


Introduction

In large-scale critical infrastructure, sustainability and dependability often conflict. For instance, intelligent and sustainable water distribution requires:

- Conservation of water and power;
- Reliability, availability, and resilience;
- Security against physical and cyber attacks;
- Safe operation, even during component failures; and
- High utilization of system capacity.

Figure 1: Water Distribution Network



Model-Based Design and Assurance

- Models are used to verify that a given system design or implementation meets specified requirements.
- **Effective verification and assurance requires comprehensive and consistent models.**
- No single model captures all aspects of a complex system's behavior.
- An array of models encompassing system dynamics, dependability, safety, and security is required.
- All of these models need to remain up-to-date and consistent.

Model transformation can facilitate the challenging task of maintaining consistency across models of a system as its design or implementation evolve.

Goals of Model Transformation

- **Facilitate creation of consistent and accurate models.**
- **Prevent (some) modeling mistakes.**

Requirements for Model Transformation

- **Broad applicability**, e.g., ability to relate:
 - Continuous- and discrete-time models and
 - Topological and dependability models.
- **Provable Correctness.**

Each model of a system serves as an approximation of that system's behavior—in other words, its semantics. **Correct approximation of semantics is key to provably correct model transformation.**

Research Objectives

This doctoral research aims to create:

- A **formalization** of how system and model semantics can be approximated.
- A method for **correctly transforming** system models.
- A method for correctly **combining models** of different types.

Proposed Approach: Abstract Interpretation

- Models are approximations of system behavior.
- **Given a model of a system, we can deduce some properties of that system.**
- **Given some properties of a system, we can derive one or more models consistent with those properties.**

Mathematically, we define a domain for **properties describing the system (Properties)**. Each **type of model representing the system is defined by a separate domain whose elements are sets of models of that type**. For example, all reliability models could be defined as Model_R .

The elements of each domain are ordered by specificity: the more specific a description of properties or a set of models, the greater the information it conveys. For instance, a property stating that a component's reliability is 0.8 is more specific than one that gives the range of 0.7 to 0.9.

We relate these domains through:

- **Abstraction:** $\alpha : \text{Properties} \rightarrow \text{Model}$ identifies models that capture the specified properties.
- **Concretization:** $\gamma : \text{Model} \rightarrow \text{Properties}$ deduces the properties that hold for every member of a set of models.

These functions are related:

$$P \subseteq (\gamma \circ \alpha)(P), \forall P \in \text{Properties}$$

$$(\alpha \circ \gamma)(M) \subseteq M, \forall M \in \text{Model}$$

If α and γ were inverses, every model type would have to fully describe system behavior. Since this cannot be, we relax that relationship:

- **Abstracting models from properties, then concretizing properties, should not add any inconsistent properties**, but may not preserve all the original properties.
- **Concretizing properties, then abstracting models from them, should recover the initial set of models (or a subset).**

Correctness

The correctness relation holds when elements of a domain correctly describe a system. If an element P of Properties describes a system S , we write $S R_P P$.

R_P induces correctness relations for each type of model: $S R_M M$ if and only if $S R_P \gamma(M)$.

Example of Model Transformation

Consider a topology model for Figure 1, specifying:

- Each consumer requires 10 gallons per minute (gpm) of water.
- The water tower supplies at least 20 gpm.
- Pipe P_1 has a capacity of 20 gpm.
- Pipes P_2 and P_3 each have a capacity of 10 gpm.

We can deduce a number of properties from this topology model, including interconnections between and capacities of components. **Crucially, we can deduce interdependencies among components:**

- If P_1 fails, total demand cannot be met.
- If either P_2 or P_3 fail, the system can still supply all the demand.
- If both P_2 and P_3 fail, the system cannot supply all the demand.

We can derive a reliability model from these deduced properties. For brevity, in this example the focus is only on physical failures. This system has four states:

- **A:** System fully functional
- **B:** P_2 failed
- **C:** P_3 failed
- **D:** System cannot meet demand

Each pipe failure causes a transition among these states. A transition probability matrix (TPM) captures the likelihood of transitions associated with each failure. (Pipe P_i has reliability p_i and unreliability q_i .)

	TPM for P_1	TPM for P_2	TPM for P_3
	A B C D	A B C D	A B C D
A	p_1 0 0 q_1	A p_2 q_2 0 0	A p_3 0 q_3 0
B	0 p_1 0 q_1	B 0 1 0 0	B 0 p_3 0 q_3
C	0 0 p_1 q_1	C 0 0 p_2 q_2	C 0 0 1 0
D	0 0 0 1	D 0 0 0 1	D 0 0 0 1

The system is initially fully functional (state A) and is considered functional in every state except D. This information, along with the TPMs, give us the **system's reliability**:

$$R = p_1(p_2p_3 + p_2q_3 + q_2p_3)$$

Current Status and Future Work

- Core theory has been accepted to the 2019 IEEE International Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering.
- A detailed case study on relating reliability and topology models is in progress.
- The next task will be relating discrete- and continuous-time models.
- Model composition is a long-term goal.