decision in favor of one service's proposal to the detriment of the other's.

Several key factors emerge in Hall's analysis. First, the marriage of technology and need resulted in the emergence of a true general-purpose combat aircraft – the fighter-bomber – which brought technology together with the RAF doctrine of the general all-purpose aircraft. Second, the RAF leadership pushed for improved communications on the frontlines between the Army and the Air Force. The result was a mobile communications system that allowed both the Army and the RAF to take full advantage of the inherent flexibility of air power for air-ground operations. Third, the Army was making its own firepower advancements, including improvements in artillery doctrine and practice, about the same time that they began to understand the full benefits of air power as the RAF envisaged it.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, personal relationships transcended service barriers. Key personalities were influential in devising an air power doctrine and in establishing a successful working relationship with their counterparts in the Army. According to Hall, while Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal successfully convinced Churchill that the RAF's approach to air power doctrine – concentration of force, air superiority, and centralized command and control – would work, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder "was instrumental in bringing about a change in army attitudes and developing an effective and efficient system of air support in North Africa."[2] The first true test came in North Africa, where Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Coningham struggled to establish a working relationship with the Army commander that was acceptable to both parties. That did not happen until General Bernard Law Montgomery received command of the Eighth Army. Hall credits Montgomery with "[grasping] both the essential character and importance of air operations in support of a land battle. Consequently, he worked closely with Coningham at all stages of drafting, planning, and executing integrated air-ground operations."[3] Hall also emphasizes the political influence of Churchill in bringing about a "meeting of the minds" between the Army and the RAF. The spectacular success in the Western Desert led to the creation of the 2nd Tactical Air Force, whose performance from the Nor-

mandy invasion to the end of the war illustrates the triumph of British tactical air power doctrine.

Although the Army was initially reluctant to accept that the RAF's air power doctrine was mutually beneficial, Hall suggests that the Americans were more open to accepting and utilizing it. The coordination between air and ground during Operation TORCH was disastrous. Poor communications and lack of centralized command were obstacles to effective air support. Consequently, American Air Force and Army commanders, particularly General Dwight D. Eisenhower, more readily accepted the integration of the RAF air power doctrine. Hopefully, Hall will explore the American reception of the RAF's air power doctrine further at some point.

Strategy for Victory complements David French's *Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War against Germany 1919-1945*, as well as other works about the British Army's tactical doctrine.[4] As indicated above, *Strategy for Victory* makes an important contribution to the understanding of air power history in general, and more specifically of British air power history. As such, it is a must-read for students at air war and other military colleges in the United States, Canada, and Britain in particular. Unfortunately, at its current price ($125.00/£70.00), it will be difficult for instructors to add this work to their students' "must read" book lists. Perhaps a less expensive paperback edition will be published, which can be assigned in the appropriate military history courses.

Notes

1. David Ian Hall, *Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), xii.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 155.
4. David French, *Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War against Germany 1919-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

MARY KATHRYN BARBIER
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The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal. Neil Boister and Robert Cryer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Cloth. Pp. 358.

A fair way to appraise this book is by what it is not. The authors are lawyers, not historians, and they aim to provide a legal, not historical, analysis of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), commonly known as the Tokyo Trial. Neither author has Japanese lan-

guage ability. Neither is primarily concerned with the historiographical controversies over the trial, except when an understanding and evaluation of these issues is relevant to the tribunal's legal context. Since the major legal issues of the proceedings such as the indictment of defendants, length of the trail, fairness of the proceedings, and legality of the verdicts also form the core of the historiographical debate over the trial, there is a natural overlap between legal and historical inquiry. The book, however, is a thematic assessment of legal interpretations, precedents, and procedures, not a history of the trial.

Boister and Cryer are measured and judicious in their opinions and explanations regarding the IMTFE's legal aspects and offer valuable observations. Just as the popular view that the Nuremberg Trials focused on Nazi brutality, as opposed to aggression, is an ahistorical reconstruction, the conventional wisdom that holds that the Tokyo Trial prosecuted war crimes is incorrect. The main thrust of the Tokyo forum was to bring to justice those accused of crimes against peace and criminal conspiracy. Any war crimes charges were an afterthought, and conventional war criminals were tried separately in B and C class courts convened elsewhere.

The Tokyo Tribunal made up its legal rulings as it went along and those decisions became the center of disputes that take up much or the trial record. The prosecution, for example, did not precisely define crimes against peace or conspiracy in relation to specific defendants. Could a potpourri of accused generals, admirals, diplomats, and statesmen, whose official roles in many cases never intersected, conspire with one another to plan aggressive war? The only way that the Tokyo Tribunal could prove the participation of each individual was to postulate an extended conspiracy, reaching back to at least 1928, and that construct of historical continuity by the prosecution became the legal basis for the trial.

As the authors make clear, there is no doubt that the indictment process was badly managed, inexpertly undertaken, politically influenced, and overambitious. A clear set of rules of evidence would have saved time because the extended proceedings often degenerated into lengthy procedural debates about the admissibility of evidence. That shortcoming paradoxically rendered the oral testimony of the proceedings far less valuable that the more than 4,300 documents entered into evidence. In sum, the Tokyo Trial was "an inadequate attempt at creating a synthesized international criminal process." There was also the larger legal issue that crimes against peace did not exist before World War II. Did trying defendants for these newly-minted crimes constitute *ex post facto* justice?

A fresh legal analysis of the IMTFE is surely needed, but not at the expense of carelessness rendering historical details. There are numerous

misspellings and factual errors; for instance, Meiji Emperor Mutsuhito vice Matsuhito, the San (?) Taisho Emperor, the 21 Demands occurred in 1915 not 1911, the final imperial conference of 2 November 1941 not 1940, Katsu H. Young vice Kaysu H. Young. Hirota Koki was never minister of defense (indeed, no such cabinet ministry existed). In this regard, one must question the editors at Oxford University Press for failing at their work. Typographical errors suggest minimal proofreading and inattention to detail. Sloppiness such as inconsistent or wrong use of diacritical marks and misaligned footnotes must track back to the editors' doorstep.

The book reads like a dry legal brief. The writing is dense and prolix. Rather than tightly construct their story, the authors are too often content to let others do their talking through excessive extended quotations. Each chapter contains hundreds of footnotes, many extraneous and others of the lengthy expository variety. Both distract the reader from the central narrative and many could have been dropped without loss of continuity or argument. There are lengthy philosophical digressions, on the nature of warfare for example, that likewise stray from the main point.

The authors sought to be impartial and objective in their assessment of the Tokyo Trail, but their balancing act results in intellectual paralysis and the conclusion that they are ambivalent about the value and nature of the tribunal.

EDWARD J. DREA
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The USS Flier: Death and Survival on a World War II Submarine. Michael Sturma. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2008. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Cloth. Pp. 232.

Michael Sturma is an Australian historian whose interest in the intersection of Australian society during World War II with the U.S. Navy's submarine service has led to this exciting and little known story. One suspects that in his research for his other books – one on another U.S. submarine and the other on the sexual relationships of Australian girls with U.S. sailors – he came across the fascinating story of the loss of the submarine USS *Flier* (SS-250) near the Balabac Strait in the Philippines in August 1944. What sets this story apart is that this is the only case where some of the crew escaped the sinking submarine in hostile territory and were rescued without being incarcerated by the Japanese (including the commanding officer).

This is a compelling story in its own right, but there was hardly

enough to it to write an entire book. Instead of jettisoning the story or simply writing up a lengthy article for a magazine or scholarly journal, Sturma wisely chose to use the *Flier* as a vehicle to give the reader a snapshot into the numerous aspects of the United States' war in the Pacific against the Empire of Japan. The book's climax, the still mysterious sudden loss of the *Flier*, serves as a sort of controlling master narrative on which Sturma hangs all sorts of interesting topical discussions. In fact, as I speedily read through this book, I thought of those physically separated "sidebar" discussions now common in popular military history formats every time Sturma diverted into a detailed discussion of some peripheral (but interesting) aspect of the story. For some authors, this technique would have been fatal to the reader's interest, but in this book it added value. This reviewer particularly appreciated Sturma's sensitivity and objectivity regarding the institutional culture of the U.S. Navy and, in particular, that of the sub-culture of the "silent service."

The central figure in the story is Lieutenant Commander John Daniel Crowley. Sturma follows Crowley's career and uses it to give the reader some real insights into the officer corps around which the United States Navy built its wartime cadre of submarine warriors. Sturma uses every occasion in Crowley's wartime career to inform the reader about areas one does not usually find in "drum and bugle" combat histories. Especially useful is his discussion of Crowley's first command of an antiquated "pigboat" (*S-28*) during the Aleutians campaign. I was astonished at how well the author captures both the danger and the boredom of that obscure campaign – especially its submarine warfare component. This is just one example of what Sturma does in his sidebars throughout the book. Whenever an opportunity offers itself to educate the readers about a little-known or esoteric aspect of warfare in the Pacific, Sturma avails himself of it. Instead of simply abandoning *S-28* after Crowley moves on to a new command, Sturma instead follows the rest of the history of the boat to its unlucky demise in the waters off Hawaii.

Other areas that get quite a bit of attention in the book include torpedo design, Japanese mining operations, coastwatching operations, and the support by U.S. submarines for Filipino-led guerilla operations against the Japanese. If one comes away with any overriding sense of submarine operations from this book it is one of how incredibly dangerous the U.S. submarine service was during World War II, both physically and to an officer's career. We get an inside look, for example, at how submarine skippers were often in as much hot water in between patrols as they were on them. Crowley may not be representative of the entire group of submarine skippers, especially those who were products of the interwar Navy and Annapolis, but Sturma seems to paint him that way. Nonetheless, his career survived two major boards of investigation into his conduct and judgment, first in the grounding of the *Flier* at Midway and

then its loss in the Philippines to a probable mine. Sturma's familiarity with the breadth of his topic is simply amazing and his research, using many primary and secondary sources, is impeccable.

Sturma does not neglect the other people in this story. He retains a solid feel for relationships and showcases them at every opportunity. From the acrimonious exchanges at the strategic level between Admirals Charles A. Lockwood, Jr. (in Pearl Harbor) and Ralph W. Christie (in Freemantle, Australia) to the tragedy of a Filipino coastwatcher's suicide, he covers quite a bit of human terrain in this neat little book. This could have been simply another swashbuckling story of naval adventure – and it is that – but it is much more. I highly recommend this work to naval history scholars and to those who are interested in learning more about the intricacies of how modern navies actually work.

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The Hunt for Nazi Spies: Fighting Espionage in Vichy France. Simon Kitson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008. Maps. Notes. Index. Cloth. Pp. 218.

Since the publication of Philip Stead's *Second Bureau* in 1959 there have been plenty of books released on the subject of French wartime intelligence operations, but little has appeared on the somewhat arcane topic of counter-espionage conducted by Vichy.[1] Now Simon Kitson, the Director of Research at the University of London Institute in Paris, has filled the gap with *The Hunt for Nazi Spies*, a fascinating glimpse into the activities of the various organizations created after the French collapse, which enjoyed a brief existence until the Nazis overran the unoccupied zone in November 1943. Kitson wrote his book in French, and this is now translated into English, but why has it taken so long? The answer is that most of the French intelligence archive was seized by the Germans who in 1943 shipped it back to the Reich, only to have it fall into the hands of the Soviets. Thus, it was not until Boris Yeltsin was elected that the records, consisting of 1,400 boxes, were returned to the Chateau de Vincennes and made available to the public.

Kitson's research reveals a rich seam of documentary material that, overlaid with the more familiar memoirs of Paul Paillole and his pro-Allied friends in the complex intelligence profession, hives a very different view of how the Vichy regime coped with a German espionage offensive, in which the participants were overwhelmingly French collaborators.[2] And of whom up to forty were executed.

The creation of the supposedly neutral administration headed by Marshal Philippe Pétain was an instant target for the *Abwehr* and *Sicherheitsdienst*, which competed against each other to plant their spies in the new ministries, penetrate the secret services, engage in black-marketeering, and monitor signs of any clandestine mobilization. Literally thousands of unemployed Frenchmen, many of them sent home by the army, became willing informants as the Nazis looted France's economic infrastucture. The British attack on the fleet at Oran, followed by combat with the Allies in Senegal, Syria, and Madagascar, created an almost institutionalized ambiguity in Vichy's relations with the Allies, Berlin, and its own population, and the result was a unique espionage environment in which loyalty to the state became a very pliable commodity.

This is a story of the notorious Klaus Barbie forcing his way into Lyons prison to free one of his own agents; of a prisoner swap in which the Germans executed a French spy but nevertheless accepted the return of their own man in exchange. Kitson explains the various police and military organizations in Vichy, concentrating on the *Bureau des Menées Antinationale* (BMA) and its subordinate *Surveillance du Territoire*, but this is not an account of one single agency's activities, nor a collection of case histories There are not many thumbnail portraits of prominent personnel and few details of what the *Abwehr* achieved, but there are some tantalizing glimpses into French schemes, including a plan to blackmail Theodor Auer, the homosexual head of the *Gestapo* in Morocco, and his Austrian Jewish lover.

The value of this book is in covering hitherto relatively obscure and unknown counter-espionage services, such as the BMA which enjoyed surprisingly substantial funding and very considerable telephone-tapping resources. While the *Milice* acquired a ruthless reputation for maltreating prisoners and assisting the *Gestapo*, the BMA has hardly entered the literature and apparently there are many more rich veins waiting to be mined in the Chateau de Vincennes. It is to be hoped that readers inspired to follow the author's lead will find the files relating to the early American networks based in Algiers and Morocco, and the efforts made by some of the neutral diplomatic community in Vichy on behalf of the British, and of the scarcely-neutral activities of the U.S. mission.

The Vichy era is a shameful chapter in France's still-painful wartime experience, and there has been a tendency for British and American historians to rely on, for instance, the legendary Gustave Bertrand to demonstrate inter-Allied cooperation in the unoccupied zone and in North Africa, but Kitson illuminates an aspect of post-Armistice intelligence operations that has been neglected since David Kahn's magisterial *Hitler's Spies*, which did look at Colonel Oscar Reile's spy-rings in France, but did not have the benefit of the new files released by Moscow.[3]

Notes
1. Philip John Stead, *Second Bureau* (London: Evans, 1959).
2. Paul Paillole, S*ervices Spéciaux, 1935-1945* (Paris: Laffont, 1975).
3. David Kahn, *Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II* (New York: Macmillan, 1978).

NIGEL WEST
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The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable. George Victor. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2007. Illustrations. Map. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Cloth. Pp. 380.

Based on a prodigious amount of research and detailed analysis of his source materials, George Victor has produced his version of the motives of President Franklin Roosevelt in taking decisions that would eventually lead to war with Japan on 7 December 1941. Victor argues that such decisions were deliberately taken in the summer of 1941 with the objective of provoking Japan into war with the U.S. in order to forestall an invasion of the Soviet Union by the Japanese by shifting their intention to the U.S. as an adversary instead. Later – in late November 1941 – an additional and overriding objective he imputes to Roosevelt at that time was to "maneuver" Japan into an unopposed attack on Pearl Harbor as a means to obtain a declaration of war by Congress against Japan and hopefully Germany.

The "saving the USSR" motive hypothesized by Victor is certainly original and worthy of consideration, though the "back door" allegation is an old chestnut favored by the conspiracy advocates, though still subject to argumentation pro and con. Much of the ground traversed by Victor I have a gone over in the research for my 2003 book as it related to 1940-1941 Japanese plans for seizing the resource-rich colonial possessions of Southeast Asia and the American reaction to implementation of such plans.[1] However, I did not find any documentation that would link American responses to secret motivations of Roosevelt to provoke Japan into war. Indeed, who really knows what they were? For that reason, and following additional research to prepare this review, I have my reservations about Victor's conclusions, which I will develop below. Some of these are shaped by consideration of sources not tapped by Victor, including Herbert Bix and Mark Stoler, as well as one – Andrew Nagorski – whose book was only published the same year as Victor's.

My reservations relate to the four "provocations" that Victor argues Roosevelt deliberately introduced with a view to averting a Soviet collapse by distracting Japan from designs on Russian Siberia. These were

(1) the imposition of an oil embargo on Japan on 26 July 1941; (2) the decision in late July 1941 to build up offensive airpower in the Philippines to threaten the Japanese mainland; (3) the suspension of diplomatic talks with Japan following its occupation of southern French Indochina on 25 July 1941; and (4) the dropping of a *modus vivendi* with Japan set to be proposed in mid-November 1941 and instead substitution of the ten-point "Hull note" on 27 November 1941 that was widely recognized would lead to war with Japan.

Historians generally have regarded the imposition of an oil embargo on Japan as a retaliation by Roosevelt for the Japanese move into southern French Indochina. The immediate response of Roosevelt for that aggressive Japanese action was to freeze Japanese assets in the U.S., thus halting all trade between the two countries and in effect to introduce a so-called "oil embargo."[2]

Did Roosevelt have a more calculated motive than simply to punish the Japanese? Victor believes so. At the time, the Japanese had started amassing 700,000 troops in Manchukuo that were ready to cross the border into Siberia in accordance with the Japanese Army plan to invade the USSR beginning 29 August 1941 in order to take advantage of an expected German victory in the west.[3] According to Victor, Roosevelt was privy to the plan.[4] However, at the Imperial Conference held three weeks earlier, on 2 July 1941, the Japanese Army plan to invade the USSR was put on hold and attention shifted towards the south to the resource-rich colonial possessions that could provide the oil Japan needed for its war effort.[5] On 30 July Emperor Hirohito "suggested" to the Army that it stop its build-up in Manchukuo – he did not want war with the USSR – and on 9 August the Liaison Conference on that date cancelled the planned invasion of the Soviet Union.[6]

Roosevelt's fear of a Japanese invasion thus proved unfounded, but he may not have had the intelligence (unlike the Soviets, via their spy Richard Sorge) that the invasion was off, though it has been maintained that by breaking the Japanese diplomatic code the U.S. was "well aware" of the 2 July proceedings.[7] Victor cites intelligence reports into the fall of 1941 that indicated such an invasion was indeed likely (the reports later proved faulty). He asserts that the embargo (and associated measures) influenced Japanese leaders to "commit their nation to war against the United States" and drop plans to invade the USSR. This is an inaccurate statement – Japan's decision for so-called Southern Operations on 2 July was seen as risking war with the United States, but did not commit her to it.

It should be noted, however, that Hirohito regarded the U.S. oil embargo as making a northward invasion (into Siberia) "impossible for the short term."[8] If so, Roosevelt's decision – if based on the premise of Victor – could be regarded as achieving its objective.

But did Roosevelt introduce the oil embargo for that purpose? While the President was anxious to help the Soviet Union in its hour of need, his closest advisor, Harry Hopkins, had told Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov during Hopkins' visit to the USSR in August 1941 that the U.S. did not want to be "provocative in its relations with Japan" in deflecting Molotov's suggestion that Roosevelt warn Japan against any plan to strike the USSR. Hopkins thus evidently did not regard the embargo as a provocation.[9] The focus of Hopkins' talks with Joseph Stalin was on Stalin's requests for material aid, not the Japanese threat. It should also be noted that U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall's War Plans Department did not see the embargo as a provocation either and only reversed its position against provoking Japan in October when it recommended "continuation of existing economic pressures" so as to render Japan "incapable of offensive operations against Russia" (evidently unaware of the Japanese decision not to invade).[10]

Ten days before the oil embargo was introduced, Marshall informed the Chief of the Air Corps that he had decided to reverse the War Department's long-standing position of no reinforcement of the Philippine Islands and was going to give the Islands "great strategic importance."[11] Air and naval bases in the Philippines were now seen as a threat to any Japanese movement south. In particular, offensive air power was to be built up in the Philippines as a deterrent to any further such Japanese moves through introducing the threat of bombardment of the Japanese mainland by heavy bombers based in northern Luzon.[12]

Victor, however, regards the decision as another intentional provocation by Roosevelt to reduce the perceived threat of a Japanese invasion of the USSR by shifting attention to the United States as Japan's real antagonist. However, he acknowledges that "there is no record of considering provocation as its purpose."[13] He dismisses the "deterrent" argument on the grounds that any such airpower build-up would have to be completed by October, not as planned by February/March 1942, for the deterrent to be in place, yet from "intercepted Japanese messages," Roosevelt and his advisors "soon learned that Japan planned such an attack" (on U.S. territory) "in mid-October."[14] Not so – the 3 September Liaison Conference decision to which Victor evidently alludes only provided for war preparations to be completed by the latter part of October and a decision for war with the U.S. only to be taken if diplomatic negotiations failed.[15] And for that reason, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson wanted to keep negotiations going until the build-up could be completed.[16] (see below)

Any documentation that I have seen on this subject gives deterrence as the reason for the reversal of policy towards the Philippines and for the development of offensive airpower into the Islands. The introduction of the long-range heavy bomber into the air arsenal of the United States

provided the rationale for the build-up, with 272 B-17s and B-24s earmarked for the Philippines under the August 1941 Air Annex to Roosevelt's "Victory Program."[17] Stimson and Marshall had become enthusiastic believers in the potential of the heavy bomber to deter Japan from undertaking a Pacific War by threatening its cities.[18]

Of course, one country's "deterrent" is another's "provocation." The Japanese would see the basing of B-17s and B-24s in the Philippines as a provocation, but believed the B-17 lacked the range to bomb Japan and return to the Philippines.[19] They evidently were not privy to American plans to have the heavy bombers refuel in Vladivostok for the return to the Philippines, plans that went down the drain and doomed the deterrent strategy when the Russians subsequently refused to allow use of the airfield there.[20] Ironically, if the Soviets had agreed, such potential operations would have been recognized by them as a warlike act against the Japanese and risk retaliation in the form of invasion of Siberia, exactly what Roosevelt was trying to avoid, according to Victor's hypothesis.

Following the Japanese occupation of southern Indochina, the diplomatic talks with Japan were "broken off," as Victor terms it. Victor maintains that the break (more a suspension, I would term it) was sanctioned by Roosevelt as a further means to provoke Japan and reduce pressure on the Soviet Union, since the Japanese were resolved to go to war with the U.S. if the talks broke down.[21] He is evidently referring to the 3 September Liaison Conference at which the decision was taken "to go to war" with the U.S., Great Britain, and the Netherlands if diplomatic means to resolve the outstanding issues were not successful.[22] (Earlier conferences did not frame the alternatives in such terms.) If Roosevelt had intelligence on the 3 September conference, as is implied here, then he should also have known that the earlier planned invasion of the USSR was off the table, as no mention of it was made at the conference. If so, it seems more plausible that the suspension of talks would have been simply as a consequence of Japan's Indochina incursion rather than a calculated decision of Roosevelt for the purpose indicated by Victor.

The role of negotiations came up again in mid-November when a *modus vivendi* was being considered by the President for the purpose of buying time until the Philippines air build-up could be completed. But it was suddenly dropped and the so-called "Hull note" given to the Japanese negotiators instead that stipulated ten conditions that all knew would be unacceptable to Japan and lead to a break in diplomatic relations.

Victor argues that the reason for the switch was probably due to "the prospect on November 25th of a Soviet collapse" following the German advance to the outskirts of Moscow.[23] Again, Roosevelt was coming to the rescue with another provocation of Japan that would certainly lead to war with the United States and discourage it from taking advantage of

the USSR's precarious situation by invading. But by late November, Stalin did not face a "total collapse," as Victor maintains. To the contrary, as of this date, and largely thanks to the Siberian troops released to the western front, the German drive to Moscow had weakened and Stalin was planning a counter-offensive for 6 December.[24] Surely, Roosevelt was apprised of the status of the "Battle of Moscow" and would not have had any reason to provoke Japan on this score.

What would be a better reason for dropping the *modus vivendi*? Only three weeks earlier, Roosevelt and his cabinet were seeking to avoid a war with Japan, not provoke one, "trying to find something to give us further time,"[25] in line with Stimson's request, even proposing a six-month truce, as suggested by Roosevelt, but rejected in order to give time to complete the build-up of offensive air power in the Philippines. Roosevelt's Joint Board on 3 November had urged an agreement with Japan "to tide the situation over for the next several months" for that purpose, as Victor notes.[26]

The news given Roosevelt on 26 November that a Japanese fleet was moving south in the South China Sea towards Indochina, obviously for the purpose of invasion, is recognized by Victor as a possible reason for submitting the Hull Note the following day, but is not accepted by him as an explanation, on the grounds that Roosevelt had intelligence as early as 1 November of advance Japanese units being sighted heading south, so why would Roosevelt be outraged over such "bad faith" more than three weeks later when given the news?[27] Victor also presents, then dismisses, allegations that the Chinese opposed the *modus vivendi* and that the submission of the note was Hull's decision alone and attributed to his moral rigidity.[28]

Rather, Victor suggests FDR had secret intelligence via British Prime Minister Winston Churchill that a Japanese task force was heading for Hawaii that if allowed to attack would ensure that Congress would declare war on Japan and probably Germany.[29] By not sending a final alert to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter C. Short in Hawaii, he could "maneuver" the Japanese into firing the first shot, a strategy Stimson recorded on 25 November as favored by Roosevelt in his anticipation of a Japanese attack "next Monday."[30] Thus, as a result of submitting the "Hull Note," he would finally achieve his long-standing objective of obtaining a declaration of war by Congress against Germany via the Japanese attack. This motive as imputed by Victor evidently trumped that of forestalling a Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union.

This, of course, is the old "conspiracy" explanation for the U.S. entering the war on which so many historians have taken sides. I do not intend to enter the debate, but I still cannot understand why Roosevelt would provoke a war with Japan for any reason when the United States was not prepared to fight in the Pacific and Far East, a situation Roo-

sevelt recognized at the time the Hull Note was presented. Did he really know at the time that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor? Even if he did, wasn't it logical to let the Japanese fire the first shot if you knew you were going to be attacked, so the aggressor could be branded as such? Furthermore, was his Navy Secretary kept so far in the dark by Roosevelt about an impending attack on Pearl Harbor that he would exclaim, "My God, this can't be true, this must mean the Philippines!" when receiving news of the attack?[31]

The Philippines indeed was the target of the Japanese hours after their attack on Pearl Harbor, where General Douglas MacArthur's air force was crippled by the strikes on Clark and Iba fields as from 1230 on 8 December, Philippines time. But the disaster cannot be attributed to the failure of MacArthur to understand the "hints" he had received earlier in orders sent him that "fell short of a full alert" and "misled" him about the imminence of war, as Victor alleges.[32] Contrary to Victor's assertion, MacArthur was not "confused" on receiving the 27 November war warning message: he had approved his air commander General Lewis H. Brereton's recommendation that his Far East Air Force be put on a war footing immediately, with a 24-hour alert order sent to all units.[33] When MacArthur received the follow-up cablegram sent to him at 1205 on 7 December (that had arrived before the Clark Field attack) warning him to "be on the alert," he was already so.[34] The blow struck his air force was due to other reasons covered in my book, not an allegedly confusing war warning from Washington.

Victor is also in error in supporting the allegations that MacArthur was further deceived by Washington after the attack of 8 December by Marshall's message that "all possible aid would be sent" when Marshall did not intend to do so.[35] Already at sea in mid-December was the so-called "Pensacola Convoy" of nine ships carrying troops and aircraft for MacArthur, followed by the Army transport USAT *Polk* that left San Francisco on 18 December with fifty-five P-40Es and pilots and the Navy transport SS *Mormacsun* with sixty-seven P-39s. All these air reinforcements were ordered to the Philippines, but later temporarily diverted to Australia due to the deteriorating conditions in the Philippines. They were going to be flown from there to MacArthur until Japanese seizure of the ferry points in the Dutch East Indies in early January 1942 precluded such an operation.[36] In addition, under "Project X," sixty-five B-17s and fifteen export-model B-24s were leaving the U.S. in late December and early January for the Philippines via Pacific and African routes, but with Japanese occupation of suitable airfields in the Philippines by the time they neared the Philippines, they were transferred to the Dutch East Indies for the aerial defense there against the advancing Japanese.

Even with Japanese control of the skies and a naval blockade of the

Philippines, "strenuous attempts" were made for seaborne help for MacArthur from early January, as ordered by Marshall. Blockade-running vessels were hired in Australia to transport food and medical supplies to MacArthur's beleagured men on Bataan and Corregidor. However, the results were "negligible" due to factors that were far beyond Marshall's control.[37]

For the men on the receiving end of the ill-fated Philippines campaign, it may have seemed no efforts were being made in Washington on their behalf, but the historical record indicates otherwise.

Notes

1. William H. Bartsch, *December 8, 1941: MacArthur's Pearl Harbor* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2003).
2. Ibid., p. 94.
3. Saburo Hayashi and Alvin D. Coox, *Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War* (Quantico: Marine Corps Association, May 1959), pp. 19-20; Edward J. Drea, *In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), p. 32.
4. George Victor, *The Pearl Harbor Myth: Rethinking the Unthinkable* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2007), p. 203.
5. Nobutaka Ike, ed., *Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 77.
6. Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), p. 399.
7. Ike, *Japan's Decision for War*, p. 107.
8. Bix, *Hirohito*, p. 399.
9. Andrew Nagorski, *The Greatest Battle: Stalin, Hitler, and the Desperate Struggle for Moscow that Changed the Course of World War II* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007), p. 158.
10. Mark A. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 55-56.
11. Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, p. 94.
12. Ibid., p. 96.
13. Victor, *Pearl Harbor*, p. 199.
14. Ibid., p. 198.
15. Ibid., p. 98.
16. Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, p. 103.
17. Ibid., p. 96.
18. Ibid., p. 98.
19. Ibid., p. 192.
20. Ibid., p. 189.
21. Victor, *Pearl Harbor*, p. 202.
22. Bix, *Hirohito*, p. 409; Ike, *Japan's Decision for War*, p. 129.
23. Victor, *Pearl Harbor*, p. 254.
24. Nagorski, *Greatest Battle*, pp. 236, 246, 312.
25. Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, p. 182.
26. Victor, *Pearl Harbor*, p. 239.
27. Ibid., p. 249.
28. Ibid., pp. 252, 253.
29. Ibid., pp. 255, 257.

30. Ibid., p. 257.
31. Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, p. 259.
32. Victor, *Pearl Harbor*, pp. 259, 296.
33. Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, p. 219.
34. Ibid., p. 257.
35. Victor, *Pearl Harbor*, p. 298.
36. I cover this subject in my forthcoming book, *Every Day a Nightmare: American Pursuit Pilots in the Defense of Java, 1941-42*.
37. Louis A. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1953), p. 390.

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Dunkirk: Retreat to Victory. General Julian Thompson. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 2008. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Cloth. Pp. 338.

Much of the story is well-known – how Adolf Hitler secured his eastern flank with the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact in order to pursue a one-front war, and then used the winter of 1939-1940 to prepare for the invasion of Western Europe and his anticipated revenge for the humiliation of Versailles. As British Major General Julian Thompson points out in his excellent new book on Dunkirk, the British and the French did not use the phony war period to their advantage: "...it was on the assumption that the next war would mirror the opening years of the last one: in the event of invasion, the French would contain the Germans."

As a prelude to the main event, German forces attacked Denmark and Norway in April 1940; the former fell quickly but Norway, with Allied support, proved more difficult. The major German assault started on 10 May 1940 in a brilliant and coordinated attack on several countries simultaneously – Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. While Luxemburg and the Netherlands soon surrendered, Belgium and France, with British help, were expected to engage in a protracted struggle, replicating the slow pace of the Great War. Instead, Allied forces were defeated in only six weeks. The French were unprepared for the audacious German plan that involved a sickle cut through the center of French forces – driving through the Ardennes, capturing the bridges across the Meuse River, and advancing into and beyond Sedan – bypassing the Maginot Line. At the end of May, Belgium quit the war without adequately warning its allies, while French leadership and morale quickly collapsed.

Just as Belgium was on the verge of defeat, remnants of the British and French armies barely escaped German encirclement, and hundreds

of thousands of soldiers made their way toward Dunkirk for evacuation. A result of one of the worst defeats in British or French history, this improvised retreat left much of the continent under Nazi occupation. The German army marched into Paris, offering a chilling image of the future of Europe. Only Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle, both of whom insisted on continuing the struggle, held out the faintest shred of hope. Prospects for the defeated allies appeared bleak indeed.

Hitler had his revenge – Germany had conquered all of Western Europe. The four-year struggle that marked World War I ended in six weeks in 1940, this time with French humiliation in the same rail car where the 1918 armistice had been signed. In June, Hitler visited the spot, danced a jig, and posed in front of the Eiffel Tower.

Thompson has written a first-rate account that focuses on the British contribution to this battle and the famous evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) from the continent. As the title of his book indicates, the British were forced into this retreat – an evacuation that resulted from a devastating and demoralizing defeat inflicted by a brilliant German plan of attack. Despite the reality of the crushing blow suffered by the Allies, the Dunkirk evacuation eventually provided a heroic narrative that inspired the Allies in their continued resistance. Unwelcome as it was at the time, the evacuation created conditions for eventual Allied victory, as more than 300,000 British and French (and other) troops were able to escape to fight another day. Further, as Thompson points out, the fall of France, combined with "the failure of the Luftwaffe to win the Battle of Britain, bought the time that Britain needed to absorb the lessons so dearly learned in France."

Thompson tells the story well. His focus is the BEF and he argues that despite poor preparation and poor equipment and (sometimes) poor leadership, the troops of the BEF performed well in the field and gave the Germans a serious run for their money. In several areas, outnumbered and facing overwhelming odds, BEF units held off German attacks and made it possible for thousands of other soldiers to make it to the evacuation point. Thompson also explains the organization of the Dunkirk evacuation itself, the underrated role played by the RAF, and the British government's attempt to save as many French soldiers as possible.

Thompson gives credit where it is due – first to the weather that was calm enough to allow ships to cross the Channel, but overcast enough to keep the *Luftwaffe* out of action. Beyond that lucky happenstance, Thompson also praises the Royal Navy for a well-executed operation; it was the large destroyers that saved most of the men. Operation Dynamo, as the evacuation was called, ironically did not depress the spirit of the losers, but instead turned into the uplifting story of the "little boats" heroically ferrying back and forth across the Channel to save weary but determined soldiers. As Thompson aptly observes in his title, Dunkirk

contributed in taking the Allies from retreat to victory.

It is fair to ask if another book on Dunkirk adds to our understanding of those terrible days. Thompson delivers in this regard, skillfully weaving both tactical and strategic concerns with military and political decisions. Thompson tells several stories at once, focusing on individual battles and the struggles of small units holding out virtually on their own, and then moving to the bigger picture as he informs the reader of the views of General Lord John Gort, General Alan Brooke, General Bernard L. Montgomery, and Churchill. Thompson is not shy about assessing the performance of the leaders on all sides: he informs the reader which British (and French) commanders were up to the task and which ones collapsed mentally under the pressure and stress. For example, Thompson evaluates the role of Gort with great honesty. While Gort is described as "a man of great personal and moral courage, he was not suited to high command and had been promoted well above his ceiling." Nevertheless, Thompson credits Gort for making the necessary decision to evacuate despite criticism for issuing the order.

If this book has a weakness, it is only apparent by omission. Judging by the notes and bibliography, the author did not make use of either French or German sources, and some readers might be interested in more perspective from those sides. Did the German military commanders agree that the BEF was as formidable a foe as Thompson claims (he discusses this issue, but quotes British sources)? Were there any French units or officers who the Germans saw as worthy opponents? In other words, do all sources agree with Thompson's conclusions about the BEF, the French, Gort, Brooke, etc.?

Despite the seeming omission of French and German sources, Thompson has written an important and admirable book that adds new perspectives to the literature on this subject. His study will continue to be a source of valuable information on Operation Dynamo.

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Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45. Max Hastings. New York: Knopf, 2008. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Cloth. Pp. 656.

Noted British journalist-historian Sir Max Hastings has followed up his look at the last year of Nazi Germany in 2004's *Armageddon*, with *Retribution*, which covers the final year of the war against Imperial Japan.[1] There is no doubt that this phase of the war has already been well-cov-

ered in modern historiography by works such as Richard Frank's *Downfall*, Ronald Spector's *Eagle against the Sun*, and John Toland's *The Rising Sun*, but Hastings delivers a somewhat iconoclastic and Anglicized interpretation that provides a new set of lenses to examine the Pacific War's conclusion.[2] At the heart of this work lies Hastings' main hypothesis, that Japan would not have surrendered without the American atomic bomb raids on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, although he reiterates that this thesis has already been "proven" by the earlier works cited and that he is merely adding his weight to this conclusion. Indeed, Hastings opines that, "those who seek to argue that Japan was ready to surrender before Hiroshima are peddlers of fantasies."[3] An unstated goal of this book seems to be to counter an evolving ignorance about the Pacific War that absolves Japan of guilt and instead seeks to label U.S. actions as "barbaric." He concludes:

> the nation [Japan] is guilty of collective rejection of historical fact…. They still seek to excuse, and even to ennoble, the actions of their parents and grandparents, so many of whom forsook humanity in favor of a perversion of honor and an aggressive nationalism which should properly be recalled with shame.[4]

Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45 is organized into twenty-two non-sequential chapters, with the focus on the main air-ground-sea campaigns in the western Pacific in late 1944/early 1945. Although each chapter is written almost as a stand-alone essay on its subject, the author does provide enough strategic and political overview material to link them together into a coherent narrative. These chapters run the gamut from submarine operations, the B-29 bombing campaign, operations in China and Burma, the reconquest of the Philippines, Japan's handling of foreign prisoners of war, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. I was a bit dismayed by the apparently rather thin research underpinning *Retribution* – there are only twenty-eight pages of footnotes and no bibliography. If you subtract all the "ibids" out of the footnotes, there are really only about a dozen pages of notes. It is particularly annoying to see the author contradict well-known quotes such as General Douglas MacArthur's "I have returned" and then not provide footnotes on direct quotes from numerous other individuals. The book does include ten decent sketch maps and seventy-four black and white photographs, but given the lack of appendices or bibliography, this feels more like a journalistic rather than a scholarly account. That is not to say that the author is not erudite or insightful, but he has not provided this book with the kind of documentary framework that one might expect from someone out to deconstruct entrenched conceptions about the war.

As Hastings repeatedly emphasizes, Japan's leaders started the war,

they chose to flout accepted (Western) conventions regarding treatment of prisoners and civilians, and then they refused to acknowledge that the war was hopelessly and utterly lost until bombed into submission. Hastings writes, "by choosing to participate in a total war, the nation exposed itself to total defeat" and "the Japanese having started the war, waged it with such savagery towards the innocent and impotent that it is easy to understand the rage which filled Allied hearts in 1945, when all was revealed."[5] Furthermore, the author cites the manner in which the Japanese waged war as justification for the ferocious American campaign of retribution that burned their cities to the ground one by one. Hastings writes, "the consequences of so-called Japanese fanaticism on the battlefield… was that Allied commanders favored the use of extreme methods to defeat them."[6]

Although I agree with a great deal of Hastings' observations/conclusions, they are based more on an emotional level and less on an analytic foundation. It is certainly true that Japan started the war, but the real mistake was that Japan's leaders widened the war to include the United States, when they really only needed the raw materials in the British and Dutch colonies. Given that the Japanese were able to overrun the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, and Singapore – giving them the oil, tin, and rubber their economy needed to withstand a U.S. embargo – in a matter of months, the decision to attack the United States and then shift to a "keep out" strategy indicates more idiocy than evil. Furthermore, the author does not delve into the origins of Japanese imperialism, much of which was based upon first-hand observation of violent Western imperialism in Asia in the period 1860-1925; the Japanese viewed themselves as merely carrying on the tradition of carving up China for profit, as the Europeans had been doing since the Opium Wars. As for battlefield misconduct, Japan's maltreatment of civilians and prisoners was hardly unique either to the Pacific Theater or even the Second World War, so it is difficult to evaluate this as "justification." He also ignores instances where the Japanese played by the rules, such as returning our diplomatic personnel and interned civilians in 1942. Furthermore, American leaders such as Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr. were already saying the day after Pearl Harbor – before Japan had abused any Allied civilians or prisoners – that "the Japanese language would only be spoken in hell" when the war was over, indicating that rage was driven by the nature of the surprise attack. Although the author skirts around the issue of racial attitudes, he does not delve into the unique U.S. incarceration of Japanese-Americans during the war, in contrast to the hands-off attitude toward German- and Italian-Americans. Indeed, there is little doubt that much of the American population viewed the Japanese as inferiors and the "sneak attack" opening of the war made them deserving of the harshest measures of retaliation. Thus, the hypothesis that Japan's behavior in the war deter-

mined the severity of the U.S. military response is contentious at best and certainly has been examined here only through emotive lenses.

Hastings continues to shape this argument throughout the book, that Japanese behavior shaped the American "retribution," beginning with the inhumane treatment of prisoners, but becoming more refined with atrocities committed in the Philippines as well as the advent of suicide tactics by *Kamikaze* units (note Americanism, actual name was *Shinpu Tokkubetsu* – special attack). The author writes that, "In considering the later U.S. firebombing of Japan and decision to bomb Hiroshima, it is useful to recall that by the spring of 1945 the American nation knew what the Japanese had done in Manila."[7] In particular, the *Kamikaze* attacks off the Philippines and Okinawa horrified the Americans; "this new terror prompted among Americans an escalation of hatred, a diminution of mercy."[8] There is no doubt that these tactics shocked and angered American military personnel, but the problem in relating these acts to this theory is that they were occurring well after the United States had decided to bomb Japanese cities into matchwood at the earliest possible moment. Furthermore, even assuming that the Bataan Death March and *Kamikazes* had never occurred, the U.S. military response to any Japanese aggression was still going to be reliant upon strategic bombardment. The alternate hypothesis – what if the Japanese had honored the Geneva Conventions – is unlikely to produce any change in U.S. methods of war-making. Whether in Europe or Asia, American military leaders favored bombing as a less costly alternative to ground invasions, a tradition which has continued up to the present day.

Of course, Hastings directs ample criticism at the Americans as well and he takes aim squarely at the legend of MacArthur. Hastings reveals an unethical side of MacArthur that I had not heard of before, writing that while his troops starved in Bataan, MacArthur accepted a large cash gift; "Only Roosevelt and a handful of others were aware of the general's acceptance in March 1942 of $500,000 from the Philippines Treasury, as a personal gift from President Manuel Quezon."[9] Amazingly, Hastings does not footnote this allegation, which is a severe disappointment. He also notes the pettiness of a commander who makes recovery of his personal property in the Philippines a priority, noting that "He [MacArthur] wrote to his wife, Jean, reporting the good news that he had recovered all the family silver."[10] However, the sharpest criticism comes for MacArthur's faulty generalship and Hastings writes that, "MacArthur's contempt for intelligence was a persistent, crippling defect."[11] As evidence, the author offers first the botched landing on Leyte, where MacArthur ignored both intelligence assessments about the enemy strength on the island and his engineer's prediction that they would be unable to construct suitable air bases in the height of the rainy season. Instead of a quick triumph, MacArthur's forces became involved in a

protracted battle of attrition on Leyte, suffering heavy casualties from both the enemy and the environment, and ultimately failing to build suitable air bases. This debacle – glossed over by the wartime American press – was followed on an even grander scale in the invasion of Luzon, where MacArthur again ignored the terrain and the enemy. Hastings also notes that both President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Halsey were unsatisfied with MacArthur's strategic rationale for the entire Philippines campaign, but due to his prestige, they let him have his head. The author concludes – in obvious reference to MacArthur – that, "it is a striking feature of the Second World War that the populist media of the democracies made stars of some undeserving commanders, who thereafter became hard to sack."[12]

Again, I have to admit that I agree with much of the author's analysis of MacArthur's faulty generalship (defects which plagued him later in Korea, as well), but these criticisms may be somewhat out of context. There were a great many other senior commanders who ignored intelligence assessments during the Second World War, but much of this was invisible until information about Enigma and Magic became publicly available in the late 1970s. Certainly, few of the Japanese commanders that MacArthur opposed paid much attention to intelligence issues either and commanders such as Lieutenant-General Mutaguchi Renya ignored the terrain around Imphal-Kohima to the extent that it resulted in the virtual destruction of his army. There is little doubt that MacArthur was imperious, obnoxious, and probably driven by personal vainglory – and I do believe that much of his Philippines campaign was strategically unnecessary – but this assessment seems to call him out not just as a bad general, but as an impostor. However, if taken in context, MacArthur was certainly not inferior as a commander to the far-less experienced likes of General Omar N. Bradley, General Courtney H. Hodges, General William H. Simpson, et al.

Hastings' chapter on the naval Battle of Leyte Gulf is one of the best in the book and takes its title from Japanese Admiral Kurita Takeo telling his officers that the fleet was offered "the chance to bloom as flowers of death."[13] Although this chapter is very engaging, it also contains a contradictory element, which condemns Japanese methods while pointing to the near-calamity suffered by American forces. Hastings writes that, "Shogo [the Japanese plan] reflected the Japanese navy's chronic weakness for dividing its forces," yet this tactic succeeded in fooling Admiral Halsey and set the stage for a potential decisive victory off Samar.[14] Only the selfless sacrifice of escorting USN destroyers and the unusual timidity of Japanese commanders prevented Samar from being the worst defeat in American naval history.

Other chapters also provide a host of non-traditional looks at the final months of the Pacific War. In the chapter on the war in China, the author

notes the British annoyance with the American fixation on building China up into a major power and Roosevelt's over-estimation of Chiang Kai-shek. American General Claire Chennault is described as a "wildly, over-promoted adventurer" which certainly contrasts with the standard view of him as leader of the Flying Tigers. The author goes at great length into analyzing the American B-29 bomber campaign over Japan, but concludes "the material damage inflicted upon Japanese industry by LeMay's offensive was almost irrelevant, because blockade and raw-material starvation had already brought the economy to the brink of collapse." Yet he adds, "it seems essential to acknowledge the psychological impact of the B-29 campaign."[15] When I lived in Japan as a student, the mere mention of the phrase "be-ni-ju-ku" brought any conversation to an immediate halt, testimony to the lingering psychological effects even three decades later. Interestingly, Hastings notes that the B-29 bomber offensive cost $4 billion – double the cost of the Manhattan Project. There are also two chapters on the war in Burma, which is two more than usually appear in most American books on the Pacific War. Hastings acknowledges that this campaign did little to defeat Japan and was fought mostly for reasons of colonial prestige, but is eager to bring details of this sideshow campaign to light.

Hastings is particularly adept at integrating first-person accounts into his narrative, but without losing coherency. A number of these accounts are quite blood-thirsty, which capture the mood of the combatants in 1945 and indicate that the Japanese were not the only ones imbued with blood-lust. The author quotes one U.S. Marine on Iwo Jima who said, "the first guy I ever killed, I got so much joy, so much satisfaction out of it…" A U.S. fighter pilot flying over Japan in July 1945 wrote, "We had the usual fun strafing and rocket-firing…" and a British captain in the advance to Rangoon said, "I'm afraid I enjoyed the campaign. It was great fun."[16] Nowadays, it has become common coin to suggest that all soldiers fight reluctantly and only for the sake of their buddies and to ignore the actual hate-rage and adrenaline-rush aspects that incite warfare, but these type of accounts bring home the message that in every war there are at least some very willing participants. Most telling about the actual mood for retribution in 1945 was an un-footnoted comment from a U.S. sailor who wrote, "We came to believe he [the Japanese] was slime…not worthy of life; seeing dead Japanese in the water was like making love to a beautiful girl."[17]

As for the Japanese, Hastings depicts them as prone to inertia and unable to innovate, which is something of a sweeping generalization. With all hopes for military victory apparently dashed, Hastings writes that, "refusal to face the logic of surrender was perhaps the most potent weapon Japanese forces possessed."[18] Hastings also uses the willingness of Japanese soldiers, sailors, and pilots to sacrifice themselves to defend

their country as a means to demonstrate non-Western perspectives on warfare. One Japanese *Kamikaze* pilot, recently married, wrote that "I'm doing this for my beloved wife."[19] Furthermore, many Japanese willingly embraced death and Hastings writes that, "it was a point of honor among the suicide crews themselves that they should take off laughing."[20] All of this might seem very perplexing to Western readers (forgetting our own tradition of honoring hopeless last-stands such as Thermopylae and the Alamo) and the author could have done a better job of putting this in a better cultural context; Japan has traditionally had a high suicide rate and their was widespread cultural endorsement of self-sacrifice long before the Second World War. At best, I would say that Hastings' interpretation of the role of the *Yamato* spirit and its impact upon the final months of the Pacific War is useful, but does not tell the full side of the motivations that drove Japan to continue fighting.

There are a few errors or omissions in *Retribution*, most of which are due to subjective interpretation rather than outright mistake. A rare factual error is the author's claim on page 278 that the submarine USS *Sealion* (SS-315) sank the Japanese battleship *Kongo* with only one torpedo, but it was actually two. Throughout the book, Hastings suggests that American bomber tactics in Europe aped British tactics of carpet-bombing cities and gave up attacks on specific targets, but this seriously misreads the American strategic bombing effort, which was very unlike the RAF effort. I was also disappointed that Hastings glossed over the U.S. naval bombardments of the Japanese coastline in the summer of 1945, writing that "the flat trajectory naval gunfire was much less effective than incendiary attack by B-29s...."[21] In fact, battleships such as the USS *Massachusetts* (BB-59) plastered Japanese steel factories with devastating 16-inch gunfire in July 1945; a visit to the museum on that warship reveals photographs that show just how effective that gunfire was. I was also disappointed that the author provided almost nothing on the first few days of the U.S. occupation of Japan, including the special airborne task force – this certainly deserved mention over two chapters on Burma.

Ultimately, Hastings blames the Japanese leaders for the devastation inflicted upon their country in the final months of the war and says that "Japan bears overwhelming responsibility for what happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, because her leaders refused to acknowledge that their game was up."[22] He writes,

> If LeMay's achievement in killing 200,000 Japanese civilians and leveling most of the country's major cities had not convinced the likes of General Anami that surrender was inevitable, there is no reason to suppose that a mere threat of atomic bombardment would have done so."[23]

Amazingly, even after the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese leaders offered no immediate response to the Allies; Hastings writes that

> even by the standards of the Japanese military…the conduct of its leaders was extraordinary. They seemed to care nothing for the welfare of Japan's people, everything for their perverted concept of personal honor and that of the institution to which they belonged.[24]

There is no doubt that the question of whether or not nuclear attacks were actually necessary to induce Japan's final surrender will continue to be debated *ad infinitum* and that Hastings' book will merely provide another step on this path, rather than a definitive answer. *Retribution* is a useful step along this discourse, packed with good intuition but not fully armed with facts and it will tend to appeal more to adherents of the traditional interpretation. Merely dismissing those who suggest that the nuclear attacks were unnecessary as "peddlers of fantasies" is not good historical method and it reduces *Retribution* to a subjective interpretation. That both myself and many readers will agree with much of Hastings' interpretation is not the point. Rather, books that deal with controversial subjects/events such as this should seek to steer towards an objective methodology that tests alternate hypotheses, not just seek to validate preconceived notions.

Notes

1. Max Hastings, *Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945* (New York: Knopf, 2004); Max Hastings, *Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45* (New York: Knopf, 2008).
2. Richard B. Frank, *Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire* (New York: Random House, 1999); Ronald H. Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan* (New York: Free Press, 1984); John Toland, *The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945* (New York: Random House, 1970).
3. Hastings, *Retribution*, p. 513.
4. Ibid., p. 550.
5. Ibid., pp. 7, 368.
6. Ibid., p. 8.
7. Ibid., p. 236.
8. Ibid., p. 172.
9. Ibid., p. 21.
10. Ibid., p. 238.
11. Ibid., p. 245.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 134.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 318.
16. Ibid., pp. 439, 328.
17. Ibid., p. 173.
18. Ibid., p. 56.
19. Ibid., p. 166.

20. Ibid., p. 171.
21. Ibid., p. 436.
22. Ibid., p. 476.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 509.

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The Guadalcanal Air War: Col. Jefferson DeBlanc's Story. Jefferson J. DeBlanc. Gretna, LA: Pelican Publishing, 2008. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Cloth. Pp. 240.

Jefferson J. DeBlanc was an extraordinary man. Even without the Medal of Honor, he would have stood out in any field, as he proved throughout his life in aviation, academia, and athletics. (Among his lesser-known achievements was becoming a medalist in the senior olympics.) He died November 2008 in his native Louisiana, age 87.

DeBlanc not only lived history, he recorded it. He wrote a family history and was frequently involved in Second World War research.[1] Therefore, Pacific War historians were delighted to learn that *The Guadalcanal Air War* was being published, albeit posthumously. Certainly DeBlanc had a story worth telling: he went to combat as a 21-year-old Marine Corps Wildcat pilot with barely 200 hours flight time. He arrived at "Cactus" in November 1942, never having fired an F4F's guns or flown a Wildcat at night.

Yet, the young Louisianan thrived in the Solomon Islands. Flying with VMF-112, he survived a nocturnal ditching and being shot down at sea. On 31 January 1943, while escorting bombers, he was credited with downing five Japanese planes before taking to his parachute. His subsequent adventures with coast watchers enabled him to return safely, convert to Corsairs, and fly a second combat tour at Okinawa. By VJ-Day he was credited with nine aerial kills, and subsequently he received the Medal of Honor for his 1943 heroism.

With so many harrowing tales to tell, *The Guadalcanal Air War* should capture a wide audience. But the title is misleading. Only about one-third of the text concerns the 1942-1943 Solomons campaign, the balance describes DeBlanc's life before he entered the service and his subsequent careers in aviation and touching upon academia. (He earned a master's in physics and a doctorate in education – one of perhaps a half dozen ace Ph.D.s.) The last chapters relate his return visits to the Solomons, mainly to establish a memorial foundation.

DeBlanc was an immensely entertaining speaker with a natural gift for

humor. Asked why he chose the Marines, he once said, "I'm a Southerner. I wasn't about to join the Yankee army." But only part of his charm comes across the pages, perhaps because so much of his appeal turned upon his delightful Cajun accent. Frequently, the book lapses into little more than a travelogue by train or airliner – space that could have addressed some fascinating topics only hinted at, including reincarnation.

Some of DeBlanc's stories had been related previously.[2] But even so, *The Guadalcanal Air War* is hampered by lack of an index and contains no photographs. (The color photograph on the back cover depicts the Air Force rather than the Navy Medal of Honor.) The only illustrations are line drawings of some of the Solomon Islands – certainly helpful given the obscure geography.

There are numerous footnotes, some of which bear marginal relevance to the text. Contemporary events in Europe are cited, but the Battle of Santa Cruz in October 1942 is not. Similarly, the note for the Yamamoto interception of April 1943 deals wholly with Sakai Saburo, who had long since departed for Japan.

In describing his Medal of Honor combat, DeBlanc refers to the Japanese fighters as Mitsubishi Zeroes, reflecting the impression of the time. Prior to his death, researchers learned that the Japanese fighters were Nakajima Oscars from the 11th *Sentai*, the first Imperial Japanese Army Air Force unit in the Solomons.[3] That information was included in a History Channel television program that aired in 2006.[4] Therefore, the actual date of the manuscript is unclear, but may be no later than 2001.

Some intriguing stories are only touched upon. For instance, the unusual circumstances of DeBlanc's Medal of Honor presentation in December 1946 are not explained. Similarly, one of his brothers flew patrol aircraft and rose to the rank of lieutenant commander before entering the priesthood.

Certainly, Jeff DeBlanc lived an exciting, varied, and rewarding enough life to warrant a much longer manuscript. But perhaps rather than regret what is not recorded, we should be grateful to have what is provided in *The Guadalcanal Air War*.

Notes

1. Jefferson J. DeBlanc, *Once They Lived by the Sword* (Privately published, 1988).
2. Joe Foss and Matthew Brennan, *Top Guns: America's Fighter Aces Tell Their Stories* (New York: Pocket Books, 1991); Walter Lord, *Lonely Vigil: Coastwatchers of the Solomons* (New York: Viking, 1977).
3. 11th *Sentai*, as discussed on j-aircraft.com, 2006 (posts no longer available).
4. *Dogfights*, "Guadalcanal," Dir. Robert Kirk, A&E Television Network, Documentary Television Series, United States, 2006.

BARRETT TILLMAN
Mesa, Arizona

Liberation of Paris 1944: Patton's Race for the Seine. Steven J. Zaloga. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008. Illustrations. Maps. Select Bibliography. Index. Paper. Pp. 96.

The liberation of the French capital in 1944 has been the subject of few focused accounts in English. Most often, the liberation is treated as an afterthought to the Allied breakout from Normandy. Steven Zaloga's most recent Osprey Campaign title addresses this shortcoming.

Zaloga's account is strong in several areas. All of his Osprey efforts are consistently well written and feature unusual levels of research for such relatively short works. His latest campaign title is no exception. He has used U.S., German, and extensive French sources to assemble the complex story of the battle for Paris. Highlights include his description of the central role of the Resistance in the events leading up to and during the liberation. He also does a good job describing the central role of Paris in Free French planning and the interaction of those forces with the U.S. Army's leadership in whose sector Paris was located. Particularly interesting is the interface between General Jacques Leclerc, commander of the Second Free French Armored Division, and Major General Leonard Gerow, the commander of the U.S. V Corps, which was tasked to execute the liberation.

One of the hallmarks of Zaloga's Osprey efforts is his attention to providing complete orders of battle. In this book, for example, he provides complete details of the size and composition of the German garrison of Paris. Though the force was some 20,000 troops in total, they were barely able to contend with the rising level of Resistance activity inside the city, much less take on the onrushing Free French and American forces. The largest single unit of the garrison was a security division with 5,000 troops. Also present was a large number of *Luftwaffe* troops and miscellaneous other security troops which were divided into three sectors. Given this force, and the decision of the garrison commander to avoid a major fight in the city, it is easily understood why German resistance was so feeble and how the city survived extensive destruction, despite the express orders of Adolf Hitler that it be destroyed.

Poised against the weak German garrison was the Seine Department of the Resistance with a reported 35,523 available fighters. However, since only 1,560 arms were reported available, this meant that only some one in twenty-three fighters possessed a weapon. The best-armed group was the communists with some 600 armed insurgents. This made the role of the Paris police, who had access to a large stockpile of weapons, critically important in any potential uprising.

The 13 August German move to pre-emptively disarm the Paris police was the spark that started the uprising in the city. The subsequent call by the communists for a general revolt beginning on 19 August was heeded

by the Resistance in general and led to combat throughout the city. A truce was arranged the next day, but only partly took effect; it collapsed altogether on the 21st. Events inside the city had meanwhile convinced General Dwight D. Eisenhower and General Omar N. Bradley that the situation was out of control, and despite their earlier desire to avoid the city during the Allied crossing of the Seine, they decided that their intervention was now necessary. Meanwhile, fighting in the city intensified on the 22nd and 23rd with the Germans unable to quell the violence.

The two divisons of the U.S. Army V Corps, the French Second Armored and the 4th Infantry Division, began their final advance into the city on the 24th. German resistance was spotty, and by the 25th they had penetrated into the center of the city and captured the garrison commander, General Dietrich von Choltitz, effectively bringing the fight for the city to an end. The role of von Choltitz was central in this drama, and Zaloga does a good job describing why a proven, tough, and seasoned veteran of the Eastern Front saw fit to deliver the city, undamaged, into the hands of the Allies.

Zaloga's high standards of research and his usual clear, concise writing style make this another valuable addition to Osprey's Second World War titles. If the reader desires a short, but thorough, account of the events surrounding the liberation of Paris, this work is now the best focused account available in English.

MARK E. STILLE
Vienna, Virginia

Junkers Ju 87 Stukageschwader of the Russian Front. John Weal. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008. Illustrations. Index. Paper. Pp. 96.

One of the enduring images of World War II is a screaming Stuka in a dive delivering an attack. The continuing fascination with the Stuka and the fact that the Junkers Ju-87 had its greatest success on the Eastern Front makes this another potentially valuable addition to Osprey's Combat Aircraft series. The book complements Weal's earlier titles covering Stuka operations in the Western and Mediterranean theaters.[1]

Incredibly, the Barbarossa campaign began with a Stuka force of only 183 operational aircraft in seven *gruppen*. The author states that the first major success of the *Stukageschwader* was the creation of the Minsk-Bialystok pocket where 324,000 Soviets were captured. Unfortunately, it is here that the author's refusal to provide any real insight or details into the role of the *Stukageschwader* begins. From other recent, more valuable works on the air war in the East, it is clear that the Stuka's ability to

destroy targets like bridges and rail lines contributed significantly to the Soviet's general inability to respond to the opening German attack. The author mentions none of this. Instead, he chooses to present the myth that all Stuka operations were impeded by Adolf Hitler's interference with the Generals' conduct of the war. Weal connects the inability of the small Stuka force to cover the entire front as meddling by Hitler. Clearly, he fails to understand the German's basic force-to-space problem in the Russian campaign and the fact that the Generals themselves could not decide how to conduct the 1941 campaign and that the resulting confusion on the German side was not simply attributable to Hitler.

Following the Battle of Minsk, Weal continues on a haphazard tour of Operation Barbarossa. The Stuka attack in September 1941 on the Soviet Baltic Fleet in Kronstadt is well described. However, events which do not lend themselves to coverage with a few paragraphs of exciting Stuka exploits are virtually ignored. No mention is made of the role of the *Stukageschwader* in the Kiev Pocket. The even larger double encirclement at Vyazma and Bryansk is given little mention. Before leaving Barbarossa, the author can not resist the temptation to introduce the delay-in-the-Balkans-killed-Barbarossa myth. How this pertains to the role of the *Stukageschwader* in the East is left to the reader's imagination.

The author then proceeds to lay out the opening moves of the German 1942 offensive. He mentions the Battle of Kharkov in May and the clearance of the Kerch peninsula and the German capture of Sevastopol. Of these three, the *Stukageschwader* contribution to the capture of Sevastopol is best described, but the author gives no real idea of the key role played by them or by German air power in general in capturing the fortress. In June 1942, the German attack to Stalingrad and the Caucasus began. However, the author gives neither a complete order of battle for the *Stukageschwader* or any mention of the role of the Stukas in smashing the Soviet front in the initial stages of the offensive. More space is spent describing the campaign in broad detail rather than providing details of the missions, losses, and impact of the Stukas. Only the barest coverage is provided by the author of the Stuka's participation in the city fight at Stalingrad.

In comparison, the *Stukageschwader* involvement in the 1943 battles is given luxurious coverage. The Battle of Kursk with its 350 Stukas receives a total of three pages. The introduction of the Ju-87G with the under-wing 3.7cm cannon is given extensive coverage, undoubtedly because of the involvement of Stuka poster boy Hans-Ulrich Rudel in the unit which flew the aircraft. By October 1943, the five remaining *Stukageschwader* began to transition to *Schlactgeschwader* equipped with the fast and well-armored Focke-Wulf FW-190, which did not have to run from Soviet fighters. However, this was a slow process. Three *gruppen* still had their Ju-87s a year later and one *gruppen* only began to re-

ceive their FW-190s as the war was ending. The tank-busting Ju-87Gs remained active for the remainder of the war.

The book is ridden with mistakes, some small, some large. The problems begin on the caption to the book's front page artwork when the caption discusses Stukas supporting "Friedrich Von Paulus'" troops in Stalingrad. Any author sloppy enough to insert a "von" in front of Paulus' name surely has an incomplete knowledge of the War in the East, a suspicion confirmed by many ensuing errors.

Junkers Ju 87 Stukageschwader of the Russian Front is nothing more than a collection of anecdotes about Stuka exploits and vignettes of the men who flew them. Even these are presented in a confusing and disjointed manner. At no point does this book offer anything of real value unless you are a modeler who can use the many color aircraft profiles. The orders of battle provided are confusing and at times contradictory. Weal makes no attempt to explain Stuka tactics and what made this slow, ungainly aircraft so effective on the Eastern Front, even after the day of the Stuka had ended everywhere else. Worst of all, there is no attempt to describe the impact of the Stuka. Sortie rates, Stuka losses, and German claims of success are only sparingly provided. Readers desiring true insight into the impact of air power on the battles in the East are encouraged to pass on this book and obtain any of the new books authored by Christer Bergström.[2]

Notes

1. John Weal, *Junkers Ju 87 Stukageschwader 1937-41* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1997); *Junkers Ju 87 Stukageschwader of North Africa and the Mediterranean* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1998).
2. For example, see Christer Bergström, *Bagration to Berlin: The Final Air Battles in the East, 1944-1945* (Hersham: Classic Publications, 2008); *Stalingrad: The Air Battle, 1942 through January 1943* (Hersham: Classic Publications, 2008); and *Barbarossa: The Air Battle July-December 1941* (Hersham: Classic Publications, 2007).

MARK E. STILLE
Vienna, Virginia

Churchill and the Jews: A Lifelong Friendship. Martin Gilbert. New York: Henry Holt, 2007. Illustrations. Maps. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Cloth. Pp. 384.

On 4 July 1944, a brief but telling report reached the Foreign Office in London, revealing that the "unknown destination in the East" to which there had been many reports of Jewish deportations was the camp run by the German SS at Auschwitz-Birkenau, near the bleak town of Oświęcim

in southern Poland. It was the largest of many Nazi concentration camps, and more than three million people were to die there. The report to the Foreign Office was a telegraphic summary of a much larger one that was on its way, cataloguing the nature and extent of mass murder at Auschwitz since the summer of 1942. The report also revealed that the Jews of Hungary, who had been deported there on a daily basis for three months, were being gassed at the rate of 12,000 per day.

Russian-born Dr. Chaim Weizmann and Moshe Shertok of the Jewish Agency for Palestine conferred with Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, who swiftly passed on their urgent requests to Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Weizmann and Shertok pleaded for the Allies to bomb the railway lines leading from Budapest to Auschwitz, along which it was clear that hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews were being transported to their deaths.

Churchill's response was immediate. "Get anything out of the Air Force you can," he instructed Eden, "and invoke me if necessary." But Churchill's order did not need to be carried out. Three days later, the deportations were halted. The prime minister learned from a decrypted message that Admiral Miklos Horthy, the Hungarian regent, had told the German minister to his country that the deportations must stop. As a result, an estimated 100,000 Jewish lives were saved.

It has not been generally known, but Britain's indomitable wartime leader was a lifetime champion of the Jews, and in this revealing narrative, Sir Martin Gilbert draws on a wide range of archives to highlight an under-appreciated aspect of the Churchill saga. As the statesman's biographer (following Randolph Churchill), Gilbert is eminently qualified.

Churchill, Gilbert relates, was born into a British class and society that was not well disposed toward Jews. But, from his youth, Churchill rejected anti-Semitism and was active throughout his political life in responding to Jewish needs. He supported the right of Jews to find safe haven in Britain, took the lead in securing a home for them in Palestine, recognized early the anti-Semitic core of Adolf Hitler's evil manifesto, and supported the creation of the Jewish Brigade, which served with the famed British Eighth Army in World War II.

A well-written, informative work that sheds light on an important and little-known subject, *Churchill and the Jews* is a perceptive and literate study that Second World War historians (and historians in general) will find eminently useful.

MICHAEL D. HULL
Enfield, Connecticut

The Greatest U.S. Marine Corps Stories Ever Told: Unforgettable Stories of Courage, Honor, and Sacrifice. Iain C. Martin, ed. Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2007. Bibliography. Index. Paper. Pp. 320.

Throughout their 232-year history, the words "Courage, Honor, and Commitment" have been the trademark of the United States Marine Corps. These three words tell the story of the U.S. Marines and their long battle history of winning battles and winning wars. From the "Shores of Tripoli" in 1805 to the streets of Fallujah in Iraq in 2004, Marines have fought their nation's battles as part of the U.S. Navy at sea or on land with their brothers-in-arms in the U.S. Army. Iain Martin's *The Greatest U.S. Marine Corps Stories Ever Told* is a series of essays chronologically organized that detail this bravery under fire. The essays, starting with the march of First Lieutenant Presley O'Bannon in March-April 1805 and ending with the urban fighting in the Iraqi city of Fallujah in November 2004, illustrate the fact that Marines have fought in every war in their nation's history.

Martin's book begins with the Marines' seizure of Derne in Tripoli during the so-called Barbary Wars launched by President Thomas Jefferson in 1801. Jefferson, who had refused to pay tribute for the passage of U.S. ships in the Mediterranean, had ordered a naval squadron to the area in order to protect U.S. shipping and punish these bandits. Put ashore on the rim of North Africa in March 1805 by the ships of the fledgling U.S. Mediterranean squadron, a combined force of American sailors and Marines, along with Greek and Arab mercenaries, all under the command of Consul General William Eaton, then marched overland along the Mediterranean protected by the U.S. fleet to the walled city of Derne where, on 27 April 1805 seven Marines under the command of First Lieutenant Presley O'Bannon, Navy bluejackets, Arab and Greek mercenaries, and other soldiers-of-fortune charged the city's defenders with fixed bayonets. In the battle that followed, the Marines, supported by naval gunfire from the USS *Hornet* and USS *Argus*, seized the city, captured the city's governor, raised the American flag, and re-installed the legitimate ruler, Hamet Karamanli. In recognition of Lieutenant O'Bannon's bravery under fire, Karamanli reportedly presented the Marine lieutenant with his own personal Mameluke sword. Today, all Marine officers now carry the Mameluke sword in honor of O'Bannon's bravery and courage.

Other essays in Martin's volume include: Joshua Barney's "The Battle of Bladensburg," detailing the actions of the Marines during the War of 1812 in front of Washington, DC; Raymond J. Toner's "Gamble of the Marines," detailing Second Lieutenant John M. Gamble's command of the USS *Essex* and the capture of three British warships during the War of 1812; Corporal Miles M. Oviatt's "A Civil War Marine at Sea," which

is taken from his wartime diary and recounts the actions against the Confederate coastal forts and the battle against the Confederate ironclad CSS *Tennessee* on 5 August 1864; Stephen Crane's "Marines Signaling Under Fire at Guantanamo," which details the actions during the Spanish-American War in 1898 at Cuzco Well and the bombardment of Spanish positions by the USS *Dolphin* made possible by the bravery of Marine Sergeant John Henry Quick and Private John Fitzgerald, both of whom dodged enemy fire to signal the American warship offshore with a wig wag signal flag (Quick and Fitzgerald were both awarded the Navy Medal of Honor for their actions); and Alan Axelrod's "Miracle at Belleau Wood," which covers the actions of the 4th Marine Brigade during the savage fighting for this French game preserve in June 1918. After nearly twenty straight days of fighting, much of it hand-to-hand, the Marines, along with Army support, seized the woods and blocked the German attempt to take Paris.

As expected, Martin provides ample coverage of the Marines during World War II. His coverage of the war begins with an excellent account of one of the first Marine aces of the war, Captain Joe Foss, who was Executive officer of VMF-121 and became America's first ace during the war by shooting down twenty-six Japanese aircraft. What made Foss' exploits all the more important was that they took place on the island of Guadalcanal, which, next to the campaign on Okinawa in 1945, became one of the most prolonged and drawn out campaigns of the Second World War. Foss' account details the day-to-day struggle Marine pilots faced flying from Henderson Airfield as they not only fought the Japanese, but managed to do so with very little in the way of aviation gasoline, ammunition, and aircraft. As Foss notes, there were, in fact,

> Two battles...raging over Guadalcanal when we arrived; one between American and Japanese troops, and the other between the forces within the American military who disagreed fiercely over the wisdom of supporting the Guadalcanal campaign. While some wanted to strengthen our position, others wanted to pull out entirely. Those of us doing the fighting were caught in the middle, poorly equipped and often confused by the actions of our superiors.[1]

As related by Foss, the Marines were on a very fragile supply line, and they fought in a malaria-infested swamp against nearly impossible odds on the ground, at sea, and in the air. In the end, with increased assistance from the Navy and the Army, the Marines defeated the Japanese in a six-month battle of attrition in the air and on the land.

Foss' excellent essay is followed by another account of the fighting on Guadalcanal's "Bloody Ridge." Here, elements of the 1st Raider Battalion, commanded by it's legendary commander, Colonel Merritt A. Ed-

son, blunted a Japanese attempt to seize Henderson Airfield. Captain John B. Sweeney, who commanded 1st Platoon, Company B, 1st Marine Raider Battalion, recounts the struggle for Bloody Ridge in his essay, "The Battle of Bloody Ridge." Captain Sweeney's platoon, part of the 1st Raider Battalion, landed on Tulagi, where the Marines, after a month-long battle, ousted the well-entrenched Japanese in a series of bloody firefights that served as a precursor to the fighting to come on the main island of Guadalcanal. Transferred to Guadalcanal on 30 August 1942, the Marines of the 1st Raider Battalion were placed in reserve for the 1st Marine Division and for the next month participated in several minor actions. Along with the rest of the 1st Raider Battalion, Sweeney's platoon was ordered to defend the approach to Henderson Airfield along the Lunga River and Hill 120 in mid-September as the fighting grew more intense. Along a ridge line separated by a deep ravine, the Marine Raiders established platoon strongpoints with machineguns and waited for the expected Japanese counterattack. Unfortunately, it is here that a map of the Marine positions would have been useful. Instead, it is left to the reader to consult the official histories of the action on Guadalcanal to locate the Marine positions on what later became known as Bloody Ridge.[2]

As Sweeney notes, the Japanese, under the command of Major General Kawaguchi Kiyotaki, made their move over a two-day period that started on 12 September and concluded on 14 September 1942. Over that period Japanese rifle companies assaulted the entrenched Marines who fought off several enemy "*banzai*" attacks with "rifles, machineguns, Browning Automatic Rifles (BARs), bayonets, knives, and even fists." In the end, while the Marines held on and prevented the enemy from breaking through, they suffered some 300 casualties of which fifty-nine were killed in action. By far, Captain Sweeney relates, the Japanese suffered a worse fate, with an estimated 800 killed in action. More importantly, by their failure to take Bloody Ridge, the Japanese embarked upon a flawed strategy of attrition, and continued to hammer away at the Marines (and later the U.S. Army's 25th Division) until the Imperial High Command ordered their withdrawal in February 1943.

Possibly one of the more intriguing sections of the book is Martin's inclusion of a chapter on the induction of women into the Marine Corps during World War II. The essay, "Woman Marine," written by one of those women Marines, Theresa Karas Yianilos, who enlisted to "Free a Man to Fight," paints an extremely interesting account of recruit training at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and the struggle women faced in being accepted by their male counterparts. General Thomas Holcomb, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (1936-1943), was the last of the service heads to allow women into his ranks, although it might be noted that women served during World War I and were known as "Marinettes."

General Holcomb had hoped to keep the Marine Corps an exclusively all-male institution. Forced by the likes of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt to induct women into the ranks of the Marine Corps, Holcomb grudgingly set out to fulfill the orders of the commander-in-chief though made it very clear that women were not welcome.

Miss Yianolos' account paints a vivid picture of women undergoing recruit training, and the problems they had in adjusting to military life, particularly in doing close order drill and other exercises. As for the exercises, Miss Yianolos writes that being referred to as "BAMs," or "Broad Ass Marines," by their male counterparts "wasn't as bad as being one. We took the exercises seriously." In fact, as the author writes in her essay, women Marines from the beginning set out to demonstrate that they were fully capable of "Carrying on the traditions of the Marine Corps," and this became the "aim of every woman Marine" during World War II.[3] Miss Yianolis writes that women Marines "had to prove our worth but still know our place. We were equal, but some Marines were more equal." Captain [later Colonel] Katherine A. Towle, the first head of the Women Marines, put it more succinctly when she said that women Marines

> have to relieve the men for combat, [but] must demonstrate we are capable of doing whatever is required, cheerfully, with a willing spirit. We must provide that the high standards of the Marine Corps shall be safe in our hands and prove to each Marine that women are necessary to help win this war.

As noted by the editor, on 12 June 1948 Congress passed the Women's Armed Services Integration Act, authorizing the acceptance of women into the regular component of the Marine Corps. This is an important essay as today female Marines make up approximately ten percent of the active duty Marine Corps. Also, women Marines today serve in combat support and combat service support units in both Iraq and Afghanistan and, sadly, have paid the ultimate price as Marines.

Sally McClain provides a well-written narrative of the first Navajo code talkers to serve as Marines. The idea to use Navajo Indians was first raised by a World War I veteran who had grown up on a Navajo reservation and had witnessed the use of Choctaw to encode messages and prevent them falling into enemy hands. In early 1942, a series of tests were staged for Major General Clayton B. Vogel, Commanding General of Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet, and his staff in order to convince them of the value of using the Navajo language as a code. After a series of tests under simulated combat conditions where the Navajos formed codes, decoded, and transmitted tactical messages, General Vogel recommended to General Thomas Holcomb that "the Marine Corps recruit 200 Navajo for use as communicators." The Commandant of the

Marine Corps accepted Vogel's recommendations and began recruiting and training Navajos as code talkers. From 1943 to the end of the war, Navajo code talkers served alongside Marines (and soldiers) throughout the Pacific War. As Miss McClain points out, the Navajo code talkers were one of the most successful projects undertaken by the Marine Corps in World War II. It is a fact that with the assistance of the code talkers, the Japanese were unable to disrupt or intercept American communications, and thus prevented a major compromise of American war plans during the fighting in the Pacific.

More than 540 Navajos served in the Marine Corps with 400+ of them being used as code talkers. As McClain's essay illustrates, the code talkers were definitely the "pride of the Navajo" and rendered their country a great service during World War II.

Robert Sherrod's book, *Tarawa: The Story of a Battle*, is the subject of Martin's next essay.[4] Sherrod, who served as a combat correspondent with the Marines during World War II for *Time* magazine, provides an account of the first twenty-four hours of the assault on Betio Atoll in the Tarawa group of the Gilbert Islands. The assault on Tarawa is a story that has been largely forgotten by many historians though needs to be retold as it was the first true assault from the sea during World War II. It was on Betio, in fact, that the Marines proved that an assault from the sea could succeed. Sherrod, who landed with the first wave, recounts the intense fighting that took place at the water's edge as the Marines struggled to get a toehold on Betio against an enemy who were determined to fight to the death. In the end, it took the Marines three days, 4,000 Japanese dead, more than 1,000 Marines and sailors killed and over 2,000 wounded to secure the island, which is no larger than New York City's Central Park. The assault on Tarawa, as described by historian Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret.) – who wrote the Introduction to this fine work – was one of "utmost savagery" and was a battle that set the stage for the island-hopping campaign that brought American forces to the doorstep of the Japanese home islands in April 1945.

In his essay, "Peleliu – The Bloody Ridges," Russell Davis (a veteran of the fighting on the island of Peleliu) provides the reader with an account of a battle the necessity of which many Second World War historians have questioned. Peleliu, an island lying at the southern end of the Palau Islands within close proximity to the equator, with temperatures that hover around 115 degrees Fahrenheit (46 degrees Celsius) daily, is comprised of a series of high ridgelines that run parallel along the interior of the northern half of the island and are dotted with many caves and tunnels. The battle for Peleliu proved to be the ultimate test of the American fighting man. In the end, and after two months of sustained combat, the island was secured. In the campaign to take Peleliu, the Marines of the 1st Division and soldiers from the U.S. Army's 81st Division suf-

fered some 9,615 casualties with 1,665 killed. As Davis' essay illustrates, "there were no easy victories in the Pacific." This was especially the case along the bloody ridges of Peleliu.

A follow-up to Davis' fine essay is Eugene Sledge's essay on service in a Marine rifle company during World War II titled "The Old Breed and the Costs of War." This essay provides the reader with an intimate view of the frontline Marine during the fighting on Peleliu and later Okinawa. As Sledge writes, there was no glamour in a Marine rifle company, just mud, filth, and death hugging at one's should day-in and day-out. Sledge, who served in the 1st Marine Division during World War II, and participated in the assaults on Peleliu and later Okinawa, wrote of the human cost of the fighting on these two island battlegrounds and the impact that these battles had on the individuals who fought there.

Richard Wheeler, a Marine veteran of the fighting on Iwo Jima and a member of the forty-man squad that placed the first American flag on Mount Suribachi, provides a painstaking account of that event in his essay, "To the Summit with the Flag." This first flag raising occurred on 23 February 1945 – D-plus 4 (four days after the landing) – as Wheeler's forty-man patrol, led by Lieutenant Harold Schrier (who was also in on the second, more famous flag raising), made their way to the summit of Mount Suribachi along with *Leatherneck* correspondent Staff Sergeant Lou Lowery in order to place the flag from the USS *Missoula* (APA-211). As the flag went up, a Marine yelled "There goes the flag" and the Marines on Suribachi and below the summit knew that while the fighting was far from over, they would prevail and wrest control of this vital island from the Japanese defenders.

War correspondent Ernie Pyle, affectionately known as "G.I. Joe," provides the reader with an account of Easy Company, 7th Marine Regiment during the first days of the landing on Okinawa on 1 April 1945 in his essay, "Men from Mars." Pyle, who was killed by a Japanese sniper on 18 April 1945 on the neighboring island of Ie Shima, saw combat in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, and often neglected the larger battle in his dispatches and concentrated instead on the ordinary soldier. Indeed, President Harry S. Truman, a man who rarely minced his words, remarked that "no man in this war has so well told the story of the American fighting man as American fighting men wanted it told. He [Pyle] deserves the gratitude of all his countrymen." Pyle's essay paints an intimate portrait of the lives of ordinary men thrown together in a common cause against a skilled, determined adversary. Indeed, modern combat journalists have yet to rise to the level achieved by Pyle with his detailed and personal portraits of the horrors of war and of the men who endure the dangers on a day-to-day basis.

The third section of the book deals with the post-World War II Marine Corps. Essays in this section include Martin Russ' excellent essay,

"Frozen Chosin," that examines the fighting between November-December 1950 during the Korean War. The Vietnam War essays include: "A Rumor of War" by Marine officer-turned writer Philip Caputo; Ron Steinman's "The Khe Sahn," about the epic Marine defense of this vital fire base during the TET offensive in 1968 in South Vietnam; and, possibly one of the best essays in this section, Marine officer and writer Nicholas Warr's highly descriptive account of the fighting for the imperial city of Hue in January-February 1968 from his excellent book, *Phase Line Green*.[5] There is also an excerpt from Charles Henderson's book, *Marine Sniper*, about the famous Marine sniper Carlos N. Hathcock.[6] In painstaking detail, Henderson describes Hathcock's stalking and killing of a North Vietnamese Army general after being inserted behind enemy lines by a Marine rifle platoon.

Post-Vietnam War essays include journalist Molly Moore's account of her time with the Marines during Desert Storm in 1991, and Jay Kopelman's portrait of the fighting for Fallujah in Operation Iraqi Freedom and its impact on the Marines who fought in that bitter struggle against Al Qa'eda and the Sunni terrorists in November 2004.

It is important to note that the common thread linking these essays is the fact that with the exception of Raymond Toner's "Gamble of the Marines," all of the authors either fought as Marines or accompanied them into battle. This is important as the stories bring into perspective the battles described in a manner that no official report or newspaper reporter can or perhaps ever will achieve.

Nevertheless, the book does have flaws. It suffers from a lack of maps as well as a decent bibliography. Martin leaves it to the reader to either consult an atlas or a history text in order to locate where the various actions took place. Also, a selection of photographs or illustrations would have made a good book even better.

Despite these shortcomings, this is a book that needs to be read not only by Marines, but also by military historians as they seek to put a human face on war. The essays presented herein represent a concise, chronological account of U.S. Marines at war. The book should be read by all Marines, both officer and enlisted alike, as the essays provide excellent coverage of Marine Corps history. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this is a book that needs to be issued to Marine recruits at the two recruit depots of Parris Island, South Carolina and San Diego, California and integrated into the curriculum at all levels of Marine Corps schools for it is a volume that contains the lessons of uncommon valor.

Notes

1. Iain C. Martin, ed., *The Greatest Marine Corps Stories Ever Told: Unforgettable Stories of Courage, Honor, and Sacrifice* (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2007), p. 61.
2. See Lieutenant Colonel Frank O. Hough, USMC, Major Verle E. Ludwig, USMC, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal: History of Marine Corps Operations*

in World War II, Volume I (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1958), pp. 271-309.
3. During World War II, the Women's Marine Reserve, headed by Major (later Colonel) Ruth Cheney Streeter, reached a total strength of 18,838 women. See Colonel Katherine A. Towle, USMCR, "Lady Leathernecks," *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 1946, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 2-7.
4. Robert Sherrod, *Tarawa: The Story of a Battle* (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1944).
5. Nicholas Warr, *Phase Line Green: The Battle for Hue, 1968* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997).
6. Charles Henderson, *Marine Sniper: 93 Confirmed Kills* (Briarcliff Manor, NY: Stein and Day, 1986).

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