An Analysis Of The French Defeat At Dien Bien Phu

AUTHOR Major Harry D. Bloomer, USA

CSC 1991

SUBJECT AREA - General




     AN ANALYSIS OF THE FRENCH DEFEAT AT DIEN BIEN PHU

                        Outline

Thesis Statement: At Dien Bien Phu the French violated
nearly all of the principles of war at every level of
war--strategic, operational, and tactical.  These violations
contributed significantly to the French defeat.


I.      Introduction
        A.      Background of Dien Bien Phu's significance to
                the west
        B.      FM 100-5 (Operations) as analysis framework

II.     Principle of objective
        A.      Definition
        B.      French objectives
        C.      Viet Minh objectives

III.    Principle of offensive
        A.      Definition
        B.      French offensive actions
        C.      Viet Minh offensive actions

IV.     Principles of mass and economy of force
        A.      Definition
        B.      French employment of mass and economy of force
        C.      Viet Minh employment of mass and economy of
                force

V.      Principle of maneuver
        A.      Definition
        B.      French maneuver
        C.      Viet Minh maneuver

VI.     Principle of unity of command
        A.      Definition
        B.      French command structure
        C.      Viet Minh command structure


VII.    Principles of security and surprise
        A.      Definition
        B.      French employment of security and surprise
        C.      Viet Minh employment of security and surprise

VIII.   Principle of simplicity
        A.      Definition
        B.      French use of simplicity
        C.      Viet Minh use of simplicity

IX.     Conclusion




     AN ANALYSIS OF THE FRENCH DEFEAT AT DIEN BIEN PHU


     On 7 May 1954 the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu

fell, culminating an operation which lasted 209 days.  The

last 54 days the garrison was actually under constant

attack.  For the French, Dien Bien Phu was the straw that

broke the camel's back.  Two months later, on 20 July 1954,

a formal cease-fire between the French and Viet Minh was

negotiated at Geneva.  This agreement ended an eight year

war which produced over 75,000 killed for France's

Expeditionary Force. (1:367)  This cease-fire was never

advanced beyond a military truce, and the lack of a

political settlement left the door open for the next

Indochina war.  In fact, the Viet Minh left Geneva convinced

that they had been double-crossed.  They believed the

Chinese forced them to accept a partition of Vietnam rather

than a unified Vietnam under their control. (5:204)  The

victory on the battlefield was lost at Geneva as far as the

Viet Minh were concerned; however, they did not give up on

their goal of unifying Vietnam.

     The Viet Minh defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu in a

set-piece battle which, in essence, amounted to beating the

French at their own game.  The shock of this defeat

reverberated throughout the western world.  As Colonel


William F. Long stated twelve years after the defeat, "Dien

Bien Phu or DBP has become an acronym or shorthand symbol

for defeat of the West by the East, for the triumph of

primitive.... Dien Bien Phu resulted in severe political

consequences."(6:35)  The French defeat was indeed an utter

disaster for both France and America who, by 1954, was

underwriting 80% of French expenditures in Indochina.

(5:170)  Given the unfavorable developments resulting from

this defeat, the causes of the French loss warrant further

examination.  The keystone Army Warfighting Manual FM 100-5

states, "Success in battle may not alone assure the

achievement of national security goals, but defeat will

guarantee failure." (8:1)  This manual also emphasizes the

importance of nine principles of war which are fundamental

to current Army doctrine.  Dien Bien Phu can be analyzed

through the use of the principles of war.  These principles

are not sacrosanct; however, they should not be violated

without thought.  At Dien Bien Phu the French violated

nearly all of the principles of war at every level of war--

strategic, operational, and tactical.  These violations

contributed significantly to the French defeat.

     The first and perhaps central principle of war is the

objective.  FM 100-5 describes the objective, "Direct every

military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and

attainable objective."(8:Appendix A)  The objective is

translated into the commander's intent which governs the

conduct of an operation.  The French objective at Dien Bien

Phu was neither clearly defined nor attainable.


     Strategically, the guidance issued to French Indonesian

forces commander General Henri Navarre was, "above

everything else, to insure the safety of our Expeditionary

Corps."  General Navarre's instructions prior to the

airborne landing at Dien Bien Phu (Operation Castor) were to

adjust his operations to his means.  French authorities in

France did not learn of the launching of Operation Castor

until six hours after it started.  In short, operations at

Dien Bien Phu were executed with very little strategic

involvement. (1:309)  Strategic guidance was issued to

General Navarre, but Operation Castor certainly was not

designed to fulfill that guidance.

     The French government by this point in the long war was

interested in stabilizing the situation in Vietnam so that

peace talks could begin.  A military victory was no longer

the objective as the French sought an honorable way out of

the war through negotiation. (7:31)  General Navarre was

aware of this; nevertheless, he undertook Operation Castor

despite the lack of a clear mandate for this sort of

operation.  Dien Bien Phu from the start lacked strategic

intent which left the focus at the operational level.

     If there was little strategic reason to occupy a valley

floor deep in enemy territory, then there had to be a good

operational reason.  An operational objective cited by

General Navarre was the defense of Laos from Viet Minh

attack.  Dien Bien Phu is located about 8 miles from the

Laotian border, and Laos was then a member of the French


Union. (5:190)  The Viet Minh had attacked Laos in the past.

The problem with this objective is that the Viet Minh could

easily attack Laos without passing through Dien Bien Phu!

Additionally, General Navarre was under no specific

instructions to cover Laos.

     Another objective purported for Operation Castor was

the intended establishment of a resupply point for tribal

guerrilla units.  These guerrillas would operate in

cooperation with the French against Viet Minh rear

areas. (2:32)  There are two problems with this objective.

First of all, these guerrilla units were not yet

operational.  Secondly, the presence of Viet Minh combat

units at Dien Bien Phi obviously would preclude the

establishment of a French resupply point.  This objective

amounted to military wishful thinking.

     The French, like the Americans who followed later, had

some difficulty engaging the enemy in set-piece battles.

Dien Bien Phu could be used to tempt the Viet Minh into such

a battle, and the French could then crush them.  General

Navarre was looking for an opportunity to inflict heavy

casualties and a stunning defeat on the Viet Minh. (3:37)

Smaller scale but similar operations had been executed in

the months leading up to Operation Castor, and the French

General viewed them as successful.

     However, these earlier successes were misread by

General Navarre.  The Viet Minh did attack and suffered

heavy losses, but the French were often pinned down and


forced to withdraw hastily or to fight their way out of

untenable spots.  These operations were never conducted at

the limits of friendly lines of communication, and

invariably the French ended up withdrawing.  Moreover the

Viet Minh commander, General Vo Nguyen Giap, learned vital

lessons from these smaller battles while the French learned

nothing.  So, at Dien Bien Phu, when the French presented

Giap with yet another lucrative target of unprecedented

proportion, Giap quickly rushed to meet the French with a

few surprises up his sleeve.  The French got their set-piece

batt1e.

     General Navarre visualized Dien Bien Phu as many

things, but no where is there any indication that he viewed

it as a jungle fortress designed to withstand a regular

siege.  Dien Bien Phi quickly became just that.(2:32)  At

the tactical level the objective just as quickly became

survival as the garrison fought for its very existence.

     In summary, French operational objectives for Operation

Castor included covering Laos, establishing a supply point

for friendly guerrilla operations, and defeating the Viet

Minh in a set-piece battle.  There was no clear strategic

objective for Operation Castor.  The only possible

attainable objective was the set-piece battle, and the

French did not properly prepare for this eventuality.

     The Viet Minh objectives, in contrast to the French,

were clear, consistent, and certainly attainable.  Giap's

objective was to destroy the French garrison at Dien Bien


Phu. (7:54)  Furthermore, the Central Committee, to whom Giap

reported, fully supported Giap's plans.  At the strategic

level the Viet Minh were anxious to gain a spectacular

military victory which would make the French negotiate on

Ho Chi Minh's terms. (5:188)  At the operational level Giap

realized that the French depended completely on aerial

resupply and aerial fire support.  Giap had identified the

French's critical vulnerability.  Therefore, his first

priority was the early destruction or neutralization of

French air power. (7:104)  The Viet Minh were also looking

for a set-piece battle, and they were determined not to let

the French slip away this time.

     The second principle of war is the offensive which FM

100-5 defines as siezing, retaining, and exploiting the

initiative. (9:Appendix A)  Operation Castor started on 20

November 1953 with five French battalions parachuting into

Dien Bien Phu.  At this point the French had seized the

initiative.  However, any hopes of remaining on the

offensive ended quickly.  By early December French troops

found it tough going beyond the valley floor.  Offensively,

actions were soon limited to air support, patrols, and local

counterattacks.

     In reality General Navarre conceded the offensive to

the Viet Minh in his estimate of the situation issued on 3

December 1953.  In that estimate he correctly forecasted the

impending enemy attack. (2:44)  General Navarre then

appointed a cavalryman, Colonel de Castries, to command the


forces at Dien Bien Phu.  So, while anticipating a defensive

struggle in the valley, General Navarre appointed an expert

in offensive mobile operations to command the defense!

Colonel de Castries took the offense seriously as evidenced

by his biting words to his artillery commander on 5 January

1954, "Shut up!  I don't want to hear the name of Na San

spoken here.  Na San was an entrenched camp.  We are an

offensive base."(7:106)

     General Navarre started exploring withdraw plans in

January 1954, but a breakout was evaluated as suicidal.

(7:112)  No significant attempt to break out of Dien Bien

Phu was ever made.  General Navarre even speculated that the

loss of Dien Bien Phu was strategically acceptable as it was

not the main effort in the theater.  However, he did not

take into account the effect of the loss on the morale of

the French Army, and he failed to consider the resulting

erosion of political support at home for the war. (2:49)  By

13 March 1954 the attack on Dien Bein Phu had begun, and the

offensive was forever lost to the Viet Minh

     Giap, on the other hand, was able to dictate the time

and place of engagements virtually throughout the

operation.  This time Giap did not rush in with human wave

attacks as the French had hoped.  He took time to mass his

forces, bring in fire support, secure his own lines of

communication, and lay formal siege to the French garrison.

The first major assault by the Viet Minh came a full three

months into the operation.  The French had given Giap the


offensive, and he gladly accepted it and used it to his

advantage.

     The next two principles of war are reciprocal.  Mass

and economy of force will be discussed together.  Mass is

defined as concentrating combat power at the decisive place

and time, and economy of force is defined as allocating

minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.

(9:Appendix A)

     Strategically, the forces squaring off at Dien Bien Phu

approached mass from two completely different perspectives.

The French simply were not willing to pay the price to field

a large force in Indochina.  As early as 1950, the French

Parliament passed a law restricting the use of draftees to

French homeland territories which precluded their use in

Indochina.  This law alone severely limited the number of

troops which could be made available for Indochina duty.

Forced to rely on their regular forces, the French gutted

their army of regulars and sent them to Indochina where they

were augmented with locally recruited troops. (2:ix)  The

average size of the French Expeditionary Corps in Indochina

hovered around 150,000 troops which was insufficient to

achieve strategic mass.  In contrast, the Viet Minh

practiced what amounted to a levee en mass.  All men and

women were expected to do their part for the war against the

French.  All available resources were mobilized to support

the Viet Minh armed forces.  By 1954 the Viet Minh had

organized, trained and eguipped six regular divisions in

addition to their territorial irregulars.


     At the operational level the French garrison at Dien

Bien Phu numbered about 13,000, or less than 10% of French

forces in Indochina. (3:20)  These troops were part of 13

battalions.  The perimeter of the valley floor at Dien Bien

Phu measured approximately 50 miles, and to properly secure

that area would reguire about 50 battalions. (2:39)  The

French intended to use superior firepower and technology to

defeat the numerically superior Viet Minh. (3:19)  To

compound the problem of insufficient forces General Navarre

issued Instruction No. 964 on 12 December 1953 in which he

detailed Operation Atlante.  Operation Atlante was set for

south central Vietnam, over 400 miles from Dien Bien Phu.

This operation involved twice as many French forces as were

being used at Dien Bien Phu.  Operation Atlante was executed

concurrently with Dien Bien Phu resulting in limited theater

reserves for Dien Bien Phu.  In fact, General Navarre saw

Operation Atlante as his main effort and Dien Bien Phu as an

economy of force operation.  General Navarre did not believe

that Dien Bien Phu would be a decisive operation despite

solid intelligence confirming that the Viet Minh were

massing there. (2:45)

     The Viet Minh massed four divisions, totalling more

than 50,000 men, at Dien Bien Phu.  At the same time Giap

tied up French forces and prevented them from responding in

strength at Dien Bien Phu by staging diversionary actions

around the country. (5:196)  Giap was able to successfully

concentrate his forces at the decisive time and place while


he skillfully employed supporting operations aimed at

deceiving the French.  French intelligence saw through this

plan; however, General Navarre took no action.

     On the battlefield the French once again were suspect

in their concentration of forces.  The French spread their

forces at Dien Bien Phu in a series of strong points.  Over

one-third of French forces in the valley were positioned at

Isabelle, the southernmost stong point in the valley.  This

position was seven kilometers from the nearest friendly

strong point and could not provide mutual support to the

rest of the garrison. (5:195)  Because of this wide dispersal

of French forces, the Viet Minh were able to concentrate

forces to achieve absolute superiority at any one French

strong point. (3:65)  In addition, the French also lacked a

dedicated reserve at Dien Bien Phu. (1:314)  This poor

situation was further exacerbated by the fact that no full

dress rehearsal for a counterattack was ever conducted.

     At every level of war the French seem to have violated

the principle of mass while the Viet Minh did just the

opposite.  If Dien Bien Phu is viewed as an economy of force

action for the French, then what became of the main effort?

Operation Atlante, after some initial success, quickly

bogged down into a series of Viet Minh ambushes on French

convoys.  The French eventually terminated Operation Atlante

with no tangible gains while Dien Bien Phu was lost.

     The principle of maneuver is defined as placing the

enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible


application of combat power. (9:Appendix A)  Dien Bien Phu is

not a good example of this principle of war.  Strategically,

the French government maintained loose control of operations

in Indochina leaving much to the discretion of the on-scene

commander.  As already discussed the government had taken

steps which limited their flexibility.  Once it became clear

that Dien Bien Phu was going to be lost without some sort of

action, the French did not possess the strategic mobility

necessary to influence the outcome.  France then turned to

America, a country who did possess the flexibility to change

the course of events at Dien Bien Phu.  America declined to

help after some interesting political activities, and the

fate of Dien Bien Phu was sealed.

     The Viet Minh displayed strategic flexibility in their

response to the French assault on Dien Bien Phu.  Plans to

deal with the assault were quickly developed by Giap and

approved by Ho's Central Committee.  At the operational

level the Viet Minh, much to the surprise of French

commanders, achieved mobility unprecedented in their past

operations.  The Viet Minh were able to concentrate their

forces in a position which put the French at great

disadvantage.  First, the Viet Minh surrounded Dien Bien Phu

within a month of the original French assault.  From then on

the Viet Minh were able to dictate the pace of the

operation.  Viet Minh tactical maneuvers were slow and

methodical.  Once they initiated the attack on Dien Bien

Phu, 54 days passed before the French surrendered.

     France's operational mobility depended on air assets.

The French employed their air to attack Viet Minh lines of

communication leading to Dien Bien Phu.  Air was to prevent

any significant enemy buildup in the area thereby securing

the French forces at Dien Bien Phu.  French air was

completely unsuccessful in preventing an enemy buildup of

supplies, heavy artillery, and combat forces.  General

Navarre could have introduced additional forces into Dien

Bien Phu via airborne assault; however, he did not.  As a

result, France gained no advantage from her superior

operational mobility assets.

     Tactically the French were reduced to counterattacks

and airstrikes to achieve mobility.  On the ground in the

last days of the operation both sides fought from trench

positions, but the French were almost totally reduced to

staying underground in order to survive.  France had hoped

to use air and artillery in combination with mobile ground

units to crush any Viet Minh attack in the valley.  Once the

Viet Minh neutralized the French air mobility advantage, the

principle of maneuver was forfeited to the Viet Minh, just

as they had done with the offensive.

     Unity of command is the sixth principle of war.  It is

defined as ensuring unity of effort for every objective

under one responsible commander. (9:Appendix A)  Major

General Rene Cogny, the commander of French forces in North

Vietnam, asserted that Dien Bien Phu had become the key

battle for all of northern Indochina and thus should have


been under a single overall commander. (2:38)  From this

assertion we can see that the French obviously had problems

in this area as with other areas already discussed.  In fact

the command picture from the battlefield to Paris was very

shakey.

     From the strategic angle, as already mentioned, the

government tended to let the generals run the war without

providing much assistance in resources or guidance.  The

government was aware of Navarre's plan to initiate action at

Dien Bien Phu.  France no longer wanted a military solution

to the Indochina problem, and Navarre was not expected to

risk his forces unnecessarily.  The government dispatched

Admiral Cabanies from the Committee of National Defense to

personally inform Navarre of the government's  opposition to

the Dien Bien Phu operation.  Admiral Cabanies arrived on 20

November 1953 to inform Navarre of the committee's opinion.

As the generals talked the first 5,000 French soldiers were

parachuting into Dien Bien Phu. (7:42)  General Navarre

pressed forward with no clear mandate to do so from his

superiors.

     The situation did not improve for the French at the

operational level.  There were many officers who expressed

opposition to Operation Castor before it even started.  The

commander of all air transport for the Expeditionary Corps,

Colonel Nicot, stated orally and in writing that he could

not maintain a permanent flow of supplies to Dien Bien

Phu. (7:27)  Other officers expressed misgivings to General


Navarre, and he listened to all the arguments against the

operation including hard intelligence depicting a

significant enemy threat.  However, General Navarre listened

to no one but himself; Operation Castor proceeded as

planned. (7:l79)  His unwillingness to listen is remarkable

considering this was a command he had held less than six

months and a command he had not actively sought (his

previous assignment was with NATO).  This command was his

first tour in Indochina!

     During the course of the Dien Bien Phu operation,

General Navarre and General Cogny became embroiled in a

vicious personality conflict.  Navarre came to believe that

Cogny was out to cause his downfall.  Navarre's wife in

France even got into the act spreading dirt on Cogny.  The

whole thing exploded on 2 April 1954 when Cogny lashed out

at Navarre, "If you weren't a four-star general, I'd slap

you across the face."(7:2l5)  The impact of this feud upon

Dien Bien Phu operations is impossible to tell; however, it

certainly did not help the situation.

     With the government backing off and the generals

snapping and brooding, the command picture at the tactical

level was bound to be better.  Brigadier General Jean Gilles

jumped into Dien Bien Phu on day two of the operation, and

he became the commander on the ground.  General Gilles was

an experienced soldier in this type of operation.  He was

quick to state to General Cogny during Cogny's first visit

to the valley, "I'd be pretty happy when you have found a


successor for me here.  At Na San I spent six months of my

life like a rat.  Make use of me somewhere where I am going

to be in fresh air." (2:19)  Cogny and Navarre then agreed to

replace Gilles even though Gilles was best suited for the

warfare which was to follow.  Colonel de Castries was

selected to command the garrison at Dien Bien Phu.  Even de

Castries warned Navarre, "If it's a second Na San that you

want, pick somebody else.  I don't feel cut out for

that." (7:278)  Navarre convinced de Castries to accept

command under the conception of mobile attacks on the Viet

Minh ranging out of Dien Bien Phu.

     Colonel de Castries proved to be totally unsuited for

events as they unfolded at Dien Bien Phu.  On 14 March 1954,

the second day of the Viet Minh attack, de Castries went

into a shell.  He could not make decisions and basically

ceased to function as the garrison commander.  There were

rumors of de Castries' impending relief, but he was instead

promoted to Brigadier General.!(7.196)  Once de Castries

lapsed into a state of despair, Lieutenant Colonel Pierre

Langlais became the de facto commander of the garrison at

Dien Bien Phu.  Langlais was an Indochina veteran and a

member of the paratroop mafia.  He immediately set out

reorganizing and simplifying the chain of command at Dien

Bien Phu.  He installed many of his paratroop cronies to

command vital subsectors of the valley.  Later, in defending

this action, Langlais stated, "Any of the brass hats in

Hanoi or Saigon could have flown up and parachuted in if


they were unhappy with his pre-emption of de Castries, or if

they had a better idea themselves."(3:67)

     While the French struggled with Navarre in Saigon and

Cogny in Hanoi and a lieutenant colonel on the ground at

Dien Bien Phu, Giap moved his headquarters to Dien Bien Phu

so that he could  personally oversee the operation.  Ho

joined him there.  The Viet Minh did not experience problems

with unity of command at Dien Bien Phu.

     The principles of security and surprise compliment each

other just as do mass and economy of force.  Security is

defined as never permitting the enemy to acquire an

unexpected advantage, and surprise is defined as striking

the enemy at a time or place, or in a manner, for which he

is unprepared. (9:Appendix A)  The French were lacking in

both of these areas at Dien Bien Phu.  Only three days after

the start of Operation Castor French newpapers ran headlines

of the parachute assault, quoting General Cogny as saying,

"This is not a raid as at Long Son, but the beginning of an

offensive."(7:55)  The Viet Minh never publicized their

operations (especially while they were ongoing).

     Some of the biggest blunders made by the French at Dien

Bien Phu can be traced to surprise.  Strategically, there

was little involvement with this principle with the possible

exception of the French government being caught off guard by

their own general's actions.  Operationally, the French were

repeatedly surprised.  The capital error at Dien Bien Phu

was the underestimation of the enemy's capabilities.(1:318)


General Navarre refused to believe many things about his

enemy.  Navarre rejected the notion that the Viet Minh could

dominate his men with artillery deployed on the hills above

Dien Bien Phu.  He failed to anticipate that Giap's

howitzers would close the air strip at Dien Bien Phu making

resupply difficult and evacuation of the wounded and

withdrawal of troops impossible.  Navarre's map

reconnaissance did not reveal a valley floor with thick

underbrush and deep mud during the spring monsoons which

would negate armored sweeps. (5:194)

     There were other surprises in store for the French.

Not only were they surprised to be outnumbered and outgunned

by the enemy artillery, but they were also shocked by their

inability to destroy enemy artillery. (3:50)  General Navarre

appears to have signed up for a number of the prevailing

myths about the Viet Minh which were doctrine to some French

soldiers.  Common knowledge things such as, the Viet Minh

never attacked when they found themselves equally matched or

faced with serious difficulty, and they had no artillery and

if they did, then they did not know how to use it, were

widely accepted as fact in the French Army. (7:104)  Navarre,

as the commander of all French forces, should have been the

last one to take the enemy so lightly.  In spite of his good

intelligence, General Navarre was taken completely by

surprise when the Viet Minh fielded four divisions with

heavy supporting artillery around the valley soon after the

French landed.


     The Viet Minh were not surprised beyond the initial

assault except perhaps by the French remaining in the

valley.  This was a pleasant surprise for the Viet Minh

because they were hoping that the French would do just that.

     Tactically, the French could not gain much from

security or surprise as the Viet Minh could readily observe

French moves along the valley floor.  The rugged terrain

surrounding Dien Bien Phu offered sanctuary to the Viet Minh

from observation and fires by the French.

     The last principle of war is simplicity which is

defined as preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and clear,

concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.

(9:Appendix A)  In no case is it desirable to introduce

confusion and misunderstanding into military plans and

orders.  By this point it should be clear that the French

could not possibly have developed a clear, concise order for

operations at Dien Bien Phu at any level of command.

Instead, complex and long directives were issued emphasizing

the offensive nature of the operation.  In the face of

intelligence reports on 3 December 1953 showing four enemy

divisions closing on Dien Bien Phu, General Navarre issued

instructions in which he stated that the French would accept

battle and that Dien Bien Phu must be held at all costs.

(7:66)  This stunned his staff and his government.  Up until

this point General Navarre had indicated no preference for a

decisive battle at Dien Bien Phu.  Navarre appears to have

been anything but clear and concise on his intention from

the outset of Operation Castor.


     On the ground the name of the game for the French

became survival.  Breakout plans were developed, but there

was no significant attempt to implement them.  There was

some speculation about launching a relief column from nearby

Laos, but that did not save the defenders either.  French

hopes for a massive American air strike to lift the siege

were dashed when America declined unilateral action to save

the French.  Lieutenant Colonel Langlais designed tactics to

maintain the integrity of the defensive perimeter and no

more.  To his credit the French held out for 54 days in the

face of overwhelming Viet Minh superiority.

     In contrast, the Viet Minh issued clear, short orders

aimed at wiping out the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu.

General Giap had the advantage of issuing orders and

carrying them out himself as he was on the scene.  Confusion

or misunderstanding could be cleared up immediately.

     There are many reasons for the French defeat at Dien

Bien Phu.  Beginning with the lack of a clearly defined

objective for the operation, the French heaped mistake upon

miscalculation to create a disaster.  The French conceded so

much to the enemy in terms of the initiative, the high

ground, and concentration of forces; yet, they still

expected to smash the enemy!  A fighter does not handicap

himself by tying one arm behind his back or allowing his foe

free swings.  The French were too ready to sacrifice sound

principles in order to entice the Viet Minh into a general

engagement.  The French chain of command was infested with


various problems; however, nothing was done to correct this

throughout the operation.  Finally, the French were caught

by complete surprise in several areas, and they could not

adjust and recover from any of these surprises.  Even with

all the obstacles faced by the French at Dien Bien Phu,

might the French have prevailed?  Only those who believe

that a massive American air strike would have turned the

tide against the Viet Minh support a French victory

scenario.  The French may have avoided defeat by recognizing

the folly of undertaking Operation Castor and calling the

whole thing off before they launched it.  Once they did

commit forces to this operation, the French effort was

highlighted by operational and strategic blundering which

staunch bravery by the fighting men could not overcome.


                    
                            
                        BIBLIOGRAPHY

l.   Fall, Bernard B.  Street Without Joy.  3rd ed. Harrisburg:
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